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2 —— Sitapur murder case
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EAST INDIA (ARMY ADMINISTRATION).

CORRESPONDENCE

REGARDING THE

ABOLITION OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF

MILITARY SUPPLY.

LIB [redacted] OF BOM BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

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EAST INDIA (ARMY ADMINISTRATION).

CORRESPONDENCE

REGARDING THE

ABOLITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY SUPPLY.

No. 1.*

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General in Council, No. 66, Military, dated May 31, 1905.

I have considered in Council with very great care your despatch in the Military Department, No. 36, dated 23rd March, 1905, in which you favoured me with the views of your Government as to the present system of military administration in India, and forwarded the opinions of the Commander-in-Chief and the Member of Council in charge of the Military Department, commonly referred to as "the Military Member," and also a Minute from Your Excellency on the whole situation. I recognise to the full the importance of the issues which you have now brought to my notice, and have submitted them for the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

2. It is pointed out in the early portion of the despatch under reply that the question submitted to you assumes a larger aspect than that which was raised in my despatch, No. 153, of the 2nd December, 1904, and you are of opinion that "the "failure to provide the Indian Army in the past with a scheme of mobilisation "equal in scope to that on which we are now engaged, upon Lord Kitchener's "advice, in carrying into effect, is not due to the system under which we are working, "but to the absence of funds, and to that cause alone." I entirely accept Your Excellency's statement as to the facts which have come under your personal notice, and realise that expenditure, which it has been reasonable to incur in recent favourable years, could not have been undertaken 10 or 15 years ago. But I would point out that, since the year 1900, there have been a succession of surpluses ranging from £1,670,000 to £4,950,000. The certainty of such surpluses accruing has usually been manifest some months before the close of the financial year. It appears to me beyond question, from some of the instances which have been brought before me in the present correspondence, that considerable orders for deficient supplies could have been more readily placed, under a system free from the delays necessitated by the relations existing between the Department of the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Department, than has been possible up to now.

3. I agree with Your Excellency in regarding the case submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, and the reply of Sir Edmond Elles, as opening up wide questions, the consideration of which is rendered extremely difficult by the startling discrepancy between the contentions of Lord Kitchener and the opinion which Your Excellency in Council has pronounced upon them. Lord Kitchener calls attention to the "enormous delay and endless discussion" involved in the Indian system; he speaks of vexatious and, for the most part, unnecessary criticism, extending not merely to the "financial effect of the proposal, but to its desirability or necessity "from the purely military point of view." He regards the system as one of "dual "control and divided responsibility," and after citing a number of instances in support of his view, he states that "the Army is bad, despite its splendid material "in officers and men," and that no continuity of policy has been pursued except that which is inherent to the present system, namely, "that of making it easy to stand still, and extremely difficult to move forward."

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* Originally printed in Cd. 2572 of 1905 (page 57).

4. Your Excellency's despatch challenges these imputations *en bloc*, while the answer of Sir Edmond Elles on the charges of delay fully satisfies your Government. As regards the friction attributed to the present system, you desire to dissociate yourselves altogether from the charge that these two officers have been trained to unfortunate jealousy and antagonism, and you think that "there is no unnecessary "or inherent want of co-ordination between the different parts of the military "machine." You more especially refer to the treatment of the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum respecting preparations for war and the rapid realisation of the reorganisation scheme put forward by him as being an unanswerable refutation of the charges against the Military Department. You are "particularly surprised "to learn that the Military Member is really omnipotent in India in military affairs, "and you regard the proposal of Lord Kitchener as one to substitute for the control "of the Army by the Governor-General in Council, which we regard as a funda-"mental principle of our constitution, control by a single individual, that is to say, the Commander-in-Chief himself." You further point out the impossibility of any one individual, however able, undertaking the sole control of the Departments now divided between the Military Member and the Commander-in-Chief, and you regard the presence of a Military Member as indispensable, in order to secure technical criticism of military proposals made by the Commander-in-Chief.

5. Your Excellency's despatch, in which all your colleagues, with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief, concur, shows that there is a complete divergence between the views of yourself and your Council and those of the Commander-in-Chief as to all these questions. No fault is admitted in the system; no suggestions are considered necessary for recasting it. Indeed, it is not easy to see in what respect, in consonance with your despatch, it would be possible to suggest reform. On the other hand, in the Minute of Your Excellency, of the 6th February, enclosed for our information, it is stated that "any reasonable reform or readjustment in "the system we would willingly consider, but no such proposals are before us." I could have wished that we had heard at the same time what was in Your Excellency's mind in regard to possible reforms or readjustments, and in what direction you thought it possible that they might proceed. In regard to this, I have carefully considered the past history of the relations of the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Department, in order to ascertain whether the difficulties which have now arisen are of a novel character, or whether, having occurred before, any remedies have been proposed for them.

6. Your Excellency's Minute states, after reciting the numerous occasions on which the Army organisation has been made the subject of review and criticism, that "on all these occasions, without exception, the result has been a confirmation "of the existing system, which may be said, therefore, to be supported by a consensus "of authority almost unprecedented in the history of military administration." I cannot help feeling that this proposition is subject to some qualifications.

Sir Ashley Eden's Commission of 1879 stated in very strong terms the objections which existed to the present system, and the impossibility of working it satisfactorily.

Among other pregnant passages it states :—

"The position of the Executive Commander-in-Chief as a Member of Council "is, in the opinion of the majority, one without precedent in the organisation of "any European Government or army. It is contrary to one of the most essential "and salutary principles of sound administrations; and the common instinct and "experience of all administrations, whether representative or despotic, has every-"where rejected it.

"It has been found to weaken simultaneously the executive initiative of the "military, and the financial control of the civil authority, by constantly confounding "and confusing their respective spheres of independent activity. It renders "practically impossible that continuous personal contact, which in every well-"organised system of military administration has been found so beneficial, between "the supreme executive head of the whole army and the subordinate heads of its "various branches and corps. Finally, between the Governor-General, the Com-"mander-in-Chief and the Military Member, whom it places in fundamentally false "relations towards each other, there has been, under each successive administration "since the existence of this ill-advised arrangement, continual friction, or cause for "friction.

"One remedy which has occasionally been proposed for the inconveniences of "the existing arrangement has been the division of the whole Army into four such "army corps as we have agreed to recommend, and the abolition of the appointment "of Commander-in-Chief altogether, making the Military Member of the Council "practically the Commander-in-Chief and the head of the War Department,— "making him, in fact, the administrative and executive head of the Army. We "cannot bring ourselves to advocate such an arrangement."

In consequence, the Committee recommended a drastic change in the existing system by excluding the Commander-in-Chief from Council.

Lord Lytton, writing as Governor-General in 1880, with a greater experience of war on a large scale than any of the Governors-General who have followed him, fully supported the Commission in their desire for change, but stated very forcibly his reasons for thinking that change should take the shape of excluding the officer in charge of the Military Department from Council, and not the Commander-in-Chief. The following paragraphs supply the main points in Lord Lytton's argument:—

"Take away this seat in Council and intensify the Commander-in-Chief's "subordination to the Military Member, as the Commission proposes to do, and it "seems to me that the official position of the great executive head of the Army in "India must forthwith become not only intolerable but untenable. I cannot but "fear that no officer conscious of his own abilities, and possessing, with the independence of character and intellect which is desirable, the military rank and reputation "which are requisite to fill with adequate efficiency and influence the great office "of Commander-in-Chief in India, would then be found willing to accept it on such "terms, and this would be a serious misfortune for both the Government and the "Army of India. I cannot too emphatically record my conviction that the dual "military Government organised in this country 'on a system of want of trust' "should be abolished as speedily and completely as possible. To quote once more "the wise words of Lord Dalhousie, 'there cannot be two masters having the power "'to control public measures.'

"My conclusion is, then that the Commander-in-Chief should be himself the "Military Member, *and the only Military Member* of the Viceroy's Council. In him "alone, as in the War Minister of every country not governed by parliamentary "institutions, should be united and concentrated the executive command and the "administrative control of the Army. . . . .

"The recognised head of this great Army of India, cannot, with advantage to "it or to the State, be long or frequently absent from the seat of Government, and "were the Commander-in-Chief in India fully invested (as I for one would wish "to see him) with all the important functions and responsibilities appropriate to "his natural position in a non-Parliamentary Government, he would I feel sure be "the first to recognise that his proper place is by the side of the Viceroy, and that "it is not consistent with the efficient discharge of his highest duties to absent "himself from the Council table of the Governor-General in order to take personal "command of fractions of his own army which may happen to be employed at any "time on active service. . . . .

"I do not approve or support the proposal to exclude the Commander-in-Chief "from Council. But I am, nevertheless, deeply convinced of the expediency of "putting an end to the dual element in our present military administration."

No action was taken on either of these proposals.

Lord Dufferin, writing in 1888, expressed in the following very strong terms his preference for the maintenance of the Military Member in Council:—

"The history of the past is invoked by the department which is concerned with "the maintenance of the constitutional and traditional policy of the Government "of India, while the purely military view of the matter under discussion is powerfully represented by the Commander-in-Chief both through the medium of his "staff, and by his own presence and influence in the Council Chamber. Under such "a system I believe there is neither danger of rash innovations being carried by a "military chief who from absence from India, or other causes, may not be in "sympathy with Indian circumstances and affairs, nor the slightest risk that "the Army of India shall be passed in the race of military reforms and "inventions. . . . .

"It will be seen, therefore, that I hold the strongest opinion that the form "of the supreme military administration in India should not be changed, but that "opportunity should be taken to introduce improvements whenever this can be done "without impairing the constitutional structure.

"In conclusion, I desire to point out to my colleagues that these opinions are "founded upon no mere theoretical considerations, but are based upon experience, "for it has been my lot to overlook during my tenure of office considerable military "operations and to enter upon military questions of great magnitude and "importance."

But in the following year Lord Roberts, the then Commander-in-Chief, placed his views very unmistakeably before the Governor-General (Lord Lansdowne) in the following passages taken from his Minute:—

"Although it would be difficult to find more able or experienced officers than "those at present employed in administering the Army, inclusive of its finances "and subsidiary departments; and although the Military Secretariat and the Army "Headquarters offices have been brought close together at considerable expense, still, "official correspondence has increased enormously, and the relations between the two "great departments of the Indian War Office are becoming less cordial than might "be desired.

"Such a state of things is much to be regretted. Here are two sets of officers "of high capacity, animated by a common zeal, guided by a common sense of duty, "and each striving to do their best for the Sovereign they serve and the army to "which they belong. Yet each set appears to be pulling a different way, to be "following a different object, and to be actuated by a jealous rivalry rather than "by a friendly emulation. Such a result can only be brought about by a system "so radically faulty that it neutralizes individual effort and estranges official "relations."

Changes in procedure were in consequence authorised by Lord Lansdowne, which satisfied Lord Roberts, and secured a more effective working of the system during the remainder of his period of office.

Your Excellency, while referring to the above opinions and some others, has not cited the views of any of the Commanders-in-Chief later than Lord Roberts, and no formal expression of opinion seems to have been invited on this matter in the ten years which preceded the appointment of Lord Kitchener. But it has been brought to my notice that both Sir George White and Sir William Lockhart, during their respective periods of command, at different times expressed opinions very similar to those which have been cited from Lord Roberts' Minute of 1889. It is also noteworthy that in June, 1898, Sir Donald Stewart, in a minute recorded in this Office, written apparently under a sense of the difficulties which then prevailed, gave his opinion as follows:—

"I should like to go further and ask the Government of India to consider the "desirability of excluding the Commander-in-Chief from Council. The Govern"ment can at any time consult the Commander-in-Chief on military or other matters "when the necessity arises."

7. So far then from the existing system being supported by a consensus of authority almost unprecedented in the history of military administration, I would point out, for your Excellency's consideration, that, while successive Commanders-in-Chief have found it exceedingly difficult to work, the force of their contentions is fortified by the fact that the Ashley Eden Committee, Lord Lytton, and Sir Donald Stewart, all at different times proposed the removal of one of the contending parties from Council, and the evidence taken generally would appear to show that, although a *modus vivendi* has been secured by the tact and good feeling of the officers principally concerned, the system has not been one tending to smooth or effective working. To these authorities must be added that of the present Military Member, who, in the minute enclosed in Your Excellency's despatch, argues in favour of the abolition of the dual system by the removal from Your Excellency's Council of the Commander-in-Chief, and adds that "his dual functions have in the past given rise to friction "and will certainly do so again."

8. In reviewing the minutes which you have placed before me, I desire at once to express my conviction that there has been no deliberate opposition to or delay of the Commander-in-Chief's proposals by the Military Department. It is due to Sir Edmond Elles' own character, as well as to that of the officers serving under him, to make it perfectly clear that his discharge of duty has been dictated entirely by his conception of the responsibilities devolving upon him, and of the public interest. Moreover, his line of conduct has under existing regulations received the approval of Your Excellency's Government. The treatment of Lord Kitchener's reorganisation scheme by the Military Department is, as Your Excellency justly observes, a testimony to the spirit which animates the work of the higher officers of that Department. The question to be now considered is whether the conception which the Military Member has formed of his duty, no doubt following the precedent of some of his predecessors, is a correct one. Sir Edmond

Elles states that "the system is that of *divide et impera*," and he cites the late Sir George Chesney to the following effect: "If the relations between Army Head-"quarters and the Government, as represented by the Military Department, are to "be maintained harmoniously under the proposed arrangement, it can only be by "the authorities connected with the former recognising their position of relative "subordination, subordination compatible with deference to their opinions on the "part of the Military Department, but nevertheless that the Military Department "is the Government as far as they are concerned, and that its decisions must be "loyally accepted."

9. These views appear to have animated the Military Member in the whole of his conduct of the affairs of his department. In theory they merely assert what is patent to everyone connected with the Government of India, namely, that the Commander-in-Chief, like every person and every department in the Government of India, must be subordinate to the Governor-General in Council, and must take his orders through some channel, and that the Military Department is the channel for conveying such orders. They infer that any indisposition on the part of the Commander-in-Chief and Army Headquarters to accept them in such a manner is due to a lack of appreciation of the constitutional principles on which the Government is conducted.

10. In practice, however, the insistence on Sir George Chesney's formula leads to an anomalous condition of affairs. It is obviously impossible for the Governor-General, who is himself immediately responsible for the control of the Foreign Department, who regulates the disposal of the difficulties that arise in all other departments of Government, and who holds one of the most laborious posts, if not the most laborious post, under the British Crown, to be consulted daily and hourly on the numberless questions which arise in the administration of an army. As a matter of daily routine, it is obvious that only a small number of such questions can be submitted to him or to the Council at all. They have to be decided, therefore, by some responsible officer, who, in this case, is the Member in charge of the Military Department.

The position, therefore, is as follows:—The most distinguished soldier available is placed in command of the Army in India. He is necessarily subject, as in the case of every other country where the command of the Army is not in the hands of a despotic ruler, to financial and political checks. But, in the case of India, alone, as it is believed, among all military organisations, the Commander-in-Chief is subject to having his military proposals checked and criticised by another expert of less standing and reputation than himself, who, after reviewing them, has the privilege of submitting the result to the final court of appeal in India, namely, the Governor-General in Council, where he votes on an equality with the Commander-in-Chief, and, finally, conveys to his own colleague the orders of the Government. This situation is rendered the more anomalous by the fact that the Secretary to the Government of India, who is necessarily in close relations with the Member in charge of the Military Department, is also an officer in the Army, and is available for consultation by the Viceroy, without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, who has consequently two critics of inferior rank whose views on military questions may be preferred to his. Under such a system it can only be due to the tact and judgment which have been shown by all parties that complaints have not more frequently transpired; and, were it not for the important constitutional questions which are raised in the despatch under reply, and which have no doubt been present to the minds of Your Excellency's predecessors, it is doubtful whether the system in its present form would have been allowed to continue without modification up to the present time.

11. In paragraph 10 of the despatch, under reply, Your Excellency states that "in its constitutional aspect, we are as much in disagreement with the argument "of the Commander-in-Chief as we have been in its more critical features. We regard his scheme as a proposal, not so much to improve the efficiency of the Army either in peace or war, as to revolutionise the Government of India," and you speak of "a system of military autocracy such as is advocated by Lord Kitchener." In paragraphs 14, 15, and 16 of Your Excellency's Minute, you review the dangers which would be involved by having a Commander-in-Chief as sole military adviser to the Government. I think that, in putting forward this contention, Your Excellency has hardly done justice to the checks under which the Government of India is worked. Even if the proposal of Lord Kitchener were adopted in its entirety,

measures connected with the Army would still be subject financially to the criticism of an expert financier with a large department, the head of which has a seat in Council. In their political bearing they would come under the review of the five or six trained heads of departments sitting in Council, while above and beyond both is the Governor-General himself, wielding great power, with access to all documents or persons whom he may desire to examine. Supposing all these obstacles to have been surmounted, any change of importance, and many which are not of great importance, are, by the statutes which govern the administration of India, referred to the Secretary of State in Council at Whitehall. The organisation of the department under the Secretary of State involves the review of any military measure by a Military Department which has at present an Indian General at its head. Such measures are then submitted to one or more Committees of the Council of India, on which experienced military officers have, from its inception, always had a place, and are finally subject to the decision of the Secretary of State in Council. By the mere fact of the time occupied in the transmission and consideration of the documents, it is obvious that no step can be taken hastily or without due deliberation. Indeed, were the machinery about to be set up *de novo*, it is open to doubt whether the Indian Government might not urge that the checks imposed on the passage of a measure from the time it leaves the hands of its author to its final adoption after discussion in London, are too numerous for the rapid progress of business. Bearing in mind all these processes, which, though familiar to Your Excellency, do not appear to have been fully weighed in the despatch under reply, it is difficult to understand how the absence of a second military expert in Council "would produce "a military autocracy," or violate "a fundamental principle of our constitution."

12. His Majesty's Government, after most carefully weighing the arguments put forward on both sides, are forced to the conclusion that, while there may be strong reasons against the adoption as a whole of the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief, the time has come when it is necessary substantially to reform and re-adjust the system under which military business is conducted. Whatever the views of the framers of the Military Department may have been at its inception, it is clear that it can only have been intended to typify the paramount civilian control of the Governor-General in Council, and not to supply a military equipoise to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. Nevertheless, during the last 25 years, the progress seems to have been consistently in the latter direction. The Secretariat has at its head a Major-General and two Colonels, while the number of military officers employed in the Department has very largely increased. Until recent years it was the practice of the head of the department to sink his military status on all occasions, and to adopt the civil *rôle* which appertains to the powers which he wields. While the estimate of those responsible as to the character of their duties appears to have somewhat changed, the actual work passing between the two departments has largely increased. It is noteworthy that in the year 1903-04 the number of communications passing between the Military Department and the Commander-in-Chief's Department amounted on mobilisation questions alone to nearly 10,000, although the two departments, as Your Excellency points out, are situated in the same building at Calcutta and in adjacent buildings at Simla. In reference to this, Sir Edmond Elles suggests that the abolition of the Mobilisation Committee is to a great extent responsible for this increase of correspondence, but it is clear that any committee, the chairman of which is liable to be subsequently overruled at the instance of one of the members, from whose department may emanate orders entirely opposed to the decision of the Committee, must be worked with some difficulty. The situation of both the Military Member and the Commander-in-Chief on such a Committee must necessarily be a delicate one.

13. The same observation applies to the discussions which have taken place between the two departments on matters in which military and financial considerations are blended. So long as the member in charge of the Military Department considers himself bound by his office to supply the Government of India with a technical and expert opinion on all that is proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, he would be wanting in his duty if he shrank from bringing forward such arguments as he thinks applicable to each case. It is thus possible for each officer to discharge his duty correctly, and yet for the public service to suffer, and I am satisfied that in many instances the discussions proceeding between these two departments have passed the limits of safety in matters in which action might be urgently required.

14. To take, as an instance, the question of the small arms ammunition reserve, on which both Lord Kitchener and Sir Edmond Elles have written at some

length. The printed proceedings show that Lord Kitchener asked for a reserve of 1,000 rounds per arm of small arms ammunition on the 17th February, 1904. The scheme apparently was not noted on in the Military Department till the 19th May, 1904, a loss of three months. Discussion in the department proceeded till the 21st July, 1904, when a despatch was sent to the Secretary of State asking what was the amount of the reserve of small arms ammunition maintained at home. The Secretary of State telegraphed a reply on the 16th August, but the Military Department decided to await details by post, and the case was returned to the Adjutant-General in the Commander-in-Chief's Department, apparently for the first time, on the 21st September, after more than seven months' delay. In October the Commander-in-Chief, while adhering to his already-recorded opinion, accepted the Military Department's proposal for the time being, but reserved the right to re-open the question in the future. Accordingly, after nine months' consideration, the reserve of 1,000 rounds asked for was cut down to 750 rounds, involving a total addition of 50,000,000 rounds to be manufactured in three years. Further discussions took place as to whether ammunition immediately available for purchase in England out of savings on the Military Budget should be accepted as part of this supply, which was again contested by the Military Department, and a final decision was only given on the 22nd December. The whole question thus occupied ten months, and it is noteworthy that during that period telegrams were passing between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy as to a possible mobilisation and the provision of stores, of which this reserve was not the least urgent.

15. In considering how the difficulties which have arisen can be met, I desire to lay down that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, it is undesirable that in the future there should be two officers appointed to the Viceroy's Council for the purpose of giving expert opinions on military questions, or that there should be two departments under the Government of India equipped for the purpose of dealing with purely military problems. On the other hand, I agree with Your Excellency in your opinion that it would be impossible for any one man, however able and hard working, to undertake the whole responsibility of the business at present conducted by the Military Department and the Commander-in-Chief. It would not be in accordance with modern ideas of military organisation to hamper the Commander-in-Chief with the details of contracts, manufacture, the provision of stores, and the conduct of military works, when the responsibilities of his own peculiar province tend to increase every year. It is necessary that the Commander-in-Chief's mind should be free for the control of the personnel and training of the army, for strategical plans, and for the direction of military intelligence and of schemes for mobilisation. But while it is highly desirable to make a division of labour which should not impose on the Commander-in-Chief the direction of details which are not wholly of a military character, it is essential that, while sparing him this burden, we should not impose on him a greater one by the duplication of discussion relating to military problems of every description. Starting from this standpoint, the following changes of organisation appear to His Majesty's Government to be necessary.

16. They propose to draw a clear distinction between the purely military services which should be controlled by the Commander-in-Chief, and the services of supply and manufacture, which will be under the control of a separate officer whose relations with the Commander-in-Chief will differ from those of the member in charge of the Military Department as at present organised.

17. The Commander-in-Chief will be directly responsible to the Governor-General in Council for command, staff, and regimental appointments, promotion, discipline, training, organisation, distribution of the army, intelligence, mobilisation, schemes of offence and defence, peace manœuvres, war preparation (excluding supply of matériel), and the conduct of war. As regards the Supply and Transport Department, in which matters of personnel and matériel are alike concerned, the arrangement which has recently been made will be adhered to. Such matériel, ammunition, and stores as are required for mobilisation will be entrusted to a personnel directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief.

18. The functions of the Military Department, in charge of another member of your Council, will be limited to responsibility to Government for the control of army contracts, the purchase of stores, ordnance, and remounts, the management

of Military Works, the Clothing and Manufacturing Departments, Indian Medical Service, and Indian Marine. The recent development of the Manufacturing Departments, which will, as Your Excellency informs us, be shortly employing 15,000 to 20,000 skilled artisans, will make a special demand upon the time and administrative ability of the member in charge.

With regard to Military Finance, it has been suggested that it would be very advisable to transfer the Departments of the Military Accountant-General and of the Controllers to the Finance Department of Your Excellency's Government. This, it is urged, while strengthening the financial control of your Government over all military proposals, would diminish the probability of friction between the Commander-in-Chief's Department and the Department of Military Supply, and would give to the latter some useful relief. I request that Your Excellency will consider this proposal in Council, and will favour me with your opinion upon it.

19. When effect is given to these provisions, the work of the present Military Department will be distributed between two Departments, one of which, dealing with the subjects specified in paragraph 17, will be known as "The Army Department," and will be in charge of the Commander-in-Chief as Member of Council; while the other, to be called "The Department of Military Supply," will deal with the subjects mentioned in paragraph 18, and will be in charge of another Member of Council; and each of these departments will have its own Secretariat.

20. Apart from the apportionment of duties as indicated above, the procedure to be followed in conducting business between the Army Department and the Military Supply Department is very important, since it appears that the friction which has occurred of late years is due to the methods of the Military Department, as well as to the principles on which it has worked. The Member in charge of the Military Supply Department should realise that his duties are more of a civil than of a military nature, and that his business is to assist the Commander-in-Chief in his endeavours to render the army in all respects fit for war, within the limits of financial considerations.

21. The present system under which junior officers in the Military Department record their criticisms on the purely military proposals of the Commander-in-Chief will necessarily terminate. Neither the Member nor his Department will have the power to veto any proposal put forward by the Commander-in-Chief. The power of veto (apart from any statutory powers vested in the Governor-General) must rest exclusively with the Governor-General in Council after due consideration. As a means of expediting business, it appears particularly desirable that there should be frequent personal conference between the heads of the Military Supply and Army Departments.

22. In this connection I think that the sittings of the Mobilisation Committee may advantageously be revived. The difficulties which prevented Lord Kitchener from fully availing himself of the Committee in the past will have been done away with. The Commander-in-Chief, sitting as President of such a Committee, which would include the Member in charge of the Department of Military Supply, and other officers, will be able rapidly and effectively to dispose of many questions which are now the subject of prolonged correspondence.

23. The Member of Council in charge of the Military Supply Department will specially advise the Governor-General in Council on questions of general policy as distinct from purely military questions, and it will be desirable in the event of the Commander-in-Chief being an officer of the British service, that the Member should be an officer of considerable Indian experience and of administrative capacity, and intimately acquainted with the characteristics of the Native Army. His functions will be essentially those of a civilian administrator with military knowledge and experience. The changes which it is proposed to introduce into his department will make it necessary to dispense with some of the officials in the department whose numbers have considerably increased in the last twenty-five years, and to employ officers of a rank not so high as at present, but equal to that of their predecessors in earlier years, while the Secretary should not, in future, be of higher rank than that of Colonel. Some reduction of staff will also be possible which will go towards meeting the additional cost of the changes which are recommended at Army Headquarters, and which I now bring to Your Excellency's attention.

24. The duties of the Commander-in-Chief have been constantly increasing of recent years. It has become necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to control questions of military intelligence and organisation, and to spend even a larger time than heretofore upon the personnel of the army. The greater amount of scientific attainment now required by officers necessitates a much more careful weighing of promotions, many of which have hitherto been given by seniority. Inspections by the Commander-in-Chief mean a great deal more than they did thirty or forty years ago. Arrangements for mobilisation, which have been shown to involve the control of the personnel connected with the custody of ammunition and stores, as well as of the Supply and Transport Department, will form a further addition to his duties. Nor can it be forgotten that the reorganisation scheme of the Commander-in-Chief and the measures which will be rendered necessary on the completion of the strategic railways, for which authority will shortly be asked, will form a specially heavy burden on the Commander-in-Chief for the next five years. I am of opinion, therefore, that it is essential that, under the arrangement proposed, an additional officer of superior rank should be appointed as Chief of the Staff to the Commander-in-Chief.

25. This addition will make it possible in future to lay down that, as vacancies occur, when the Commander-in-Chief is an officer of the British Army, two out of the three chief officers under him—the Chief of the Staff, the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General—shall be selected from the Indian Army, while, when the Commander-in-Chief is an Indian Army officer, two out of the three staff officers may be drawn from the British Army. While it is desirable that the Commander-in-Chief should be the sole expert adviser of the Government on purely military questions, it appears to be of great importance that adequate experience and advice should be ready to his hand at the inception of all his proposals.

26. The desire to obtain increased efficiency and proper training for a voluntary army must involve an increase of strain upon officers and men, whether in Great Britain or India, and it often happens that the best military results cannot be obtained without a curtailment of holidays and recreation, or without calling for a certain amount of self-sacrifice on the part of all ranks. It is highly desirable in an organisation like the Indian Army, that the measures, which may be necessary for this purpose, should not be undertaken, or even indicated, without careful expert consideration at headquarters, and it is clear that the necessary precautions in carrying out such measures should not depend on the foresight of one officer in the military hierarchy alone.

27. Assuming this to be recognised, it is most important that the Commander-in-Chief should not feel that all his measures are put forward tentatively to be checked by minute criticism in another department, after he has arrived at his opinion. He should be in a position to submit his schemes direct to the Governor-General in Council, which is not at present the case. It is, therefore, essential that there should be a Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department to prepare cases and documents for direct submission to the Governor-General in Council, and to undertake correspondence with other Government Departments. Alike when the Commander-in-Chief is present, and in the event of his absence from Council, this officer will attend its meetings to submit papers and to give such information and explanations as may be asked for. He will draw the same salary as may hereafter be assigned to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Supply Department.

28. I have now laid down the measures which it appears to me, after consideration in Council, desirable to adopt in view of the decision of His Majesty's Government that the present conflict of authorities shall be put an end to, and that greater freedom of working shall be given to the Commander-in-Chief. I request that Your Excellency will consider forthwith what procedure will be necessary to give effect to this decision, and that you will submit for my approval the arrangements and the rules of business which it will entail. I have already requested Your Excellency's Government to advise how the question of the Finance Department should be dealt with, while the Commander-in-Chief will no doubt furnish for approval the general distribution among his staff officers of the different duties hereby assigned to him.

29. It is highly desirable, in the interests of all concerned, that the changes which His Majesty's Government have decided upon should not be delayed, and

that the officials, who may be appointed to undertake the discharge of the duties laid down above, should enter upon office as soon as may be convenient, but not later than the 1st October next.

30. I have felt it necessary to review at considerable length the various points which have arisen in the present controversy, in order that Your Excellency's Government may be assured that the changes now proposed have not been adopted without the fullest possible consideration of all the interests involved. The smooth and effective working of any department, civil or military, can only be secured by the goodwill of individuals, but the organisation which His Majesty's Government have decided to adopt may, I hope, be counted upon to remove the obvious causes of friction which have militated, in some instances, against good working in the past. The undoubted supremacy of the Governor-General in Council will be maintained. The Commander-in-Chief will wield powers and possess machinery adequate for the furtherance of his military schemes, but not such as to free him from proper financial and political criticism. The Military Supply Department will form a valuable link between the civil and military elements in the Government of India, and the officers employed in it and in the Army Department respectively will mutually assist each other in removing the obstacles which the present Commander-in-Chief, in common with some of his predecessors, finds to be existing to the impediment of business. I cannot doubt that all departments of the Indian Government, and all the individuals concerned, will co-operate with Your Excellency to bring the new system into successful working at the earliest possible moment.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

No. 2.*

Despatch from the Secretary for State for India to the Governor-General in Council, No. 18 *Military, dated* 9*th February,* 1906.

I have considered in Council Your Excellency's communication of 23rd January, and the new Draft Rules of Business proposed by the Government of India, in conformity with the request made by my predecessor in his despatch of 31st May, 1905, and repeated in his telegram of 21st November.

2. The policy set out in that despatch was designed to put an end to an alleged conflict between the Military Department of the Government of India and the Commander-in-Chief as head of the Army; to do away with a troublesome and superfluous duplication of work and to concede to the Commander-in-Chief "greater freedom of working." With these objects in view the Military Department was to be transformed into a branch of administration confined to contracts, ordnance, military stores, works, and the like. The Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand, was to be placed in charge of a newly designated Army Department, which would be invested with all the duties and powers of which the old Military Department had been stripped, save those comprehended under the name of Military Supply.

3. Changes such as these, it is manifest, could easily be made to raise the largest questions of military organisation in India, such, for example, as were handled in the Commission of 1879, and on some other occasions. The scheme itself was inevitably open to many criticisms, both of principle and detail, and to these it was abundantly subjected from various quarters. Is not the combination, it was asked, of the active duties of executive command with the duties of general military administration, a burden too heavy for any one man, however capable and energetic, to support? Can the accidents of personality be overlooked, and the difference between a Commander-in-Chief with special aptitude and predilection for training,

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* Originally printed in Cd. 2842 of 1906 (page 6).

discipline, manoeuvres, mobilisation, and all the conduct of actual war; and a Commander-in-Chief of another type who excels, and might perhaps have been expressly appointed because excelling, in the sphere of office administration and preparation? How is one system to fit each of these two types? What, again, is to happen in this important sphere of office administration and organisation, if the Member in Charge of the Army Department, in his other capacity of Commander-in-Chief, is called away to duties in the field? Ought not the Member in Charge of Military Supply to be a civilian rather than a soldier? On the other hand, is it indispensable that purely military proposals by the Commander-in-Chief should always be formally submitted to criticism from other military experts, provided always that the Governor-General in Council exercises actual and decisive control where any political or financial question, great or small, directly or indirectly arises? And might not that control be more impaired by a possible concert between two different military authorities under the old system—and I understand that such cases have not been unknown—than by a single military authority with unshared military responsibility, such as is contemplated under the new?

4. These are some of the points that have been brought into view by the despatch of 31st May, 1905, and in the proceedings that followed it. Your Excellency is familiar with them all, and it would be waste of time, under our present circumstances, for me to ask you to travel over ground so well trodden. Into the great fundamental questions of military systems His Majesty's Government do not consider that the occasion of this despatch calls upon them to enter. They have to deal with an actual emergency, and to terminate a deadlock that, apart from a mischievous rise of temperature in discussion to a point considerably above normal, cannot become other than detrimental to effective administration of the Army itself.

When Your Excellency assumed the responsibilities of your great office last November, and I became Secretary of State a few weeks later, it was no *tabula rasa* that we found. A proposed scheme had been agreed upon in principle, with whatever reluctance and qualification, between the Secretary of State in Council and the Governor-General in Council, with the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief, last July. This compromise among conflicting opinions as to the best way of meeting an admitted desirableness of some improvement and readjustment in the position of the Military Department, His Majesty's Government do not think it wise to re-open, nor by a stroke of the pen to dismiss, at the risk of an indefinite prolongation of fruitless and injurious controversy. On a survey of the practical circumstances of the case, they are convinced that it would be altogether inexpedient to break off Your Excellency's labours in working out the plan of last summer, in accordance with the request addressed by my predecessor to the Governor- General of that day. Accordingly, the task that Your Excellency had undertaken proceeded. It is impossible not to recognise the care, fidelity, and diligence, with which those labours on a vexed and thorny question have been performed, and His Majesty's Government owe Your Excellency their thanks for the full and candid narrative in which you have taken pains to record what has passed.

5. The draft of the rules, in Your Excellency's language, "distributes the "functions of the present Military Department between the [proposed new] Army "Department and the Department of Military Supply"; and it "amalgamates "the new Army Department with the Army Headquarters under the control of "the Commander-in-Chief as Member of Council." You further explain in detail how effect is to be given to these objects, and what provision is to be made for the constitutional control of the Army. The cardinal object of maintaining the constitutional responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General in Council is to be secured by arranging "that the Secretary in the Army Department "shall have full knowledge of the business of the Department at every stage, from "initiation to completion," so as to "be in a position to keep the Governor-General "fully informed upon every detail of military administration over which the "Government of India exercises ultimate control." Your Excellency adds, however, the extremely important limitation "that although under my proposals the position "of Secretary in the Army Department will differ somewhat from that of Secretaries "in other departments, I regard this as unavoidable, and, in view of many safe-"guards provided for him, I consider his position as unassailable, and in no way "inferior to theirs."

The Financial Department accept as sufficient for their requirements the Draft Rules affecting them, and the other arrangements for securing complete financial control of military expenditure. The Member in charge of the Department of

Military Supply is to be in exactly the same position as any other Member of the Governor-General's Council.

6. On the consideration of these changes, Your Excellency's Council found itself divided. Four Members of the Council dissented from the proposed alterations, and Your Excellency summarises with marked clearness and good faith the line of their objections. The four dissentient Members, as you state their view, "object to the intended amalgamation of the Army Headquarters Staff with the "Government of India's Secretariat. They hold strongly that, if the control of "Government over the Army and its head is to be a reality, it is essential to keep "the functions of the Commander-in-Chief as Executive Head of the Army entirely "distinct from his functions as Member of Council in charge of the Army Depart-"ment, and entitled in that capacity to pass orders in the name and with the "authority of the Government of India." They insist "that the agencies through "which these two distinct classes of function are respectively exercised should be "kept separate. They object also to the position assigned to the Secretary in the "Army Department, which differs from that of all the other Secretaries to Govern-"ment, inasmuch as, instead of the whole business of the Departments passing "through his hands from its inception and in ordinary course, much of it will "reach him only after orders have been approved for signature, unless by the "exercise of an invidious discretion he specially calls for papers. They attach "special importance to a strong position for the Army Secretary, since, in the "absence of the constitutional check provided in civil matters by the existence of "local governments with free access to Viceroy, his independence is the main security "for effective control."

Such is Your Excellency's report of the attitude of those Members of Council* who were unable to assent to the proposed plan.

On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief, General Scott, and Mr. Baker regard these suggestions of their colleagues as unpractical, as re-introducing that duplication of work of which complaint was made, and as likely to set up a system of administration at once inefficient and expensive. With those views Your Excellency agrees.

7. The proposed changes I have now examined with close attention in Council. The position of the Secretary of the Army Department is, as Your Excellency has always perceived, the pivot on which the discussion turns. Whether any rule that the wit of man could devise on paper would effectively secure the absolute independence of this representative of the Government of India in the Army Department, and guarantee with certainty that the Governor-General could make sure of competent information and counsel enabling him to test proposals coming to him from the Army Department, may be doubtful. But I am advised here unanimously, and I consider, that if the supremacy of the civil government is to be real and effectual, and if the Governor-General in Council is to be in a position to fulfil the duty cast upon him by the Statute of 1833, of superintending, directing, and controlling military affairs in India, then it is necessary that the Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department should have status, powers, duties, and responsibilities precisely similar to those of the Secretaries to the Government of India in the other Departments.

The rules as drafted and forwarded to me by Your Excellency would appear to effect a practical amalgamation between the new Army Department and the Headquarters Staff. The Commander-in-Chief becomes necessarily the head of both, and Rule 3 (*a*) provides that "papers and cases," may be submitted to him direct by various members of the Headquarters Staff. It might thus happen, I conceive, that a very important matter might be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief (as Member in Charge of the Army Department) by the Chief of the Staff, and might be placed before the Governor-General in Council, although the Secretary of the Army Department would practically have had no opportunity of saying anything on the merits of the case. It would, as I understand, be quite impossible in any other Department—in the Financial Department, for instance,—that a matter should be thus dealt with by the Member in Charge, without passing through the hands of the Secretary.

8. It appears to me that the members of the Army Headquarters Staff, while continuing to perform as heretofore their duties as members of that staff in all

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* Sir A. Arundel.
Sir D. Ibbetson.
Mr. Richards.
Mr. Hewett.

matters in the control of the Commander-in-Chief as such, should, on the other hand, be Departmental Officers of the Army Department, though without any of the powers of a Secretary. In their two separate and distinct capacities the members of the Headquarters Staff—that is to say, the Chief of the General Staff, should such an officer be created, the Quartermaster-General, the Adjutant-General, the Director of Ordnance, the Principal Medical Officer, and the Military Secretary,—will thus perform two separate and distinct functions; one, the function appertaining to their respective duties as Members of the Headquarters Staff pure and simple; the other, the function appertaining to their duties as officers of the Army Department. From this point of view, it would be incorrect in fact, as it seems undesirable in principle, to speak of the amalgamation of the Army Headquarters Staff with the Government of India Secretariat. For some purposes, and for those only, the members of the Headquarters Staff will be brought within the Army Department.

It follows from this that no member of the Headquarters Staff, when engaged on the work of the Army Department, should have any power to submit direct to the Member in Charge of the Army Department (that is to say, to the Commander-in-Chief) any case in that department, or to issue in regard to such work in it any order on behalf of the Government of India.

9. Now, in so far as the proposed Rules do not keep the Army Department distinct from the Headquarters Staff, and in so far as they put the Secretary of that department on a lower pedestal than other secretaries, they would depart from the intention of the scheme set forth in my predecessor's despatch of 31st May, 1905, and accepted, though reluctantly, and subject to modifications, as I have already said, by Your Excellency's predecessor on 6th July, 1905. To that extent I regret that I am unable to approve them.

Your Excellency's suggested Draft Rule 3 (*a*) should therefore, in my opinion, be omitted, and the reference to it in Draft Rule 3 should be struck out. These suggested alterations will necessitate the striking out of paragraph (IV.) of Draft Rule 6 (*a*) as unnecessary. I also suggest that after the words "Advisory Council" in Draft Rule 6 (*a*) the words "and of the Mobilisation Committee should be added, and paragraph (II.) of that rule should be omitted. In Draft Rule 11 (2) (*b*) after the words "Secretary of State" the words "in Council" should be added.

It further appears to me that the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Supply Department should be a member of the Mobilisation Committee; that the Member in charge of the Military Supply Department should be a Member of the Defence Committee; and that the Governor-General should have power to appoint for the time being to the Mobilisation Committee, the Defence Committee, and the Advisory Council, or to any or either of them, such person as he may consider advisable. I assume that any Member of the Mobilisation Committee may note upon any case before that Committee, and such note, when made, will form part of the case for submission to the Governor-General in Council.

10. The object of these amendments is to make sure that all matters, before they reach the Commander-in-Chief, as Member in charge of the Army Department, shall have passed through the hands of the Secretary.

I venture to hope that after considering the case as I have now put it, Your Excellency will regard this as a vital element in any scheme which is to be at once workable and constitutional.

In your other amendments I have only to express my concurrence.

11. With entire freedom from personal prepossession, anxious to avoid exaggerations, and strongly desiring to find myself in substantial accord with the Government of India, I have done my best to decide in Council the questions arising under the Draft Rules wholly upon their merits. I trust that the opinions expressed in this despatch will tend to compose a controversy too long outstanding; and will safeguard the fundamental principle that the Government of India, in all its branches, aspects, and divisions, subject to the statutory powers of the Secretary of State, has been solemnly and deliberately confided by Parliament to the Governor-General in Council.

12. Lord Lansdowne, in his speech in the House of Lords on the 1st August, 1905, said of the plan devised by my predecessor for reorganising military administration in India: "There is no finality in these things, and a moment may come "when it will be necessary to reconsider some of the details." This remains true. Meanwhile, as everybody will agree, far less depends upon the letter of the

written rule, important as the written rules undoubtedly must be, than upon a spirit of harmonious co-operation in working them. That spirit I confidently anticipate Your Excellency will have the high good fortune to secure.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN MORLEY.

No. 3.

Letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Secretary of State for India, No. 33, *dated* 19*th March,* 1907.

Your predecessor, in his despatch No. 66 (Military), dated 31st May, 1905, informed us that His Majesty's Government had decided that the business of army administration in India should, in future, be controlled by two Departments, viz., the Army Department and the Department of Military Supply. To the Army Department was entrusted the conduct of all military business except such as was specifically allotted to the Department of Military Supply. To the latter was assigned the important but auxiliary role of controlling Army contracts, purchasing stores, ordnance and remounts, managing Military Works, the clothing and manufacturing departments, and administering the Indian Medical Service and Indian Marine. Each of these Departments was to be equipped with its own Secretariat Staff and establishments.

It was also suggested that the officers of the Military Accountant-General, and of the Controllers of Military Accounts, should form part of the Finance Department, so as to strengthen the financial control of the Government of India over all proposals entailing military expenditure. This proposal was considered by us in Council, and we recommended that Army Finance should be administered by the Finance Department,—a special Military Branch of the latter being created for this purpose.

2. Revised Rules of Business, giving effect to these arrangements, were drafted by us and submitted for your approval on the 23rd January, 1906, and after being amended in certain particulars were brought into operation on the 19th March, in accordance with the sanction conveyed in your despatch No. 18 (Military), dated 9th February, 1906.

3. A year having elapsed since the inauguration of the changes referred to, we beg to submit the following observations upon the working of the new system.

4. The abolition of a long-established administrative agency like the late Military Department, and its replacement by the newly created Departments above mentioned, necessarily entailed some temporary inconvenience. The Army and Military Supply Departments, at their inception, had to overcome the difficulties which present themselves to all newly organized offices; the detailed distribution of work between the various Divisions of the Army Department had to be arranged for; the co-ordination of the work of the Army Department and Department of Military Supply *inter se*, and with other Departments of Government, had to be adjusted; and lastly the heavy arrears of work left over by the late Military Department had to be disposed of. This work imposed a considerable strain upon the two Departments and their newly established Secretariats, which, however, gradually lessened as the new system of administration got into working order and its principles and practice became well understood.

5. The endeavours of the Commander-in-Chief to increase the efficiency of the Army have, in respect to its matériel and stores, been cordially supported by the Department of Military Supply, which has worked with the Army Department in a spirit of loyal co-operation, and made considerable progress in the development of its manufacturing resources.

6. Owing to the dual functions imposed upon the Heads of Divisions of Army Headquarters, viz., the Chief of the Staff, the Quartermaster-General, the Adjutant-General, the Principal Medical Officer, and the Military Secretary, under paragraph 8 of your despatch, it was found necessary to issue simple rules of procedure, based upon the Secretariat Instructions, so that the distinction therein prescribed might be fully understood and complied with. Further, in order that these

Divisions might be familiarised as soon as possible with the new methods of business, a quota of experienced Secretariat clerks was allotted to each, so as to complete their personnel with a nucleus of trained men.

A satisfactory feature of the new system is that the Heads of Divisions of Army Headquarters, with whom rests the initiation of new proposals, being now personally accountable for the latter in every respect, evince a growing sense of their financial responsibility, which is being more fully developed by associating them in the duty of watching expenditure in those Grant heads of the Military Budget with which they are specially concerned.

7. Our opinions with regard to Army administration in its relation to Military Finance have been so fully stated in our despatch No. 10-M.F., dated 7th February, 1907, that it is unnecessary to refer to them here. We are, however, glad to report that the various measures which have been undertaken to ensure the smooth working of the new system have been completely successful, and that the business of Army administration, in all Departments, is now conducted with a singleness of purpose and a freedom from delay which is greatly to the advantage of the Public Service.

8. Under the present constitution of Army administration, all important measures are discussed either in the Advisory Council, or in the Mobilization or Defence Committee, and all proposals emanating from Army Headquarters requiring Government sanction—except those of a routine or trifling nature—have first to receive the Commander-in-Chief's executive approval, and have then to obtain the administrative concurrence of the Army Member, through the Army Secretary. The Secretary is consequently in complete touch with the work of the Department and acquainted with the progress of all its cases, and the Viceroy is kept fully informed of all measures undertaken in the administration of the Army by the Secretary of the Department concerned, who is able to bring any important matter to His Excellency's immediate notice at any stage from initiation to completion.

9. We recognize that finality in military administration is difficult of attainment and that it may be necessary to make some modifications in the details of the system now in force, in order to simplify its organisation and reduce its cost; but we have much satisfaction in being able to report that the important changes ordered in your despatch, No. 18 (Military), dated 9th February, 1906, have been productive of excellent results, and that, thanks to the harmonious co-operation of all concerned, they have fulfilled the intentions of His Majesty's Government, and justified the anticipations expressed in the concluding paragraphs of your despatch.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) MINTO.
,, KITCHENER.
,, H. ERLE RICHARDS.
,, E. N. BAKER.
,, C. H. SCOTT.
,, H. ADAMSON.
,, J. F. FINLAY.
,, J. O. MILLER.

No. 4.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General in Council, No. 105, Military, dated 28th June, 1907.

I have received and considered in Council your despatch in the Army Department, No. 33, dated 19th March, 1907, in which Your Excellency's Government report on the working of the new system of Army Administration in India.

2. I have read with pleasure the excellent results so far achieved by the harmonious co-operation of all concerned in fulfilling the intentions and in justifying the anticipations of His Majesty's Government. Friction appears to have sensibly decreased, and for this, praise is due to all who have taken part in the development of the new system.

3. I agree with Your Excellency, however, in recognising that it may be found necessary to make modifications of the system with the view of simplifying its organisation and reducing its cost.

4. There appears to me to remain under the new system so little work to be controlled by the Honourable Member in charge of the Military Supply Department, that the expediency of maintaining this appointment, or the Secretariat attached to it, or perhaps both, becomes a matter for consideration.

5. I should be glad therefore to receive full information on various points bearing on this question, such as (1) the financial saving that might be effected by the abolition of the Department of Military Supply; in this connection it should be shown whether the pay of the Secretariat, as well as that of the Honourable Member, would be saved entirely, or whether this Secretariat would have to be transferred, in whole or in part, to the Army Department; (2), whether the work now entrusted to the Supply Department would, in the event of the appointment being abolished, be transferred to the Army Department or apportioned to members of the Army Staff, or otherwise disposed of; (3) whether the experience of the working of the Army Department, so far as it goes, tends to show that it has been able to grapple adequately with the work with which it has had to deal; (4) whether there is any congestion in the office of the Secretary of the Army Department or of that in the Chief of the Staff, and, if so, how this compares with the condition of affairs that existed in the offices of the Commander-in-Chief before the abolition of the Military Department of the Government of India.

6. The question of the necessity of maintaining the Department of Military Supply is one which I am prepared to consider on the receipt of the views of Your Excellency's Government as to the expediency of its maintenance or its abolition on political, administrative, and economical grounds; and in order that I may be enabled to arrive at a decision I request that I may receive a full exposition of your views on all the points at issue as well as the detailed information on the several matters noted above.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN MORLEY.

No. 5.

Letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Secretary of State for India, No. 96, dated 26th September, 1907.

We have received and considered in Council your despatch, Military, No. 105, dated 28th June, 1907, in which you propose, for our consideration, the abolition of the Military Supply Department, its work being taken over by the Army Department, and the consequent reduction of the representation of the Army in the Council of the Governor-General of India.

2. After giving this question our fullest consideration we are agreed in respectfully but strongly deprecating the re-opening of the question of Military Administration in India at the present time, and only some 18 months after the introduction of the new system, when if the proposed change should be accepted, we cannot but apprehend a recrudescence of heated and acrimonious public discussion which in the interests of the Army and the Government of India generally it is most desirable to avoid.

3. To the specific questions asked by you we are able to reply as follows :—

(i) If it should be decided to abolish the Department of Military Supply, the pay of the Honourable Member, and of the Secretary, would be saved. These together amount to Rupees 1,10,000 per annum. The cost of the remaining officers of the Secretariat and of the clerks and menial establishments, with their allowances and contingent expenses, amounts to Rs. 1,80,650 per annum. Exactly what proportion of these could be dispensed with we should hesitate to say without much more detailed consideration than seems justified at this stage. We feel, however, some confidence in affirming that the reduction would in no case amount to less than one-fourth of the whole, and we anticipate that it might not improbably be as much as one-half. In other words, the total saving involved in the measure will not in any case fall short of one and-a-half lakhs a year, while it will more probably approximate to two lakhs.

(ii) The work now entrusted to the Supply Department would be transferred partly to the Army Department, and would be dealt with in part by the Army Headquarters Staff.

(iii) So far as our experience goes of the working of the Army Department, it tends to show it has been fully able to grapple with all the work with which it has had to deal.

(iv) There is no congestion in either the office of the Secretary of the Army Department, or that of the Chief of the Staff. This compares most favourably with the condition of affairs that existed in the offices of the Commander-in-Chief, and in the Secretariat of the late Military Department of the Government of India before the abolition of the latter. All arrears have been disposed of, while the current work both in the Army Department Secretariat and in Army Headquarters is well up to date, and is dealt with as it arises.

4. After giving the matter our fullest consideration, although we are, as stated in paragraph 2, unanimous in deprecating the raising now of the question of carrying out the suggested reform, we are agreed that the proposal is administratively and economically based on sound arguments and will have to be dealt with sooner or later.

5. With regard to the political considerations involved, we are of opinion that we cannot do better than leave the question entirely for your consideration and decision.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) MINTO.
" KITCHENER.
" H. ERLE RICHARDS.
" E. N. BAKER.
" C. H. SCOTT.
" H. ADAMSON.
" J. F. FINLAY.
" J. O. MILLER.

No. 6.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General in Council, No. 211, Military, dated 27th December, 1907.

I have considered in Council your despatch in the Army Department, No. 96, dated 26th September, 1907, in which you express your agreement with the view that the abolition of the Department of Military Supply would be advantageous on administrative and economical grounds, but deprecate the re-opening of the question of military administration in India at the present time, as you fear a recrudescence of heated and acrimonious public discussion.

2. I do not feel sure that this apprehension is well founded. It seems to me that public opinion has to a great extent acquiesced in the settlement arrived at in 1905, and that the partisanship which at that time was acute in India has died out; and further, that some of those who were opposed to the change then made, now recognise that the Military Supply Department, as an integral part of the military administration, has proved to be superfluous, and is also useless for such purposes as had previously been considered to require the existence of a military authority in the Government of India separate from the Commander-in-Chief. The share of work and responsibility assigned to the Military Supply Member and his staff has been diminished by the transfer of the Supply and Transport Corps to the control of the Commander-in-Chief, and the efficiency and economy realised by this change suggest the expediency of making further similar changes as soon as possible.

3. In these circumstances, even if a considerable amount of discussion and controversy were to be aroused, I could not for that reason consent to be a party to the retention of an arrangement which throws a heavy charge upon the revenues of India, and which has, in your opinion, been shown by the experience hitherto acquired to be unnecessary and inconvenient.

4. I am, however, willing, in deference to the wishes of your Excellency's Government, to postpone any action in the matter for a year from the present time.

Further experience will then have been gained, and there will be less probability than at present of any discussion other than what may be required on the merits of the case. I request that you will keep the subject in view, and address me again upon it before leaving Simla in the autumn of 1908.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN MORLEY.

No. 7.

Letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Secretary of State for India, No. 103, dated 1st October, 1908.

In Your Lordship's despatch, Military, No. 211, dated 27th December, 1907, paragraph 4, you desired that we should address you again on the subject of the abolition of the Department of Military Supply before leaving Simla in the autumn of 1908.

2. The experience gained since we wrote our despatch in the Army Department, No. 96, dated the 26th September, 1907, has not altered the views we then placed before Your Lordship.

3. Should you, however, be of opinion that the time is now opportune for abolishing the Department of Military Supply, the following are our proposals for dealing with the work of the Army in India which is at present carried out by that Department:—

The business now dealt with in the Department of Military Supply consists of—

(i) Purchase of Remounts, Stores and Ordnance.
(ii) Control and custody of Ordnance, Stores and Remounts.
(iii) The management of Military Works.
(iv) The Clothing and Manufacturing Department.
(v) The Indian Medical Service.
(vi) The Royal Indian Marine.
(vii) Marine Surveys and dangers to navigation.

This we suggest should be disposed of as follows:—

By the Army Department.

(i) The Indian Medical Service.
(ii) The Royal Indian Marine.
(iii) Marine Surveys and dangers to navigation;

and for this purpose the Army Department will also become the Marine Department of the Government of India.

Two new divisions should be created at Army Headquarters:—

(i) Under the Director-General of Ordnance for the purchase, control and custody of Ordnance stores; and administration of the Ordnance Department and Ordnance Factories.
(ii) Under the Director-General of Military Works for the management of the Military Works Services.

The Clothing and Manufacturing Department should form a new branch of the existing Division of the Adjutant-General. The purchase, control and custody of Remounts and the Remount Department should form a new branch of the existing Quartermaster-General's Division.

The financial business which is at present disposed of by the Department of Military Supply in the exercise of the financial powers vested in a Department of the Government of India, would be dealt with by the Military Finance Secretary under the arrangements proposed in paragraphs 9 and 10 of our despatch No. 10 M. F., dated the 7th February, 1907, and accepted in Your Lordship's Financial despatch, No. 49, dated the 12th April, 1907.

4. In order to deal efficiently with the extra work which the above redistribution would impose on the Army and Military Finance Secretariats, we would ask for authority to strengthen the superior staffs of these Departments. Our estimate must of necessity be somewhat general; but we put forward the following proposals as being likely to represent the maximum requirement, and we shall be prepared to reduce them if experience shows them to be in excess of what is absolutely necessary for the efficient working of the new system of administration.

Army Department.

(*a*) 1 additional Deputy Secretary on Rs. 1,700 per mensem.

(*b*) 1 additional Assistant Secretary on Rs. 1,000 per mensem.

These are the rates of pay attached to the existing appointments in the Department.

Military Finance.

(*c*) 1 additional Assistant Secretary on Rs. 1,000 per mensem.

(*d*) The increase of the pay of one of the existing Assistant Secretaries from Rs. 750—50—1,000 to Rs. 1,000—50—1,300.

With regard to the additional Assistant Secretary we propose the same rate of pay as that authorized for the similar appointment in the Army Department, because the lower rate assigned to the appointment in this Branch has been found inconvenient in practice.

An increase of pay is proposed for the existing Assistant Secretary because his responsibilities will be increased. At present this officer submits his cases to the Secretary through the Deputy Secretary, who is already sufficiently employed. If the financial business of the Department of Military Supply is transferred to the Military Finance Secretariat, we think that it will save time and duplication of work to let the general Assistant Secretary submit cases direct to the Secretary, but as the latter is a civilian, it will be essential that he shall be able to rely on the technical accuracy of his assistant, and in order to secure and retain the services of a man with the necessary qualifications, we are of opinion that the pay of the appointment should be raised to the figure proposed above.

As regards clerks and menials we estimate that additional establishments costing about Rs. 40,000 a year, or somewhat below half the present cost of those now employed in the Department of Military Supply, would be required to deal with the extra work that would devolve on the Army and Military Finance Secretariats. We propose to defer the preparation of formal proposition statements until we receive your Lordship's decision. Such establishments of the Department of Military Supply as can be utilized in the additional appointments required will be retained, and the balance disposed of by compensation pensions and gratuities. In this connection we would bring to Your Lordship's notice that the establishments to be dispensed with, will, under Article 436, Civil Service Regulations, be entitled to three months' notice or full pay in lieu.

5. The following table shows the general financial effect of our proposals :—

Department.	Permanent Establishment.			Other expenses, *i.e.*, Local and Travelling Allowances, Postage, Telegrams, &c.			Net result + Increase —Reduction.
	Class.	Present.	Proposed.	—	Present.	Proposed.	
		Rs.	Rs.		Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Department of Military Supply.	Officers ...	1,46,708	Nil	Other expenses	63,850	Nil	—2,94,225
	Clerks and menials.	83,667	Nil				
Army Department	Officers ...	74,400	1,06,800	Other expenses	77,360	1,12,360	+ 98,108
	Clerks and menials.	1,05,787	1,36,495				
Military Finance Branch of Finance Department.	Officers ...	85,050	1,00,500	Other expenses	31,080	38,080	+ 32,450
	Clerks and menials.	47,826	57,826				
Total	—	5,43,438	4,01,621		1,72,290	1,50,440	—1,63,667

We have, &c.,

(Signed MINTO.
„ KITCHENER.
„ H. ERLE RICHARDS.
„ C. H. SCOTT.
„ H. ADAMSON.
„ J. O. MILLER.
„ W. L. HARVEY.
„ J. S. MESTON.

No. 8.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Governor-General in Council, No. 10, *Military, dated 22nd January,* 1909.

I have considered in Council your Army Department despatch, No. 103, dated 1st October, 1908, in which you inform me that you have not altered the views expressed in your despatch, No. 96, of 26th September, 1907, regarding the question of the abolition of the Department of Military Supply; that is to say, you agree with me that the Department should be abolished, and only differ from me in holding, as you did a year-and-a-half ago, that this measure should not be carried into effect until some future time when it might be less likely to cause public discussion and controversy.

2. While appreciating the inconveniences that such controversies may possibly cause, I see no ground for altering the decision which I expressed in my despatch of 27th December, 1907. I request therefore that the abolition may take effect at the earliest date which will permit adequate notice to be given to the Honourable Member at present in charge of the Department of Military Supply and his subordinates, and will allow time for formulating the new arrangements. The beginning of the financial year 1909-10 will, I think, be a convenient time to fix for this change, and I request that Your Excellency will make the necessary communication to Major-General Scott, who will, I trust, understand that the decision to abolish the Military Supply Department has been taken on financial and administrative grounds only, and involves no shadow of reflection on his efficiency as Member of the Government of India in charge of this Department since November, 1905.

3. I sanction the proposals submitted in paragraphs 3 and 4 of your despatch for dealing with the work of the Army in India at present entrusted to the Department of Military Supply. Under the new arrangements the appointment of Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department will be one of even greater importance than at present. It requires an officer possessing high ability and extensive military experience, and especially a thorough knowledge of the Native Army. As one of the highest posts in the administration of the Army in India, it should ordinarily be filled by an officer of not lower rank than Major-General.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

No. 9.

Diagram showing the organisation of the Army Administration in India on the abolition of the Military Supply Department.


GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL.
Commander-in-Chief as Member in Charge of the
ARMY DEPARTMENT.
SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
Two Deputy Secretaries.
Two Assistant Secretaries.
Chief of the Staff's Division.
Adjutant-General's Division.
Quarter-Master-General's Division.
Principal Medical Officer.
Director-General, Ordnance.
Director-General, Military Works.
Indian Medical Service.
Royal Indian Marine.
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
NORTHERN ARMY.
1st Division.
2nd Division.
3rd Division.
7th Division.
8th Division.
and the Kohat Bannu Derajat Independent Brigades.
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
SOUTHERN ARMY.
4th Division.
5th Division.
6th Division.
9th Division.
Burma Division.
and the A[illegible]ent Brigade.

EAST INDIA (JUDICIAL)

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

SITAPUR MURDER CASE.

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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2	Ditto	July 11	Ditto	Ditto	Asks that reply to No. 1 may be telegraphed as soon as possible. Have Local Government despatched record?	3
3	Despatch	July 11	Ditto	Government of India.	Suggests revision of rules governing petitions for mercy from persons under sentence of death.	3
4	Telegram	July 14	Viceroy.	Secretary of State for India.	Refers to No 2. Government of United Provinces have been consulted. Communication will be made as soon as possible. Records were despatched on 3rd July.	5
5	Ditto	July 18	Ditto	Ditto	Statement of dates	5
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EAST INDIA (JUDICIAL).

SITAPUR MURDER CASE.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

No. 1.

From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 30*th June,* 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

Sitapur murder case. Please instruct Government of United Provinces to send printed record of trial and of judgment of Judicial Commissioners by this week's mail direct to this Office. Also report as soon as possible by telegraph, after consulting Local Government, reason of delaying preferment of appeal until July against an acquittal pronounced in February by the Sessions Court. File showing action of United Provinces Government has also been requested in my Public Secretary's letters of 27th instant.

No. 2.

From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 11*th July,* 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

Please telegraph as soon as possible reply to my telegram of 30th June. Sitapur murder case. Also please report whether Local Government have despatched record.

No. 3.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, No. 170 (*Public*), *dated* 11*th July,* 1913.

In continuation of my telegram of the 30th June, 1913, on the Sitapur murder case, I desire to invite the attention of Your Excellency's Government to the general question of the rules regarding the procedure to be adopted in connection with petitions for mercy from persons under sentence of death. The present rules are, I understand, those set forth in the Circular from Your Excellency's Home Department to Local Governments, dated the 11th February, 1911, which supplement, but

(31049—3.) Wt. 15972—239. 750. 8/13. D. & S.

do not altogether supersede, those contained in the earlier Circular of the 30th June, 1909.

2. I am, as I need hardly say, fully alive to the desirability of preventing the submission of fruitless petitions to the Government of India, entailing temporary reprieves in cases in which mercy is impossible, and protracted anxiety as to the date of execution can only add to the sufferings of the convict.

3. Nor do I overlook the fact that under Sections 401 and 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concurrent jurisdiction is given to the Local and Supreme Governments in the matter of reprieves and commutations of sentence. But the existence of a right of appeal to the Supreme Government, which cannot without consultation with the Local Government be fully apprised of the circumstances of a case, and the general principle laid down in the Memorial Rules that a petition must be addressed to the Local Government in the first instance, combine to produce in the mind of the people the belief that petitions for mercy should be presented to the Local Government in the first instance, and that, if the Local Government reject the petition, it may be repeated in exactly the same terms through that channel to the Government of India.

4. On the particular aspects of the Sitapur case, I do not desire to pronounce an opinion until I have received and considered the fullest information. But it may be that an exact observance of existing rules is not incompatible with results that leave in the public mind the apprehension that the action of Government has failed to comply with considerations of humanity.

5. Under the present rules a Local Government should withhold a petition for mercy only when three conditions are fulfilled, namely (in effect):—

(1) That the petition cannot reach the Government of India in time to allow 48 hours for consideration;

(2) That there are no circumstances which, in the opinion of the Local Government, " would be likely to cause the Governor-General in Council to take a different view of the case "; and

(3) That the case has not aroused considerable public interest.

6. I understand the convenience, as a departmental rule, of the third condition, but its terms seem to me to suggest two necessary criticisms.

7. In the first place, a convict whose case has not happened to arouse considerable public interest is obviously entitled to just as much consideration as one whose case has been freely discussed. Secondly, even if we are to accept as a criterion of the amount of consideration due in such a case the accident that the conviction has attracted the attention of public speakers or journalists, it is clear that a case may occur in which, while the fact of condemnation by a Court of Justice has passed unmarked, the circumstances attending the treatment of a resulting petition for mercy may be such as to give rise to much discussion. But this possibility is not suggested for the consideration of the Local Government by the use of the past tense in the rule.

8. The criterion laid down seems to me fundamentally unsound, and I should prefer to substitute some such phrase as—

> " that the case is not one in which either the nature of the crime, or the history of the trial, or of the petition for mercy, renders the matter one on which the Supreme Government should be given an opportunity of expressing an opinion."

9. I turn now to the second condition. When the Local Government after full and conscientious consideration of an appeal for mercy has come to the conclusion that the sentence should take its course, that Government is in a somewhat difficult position when required to decide whether circumstances exist which may lead the Government of India to take a different view. And it may be felt by the public that as the condition is now expressed the convict's right of access to the Supreme Government is dangerously restricted.

10. The provision of the Criminal Procedure Code which allows a Local Government to appeal to a High Court against an acquittal by a lower Court—a provision unknown to English law—renders it necessary that a person thus convicted, after previous acquittal, should be allowed an opportunity of petition to an authority other than that which sanctioned the appeal. As the Code confines to High Courts the trial of European British subjects upon a capital charge, the provisions, so far as they relate to capital charges, which allow an appeal to the High Court from an acquittal in a trial before a Court of Sessions, apply in effect to natives of India only.

But although a native of India may be condemned to death by a judicial procedure which would not have been applied in exactly the same forms to a European British subject, equality before the law is really maintained by the provision that no person can suffer the death sentence without that sentence being either pronounced or confirmed by a High Court. None the less this fundamental fact is easily misunderstood, and if a native of India suffers a death sentence (pronounced by a High Court) after previous acquittal by a lower Court, the apparent difference between the treatment accorded to natives of India and to Europeans lends itself to criticism of a mistaken kind, and strengthens the case for giving to persons thus condemned the fullest opportunities of petition to the Supreme Government.

11. I would, then, recommend to Your Excellency's Government the revision of the second " condition " in the light of these remarks, and, while I do not at present desire to suggest any exact form of words, I think it necessary that the wording adopted should make it clear that the petition must invariably be forwarded if it relates to a case in which the death sentence has been passed by a High Court on an appeal preferred by the Local Government against an acquittal in a lower Court.

12. The first condition has been laid down after very full discussion in the past, and I have no criticism to offer upon its terms, which must of course be read with the direction that, unless the second and third conditions, amended as suggested, are fulfilled, the Local Government must forward a petition, and if necessary postpone the execution in order to give Your Excellency's Government with whom the ultimate responsibility in such matters must reside, time to come to and communicate your decision.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CREWE.

No. 4.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 14*th July,* 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

Murder case, Sitapur. Your telegram of 11th July. As to your telegram, 30th June, we have consulted Government of United Provinces, and will communicate with you as soon as possible. Records were despatched to you by mail of 3rd July.

No. 5.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 18*th July,* 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

Sitapur case. My telegram of 14th instant. Important dates as follows have been reported by Local Government. Accused acquitted 22nd February by Sessions Judge. On 13th March the Judge signed his prepared statement, which was placed before Registrar, Judicial Commissioner's Court, on the 29th March. Judicial Commissioner called for police diaries and record on 9th April after Easter holidays, and record was received 18th April. An order was passed on 19th April, by the Judicial Commissioner, Lindsay, in which attention of Public Prosecutor was called to the case, and the latter officer recorded that he addressed District Magistrate on 20th April. Narrative of facts prepared by District Magistrate 3rd May, and sent to Commissioner of Division, 8th May. Report of Commissioner reached Government 15th May. On the 20th May the case was referred to the Legal Remembrancer, and the Secretariat received it on the 23rd May and examined it, as a result of which preferment of appeal was directed by the Lieutenant-Governor on 25th May. A certified and sealed copy of judgment of Sessions Judge was requested from Commissioner by telegram on 29th May. This, with the record, reached Legal Remembrancer from Commissioner on 3rd July. Legal Remembrancer ordered filing of appeal by Government pleader on 5th July, which was done, and appeal admitted on 10th July. Additional Judicial Commissioners, Kanhaiya Lal and Stuart, heard and decided appeal on 16th August. An explanation of procedure together with a detailed statement of dates, will be sent to you from Lieutenant-Governor by this mail.

No. 6.

Despatch from Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, No. 189 (*Public*), dated 25*th July,* 1913.

With reference to the correspondence ending with Your Excellency's telegram of the 18th July, 1913, on the subject of the case of Chutkau Singh and Sikhdar Singh, convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Court of the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh, I forward, for the information of your Government, a copy of a statement which I have received from Sir John Hewett, late Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

2. The full and able explanation which Sir John Hewett has given of his action in connection with these proceedings satisfies me that the case in all its aspects received from him most careful and anxious consideration, and that in deciding not to transmit to your Government the petition for mercy addressed to it on behalf of the convicted persons, he acted under a full sense of personal responsibility, and followed the course which in his judgment met the requirements of justice, and also conformed to the instructions of the Government of India for the disposal of petitions for mercy in capital cases. These instructions may be differently interpreted. Had Sir John Hewett elected to suspend the execution of the sentences, and to throw the onus of confirming or modifying them on to the Government of India his action would have been justified, and I adhere to the opinion which I have already expressed that this would have been the wiser course. But I have no doubt whatever that he exercised his discretion with a sole eye to the right discharge of his duty.

3. I propose to present the statement to Parliament along with the judgment of the Judicial Commissioners and other relevant papers, and having done that I shall consider the matter as closed, except as regards the general question of the rules at present governing the transmission of petitions for mercy in capital cases. This was the question raised by Sir Henry Cotton in drawing attention to the case, and in my despatch, No. 175 (Public), of the 11th July, 1913, I have pointed out the defects of the existing rules and have requested you to undertake their revision so as to make it clear that a Local Government must invariably transmit a petition for mercy, however late received, when it relates to a case in which the death sentence has been passed by the High Court on an appeal preferred by the Local Government against an acquittal in a Lower Court.

4. I shall be glad if you will deal with the matter with as little delay as possible. A consideration of the circumstances of the case under reference has impressed me with the necessity for removing the ambiguities of the present rules, and placing the position and responsibilities of Local Governments in dealing with cases of this kind beyond doubt.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CREWE.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Statement by Sir John Hewett, G.C.S.I., C.I.E., dated 19*th July,* 1913.

I am asked to explain my action in the case of Chutkau Singh and Sikhdar Singh convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Court of the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh—after having been acquitted by the Sessions Judge of Sitapur, Mr. Bell, a member of the Indian Civil Service of 21 years standing—and subsequently executed in accordance with the sentence. A third man, Ganga Singh, was sentenced on appeal to transportation for life. The order of acquittal was passed by the Sessions Judge on February 22nd, 1912: the appeal before the Judicial Commissioners was filed on July 10th: the Judicial Commissioners passed sentence on August 16th: the petition for mercy from the condemned prisoners reached me on August 27th: it was rejected on August 31st: the legal adviser of the condemned prisoners apparently received the order of rejection on September 2nd: on September

6th a petition to the Government of India reached me, which I withheld for reasons to be detailed below: on 9th September the two prisoners sentenced to death were executed. The points on which I understand that my explanation is specially wanted are (1) the delay in filing the appeal in the Judicial Commissioners' Court, and (2) my action in refusing to send on to the Government of India a petition for mercy from the prisoners sentenced to death which could not reach their headquarters at Simla within the time prescribed by their rules. In order to explain and justify my action it will be necessary to enter into considerable detail.

It may possibly prevent some confusion if it is explained at the outset that the Sessions Judge of Sitapur exercises jurisdiction in both the Sitapur and Kheri districts, and that the case arose in the latter district. I should also explain that the Government of India and the Governor-General in Council are equivalent terms for the Supreme Government in India, and that when the term High Court is used in dealing with the facts of this case it means the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh, whose Court is, under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court for the part of the country where Kheri lies.

There are some very important points of difference between the criminal law in England and that in India, to which it is necessary to draw attention. In the first place a trial for murder in England is held by the High Court of Judicature. In India the High Courts do not, except when trying European British subjects or persons charged with offences committed within their original jurisdiction in the Presidency towns, exercise original powers in the trial of offenders against the criminal law. A person against whom there is a *primâ facie* case of having committed an offence for which a magistrate cannot himself try him, as for instance, murder, is committed by the magistrate for trial by the Sessions Judge.

Secondly, when a person is convicted of murder the Court need not, as it must in England, pass a sentence of death; it can, if the circumstances do not, in its opinion, demand the penalty of death, pass a sentence of transportation for life.

Thirdly, the order of a Sessions Judge sentencing a prisoner to death is not final—; before it becomes so it must be confirmed by a Bench of the High Court of two Judges.

Fourthly, the Government (*i.e.*, in Oudh the Lieutenant-Governor) has the power to give sanction to the institution of an appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by a Sessions Judge or a Magistrate. If the order was passed in a trial that has been held with assessors, the appeal lies both on the facts and the law: if it was passed in a trial held with a jury the appeal can only be made on a point of law. The case against Chutkau Singh, Sikhdar Singh and Ganga Singh was tried by the Sessions Judge with assessors, and the order of acquittal was, therefore, appealable by the Government, both on the facts and on the law.

This power of appeal against an order of acquittal is not recklessly or even frequently exercised. The principles which I followed were that I would not give sanction to the filing of such an appeal unless (1) the legal adviser of Government considered that the possibilities were strongly in favour of its being successful and (2) the case was of such a nature that the interests of the Indian population or of the Government made it important that the order of acquittal should, if possible, be reversed. There were in the United Provinces during my term of office as Lieutenant-Governor some 30,000 cases of acquittal in cases cognizable by the police, *i.e.*, in the more important offences, against which the Government might have appealed. It appealed in 78 cases only. Of the 78 appeals 57 (73 per cent.) were successful. I cannot give the number of murder cases included in the figure 78, but they were very few. There were many cases in which, acting on the advice of my legal adviser, I declined to give sanction to the institution of an appeal when this course had been recommended to me by other authorities.

The Magistrate of the District is the authority who makes the first move in recommending an appeal against an order of acquittal. He acts on his own initiative or at the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor. The fact that a person has been acquitted by the Sessions Judge becomes known to the Magistrate of the District officially when the calendar of offences tried by the Sessions Judge at a particular Sessions reaches him. It is not till then that he can become apprized of the reasons for the acquittal, as set forth in the judgment of the Sessions Judge; this stage is not reached till some time after the order of acquittal has been passed. It may take a fortnight or three weeks for the Magistrate of the District to be in a position to read and consider the order of acquittal.

The Magistrate of the District—if he wishes the Government to sanction an appeal in a case of acquittal—has to prepare a statement of the case, setting out in detail his reasons for asking for the sanction, and to submit it through his official superior, the Commissioner of the Division. The latter officer has to forward it, with his recommendation, to the Lieutenant-Governor.

If the Magistrate of the District recommends—and the Commissioner endorses his recommendation—that an appeal should be made against an acquittal, the case, when it reaches the Lieutenant-Governor, is forwarded to the Legal Remembrancer for advice. The Legal Remembrancer, in considering the circumstances of each individual case, has to pay regard to the rulings of the different High Courts regarding the limitations within which they will exercise the power of reversing an order of acquittal.

Appended to this explanation is a statement showing the date of each step taken in this case between the acquittal of the accused on February 22nd, and the filing of the appeal on July 10th. Mr. Neave—the District Magistrate of Kheri—went on leave towards the end of March. He had obviously not had time to consider the order of acquittal before he left Kheri. He was relieved by Mr. Campbell, who, on taking up his new office, would naturally find himself much occupied. When the statement of cases disposed of by the Sessions Judge of Sitapur was placed before Mr. Lindsay—the senior Judge of the Judicial Commissioners' Court—he called for the record, and, after perusing it, called the attention of the Public Prosecutor to the case. Mr. Lindsay had nothing to do with the hearing of the appeal. The Public Prosecutor addressed the District Magistrate of Kheri on April 20th. On May 3rd, the District Magistrate of Kheri wrote a memorandum recommending that an appeal should be made. This recommendation reached the Local Government on May 15th, and, after consulting the Legal Remembrancer, I sanctioned the institution of the appeal on May 25th. On receipt of this sanction the Legal Remembrancer had to obtain certified copies of all the records and papers, to prepare the memorandum of appeal, and to instruct counsel. The Government Pleader was directed by him on July 5th to file the appeal and filed it on July 10th. Each step in the procedure for filing an appeal on behalf of Government in a case like this requires deliberation, and cannot be hurried. The law prescribes six months as the period within which an appeal must be filed: this appeal was filed in four months and nineteen days. It is not unlikely that had the different steps anterior to the filing of the appeal taken a shorter time, the criticism might have been that it was too hastily instituted; in any case the law recognises that deliberation is necessary, and has fixed the period within which an appeal may be filed at six months. In this instance the appeal was filed six weeks before the period of limitation would expire.

In this case the Legal Remembrancer advised that an appeal should be made. A very brutal murder had been committed. I was advised that a failure of justice had occurred, and that an appeal would probably be successful. The fact that some sections of the people in the neighbourhood are inclined to be lawless, and that the law-abiding portions of the population would be prejudiced if a crime of this nature remained unpunished, had to be considered. I determined that the circumstances of this particular case justified me in giving sanction to the institution of an appeal.

The order sanctioning the institution of an appeal was transmitted to the Legal Remembrancer for him to prepare the grounds of appeal and to arrange for the filing of the appeal. The giving of this sanction did not mean that I had determined in my own mind that the men were guilty of murder: it meant that I was advised that the Sessions Judge had not weighed the evidence properly, with the result that a very brutal crime would go unpunished to the detriment of the country-side, and that it was most probable that the High Court would hold that the men ought to have been convicted. The giving of sanction to an appeal in these circumstances could not render me unfit to determine, in case of a conviction, whether the Government should or should not exercise its power of clemency.

The description of the procedure of the Judicial Commissioners in Mr. Swift McNeill's words "what they did was to read the record" does not accurately describe it. They acted strictly in accordance with the law, and precisely as they would have acted had the case been one of a conviction for murder by the Sessions Judge, sent to them by that Court for confirmation of the sentence and with an appeal by the condemned prisoners. The accused were not present during the hearing of the appeal, but no application for their personal attendance seems to have been made, and every opportunity was given for their case to be placed before the Appellate Court in the most complete manner. Mr. John Jackson, a barrister of over 20 years' practice, who had represented the accused before the Sessions Judge, appeared on their behalf before the Judicial Commissioners also. The reputation of the Courts is best defended by their own public utterances, and it would be presumptuous of me to attempt to reply to the criticisms that have been made in the House of Commons of the action of the Judicial Commissioners. Their justification is contained in their own judgment, which deals fully with the credibility of the evidence, with special advertence to the fact that a Sessions Judge of long service had, agreeing with the majority of the assessors, refused to believe it, and with the question of the form of punishment of the two elder men for their share in what the Court regarded as a brutal, cold-blooded and premeditated murder. Both the Judicial Commissioners were men of great knowledge, capacity and uprightness, the one an Englishman, the other a Brahman. There was not the slightest likelihood that in dealing with a case of the kind they would come to a conclusion not justified by the evidence, or pass a sentence not demanded by the facts of the case.

So far as my own conduct is concerned in giving sanction to the institution of the appeal, I submit that there is nothing that merits criticism. When both the administrative and executive advisers of the Lieutenant-Governor—the Magistrate of the District, the Commissioner of the Division, and the Legal Remembrancer to the Government—unite in advising him that there is a convincing case for an appeal in respect of a crime of such seriousness as this particular murder, he is bound to give the sanction necessary for the High Court to entertain it. The judgment of the High Court proves conclusively that the sanction was rightly given in this case.

I now pass to the petition for mercy. Any prisoner under sentence has the right to petition the Lieutenant-Governor for mercy, and, if this petition is unsuccessful, to petition the Governor-General in Council. There is no duty that a Lieutenant-Governor is called on to perform which imposes a sense of greater responsibility than that of considering a petition for mercy from a prisoner sentenced to death by the High Court. And this sense of responsibility is hardly lessened by the fact that the High Court will, in every such case, have itself determined that only a sentence of death, and not the smaller punishment of transportation for life, will fit the crime.

Crimes affecting human life are more numerous in the United Provinces than in any other part of India: there are three to every one in Bengal. Some 600 murders are committed every year, and the average number of death sentences is nearly 150. The duty of disposing of petitions for mercy in these cases has weighed heavily on me. Feeling the weight of responsibility in regard to them, I endeavoured to ensure my dealing properly with them by taking special precautions to obtain in advance copies of the evidence, so that I might have sufficient time to read and think it over thoroughly.

The petition for mercy in this case reached me on 27th August, 11 days after the sentence, and 13 days before the date of execution. It was considered by me with the care and attention that I was in the habit of giving to all such cases. The judgment of the Judicial Commissioners seemed to me to demonstrate that the case against the prisoners was absolutely clear. The murder was a most brutal one, committed within the village site and at a time when the villagers must have been at home, and not outside in their fields. The deceased's body was found to have some 40 wounds on it. I could discover no ground whatever for disagreeing from the view of the High Court that the circumstances of the case demanded that two of the accused should be sentenced to death. I, therefore, refused to interfere on their behalf. This decision was given on 31st August, and intimation of it reached the petitioner's Counsel, I believe, on September 2nd, the execution being fixed for September 9th. Mr. Jackson seems not to have acted for the prisoners in the last stages of the case. The proper course—following the procedure laid down in this class of case—which is well known to the members of the Bar Libraries in India, was for the counsel to present at once to the Lieutenant-Governor a petition for transmission to the Government of India, and I should have forwarded it immediately for their orders. Instead of doing so, he telegraphed to the Government of India asking them to postpone execution. This telegram was received by the Government of India on September 4th. The request for the postponement of the date of the execution was rejected by them in a telegram also dated September 4th, in which I was directed to deal with the case according to rule. The petition to the

Government of India for mercy, subsequently received by me from an Indian barrister, reached me on September 6th at a time which did not, under the postal arrangements, admit of its being delivered at Simla 48 hours before the time fixed for the execution. I therefore in accordance with the general rule and the specific instructions given to me in this case, refused to forward the petition. In construing the rule, I had some specific instructions given by the Government of India in individual cases to guide me. The rule was prescribed by the Government of India in order to prevent executions from being postponed unnecessarily. In 1911 Sir Leslie Porter, the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces during my absence on the Coronation Durbar Committee, had forwarded to the Government of India a petition from a prisoner under sentence of death on the ground that there was a possibility that it might reach them 48 hours before the time fixed for the execution. It did not, as a matter of fact, reach them within the prescribed period. The Lieutenant-Governor was told that the petition should not have been forwarded. Again, several instances occurred in which a telegram was received by me as Lieutenant-Governor informing me that a petition to the Government of India for mercy would be subsequently sent. The telegram would come in time to reach the Government of India more than 48 hours before the time fixed for the execution, while the petition could not reach them till too late. A telegram of this nature was actually received by me in this particular case on September 4. In several cases of this nature I sent on the telegram with the papers of the case in order that the Government of India might be apprised of the facts before the petition could reach them. The Government of India did not approve of my action and I was directed to deal with such cases according to rule, and not to send the papers of a case on till the actual petition for mercy was received. It was thus evident to me that the Government of India held me strictly to the duty of refusing to send on a petition which could not reach them at least 48 hours before the time fixed for the execution, save in the two exceptions mentioned by Mr. Montagu, viz.: in (1) when any consideration was set forth in the petition, or there were any circumstances in the case which, in my opinion, would be likely to lead the Government of India to take a different view of the case from that taken by me; (2) when the case was one in which for some special reason public interest had been aroused. Neither of these two exceptions arose in this particular case. I understand that it is contended that, because I had given sanction to an appeal being instituted against the acquittal of the accused in the Lower Court, I should have assumed that the Government of India might differ from my view. But my action in giving sanction to the filing of the appeal was in a sense ministerial, and based entirely on advice given by others; before giving it I had not to come to any conclusion that the accused were necessarily guilty. I was informed that there had been a failure of justice, and that it was probable that the Court of Appeal would come to this conclusion. The sanction given by me merely amounted to this—"let the matter go to the Court of Appeal for its consideration." When it became my duty to examine the judgment of the Judicial Commissioners in connection with the petition for mercy referred to me by the prisoners, the case appeared to be so clearly proved against the accused, and the murder to be one of such an atrocious character, that the sentence of death seemed to be the only appropriate one for the two ringleaders. In view of these considerations, I did not, when the petition to the Government of India reached me, conceive it possible that they would take a different view of the case from that taken by me. Consequently, in accordance with the prescribed rules, I withheld the petition. It would have been quite easy to shift all responsibility in the case to the Government of India. But that is not my conception of the duty of a Lieutenant-Governor in dealing with a case in such circumstances. The Government can at any time restrict his duties and responsibilities but, within the duties assigned to him and the responsibilities imposed on him, it is incumbent on him to exercise without fear or favour the powers entrusted to him.

Mr. Montagu has stated in the House of Commons that the Secretary of State for India doubts whether, in the circumstances, the discretion vested in me by the rules was wisely exercised. Expression was publicly given to this doubt without my having been given any opportunity whatever, whether verbally or in writing, of explaining my action. I was at hand and could have been summoned at any moment. I contend that my order withholding the petition for mercy was strictly in accordance with the terms of the Government of India's own rule and with their own intentions as shown by their orders interpreting it, and that the discretion with which I was vested was properly exercised. And this conclusion is, I submit, supported by the fact that the third prisoner—sentenced to transportation for life—appealed to the Government of India, and that his appeal was rejected.

I have now given my explanation on the facts of the case, the delay in filing the appeal and the exercise of the discretion to withhold the petition for mercy to the Governor-General in Council. I might end here, but I think it right to call attention to the remarkable mistakes and misconceptions regarding Indian law, procedure, and practice, which characterized the speeches made in the House of Commons by some of my critics in this case. The following statements were made by Mr. Swift MacNeill:—

(1) That the judicial and administrative arrangements in Oudh are peculiar: "instead of Judges they have Commissioners; instead of Magistrates they have Sub-Commissioners and Petty Sessions Judges; and instead of a Lieutenant-Governor, although he has all the powers of one, they have a Chief Commissioner." Mr. Montagu has pointed out the incorrectness of these remarks so far as they relate to the Judicial Commissioners and the Sessions Judges. I need only add that the statement "instead of Judges they have Commissioners" was true prior to 1891, when the law was changed so as to provide for the appointment of Sessions Judges of the same class and with the same powers as in the most advanced parts of British India. The Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces was also Chief Commissioner of Oudh till 1902 when the title of Chief Commissioner ceased to exist owing to a law having been passed creating the Lieutenant-Governorship of the United Provinces. That Mr. Swift MacNeill should have been inaccurately informed on these points is, perhaps, not a matter for surprise, but Sir Henry Cotton, who furnished him with information and inspired his attack on me, should know the truth as well as I do.

(2) Proceeding on these and other false assumptions, Mr. Swift MacNeill observed "Then" (*i.e.*, on 10th July) "the Chief Commissioner himself" (*i.e.*, the Lieutenant-Governor) "directed the Crown Prosecutor of the District" (*i.e.*, the District Magistrate of Kheri *vide* Mr. Swift MacNeill's remark on page 1166 of the official report of the discussion) "to appeal not to the High Court of Allahabad, but to the Chief Commissioners of the United Provinces" (*i.e.*, the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh) "to re-try the case." It is difficult to imagine a sentence more full of incorrect statements than this one. I did not direct the District Magistrate of Kheri to file an appeal; and, if I had done so, he could not have filed one. What I did was to give to the Legal Remembrancer of the United Provinces Government—on his assurance that he thought that an appeal would be successful—the sanction necessary to satisfy the High Court that the conditions prescribed for the filing of an appeal by the Government against an order of acquittal had been fulfilled. The sentence under reference conveys the insinuation that an order was given by me to appeal to the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh in preference to the High Court at Allahabad. The only possible explanation of this insinuation is that I applied to the Judicial Commissioners in preference to the High Court at Allahabad because I thought them more likely to reverse the order of acquittal. It is not necessary to say more in refutation of this gross insult to the Judicial Commissioners and myself than that the High Court at Allahabad had no jurisdiction in the case at all and could not have admitted an appeal had I asked it to do so.

(3) Mr. Swift MacNeill correctly stated that the petition for mercy received from the condemned prisoners was rejected by me on August 31st. He went on to say that it reached the prisoners' Counsel on September 2nd. This date is no doubt correct, but the following words "the execution meantime had been fixed for the 9th September" are grossly misleading. The date for the execution was fixed by the Sessions Judge, in accordance with standing rules, as soon as he received the warrant from the Judicial Commissioners, and had been fixed before the appeal of 27th August was presented to me. The statement is calculated to lead people to think that I disposed of this petition, and then proceeded to fix an early date for the execution in order to make it more difficult for the prisoners to lay a petition for mercy before the Government of India. The Lieutenant-Governor has no power to fix the date of an execution. He can say that a man shall not be hanged on the date fixed by the Sessions Judge, but, if another date has to be fixed, it is fixed by the Superintendent of the Jail in accordance with standing orders.

(4) Mr. Swift MacNeill asserted that I "stimulated" the re-trial. I have already explained the circumstances which show that the use of this term was quite

unjustifiable. The points to be taken in the appeal are, in such cases, left to the Legal Remembrancer.

(5) Mr. Morrell suggested that I was promoted in the Order of the Star of India when the facts connected with this case were perfectly well-known to the Government. I naturally wish to refer as little as possible to this matter, and all I need say is that my promotion was announced on December 12, 1911, and that the murder took place a fortnight later on December 25.

(6) Mr. Dillon stigmatised my conduct as "inhuman." As he prefaced his remarks on the case by saying "knowing absolutely nothing of the circumstances of this particular case I approach this question with an absolutely open mind," those who read this judgment of his in Great Britain will, doubtless, be able to discount it. But the case is different in India. People there believe that Members of Parliament speak with authority, and still attach an exaggerated importance to their utterances. The public use of the epithet "inhuman" to describe the conduct of a man, when holding high office under the Crown, who has had no opportunity of saying a word in his defence and cannot respond to the charge at the time when it is made, is monstrously unfair.

I repudiate, with all the vigour in my power, the description of my conduct as "inhuman," and the suggestion made by Sir William Byles that the circumstances of the case constitute "an official murder." An Englishman (I use the term in its broadest sense) does not, when he goes to serve his King in India, leave behind him the instincts on which his race prides itself. One of the best of these instincts is a desire to help the oppressed and to remedy wrong. A Lieutenant-Governor deals with a case like the one under consideration without any personal feeling whatever. The people of the tract in which the murder occurred are impulsive, have very little regard for the sanctity of human life, and, especially in cases in which their women or their title to landed property are concerned, let nothing stand in the way of their ends, however wicked those may be. If a brutal murder like this one goes unpunished, the escape of the perpetrators of it encourages others to attempt similar crimes. The security and contentment of all the well-disposed men and of their women and children are threatened if encouragement is given to the evilly-disposed to think that they can flout the law. I claim that I was not, in any step taken in the disposal of this case, actuated by any desire to be harsh or inhuman to the miserable men who were convicted of a very brutal murder. In dealing with the circumstances connected with it I was influenced by a genuine and honest desire to do my best to protect the interests of the well-disposed and law-abiding members of the country-side generally, and I confidently assert that servants of the Crown in India, of whom I am proud to have been one, are, when dealing with cases of this nature, actuated only by a genuine solicitude for the welfare of the millions of peaceful men, women and children entrusted to their charge.

(Signed) J. P. HEWETT.

Annexure.

1912.
22nd February. Sessions Judge acquitted accused.
13th March. Sessions statement prepared and signed by Sessions Judge.
29th March. Sessions statement placed before Registrar of Judicial Commissioner's Court.
9th April. Judicial Commissioner called for the record and police diaries.
19th April. Mr. Lindsay, Judicial Commissioner, called Public Prosecutor's attention to case.
20th April. Public Prosecutor addressed the District Magistrate of Kheri.
8th May. District Magistrate forwarded to Commissioner of Division his recommendation that an appeal should be filed.
15th May. Commissioner's letter forwarding and endorsing District Magistrate's recommendation was received by the Local Government.
20th May. The Local Government referred the case to the Legal Remembrancer.
25th May. The Lieutenant-Governor, after considering the Legal Remembrancer's report, sanctioned the institution of the appeal.
5th July. The Government Pleader directed by Legal Remembrancer to file appeal.
10th July. Appeal filed and admitted.

APPENDIX I.

Judgment of Sessions Judge, Sitapur.

To understand the present case reference must be made to the record of a civil suit now before this court. This is the record of a suit instituted by three Bhat brothers named Ram Sahai, Gajraj and Kedar, sons of Beni Bhat and residents of Gilauli in the Kheri district (subsequently joined by a fourth plaintiff named Jagdish Singh a Thakur of the same village) on the 11th of August, 1910, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Kheri. The suit was transferred in the ordinary course of business to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Biswan, where it came to an end by being dismissed completely on the 11th of July, 1911. The plaintiffs in that suit set up a mortgage alleged to have been executed in the year 1867 by Thakurs residing in and owning half of Gilauli and hypothecating that half of Gilauli (as well as other property) to the above-mentioned Beni Bhat of Gilauli. The plaintiffs contended that the amount due on that mortgage was over a million of rupees, but they confined their claim to one hundred and fifty thousand rupees: they asked for foreclosure in default of payment of that sum. Ram Sahai, Gajraj and Kedar appeared as plaintiffs because they are the sons of their father. Jagdish Singh is already the owner of the half of Gilauli not affected by the alleged mortgage: his interest in the suit is derived from an assignment made to him by Ram Sahai, Gajraj and Kedar of half their rights and claim under this alleged mortgage. The total nominal consideration for the assignment is only three thousand six hundred rupees. Half of the price, too, is kept back by Jagdish Singh for lawyer's fees: there is evidence to the effect that before the execution of the deed of assignment the three Bhat brothers had received from Jagdish Singh consideration to the value of fifteen hundred rupees. The small balance of three hundred rupees is said to have been paid over to them after the assignment. Nothing was paid before the Sub-Registrar in whose office the deed of assignment was registered. The case of the plaintiffs is that the original mortgage deed is lost and they have not even a copy of it nor is a copy obtainable. They seek to prove the mortgage deed by what is alleged to be an abstract of its provisions found on the last page (of the nature of an index) of a book of the Lucknow Registration office. The Subordinate Judge demanded proof of loss of the original. Evidence was tendered in proof of loss but was disbelieved by the Subordinate Judge and this is why the suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs appealed to the learned Judicial Commissioner and in that court the appeal was instituted about the end of October, 1911. No date has yet been fixed for hearing. The record before me is of the court of first instance. No part of the record of the appellate court is before me, but in this trial both parties have referred to one of the usual printed copies of the memorandum of appeal (part of the paper book) as showing that the number of defendants is fifty-four, of whom thirty-four are Thakur residents of Gilauli, being the alleged representatives of the alleged mortgagors of 1867; there is evidence to the effect that these thirty-four are nearly all of the proprietors of Gilauli. The remaining twenty defendants are outsiders, persons who are said to have acquired interests in Gilauli. All the Thakurs of Gilauli, including all the thirty-four defendants mentioned and also the plaintiff Jagdish Singh and all of the Thakur witnesses of the village to the present criminal case are said to be descendants of a common ancestor. The constitution of the village is imperfect pattidari with four *thoks* and two lambardars, of whom one is Jagdish Singh. He is the principal man of the village and is a member of the District Board of Kheri. He is also headman of the village and a fairly substantial man. Ram Sahai, although the eldest of the three Bhat brothers, was a chronic invalid, and consequently the business of the suit was managed by Gajraj who had a special power-of-attorney on behalf of his two brothers. Among the defendants the most prominent part in opposing the claim of the plaintiffs was taken by four persons. Two of these need not be mentioned. One is Chhutkau Singh, himself a defendant, and son of Bariyar Singh, also a defendant, in fact, a son of one of the alleged mortgagors. Another is Chhutkau Singh's cousin, Sikhdar Singh, named also Sardar Singh. This man has a son, Ganga Singh, also a defendant. These three, Sikhdar Singh, Ganga Singh and Chhutkau Singh, are among the Gilauli Thakurs who are impleaded as representatives and descendants of the original mortgagors. These three also are the accused in the present case. The charge against them (to which they all plead not guilty) is that they murdered the plaintiff Gajraj on the 25th of December, 1911. The witnesses by whose evidence it is sought to bring home the charge to the accused are the plaintiff Jagdish Singh, the plaintiff Kedar, Gokharan Singh, another of the Gilauli Thakur defendants who did not dispute the mortgage but merely sought to be exempted from liability, Sultan Singh, another of the Gilauli Thakurs who did not appear as a party in the suit but as a witness for the plaintiffs attempting to prove the mortgage, and Sardar Singh, also a Thakur of Gilauli, the only one of the persons named so far who does not appear to have had any connection with the suit and the only one of the witnesses (save a constable and a medical witness) who does not appear to have any interest in common with Jagdish Singh.

There is a plan in evidence, prepared by the investigating officer, and also a written description of the plan. These show the spot alleged to be the scene of the murder and also the residences of the local witnesses. The place mentioned is just within the village site and just on the south-western edge of the village site. It is a place where 5 ways meet. East and west run the eastern and western branches of a road passing through the village and running approximately east and west. Some distance north of this road is the house of Jagdish Singh and some distance south of it is the house of the deceased. A lane continued by a path connects these two houses and the place of the murder is said to be the spot at which this lane crosses the road. On the road, some distance to the west, is a grove into which the accused are said to have run immediately after committing the murder, having been seen by the witness Sardar Singh while on their way thither. The distances given are the result of actual measurement made by the investigating officer. The alleged place of the murder is very close to the back wall of the house of one Munshi Singh. This is the nearest house of all: it furnishes no witness. Eight yards west of the alleged place of murder is a cattle house belonging to the witness Sultan Singh with entrance facing the alleged scene of murder. Ten yards south of the alleged place of murder is a place at which the witnesses Gokaran Singh and Kedar told the investigating officer that they were when they saw the murder being committed. Thirty-six yards south-east of the latter spot is the house of Gokaran Singh, which thus is about forty-six yards east by south from the alleged scene of murder. The house of the deceased (in which resides his brother the witness Kedar) is forty-four yards south of the place mentioned by Gokaran Singh and Kedar to the investigating officer and fifty-four yards south of the alleged scene of murder. On the plan is a point marked by a * thirty-seven yards from the alleged scene of the murder: Sardar Singh pointed it out to the investigating officer as the place at which he was when the accused after committing the murder came into his sight coming from the east after committing the murder and running into the grove to the west. North of this spot is a shed in which are kept the cattle of Sardar Singh, witness, and south of this spot is a pond mentioned by Sardar Singh, witness. It is close behind the cattle house of Sultan Singh.

The case for the prosecution is the following. Deceased came to the house of Jagdish Singh on the evening of the 25th of December, 1911, just before dark. He asked Jagdish Singh for some curd, was given it by Jagdish Singh and went away with it: Jagdish Singh saw him depart with it. Jagdish Singh then re-entered his house and a few minutes later he heard a shouting. This sounded like the shouting attending a fight but conveyed nothing more definite to him. So he sent a servant to make enquiries. This man (who is not a witness) came back and made a statement to him at about ten or twelve minutes after the departure of Gajraj from his house. On receiving the news he went to the place already mentioned as the alleged scene of the murder. There he found Gajraj lying dead. Beside the corpse he found the witnesses Sultan Singh, Gokaran Singh, Kedar and Sardar Singh, in addition to several other persons. The first three told him that they had actually witnessed the murder and Sardar Singh said he had seen the murderers running away. Jagdish Singh then recounts the conversation he had with the witnesses, who explained why they had been unable to intervene. Kedar said that he was close in front of his house when he heard deceased call out. He ran forward at once. Gokaran Singh said that he was in the *barotha* of his house when he heard deceased call out. Thus they indicated that the attack had begun before their attention was attracted. Sultan Singh said he did not go forward at first: when first he saw the affair he was afraid to advance: he went forward when Gokaran Singh and Kedar did, but by then the whole business was over and the murderers ran away. Jagdish Singh says that it was just about sunset when Gajraj came to his house and that the sun had set when he saw the corpse. Thus he fixes the time of murder at almost exactly sunset on the 25th of December. The persons named as the murderers there and then were the three accused and a fourth named Bachan Singh not before the court. He also is a Thakur of Gilauli, but there is nothing to show that he is concerned in any way with the litigation or more nearly related to the accused than to Jagdish Singh or that he is a particular friend or associate or partisan of the accused in anything but this murder.

Kedar's story agrees with the foregoing account of what he is alleged to have said to Jagdish Singh. He differs from Jagdish Singh regarding this conversation alleged by the latter. He adds that he heard his brother call out that Chhutkau and Ganga and Sikhdar and Bachan were killing him. When he heard this he was in the lane, four paces in front of his house. On hearing his brother's cry he ran forward shouting: Jagdish Singh indicates that the shouting that he heard was the shouting of Kedar. Kedar as he ran forward saw four men hacking his brother as he lay on the ground, two with *gandasas*, one with a sword and one with a *banka*. He got within eight or ten paces of them while they were doing this. In answer to his shout Gokaran Singh and Sultan Singh came running forward, and when the three of them neared the murderers the latter ran away. Then Kedar sent for the chaukidar and then Jagdish Singh came. Kedar then went at once to the thana which is five miles distant. He made a report there at 9 p.m., and the Sub-Inspector reached the village at about midnight. He adds that Gokaran Singh came up to the scene of murder two paces behind him and that Sultan Singh reached the corpse at the same time as he (Kedar) did. When first he heard the cry of deceased he was about forty paces from the place of killing. Sardar Singh came up about four paces behind Sultan Singh.

The evidence of Gokaran Singh also does not really contradict that of Jagdish Singh save regarding a conversation which the latter alleges and the former denies. He says that he was in his house, and the first thing that he knew was that he heard Kedar call out that his brother was being killed. He ran forward and when he had gone a little distance from his house he saw the murder being committed. He was within eighteen feet of the murderers when they started to run.

There is also no real contradiction between Sultan Singh and Jagdish Singh except regarding the conversation. Sultan Singh says it was lamp-lighting time and he was coming out of his cattle house after foddering his cattle when he heard the cry of deceased. While still at the door of his cattle house he saw the murder being committed.

The story of Sardar Singh is he had tied up his cattle in his cattle house and was on his way to the pond. Just as he reached the edge of the road that runs to the west he encountered the four murderers running from the east. But just before this he had heard the cry of Kedar at a moment when he was within a pace of the road, and at the same moment he caught sight of the four accused at that moment about three or four paces east of him on the road. The spot at which he was is 40 paces from the spot at wihch the murder was committed.

Now the story of this witness when examined by the police in the night immediately after the murder was that he was actually tying up his cattle in his cattle house when the four murderers ran past. When and how he changed his story it does not appear, but it must have been before the completion of the police investigation, because in the plan the place pointed out by him (marked by a star) as that at which he was when he saw the murderers run past is by the side of the road: thus, before that plan was complete he had changed his original story to his present one. The spot marked by the star is twenty-five paces from his cattle house in which according to his original story he must have been when the accused ran past. The next difficulty in his evidence is that he says he was at the spot marked by the star and that the murderers were three or four paces east of him and in his sight when he heard Kedar call out. But, according to the other witnesses, Kedar cried out some before the murderers started to run, and no one speaks of continued shouting on the part of Kedar. Another difficulty arises in the following way. Kedar says that he got within eight or ten paces of the murderers before they left deceased: he and Sultan Singh reached deceased simultaneously and Sardar Singh came up four paces behind him and Sultan Singh. How then could the murderers have run thirty paces or more to the west, and after they had done so and reached Sardar Singh, Sardar Singh have run back the same distance in time to reach the corpse only four paces behind Kedar and Sultan Singh?

Thus the story of Sardar Singh cannot be true at the same time as the story of the professed eye-witnesses. Either he is false or they are false, or he and they are false.

The medical evidence shows that there were more than forty separate blows struck and nearly fifty injuries in all. There were twenty separate cuts on the arms, hands, feet and legs. There is evidence that deceased was a very powerful man. This taken with the number of the injuries on the limbs shows that there must have been a violent struggle between deceased and his murderers, prolonged for an appreciable duration of time. It shows also that deceased cannot have been silenced for an appreciable time. These circumstances do not at all fit in with the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses. They make the affair exceedingly brief and put an exceedingly small interval between the first cry of deceased and his death. Even Jagdish Singh makes the interval extremely small. The interval from the time of deceased's departure from his house to the time of his learning that he was dead is ten or twelve minutes. During this interval deceased walks eighty-nine yards to the spot where he met his death. Then Jagdish Singh hears a cry. Then he comes out of the house and asks a servant what the matter is. That servant goes away, how far it is not known.

Then he comes back and tells Jagdish Singh what has happened. All of this takes place in ten or twelve minutes. However, the interval allowed by Jagdish Singh is not impossibly small.

Kedar's evidence is to the effect that he had to run only forty or forty-five yards after hearing his brother's cry and before the murderers departed (his house is fifty-four yards from the scene of murder, he was four yards in front of his house, the murderers ran away when he was within eight or ten paces of them). The time taken by Kedar to run this forty or forty-five yards according to his evidence was sufficient for the whole affair, from the first cry of the victim to the last blow struck by his murderers. Gokaran's house is eight yards nearer the scene of the murder than the house of Kedar. He was only two yards behind Kedar in running up to deceased and the murderers. He says he was within six yards of the murderers before they began to run. Kedar's cry must have been uttered immediately after hearing his brother's cry, for his brother, he says, called out that he was being killed. Gokaran Singh says he started to run immediately on hearing the cry of Kedar. Thus Gokaran Singh allows no more time for the murder than Kedar does. Sultan Singh is not so definite, but he also makes the affair last a very small time.

It might be possible to say regarding the evidence of Sardar Singh that he may not have heard the first cry of Kedar but a later cry. This would give time for the murderers to reach the point on the road where he says he saw them, but, on the other hand, it would emphasise the difficulty of making him reach the corpse so early as the other prosecution witnesses allege.

It is pointed out that the minimum of time was spent in reporting the case to the police, naming the murderers, getting the police in the village and having the statements of the witnesses down on paper. But the witnesses had six hours' start of the police and it was very easy in such a time to make up so simple a story as the evidence for the prosecution puts forward in examination-in-chief. But, unfortunately for them, the investigating officer was a man who realised the importance of local detail, and was careful to make measurements for his plan instead of trusting to estimating and pacing.

The question of motive does not help at all in this case. The plaintiffs in the suit had a very stale claim, and how speculative this was is clear from the terms on which Jagdish Singh was able to buy half. The Subordinate Judge had dismissed the suit on a point of credibility of witnesses. No advantage was to be gained by murdering Gajraj (for the man financing the case and the brothers of Gajraj were left), unless the idea was to terrify the remainder of the plaintiffs by murdering one of them. Also the accused are not the only defendants in the suit. There are also equal motives on the other side, for Sikhdar Singh once had the property of Jagdish Singh attached. Then none of the witnesses are really impartial. Jagdish Singh and Kedar are plaintiffs in the suit, and on this account have just as much motive for trying to get the accused or any of the contesting defendants out of the way as any of the defendants have for trying to get a plaintiff out of the way. Gokaran Singh is a defendant who was prepared to make admissions in the suit favourable to the plaintiffs. Sultan Singh was one of the plaintiffs' witnesses in the suit. He also is a co-sharer and tenant of Jagdish Singh in one of his *pattis*. No reason for partiality or hostility has been made out against Sardar Singh, but that he must have one is evident from the fact that he has thought fit to change his story in order to improve the case against the accused.

The accused have been consistent in their denials from the very beginning.

Reliance is placed on the promptitude of the first report. Now the murder must have been committed not later than 6 p.m. according to the evidence. The report was made at 9 p.m. at a thana five miles away. This leaves quite enough time for the getting together of a story for the police report. And that report ties down no one at all to any particular fact save Kedar himself. He says that he saw the murder being committed, but, regarding Sultan Singh, Gokaran Singh, and Sardar Singh, all that is said is that they came up hearing the cry of deceased. There is nothing in the report to make it impossible for the evidence to be made up in the six hours before the police came. It seems to be quite clear that the witnesses for the prosecution are not really describing what they saw. It is impossible to say how much as evidence is fact and how much is fiction. One assessor believes the evidence for the prosecution and would convict all three of the accused. The other two go so far as to regard the case as a fabricated one going upon some of the more general aspects of the case that I have not mentioned, in fact, upon the unlikelihood of the commission of a murder in the place and at the time and in the manner alleged.

I find it impossible to convict on the evidence offered, for I do not believe it. Agreeing with two assessors and differing from one, I acquit the accused Chhutkau Singh, Ganga Singh, and Sikhdar Singh of the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

(Sd.) H. J. Bell,
Sessions Judge.

22nd February, 1912.

APPENDIX II.

Judgment of the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh.

This is an appeal instituted according to the provisions of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Public Prosecutor under the direction of the Local Government against the acquittal of Chhutkau Singh, Sikhdar Singh and Ganga Singh by the Sessions Judge of Sitapur upon a charge of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. On the 25th December, 1911, Kedar *Bhat* arrived at the Mohamdi police station in the Kheri district at 9 p.m. and made the following report:—

"A suit in a civil court in respect of *zamindari* (property) was fought between my brother Gãjraj Singh (on the one side) and Baryar Singh, Sikhdar Singh and other *pattidars* (on the other). About three or four months ago my brother Gajraj Singh lost the suit. An appeal has therefore been filed in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. For this reason Baryar Singh and other *pattidars* bore a grudge. This evening my brother Gajraj Singh was sitting at the door of Jagdish Singh. A little while after he returned home. When he neared the house, he cried out 'Ah! Chhutkau Singh and Sikhdar Singh are killing (me).' I was in the house. Hearing the voice I ran up to the spot and saw that Sikhdar Singh, Chhutkau Singh, Bachan Singh and Ganga Singh were stabbing my brother Gajraj with a *banka*, a *gandasa* and some other weapon which appeared to shine like a sword. Gokaran Singh, Sultan Singh and Sirdar Singh had also come up on hearing the voice. Thereupon Sikhdar Singh, Chhutkau Singh, Bachan Singh and Ganga Singh ran towards the west in the direction of the grove. The corpse of Gajraj Singh is lying on the very spot, and a *danda* and a brass *biliya* (bowl) in which Gajraj Singh was bringing curds are lying at the same place. I have come for making a report. Fateh *chaukidar* has been seated near the corpse." On receipt of this report Sub-Inspector Sheoraj Singh, the second officer of *thana* Mohamdi, proceeded at once to Gilauli, the scene of the alleged occurrence, which he reached at about midnight. Gilauli is from 4 to 5 miles distant from Mohamdi, but as the investigating officer would naturally have had to make some preparations for his journey and as that journey took place at night over open country, it does not appear that there was any improper delay in taking up the investigation on the spot. On arrival at Gilauli the investigating officer discovered the corpse of Gajraj at the place marked on the plan which is just outside the cattle shed of a certain Sultan Singh. He despatched the corpse to Gola for medical examination.

The preliminary report is complete. It alleges a motive for the murder, details the manner in which the murder was committed, gives the names of all the persons who are alleged to have participated in the commission of the offence and gives the names of witnesses who are alleged to have seen the offence committed or to have arrived upon the spot directly after Gajraj was killed. It further gives details as to a stick and a small brass vessel having been found close to the corpse. The investigation then proceeded. Three persons mentioned in the first report, namely Chhutkau Singh, Sikhdar Singh and Ganga Singh, were arrested. Bachan Singh has not been arrested and appears to have absconded. The three men who were apprehended were subsequently committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge of Sitapur, who acquitted them by a judgment dated 22nd February, 1912, mainly upon the ground that he considered the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses unreliable. Of the three assessors who assisted him in the trial two concurred in a verdict of acquittal; the third believed the evidence and suggested a conviction.

The three accused persons were defended before the Sessions Court by Mr. John Jackson, Barrister-at Law. He has appeared for them again in this Court, and we have thus had the advantage of having the same arguments advanced before us as were advanced before the learned Sessions Judge, and which must have to a considerable extent influenced him in arriving at his decision. There can be no doubt of any kind upon the evidence as to the fact that Gajraj was murdered. It is unnecessary to give our reasons for this conclusion, as the Sessions Judge and the learned counsel for the defence are both in agreement as to this fact.

The next point for determination in this case is, whether the murder was committed as alleged by the prosecution witnesses at the place indicated in the plan. Mr. Jackson's contention is, that the evidence justifies the conclusion that Gajraj was not murdered at this place or anywhere near it; that he must have been murdered at another place at some distance from the place suggested; and that his dead body must after the murder have been removed from the place where he had been killed and put at the spot in question before the arrival of the police investigating officer.

It is to be observed that the learned Sessions Judge has not found anywhere in his judgment that there are grounds to support Mr. Jackson's theory. He has discussed what he considers to be the weaknesses of the evidence in considerable detail, but nowhere does he arrive at the conclusion at which Mr. Jackson asks us to arrive, upon this particular point. Further, he nowhere suggests the possibility of such a theory. Neither of the two assessors who were in favour of an acquittal suggests this view of the case. It is true that they say "It is not likely that at that time of day a man would be murdered in the *tola* of the enemies of the accused if the accused were the murderers." But this in no way indicates that they accepted such a theory as that propounded by Mr. Jackson. He has informed us that he placed this theory before the Sessions court. The only conclusion that we can draw is that neither the Sessions Judge nor the assessors accepted it. Apart from the views of the Sessions Judge and the assessors, which are only material in assisting us to a conclusion, the evidence upon the record must be examined to see whether it can justify the acceptation of this theory. We asked Mr. Jackson to indicate the evidence which is in favour of the view he pressed upon us. He indicated to us a portion of the evidence given under cross-examination by the witness Jagdish Singh: "It is not correct to say that the place at which Gajraj is said to have been killed is surrounded by the houses of the enemies of the accused. The houses of the accused's enemies are on the east of that place and on no other side." This was the only portion of the evidence in the case to which Mr. Jackson could refer. We have no hesitation in saying that this evidence cannot be held to prove that the corpse of Gajraj was removed from the place where he had been killed and placed on the spot where it was discovered by the police investigating officer. It is obvious that, if the murder was committed on the spot suggested by the prosecution, the appearance of the ground where the corpse was found would have been likely to afford some indication of the fact, and conversely if the body of Gajraj had been removed to that spot after his death there would be every likelihood of deducing from the absence of such indications that the murder had not been committed in that place. There is, however, no evidence on the record from which a conclusion to this effect can be drawn one way or the other, and such evidence cannot be obtained now. Mr. Jackson on his own showing refrained from cross-examining the police officer or the witnesses, who alleged that they had seen Gajraj murdered, or had seen his corpse shortly after the murder was committed, in order to elicit that there were no traces of blood, pieces of cut flesh, disturbance of the ground or other marks of such a nature upon the place mentioned in the plan. He further called no evidence to prove the absence of such marks upon the spot. He has argued that it was not his duty either to cross-examine upon the point or to adduce evidence to prove a negative, but that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove affirmatively that there were such indications on the ground; and that, as the prosecution failed to do so, the inference to be drawn by this Court should not only be in favour of his theory but should be sufficient in itself to justify its acceptance. We cannot accept this conclusion. We consider that the prosecution would have been well advised to produce evidence upon the point; but in view of the fact that the prosecution produced direct evidence to prove that Gajraj was murdered on the spot, it was not absolutely necessary that it should produce evidence as to the state of the ground; and we do not see how we can be possibly expected to come to a direct conclusion that the alleged scene of the occurrence showed no indication that a murder had been committed upon it, because there was no evidence upon the record to justify such a finding.

If the circumstances of the case are looked at, it will be seen that they go to negative any such conclusion. Kedar in his first report alleged that Gajraj had been murdered that evening, and the subsequent evidence goes to show that the murder took place a little before or after sunset, that is to say at about 5.30 p.m. to 6 p.m. on the 25th December. The medical evidence shows that the stomach of the deceased at the time of the *post mortem* examination contained a pound of liquid food, for the most part undigested rice, which indicates that the deceased had died three to four hours after he had eaten his last meal. The *post mortem* examination was made on the 27th December, 1911, and the medical witness who conducted it has deposed that death had occurred some forty hours before the *post mortem* examination was made. As the last meal of the deceased must on these two circumstances have been his midday meal, we arrive at the conclusion that his death took place at about 5.30 p.m. or 6 o'clock of the evening of the 25th December. Kedar arrived at the Mohamdi police station at 9 p.m. on the same day. The investigating officer apparently took two hours to cover the distance from Mohamdi to Gilauli, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that Kedar must have taken a somewhat similar time to cover the distance from Gilauli to Mohamdi. It is true that a man walking fast would not require two hours ordinarily for a journey of five miles, but, as it was a winter night and the map appears to show that the direct route which would cover five miles would be a cross-country route and the route would be considerably more than five miles if an attempt were made to follow roads or paths, we think that we are justified in assuming that Kedar took some two hours over his journey. In these circumstances he must have left Gilauli at about 7 p.m. In other words, he left the village about an hour after the death of his brother. This circumstance appears to us to tell strongly against a theory that the corpse of his brother was removed from the place where it had been killed and brought to another place, and that Kedar had arranged to make a false statement as to where the murder was committed. There obviously was not sufficient time in which to carry out such a plan.

The learned Sessions Judge has laid considerable stress in his judgment upon the question of motive and upon the arguments which convinced him that the witnesses for the prosecution were partisans and influenced by feelings of enmity against the accused. We shall now consider what weight there is in these observations. It is established that Gajraj, deceased, Kedar, the prosecution (? witness), and Ram Sahai had instituted in 1910 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Kheri a suit upon the basis of an alleged mortgage for possession by foreclosure of half the village of Gilauli and other property. They transferred by sale to Jagdish Singh, also a witness for the prosecution in this case, half their alleged rights, and Jagdish Singh is proved to have financed the litigation. This suit was against over 50 Thakurs of the village. The three original plaintiffs were Bhats, Jagdish being a Thakur. Chhutkau Singh, Sikhdar Singh and Ganga Singh were three of the defendants and Chhutkau and Sikhdar Singh were two of the four men who prepared the case and instructed for all the defendants. This suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge. An appeal lay to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. The plaintiffs have filed an appeal which has not yet come on for hearing in this Court. The case in question is the case to which reference is made in the first report.

It is a justifiable conclusion that the existence of this litigation would be likely to produce friction, which may have been of a very serious nature, between the plaintiffs and their party and the defendants and their party, but the failure or success of the appeal which is now pending in this Court can hardly be affected either by the murder of one of the plaintiffs or by the institution of a false charge of murder against three of the defendants. The removal of Gajraj on the one side or of Chhutkau Singh, Sikhdar Singh and Ganga Singh on the other cannot affect the instruction of counsel. Thus the suggestion, which is made by Mr. Jackson, that Gajraj was murdered by some of his own party so that a false charge might be fixed upon the other side to the prejudice of their success in the appellate court, or that Gajraj was murdered by third parties and the opportunity was seized by the plaintiffs to remove three of the leading defendants-respondents cannot be supported by any consideration of the prospects of the pending appeal. We are unable to see what possible advantage can be gained by the plaintiffs-appellants from the death of Gajraj, or what motive they could have with regard to their prospects in this litigation to wish to get rid of him. The motive for the defendants or some of the defendants to murder Gajraj would also not be in connection with the prospects of the case, but it is a perfectly reasonable presumption that, as Gajraj had made himself very conspicuous in the suit against the Thakur defendants, his action in so doing may have been intensely resented, and this fact would afford a motive for his murder. The question of motive is, however, by no means clear, and we are not disposed to come to any decision upon the point. In view of the evidence as to actual murder the point of motive is comparatively immaterial.

We shall now consider the facts which go to show whether the witnesses in the case are or are not partisan witnesses and enemies of the persons charged. Jagdish Singh, the first prosecution witness, is the main plaintiff in the case. It may fairly be conceded that he is not likely to be on friendly terms with the accused persons. Kedar, the brother of the deceased, is a plaintiff in the case, and he also is not likely to be on good terms with the accused men, even if they did not murder his brother. Gokaran Singh, the third witness, was a defendant in the suit, but he admitted the existence of the alleged mortgage although he alleged that he was not liable under its terms. This does not absolutely show that he belongs to the party of the plaintiffs, but in case of doubt the inference may well be that he does belong to that party. Sultan Singh, the fourth witness, gave evidence for the plaintiffs in that suit, and may be considered to belong to the party of the plaintiffs. Sardar Singh, the fifth witness, is not shown to have any connection with either party. It is thus established that four of the important witnesses out of five are connected with one side in this civil litigation and that the accused are connected with the other side. The learned Sessions Judge was right in attaching importance to this circumstance; but we consider that he has attached undue importance to it, and that, while examining the evidence of these witnesses from the standpoint of their connection with the civil suit, he has overlooked the salient aspects of the case. An examination of the plan shows that there are very few houses situated close to the place where Gajraj is alleged to have been murdered. The place is on the outskirts of the inhabited area of the village and there appear to be open ground and fields to the west. The following persons reside in the immediate vicinity. Adjoining the place is the house of a certain Munshi Singh. Gajraj is said to have been murdered outside the back of the wall of the house of Munshi Singh. Opposite is a cattle shed of Sultan Singh. At some little distance to the north is the house of Jagdish Singh. To the north-west are the house and the cattle shed of Sardar Singh and the house of Sultan Singh. There is also the house of Kishori Singh. To the south is the house of Gokaran Singh, close to which is the house of Kedar and the deceased Gajraj. There is in addition an unoccupied shed belonging to Bharan Singh in the vicinity. If the murder were committed as alleged the only persons likely to have been in the immediate neighbourhood were the residents of the houses of Jagdish Singh, Kedar Singh, Gokaran Singh, Sultan Singh, Sardar Singh, Munshi Singh and Kishori Singh. Of these Jagdish Singh, Kedar Singh, Gokaran Singh, Sultan Singh and Sardar Singh have given evidence. No one has given evidence from the house of Munshi Singh and Kishori Singh. It is clear that, apart from the fact that the murder is alleged to have been committed behind the back of wall of the house of Munshi Singh, there can be no reason to suppose that the inmates of those houses must have either been present at the time or even if present, in a position to give relevant evidence as to the occurrence. The case then stands that although four out of five of these witnesses were not inclined to be disposed favourably towards the accused persons all five were nevertheless in a position in which, if the murder had been committed at the place alleged, they might be able to give evidence relevant as to its commission. Further, it is not sufficient to dispose of the evidence of a witness by saying that he is a partisan. In any circumstances the evidence of a witness should be examined and sifted thoroughly. We should hardly be inclined to go behind so far as to say that the evidence of a partisan witness should be examined more closely than the evidence of any other witness, for the evidence of all witnesses should be examined as closely as possible. The learned Sessions Judge appears, however, to have approached the case with a strong prejudice against the evidence of all these witnesses, simply because he considered four out of five to be partisans. We do not go so far as to say that any of them are enemies of the accused. While admitting that four out of five were not disposed to be friendly with the accused, before the murder was committed, there is no sufficient evidence on the record to show that they were on terms of actual enmity with them.

We shall now examine the evidence in detail. Jagdish Singh, who was the first witness, deposed that Gajraj came to his house that evening and that he gave Gajraj some curds which the deceased took away with him. His evidence on this point is corroborated by the fact that a brass vessel, which had apparently contained curds, was found lying near the corpse of the deceased. Shortly after the deceased had left the house of the witness Jagdish Singh heard shouts. He sent a man to inquire what had happened, and on the man's return and in consequence of the information received he went to the spot and there found the corpse of the deceased. The house of Jagdish Singh is 89 yards from the place where the corpse is alleged to have been found. The learned Sessions Judge makes the following comments on the evidence of this witness:—"Even Jagdish Singh makes the interval extremely small. The interval from the time of the deceased's departure from his house to the time that he learnt that he was dead is ten or twelve minutes. During this interval deceased walks eighty-nine yards to the spot where he met his death. Then Jagdish hears a cry. Then he comes out of the house and asks a servant what the matter is. That servant goes away, how far it is not known. Then he comes back and tells Jagdish what has happened. All this took place in 10 or 12 minutes." The learned Sessions Judge, it is true, adds "however the interval allowed by Jagdish Singh is not impossibly small," but it appears to us palpable that he was affected in his appreciation of the evidence of Jagdish Singh by an impression that Jagdish Singh had stated that the whole occurrence had taken place in a period which was not sufficiently long to permit all the incidents which the other witnesses had mentioned to have happened within it. We are unable to follow the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge. Gajraj had to walk 89 yards. Even if he were walking at a rate of only three miles an hour, it would not take him more than a minute to cover 89 yards. The assailants of Jagdish Singh may well have been waiting for him near the pond behind Sultan Singh's cattle shed or in the lane to the south of the house of Munshi Singh. While in this lane they would not be observed by inmates of the house of Munshi Singh (even if there were any inmates within the house at the time), and Gajraj would not see them until he arrived at the place of his death. It would have been perfectly easy for one of the assailants to have been watching up the lane leading from the spot to the house of Jagdish Singh, and as soon as he saw Gajraj coming down the lane to have turned back to the lane south of the house of Munshi Singh before Gajraj observed him. When Gajraj came round the corner to the spot where he was killed, if his four assailants had set on him at once, all the injuries could have been inflicted upon him, as we shall subsequently show, within a space of forty seconds. It is then in evidence that the murderers ran away. The shouts of the persons who had arrived on the scene immediately afterwards would thus have reached Jagdish Singh within two or three minutes of the time that Gajraj had left his house. If he sent a servant immediately to inquire, the servant could have reached the spot, obtained the necessary information and returned within three minutes more. This would allow Jagdish Singh at least four minutes to walk eighty-nine yards to the spot, even if he reached the place ten minutes after Gajraj had left his house.

There is absolutely nothing in these circumstances upon which the evidence of Jagdish Singh should be discredited. We have examined his evidence carefully. We cannot find that it was in any way shaken in cross-examination.

The next witness is Kedar. He alleges that at that time he had come outside his own house to pass water; that he heard his brother cry out that he was being murdered; and that he thereupon ran towards the spot. The learned Sessions Judge points out that this witness had some forty-five yards to run. Kedar says that, when he reached the spot, he saw Ganga Singh, Sikhdar Singh, Chhutkau Singh and Bachan Singh hacking at his brother who was lying on the ground with various weapons, two of which were choppers, one of which was a heavy sickle, and one of which was a sword, and that when he reached within eight yards of them they ran away to the west. It would be too much to assume, although Kedar says that he started immediately that he heard his brother's cry, that he commenced running at the very instant that he heard the cry. It is quite as likely as not that he remained immovable for ten, twenty or even thirty seconds. A man who is sitting down to pass water and hears his brother call out "Murder!" may well pause for at least half a minute to grasp the significance of the fact. He may not be sufficiently alert to jump at once to his feet and dash off at a run towards the place, but in giving his evidence an Indian villager would not be definite in his own mind as to the interval that elapsed between the time that he heard the cry and the time when he commenced to run. If he had paused as much as thirty seconds he would still think that he started immediately, and in the circumstances there is absolutely no reason to suppose that this witness Kedar reached the spot eight yards from his brother's body sooner than within forty seconds (or possibly more) from the time when his brother received the first blow. This witness was cross-examined, and his evidence was not shaken in any way in cross-examination.

The third witness is Gokaran Singh. He says that he was inside his house at the time, a place in which he naturally might be at such an hour; that when he heard Kedar call out that his brother was being killed he came out of his house and ran up behind Kedar, reaching the place at about the same time that Kedar reached it. Thus he would also have reached the spot not less than forty seconds after the deceased received the first blow. His evidence was also not shaken in cross-examination.

The next witness is Sultan Singh. He says that he was inside his cattle shed feeding his cattle. He heard the cry of the deceased, and, going towards the entrance of his cattle shed, looked out. He is a man of sixty-one years of age, and he says he was afraid to come out of his cattle shed at first and that he did not do so till Gokaran Singh and Kedar had arrived. His evidence shows that the murderers did not run away till at least forty seconds after the first blow had been struck. The evidence of this witness also was not in any way shaken in cross-examination.

The learned Sessions Judge discredits these three witnesses for the following reasons:—

"The medical evidence shows that there were more than forty separate blows struck and nearly fifty injuries in all. There were twenty separate cuts on the arms, hands, feet and legs. There is evidence that deceased was a very powerful man. This, taken with the number of the injuries on the limbs, shows that there must have been a violent struggle between deceased and his murderers prolonged for an appreciable duration of time.

"It shows also that deceased cannot have been silenced for an appreciable time. These circumstances do not at all fit in with the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses.

"They make the affair exceedingly brief and put an exceedingly small interval between the first cry of deceased and his death" . . . . "Kedar's evidence is to the effect that he had to run only forty or forty-five yards after hearing his brother's cry and before the murderers departed (his house is fifty-four yards from the scene of murder, he was four yards in front of this house, the murderers ran away when he was within eight or ten paces of them). The time taken by Kedar to run this forty or forty-five yards, according to his evidence, was sufficient for the whole affair from the first cry of the victim to the last blow struck by his murderers. Gokaran's house is eight yards nearer the scene of the murder than the house of Kedar. He was only two yards behind Kedar in running up to deceased and the murderers. He says he was within six yards of the murderers before they began to run. Kedar's cry must have been uttered immediately after hearing his brother's cry, for his brother, he says, called out that he was being killed. Gokaran Singh says he started to run immediately on hearing the cry of Kedar. Thus Gokaran Singh allows no more time for the murder than Kedar does. Sultan Singh is not so definite, but he also makes the affair last a very small time."

In the first place the medical evidence does not show that there were more than forty separate blows struck. The medical evidence shows that there were thirty-nine wounds on the body which had been caused by cutting weapons. The remaining injuries might as easily have been caused by a fall on the ground and were certainly not caused by cutting weapons. The learned Sessions Judge deduces from the existence of these thirty-nine injuries, and the fact that the deceased was a very powerful man, the theory that there must have been a violent struggle between the deceased and his murderers prolonged for an appreciable duration of time, and that the deceased could not have been silenced for an appreciable time. We are unable to understand his reasoning here. Granted that the deceased was a very powerful man, he was set upon by four men, all armed with dangerous lethal weapons. There is every reason to suppose that he was taken unawares and attacked before he had time to grasp the situation. It is possible that he was never able to offer any defence at all, but, even if he attempted to ward off a blow with the stick that he had, or to grapple with his opponents, he obviously was in no position to defend himself against four men at once. While he was guarding a blow on one side or attempting to grapple one or even two of his assailants he would be laid open to attack by the third or the fourth or both. There may have been and possible was some struggle. He possibly may have resisted his assailants for an inappreciable time, but there is nothing in the medical evidence to show that he was not overpowered and felled to the ground within two or three seconds of the attack upon him. Granted that he called out as soon as he saw his murderers and that he had defended himself for an instant or two, as soon as he had received one of the wounds that smashed the lower jaw into pieces or one of the wounds that cut the upper jaw, he would have been utterly incapable of defending himself in any manner. If then the four men had set upon him as the witnesses have described, and standing over him had hacked him with their choppers, sickle and sword as they are described to have done—very much in the manner of persons chopping fodder—there would not be the slightest difficulty in inflicting forty, fifty, or sixty wounds in forty seconds. Even if sixty wounds were inflicted that would only mean that the one of the four assailants who inflicted most wounds would have to inflict twenty at most, and twenty such wounds could be easily inflicted in forty seconds. The assumption of the learned Sessions Judge is thus unjustified by the facts, and it is largely on this assumption, added to the fact that he finds the witnesses partial, that he has discredited the evidence of these three eye-witnesses. The conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge, so far as it is based on that assumption, can carry no weight of any kind.

The fifth witness was a certain Sardar Singh. This witness is not proved to be connected with either of the parties to the civil suit. His evidence as given in the Sessions Court is to the effect that he had secured his cattle in their shed, which is some fifty or sixty yards from the scene of the murder; that he had then left the cattle shed and was proceeding south towards a pond to perform an office of nature, and that when he had arrived at a spot thirty-seven yards from the scene of the murder, four men, Chhutkau Singh, Sikhdar Singh, Ganga Singh and Bachan Singh, ran past him towards the west and that they were carrying the weapons which have already been described. The learned Sessions Judge has thus criticized the evidence of this witness: "Now the story of this witness, when examined by the police on the night immediately after the murder, was that he was actually tying up his cattle in his cattle house when the four murderers ran past. When and how he changed his story it does not appear, but it must have been before the completion of the police investigation, because in the plan the place pointed out by him (marked by a star) as that at which he was when he saw the murderers run past is by the side of the road: thus before that plan was complete he had changed his original story to his present one. The spot marked by the star is twenty-five paces from his cattle house in which, according to his original story, he must have been when the accused ran past. The next difficulty in his evidence is that he says he was at the spot marked by the star and that the murderers were three or four paces east of him and in his sight when he heard Kedar call out. But according to the other witnesses Kedar cried out some time before the murderers started to run, and no one speaks of continued shouting on the part of Kedar. Another difficulty arises in the following way. Kedar says that he got within eight or ten paces of the murderers before they left deceased: he and Sultan Singh reached deceased simultaneously and Sardar Singh came up four paces behind him and Sultan Singh. How then could the murderers have run thirty paces or more to the west, and after they had done so and reached Sardar Singh, Sardar Singh have run back the same distance in time to reach the corpse only four paces behind Kedar and Sultan Singh?

"Thus the story of Sardar Singh cannot be true at the same time as the story of the professed eye-witnesses. Either he is false or they are false or he and they are false." It is true that the witness admits that he stated to the police that he was fastening up his cattle when Sikhdar Singh, Chhutkau Singh, Bachan Singh and Ganga Singh ran past him to the west, but we are of opinion that, when he said this, he did not mean to imply that he was actually in his cattle shed when he saw these men run past him. Indian villagers are not usually exact in their description of such incidents. A man who has just fastened up his cattle in a cattle shed and has then walked out some yards away from the cattle shed and has seen certain incidents is quite as likely as not, when questioned as to what he had seen, to reply: "I saw the men at the time that I was fastening my cattle" or "I saw the men when I was fastening my cattle." He really means that he had finished fastening his cattle and had just come away. What fixes the time in his mind is the fastening of the cattle, but he does not mean much more than "I saw the men at the time when I was fastening my cattle and near the place," and we cannot consider that the circumstance that he made the statement that he did to the police affords any reason why the statement that he made in the Sessions Court should not be true.

The next point that the learned Sessions Judge takes is that Kedar deposed that Sardar Singh came running from the west, and came four paces behind Sultan Singh. On turning to the vernacular evidence we find that the correct translation of the latter sentence is that he arrived four paces behind Sultan Singh. Gokaran Singh and Sultan Singh stated that they were unable to say how many paces behind Sardar Singh was. What we understand this evidence to mean is that when Kedar, Gokaran Singh, and Sultan Singh first noticed Sardar Singh the latter was standing four paces behind Sultan Singh. There is absolutely no reason why this should not be correct, and nothing that Sardar Singh has said would contradict this statement. If, as his evidence shows, he saw these men running past him and then proceeded either slowly or quickly towards the spot where the dead body of Gajraj was lying the other three witnesses may well not have noticed him until his arrival, and he may then have been standing four paces behind Sultan Singh. The learned Sessions Judge has also noted that Sardar Singh says that his attention was attracted by the shout of Kedar, and that the evidence of the other three witnesses shows that Kedar cried out before he reached the spot and did not cry out again. The whole affair lasted less than a minute. Sardar Singh may well not remember exactly when he heard the shout, and, further, it is exceedingly likely that Kedar shouted more than once. It is true that no one speaks of continued shouting on the part of Kedar, but no witness appears to have been questioned on the point. There is nothing in the evidence to show that Kedar only shouted once. For the above reasons we are unable to find that the criticisms made by the learned Sessions Judge on the evidence of Sardar Singh in any way discredit that evidence.

The case then stands as follows. There is the evidence of Kedar, Gokaran Singh, and Sultan Singh, who depose that they saw the murder committed. There is the evidence of Sardar Singh, who deposes that he saw the murderers running away directly after the murder was committed. The condition of light at the time was such that these witnesses could have easily identified Chhutkau Singh, Sikhdar Singh, Ganga Singh and Bachan Singh, all of whom they knew before, at the very short distance that they saw they were from them. The evidence of not a single one of these witnesses has been shaken in cross-examination. The reasons adduced by the learned Sessions Judge for disbelieving them are found by us to be of no value. The story stated now is substantially the story which was told in the first report. The first report was made by Kedar, who had left the scene of the occurrence an hour after the murder, and who is a witness in the case. We are unable to understand how the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that Kedar had six hours' start of the police in which to make up the story. It is perfectly clear that the story told by Kedar is the story to which all the witnesses have deposed. These witnesses further are the persons who would be most likely to have been present on the spot at the time of the murder. They are corroborated by Jagdish Singh. After a careful examination of their evidence we can find nothing in the record to discredit it. It is true that four out of five were not actuated by friendly feelings to the accused persons before the murder was committed. But that circumstance in itself affords no reason why their evidence should be discredited, now that it has been carefully tested, and in view of the fact that it is strongly supported by the expedition with which it was recorded after the occurrence. There is then left only one reason why we should discredit this evidence, and that is because the learned Sessions Judge and the two out of three assessors disbelieved it. The third assessor, it is to be noted, believed it. An Appellate Court is always placed in a difficult position when it is asked to find that the evidence of witnesses whom the Judge and assessors have seen and observed is true, when the Judge and the assessors have found it false. This difficulty is present to our minds. It is slightly diminished in this case by the fact that one assessor out of three believed the evidence, but we feel ourselves justified in the finding at which we arrived to the effect, that this evidence is true and reliable, by the circumstance that it appears to us that the learned Sessions Judge has based his finding that these witnesses are unreliable not upon their demeanour, not upon the manner in which they gave their evidence, not upon a suggestion that they were broken down in cross-examination (not a single witness has been broken down in cross-examination) but upon impressions and surmises, which we find to be mistaken and unjustified. The assessors who disbelieved the evidence appear to have been led away by the idea that no man could possibly be so reckless as to murder another, while the light was in the sky, close to the houses of his relatives and friends. This is also a mistaken impression. In the first place the murderers did not run necessarily any great risk. Had they confined themselves to striking two or three blows they would probably have effected their object before any one observed them, and could have made their escape before any neighbour arrived on the scene. The spot on which the murder was committed appears to have been absolutely secluded from the view of persons inside the neighbouring houses. It is clear, however, that the murderers did run a certain amount of risk, but it is a well-known fact, not only in India but elsewhere, that men committing a murder often display an extraordinary disregard of prudential considerations, and to lay down the proposition that it is unsafe to convict on evidence that any person has committed a murder in a place close to the houses of the friends of the deceased in circumstances in which he might have been interrupted at any moment would give countenance to the doctrine that any unprincipled person who chose to run these risks should be permitted to murder with impunity provided he was not caught red-handed on the spot. We have arrived at the conclusion at which we now arrive after prolonged reflection and as careful study of the evidence as we have been able to make, and as a result we are satisfied that the evidence of Jagdish Singh, Kedar, Gokaran Singh, Sultan Singh and Sardar Singh is reliable. Such being our conclusion, we have no option except to reverse the acquittals and to convict Chhutkau Singh, Sikhdar Singh and Ganga Singh on the charge of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It remains to consider the sentences to be passed. This was an exceptionally brutal and cold-blooded murder. It was clearly premeditated. It is true that we are not in a position to discover the motives which actuated the murderers, but they have been unable to set up any defence or explanation. They have contented themselves with a simple denial, and no circumstances have been advanced by the learned counsel who has defended them ably and strenuously which can be considered of an extenuating nature.

We therefore direct that Chhutkau Singh and Sikhdar Singh be hanged by the neck till they are dead. With regard to Ganga Singh we consider, though with some hesitation, that it is not necessary to pass the extreme sentence. He is a young man of twenty-four or twenty-five years of age and the son of the accused Sikhdar Singh. The deceased man appears, as is shown by the first report, to have indicated at the time that Chhutkau Singh and Sikhdar Singh were taking the leading part in his murder. It does not necessarily follow that Ganga Singh took a minor part, but there is some slight indication that he was not as prominent as the other two, and we think that we are justified in giving weight to the view that he probably was acting under the influence and possibly under the direction of his father. We therefore sentence Ganga Singh to transportation for life.

(Sd.) KANHAIYA LAL,
Second Additional Judicial Commissioner.

(Sd.) L. STUART,
First Additional Judicial Commissioner.

16th August, 1912.

APPENDIX III.

Convicts' Petition to the Government of India.

To His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

The humble memorial of Chhatkau Singh and Sikhdar Singh, residents of Gulauli, Police Station Mohammadi, District Kheri, sentenced to death, and Ganga Singh, of the same place, sentenced to be transported for life, and charged under Section 302, Indian Penal Code.

Most respectfully showeth:—

(1) That the memorialists were charged with having murdered Gajraj in the village Gulauli on the 25th December, 1911, and acquitted by the Sessions Judge of Sitapur. On an appeal by the local Government under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh sentenced Chhutkau Singh and Sikhdar Singh to death and Ganga Singh to transportation for life on the 16th August, 1912. This decision under the law being final, your memorialists submitted a memorial to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor on the 27th August, 1912, for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy in their favour.

That His Honour's order rejecting the memorial was communicated to your memorialists on the 2nd September, 1912. Therefore the memorialists most humbly and respectfully appeal to your Excellency for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy in their favour on grounds submitted in the following paragraphs of this memorial:—

(2) That the story for the prosecution as it has been accepted by the Court of Judicial Commissioner may be briefly stated as follows:—

In the evening about sunset time on the 25th December, 1911, Gajraj Singh, deceased, was returning from the house of Jagdish Singh of Gulauli to his house. When he reached the place where five ways meet your memorialists, along with one Bachan Singh, attacked him with sword, *Banka* and *Gandasa.* The deceased shouted and his brother Kidar came and shouted for help, and, stopping a few paces from the alleged scene of occurrence, saw the deceased lying on the ground and your memorialists giving blows till your memorialists had fled to the west after giving the deceased some 40 blows. Other witnesses had arrived in the meantime.

(3) That the nature of the evidence upon which the aforesaid story of the prosecution is based would appear from some of the important discrepancies and strange and unexplained features of that evidence as hereinafter mentioned.

(4) That it is admitted that Gajraj, deceased, along with his brother Kidar and one Jagdish, who are witnesses for the prosecution, and others brought a suit for foreclosure in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Kheri against your memorialists and others on the basis of a mortgage; the amount alleged to be due under the mortgage was over a million of rupees. That the suit has been *completely dismissed.* That all the eye-witnesses are more or less interested in that case excepting the witness Sirdar Singh, who has varied his story from time to time.

(5) That the house close to the alleged place of murder furnishes no witnesses.

(6) That it is not explained how it was possible for your memorialists to have escaped being noticed by anybody where it is suggested they were waiting in an open space where five roads meet, with sword, *Banka*, etc., in their hands.

(7) That the nature of the wounds and the medical evidence along with the admitted fact that the deceased was a very strong and powerful man show that there must have been a violent struggle, prolonged for an appreciable duration. It shows also that deceased cannot have been silenced for an appreciable time yet the witnesses, even those who were at places from which the alleged place of murder was clearly visible, see nothing except the deceased lying on the ground and your memorialists giving him blows with sword, etc., and witnesses make the time incredibly short.

(8) That Sirdar Singh whom your memorialists are alleged to have passed at some distance from the alleged scene of occurrence sees nothing and yet comes up four paces behind Kidar.

(9) That the prosecution witness No. 1, namely, Jagdish, who is a very influential man owning half of the village, who has lost the suit for the other half while the memorialists were the successful party, would naturally devise this method of terrorising your memorialists, the defendants, who were successful in the suit into a compromise or abandonment of their resistance.

(10) That it is highly improbable that your memorialists should have chosen the place of murder at a time when there was light enough for them to be identified, and in the midst of houses occupied by persons known to be hostile to them without any attempt to disguise themselves.

(11) That the evidence was disbelieved by the Sessions Judge and two out of the three assessors who tried the case and before whom the witnesses were produced and who were in a better position to judge the weight of the evidence. That it was because of the weak points in the prosecution evidence and of the mysteriousness of the crime in the absence of any motive on the part of the memorialists that the majority of the assessors with their experience of the village life gave a verdict of acquittal with which the learned Sessions Judge, who along with them had an opportunity to observe the demeanour of the witnesses, agreed. It is respectfully submitted that this alone shows that the case was a very doubtful one for the prosecution.

(12) That no motive has been proved for the alleged murder. The learned Judicial Commissioners say "we are not in a position to discover the motives which actuated the murderers". It is respectfully submitted that the absence of motive for the crime is generally considered a good ground for the acquittal of the accused persons, and even in exceptional cases there must be evidence not only of the most truthful eye-witnesses but their testimony must be corroborated by other witnesses. In the present case, it is respectfully submitted that the evidence of the eye-witnesses is tainted, as all of them have a strong motive to get your memorialists out of the way, while Sirdar Singh, who may be said as a corroborative witness is perhaps the greatest liar whose evidence is disbelieved even by the only assessor who was in favour of conviction, and in the statements of all the witnesses there are discrepancies which even the Court of Judicial Commissioner noticed but to which it has failed to attach sufficient importance.

(13) That the accused had called a number of witnesses for the defence whom they did not produce, relying on the demeanour of the learned Sessions Judge who appeared to be favourable to the accused at the close of the prosecution. And on appeal the accused did not expect that a complete acquittal would be changed into a conviction. The accused have been misled and mistaken into not producing their defence witnesses who would have given a true and intelligible story of the murder, which is to the effect that Gajraj was murdered by Mathura, who had an intrigue with the wife of the deceased and who was afraid of the deceased taking a revenge on him. He has been several times prosecuted for murder but the cases failed for want of sufficient evidence. This Mathura even now keeps the widow of the deceased and is a servant of Jagdish, prosecution witness No. 1, who, in order to shield his servant and to get your memorialists out of the way, as mentioned above, has falsely got this suit to be brought against your memorialists.

(14) That it is a well known fact in the village where this murder was committed and in the neighbouring villages also that your memorialists are innocent. As a proof of this, your memorialists attach a statement that your memorialists are believed to be innocent, signed by 120 respectable people of the village and the neighbouring villages, Zamindars, Lambardars, and etc.

(15) That considering the nature of the case and the many doubts that it raises, the memorialists most humbly and respectfully pray that your Excellency may be so good and gracious as to exercise the prerogative of mercy on their behalf and set at liberty or commute the capital sentence passed on two of them to one for transportation. It is further prayed that pending the disposal of their memorial by your Excellency, the execution of the memorialists which is fixed to take place on the 9th of this month be stayed.

And your Excellency's humble memorialists as in duty bound shall ever pray.

SADIQ ALI KHAN, Bar.-at-Law.

Dated Lucknow, the 5th September, 1912.

EAST INDIA (MEDICAL).

CORRESPONDENCE

REGARDING THE

INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE

AND THE

MEDICAL PROFESSION IN INDIA.

[*In continuation of Cd.* 4666.]

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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EAST INDIA (MEDICAL).

CORRESPONDENCE

REGARDING THE

INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION IN INDIA.

[*In continuation of Cd.* 4666.]

No. 1.

Letter from the Government of India (Home Department) to the Right Honourable the Earl of Crewe, K.G., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 21 *(Sanitary, Medical), dated Calcutta, the* 17*th November,* 1910.

Lord George Hamilton, in his despatch, No. 45, dated the 4th May, 1899, referred to the great increase in the Indian Medical Service which had taken place between the years 1884 and 1899, and asked whether means could not be found to reduce the establishment or at any rate to restrict its increase. Later, in his despatch, No. 5, dated the 18th January, 1900, written in reply to the despatch from Lord Curzon's Government, No. 185, dated the 26th October, 1899, he remarked that the question of reducing the establishment of the Indian Medical Service or of restricting its growth was one which deserved attention, both on the ground of economy and also with reference to the recruitment question; and that the two questions were closely connected, because any failure in the supply of candidates might call for remedies involving considerable permanent increase of expenditure. He observed that it was clear that if the increase of the number of medical officers in the pay of Government, or the specialisation of their functions, were to keep pace with the growth of an immense population, the extension of the service might proceed indefinitely. He assumed that he would have the concurrence of the Government of India in thinking that an attempt to organise medical relief or research on a scale which would be much larger than that which was required for administrative duties was neither expedient nor practicable, and added that it was of material importance that no impediments should be placed in the way of the gradual spread through the interior of India of an independent medical profession, which alone could adequately supply the needs of the people.

2. Lord George Hamilton reverted to the question in his despatches, No. 29, dated the 15th March, 1900, and No. 157, dated the 13th December, 1900, in connection with a scheme for improving the administration of asylums in India by the appointment of officers of the Indian Medical Service as whole-time superintendents. In the former he raised the question whether, if persons possessing special knowledge and experience of mental diseases were required, it would not be better to obtain, at the beginning, one or more experts from England for the purpose. In the latter he said that the point for discussion was whether Government were bound to provide from the Indian Medical Service for the growing needs beyond the ordinary administrative duties, of the country in respect of medical relief, and suggested that the time might have come for determining whether the Indian Medical Service should continue to be treated as the sole source of supply for demands that were sure to multiply indefinitely and that were provided for in other countries by resort to an open profession. He then went on to urge the advisability of giving some of the appointments which were reserved for the Indian Medical

Service to men selected from the medical profession generally. He observed that such men existed at present in India in limited numbers only, but that that was partly the result of their practical exclusion from all official recognition in connection with public offices. He added that it would be of great benefit to India generally if medical men were to establish themselves in private practice in the country in the same way as they did in other parts of the Empire, without increasing the medical service connected with the army. In his despatch, No. 43, dated the 26th April, 1901, he repeated several of these arguments, and emphasised the fact that the Indian Medical Service was primarily a military service, and that its first and only indispensable duty was the medical charge of the Indian Army. Lord Curzon's Government, in paragraph 14 of their despatch, No. 86, dated the 13th June, 1901, expressed their full concurrence in Lord George Hamilton's opinion that it was most undesirable to attempt to provide from the Indian Medical Service for the growing needs, beyond the ordinary administrative duties, of the country in respect of medical relief. They observed that the growth of an independent medical profession in India was a development which they would welcome, and that they would be ill-disposed to recommend any measures which might retard it. On the other hand, they expressed the opinion that the development of such a profession must necessarily be a slow and gradual progress.

3. Throughout the whole of this correspondence the point on which most stress was laid was the impossibility of providing by extensions of the Indian Medical Service for the growing medical needs of the people of the country, as distinguished from the ordinary requirements of the administration. No suggestion was made that medical officers of Indian nationality should be substituted for European medical officers, and in fact Lord George Hamilton appears to have thought that European medical men, if encouraged by the prospect of obtaining Government appointments, could be induced to establish themselves in private practice in India as they have done in other parts of the Empire. We think it necessary to emphasise this point, because the fact that the previous correspondence was not sufficiently referred to or considered in our despatch of the 20th August, 1908, or in the letter which we addressed to local Governments after we received Your Lordship's despatch of 11th December, 1908, has, we find, given rise to much misunderstanding Several of the local Governments, in particular the Punjab, have inferred that the main object aimed at was the transfer of a considerable number of appointments, now held by a service mainly European, to medical officers of Indian nationality, even at a serious loss of efficiency. We regret that this misunderstanding should have occurred, as it has obscured the main issues raised, which are (1) how far it is possible for Government to stimulate the growth of an independent medical profession; (2) whether, and, if so, how far, the allotment to the Indian Medical Service of the civil posts, which they now hold, operates to discourage the growth of such a profession; and (3) how far the withdrawal of such appointments, so far as practicable and expedient, from that service, would serve to encourage it. The question how far it is possible or expedient to substitute for officers of the Indian Medical Service medical men of Indian nationality or medical men recruited in India, though one which merits our most careful attention, cannot be considered as more than one of the subsidiary points for consideration.

4. In 1908 we pointed out that about one-third of the civil appointments now held by the Indian Medical Service do not form any part of the war reserve, and that consequently there would be no objection, from a military point of view, to their transfer to medical men not belonging to that service. Starting from that premise, we concluded that, subject to certain specified conditions, a considerable number of the appointments not included in the war reserve might gradually be transferred to medical men not belonging to the Indian Medical Service. We had not at that time had the advantage of the opinions of local Governments, and we regret to find that we gravely underestimated the objections, on other grounds than those connected with the requirements of the Indian Army in time of war, to the transfer of appointments which we contemplated. We have now given the whole question our most careful consideration in the light of the opinions of local Governments, copies of which are enclosed with this despatch. We recognise most fully the importance of encouraging the growth of a private medical profession and the impossibility of the Indian Medical Service being expanded so as to meet all the medical needs of India. But we feel bound to recede from the position which we previously took up, because, on further consideration of the question, we are convinced that the mere transfer of a certain number of Government appointments from the Indian Medical

Service to private practitioners would do practically nothing to encourage the growth of an independent profession; that most of the civil appointments now held by the Indian Medical Service could not suitably be given to men not in regular Government service, with whom their private practice would be the first consideration; and that the retention of a considerable number of superior civil medical appointments for the Indian Medical Service is essential, not only in the interests of administrative efficiency, but also for the purpose of making the service itself attractive to able medical men. In short, while we adhere to the views previously expressed, that it is impracticable to provide from the Indian Medical Service for the growing needs, beyond the ordinary administrative duties, of the country in respect of medical relief, we hold strongly that the appointments now held by officers of the Indian Medical Service are required strictly for ordinary administrative duties, which cannot suitably be performed by men otherwise recruited.

5. As indicated above, the most important question which we have to consider is what can be done by Government to encourage the development of an independent medical profession. It has been assumed in previous correspondence that the chief, if not the sole, cause operating against the development of such a profession is the fact that most medical appointments have hitherto been retained for the Indian Medical Service. The letters received from the local Governments prove conclusively that this is not the case. In the first place, it is manifest that before a large supply of medical practitioners qualified according to Western methods can be called into existence, there must be a wide-spread demand for them. The fact that there is not, at the present time, such a demand is almost entirely due to the circumstance that the mass of the people are still content with the *kaviraj*, *hakim*, *vaid*, *ojha*, and the like, who are trained according to indigenous methods, and who exist in very large numbers everywhere. When the mass of the people become dissatisfied with men of this class and require the services of medical men qualified according to Western methods, the supply will readily be forthcoming. The demand already exists in some of the cities and large towns, and will no doubt increase in such places as time goes on, and it will, doubtless, similarly extend in due course to the country districts. The letters of the local Governments show very clearly that what is wanted for the encouragement of the school of allopathic medicine is the gradual conversion of the people to this system, and that the mere transfer of a certain number of appointments from the Indian Medical Service to private practitioners would have no effect in that direction. On the contrary, as the Bombay Government have pointed out, such a measure might have a positively detrimental effect, as it might lead young men to try by various methods to secure Government appointments, instead of settling down to private practice. The withdrawal of Indian Medical Service officers, except with due circumspection, would also operate in another way against the development of an independent medical profession. We would instance the city of Ahmedabad, in the Bombay Presidency. There, originally, the civil surgeon had all the allopathic practice, and there were no private practitioners other than the *kaviraj* and the like, trained according to indigenous methods. At the present time the civil surgeon has scarcely any private practice, almost the whole of his time being devoted to his administrative duties. On the other hand, there are a large number of private allopathic practitioners, and this happy result has been due entirely to the confidence in the allopathic system engendered by successive Indian Medical Service officers. This beneficial process has been going on everywhere in India, and it would be, in our opinion, a fatal mistake to check it by withdrawing the very men who are making allopathic medicine popular.

6. Government can, however, assist the development of an independent profession, and some of the chief ways in which they can do so are:—

(1) By providing, as they do at present, and as they should do in an increasing measure in the future, so far as may be necessary, Government colleges and schools for the instruction of qualified practitioners.

(2) By throwing open, as has already been agreed to by the Government of Bengal, the appointments of house physician and house surgeon in the large Presidency Government hospitals to the best students of each year, whether or not they propose to enter Government service.

(3) By encouraging the establishment of medical colleges and schools affiliated to the Universities or to Government medical schools, but conducted by independent medical practitioners. We are already taking

steps to this effect in Calcutta and Bombay. It is well known that the Government colleges and schools cannot provide for more than a fraction of those who apply for admission. There is, therefore, ample room for well-equipped and adequately staffed unofficial colleges and schools. The professorships at such colleges and schools, if established, would afford the experience which can be derived from practice in hospitals, which is so important, and which we wish to see extended.

(4) By demonstrating, as they do at present, and as they should do in an ever-increasing measure in the future, both through the agency of their own officers and through that of the various local authorities, the advantages of Western methods in hospitals and dispensaries.

(5) By associating selected private practitioners with the staff of Government hospitals, as honorary physicians and surgeons, and by allowing them facilities for consultations at Government hospitals and the use of the operating theatre, as has already been done in some instances in Bombay, the United Provinces and the Central Provinces. We regard this as a most important measure. It will not enable us to make any reduction in the number of the Indian Medical Service officers at present at the hospitals, but we hope that it may operate to prevent a further increase of such officers.

We have also under our consideration another important question, referred to by the Punjab Government and the Central Provinces Administration, namely, whether anything can be done to stop, or at any rate to lessen, the abuse of charitable hospitals and dispensaries and the unfair competition caused to private practitioners by allowing free attendance and free medicine to well-to-do persons. We have consulted the local Governments on this subject, and propose to examine it carefully when we receive their replies.

7. A further most far-reaching step which Government can take towards assisting the development of an independent medical profession is by making provision for the registration of medical practitioners qualified to practice according to Western methods. This question has attracted attention in this country for many years, but hitherto nothing effectual has been done, because too much has been attempted or proposed. The difficulties connected with the subject have undoubtedly been great, owing to the fact that the mass of the people still prefer to patronise the *kaviraj* and other practitioners trained according to indigenous methods. Any measure which purported to confer benefits on medical practitioners, qualified according to Western methods, and consequently the rivals of the *kaviraj* and the like, was bound to provoke opposition. It was, therefore, necessary to wait until the former class had become considerable both in point of numbers and influence before action could profitably be taken. The Government of Bombay have now proposed to enact a local Registration Act, and to provide for the creation of a medical council. They propose to secure their object as far as possible in the first place by the grant of privileges to qualified practitioners, rather than by the infliction of of penalties upon unqualified persons. When a register of qualified practitioners has been framed, the fact of being a registered practitioner will in itself be a qualification; unqualified practitioners will be sufficiently marked out by the fact that they are not registered; and registered practitioners will take care to make the most of the fact. The registered practitioners, backed by the medical council, will, in course of time, become a powerful body capable of making their influence felt; and then it will be easy, if it is thought desirable to do so, to make the provisions of the law more stringent. The Government of Bengal, which also desires to legislate on the subject, have been advised to frame their Bill on similar lines.

8. We propose to examine separately a suggestion made by the United Provinces Government that the rules regarding retirements should be modified so as to allow an assistant surgeon or sub-assistant surgeon, who may have a chance of an opening in private practice, to take it up without losing all the benefit of his Government service. We have already authorised local Governments to empower properly qualified medical practitioners to sign medical certificates regarding non-gazetted Government servants without requiring that the certificates should be countersigned by a Government medical officer; the old rule in the Civil Service Regulations having tended to divert to Government medical officers practice which might otherwise have gone to private practitioners.

9. Having explained what appear to us to be the chief practical means of developing an independent medical profession, we will now deal with two of the further questions referred to in paragraph 4 of this despatch, viz. :—

(1) whether, and, if so, how far, the allotment to the Indian Medical Service of civil posts, which they now hold, operates to discourage the growth of an independent medical profession;

(2) how far the withdrawal of such appointments, so far as practicable and expedient, from that service, would serve to encourage it.

10. As regards these questions, we cite some of the views expressed by the local Governments. The Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, writes :—" This cry, that the existence of the Indian Medical Service and of the salaried medical services of Government subordinate to it, is militating against the creation of an independent medical profession, is a specious one which will not bear close examination. So far as the Indian agency employed is concerned, the change suggested merely substitutes one set of men for another set of men, a set of men engaged by temporary contract for particular posts for a set of men engaged by permanent contract for a particular service, men without discipline for men under discipline, men who cannot be replaced by transfer if inefficient or guilty of misconduct, for men who can be replaced. There is involved, therefore, a very serious loss of efficiency, there is no addition to the medical practitioners of the country, and no increase in the number of patients treated. As regards the Indian Medical Service, if the civil portion of this service were replaced by Indian doctors, there would again be no net increase in medical practitioners nor in patients treated. There would, in the Central Provinces and Berar, be some 10 or 12 appointments held by Indians which are now held by Europeans, but the objections already urged are so formidable as to make such a step unthinkable. The cry for an independent medical profession therefore resolves itself into the familiar cry for appointments under Government and for the substitution of Indian for European agency." Again he writes :—" In a single sentence, what the budding Indian medical profession is really asking for is salaries; what it really requires for its proper establishment and expansion is not salaries but patients; and patients, if it is worth anything, it will obtain for itself out of India's untreated millions." The Government of the Punjab have made certain proposals for giving up certain appointments, against the wishes of their officers and their own judgment, in the belief that it is the settled policy of Government that this should be done. The letter of the local Government adds, however—" But Sir Louis Dane does not disguise from himself the fact that the course which he is thus prepared to adopt for the purpose of promoting the more extensive employment of Indians in the medical service cannot be described as a step in the direction of fostering a profession of private medical practitioners." The Government of Bengal write :—" Once an officer has accepted an appointment under Government he necessarily ceases to be independent, and the work which he undertakes on behalf of Government will occupy the greater portion of his time; that is to say, he will be a Government servant first and only secondarily a private practitioner." The Government of the United Provinces observe—" That it is desirable to encourage the growth of such a profession (an independent medical profession) is an opinion which is strongly held by the Lieutenant-Governor. He fully agrees in this respect with the view of the Secretary of State and of the Government of India. But he does not consider that the growth can be fostered by petty changes in the system of Government service. The establishment of such a profession is impossible without the existence of a demand for it." And again :—" If any independent practitioner accepted Government service, he would either cease to be independent or he would be useless as a Government officer." And further :—" There are only 46 such officers (Indian Medical Service officers) in a province containing 47⅘ millions of people, in which there are always on duty about 190 Indian civil servants, 85 police officers recruited in England, and 60 or more officers of the Public Works Department similarly recruited. His Honour recognises that the main strength of this argument lies in the acceptance of the fact that the administrative duties which the Indian Medical Service officer has to perform are of an importance equal to that of the duties of officers of the other departments named. He himself has no doubt that this is the case. He does not consider it necessary to elaborate the argument that among 47⅘ millions of people a staff of 46 Indian Medical Service officers is the lowest that could be entertained. A body of highly qualified men of at least this number could always be fully employed (apart from the necessity of entertaining them for the purposes of the Government itself) as

consultants in the practice of assistant surgeons and the existing private practitioners." The Government of Bombay are of the same opinion, and, in connection with the memorial (referred to in paragraphs 29 and 30 of this despatch) of Sir Bhalchandra Krishna urging that more appointments should be given to private medical practitioners, they say :—" The acceptance of the proposals contained in the memorial would, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, result in the creation of a Government medical service wholly recruited in India, and this would in no way further the object in view, which is to foster the growth of an independent medical profession apart from Government service."

11. We fully agree with the local Governments, whose remarks we have quoted above, that the giving of a few appointments here and there which are now held by the Indian Medical Service to men not belonging to that service would not have any appreciable effect on the development of an independent medical profession. It is necessary, we think, to lay particular stress on this point, because once it is admitted, it follows that, throughout the remainder of the discussion of the proposed withdrawal of appointments from the Indian Medical Service, the question is not one of encouraging the growth of an independent medical profession, but that referred to at the close of paragraph 4 of this despatch, viz., the question of substituting, so far as expedient and practicable, for officers of the Indian Medical Service medical men of Indian nationality or medical men recruited in India. The distinction between these two quite separate questions was not, we consider, sufficiently brought out in our previous despatch. We will now proceed to consider how far it is expedient and practicable to give effect to such a policy.

12. In this connection the first point which we think it desirable to emphasise is the importance of not doing anything which would lower the attractiveness of the Indian Medical Service. As Your Lordship is aware, of the total number of officers of that service in civil employ, two-thirds represent the war reserve, which cannot in any circumstances be encroached upon, while the remaining one-third are officers who are employed solely on civil duties. Although we stated in our despatch of the 20th August, 1908, that there would be no objection, from a military point of view, to the transfer to independent practitioners of all the civil appointments held by that one-third, it is obvious that, if all or a large number of these appointments were to be given away to private medical practitioners, the attractiveness of the Indian Medical Service would be greatly diminished. We admitted in that despatch that this danger existed, but we were inclined to think that, as the process would be gradual, and as, by the time that a large number of local candidates was forthcoming, it was possible that the number of medical schools and professorial chairs would have increased, there would be no difficulty in retaining for the Indian Medical Service a proportion of prize appointments sufficient to maintain its attractiveness. There is ample evidence, however, that the publication of our despatch, together with Lord Morley's despatches of the 9th August, 1907, and the 11th December, 1908, has already given rise to widespread uneasiness in professional circles. We have examined the "*British Medical Journal*," the "*Lancet*," and the "*Indian Medical Gazette*," and we cite below the gist of some of the more important articles on this subject. An article of the 15th May, 1909, in the "*British Medical Journal*" stated that the despatch of the Secretary of State had produced a feeling of serious apprehension among the officers of the Indian Medical Service, and a further article, published on the 22nd May, 1909, observed that, if the civil list of the Indian Medical Service were reduced, the result would be that instead of nearly two-thirds of the service being able to look forward to the professional opportunities in civil life which practically all enter in the expectation of attaining within three or four years of reaching India, only a minority would be able to obtain civil work, and that only after a number of years in military employ. The article expressed the hope that the present uncertainty as to the future of this famous service would soon be settled in such a manner as fully to maintain its prospects and traditions, as otherwise the standard of entries would inevitably deteriorate rapidly. On the 4th September, 1909, an article appeared in the same journal pointing out that the prospects of the Royal Army Medical Corps had materially improved in recent years, and that this was another reason for circumspection as regards curtailing the attractiveness of the Indian Medical Service. The "*Lancet*," in an article of the 10th July, 1909, expressed the opinion that the proposals of the Government of India and the Secretary of State would affect the Indian Medical Service injuriously. Again, on the 20th August, 1909, an article in the same journal pointed out that there was less competition now than formerly for the various medical services, that this was

the more unfortunate, inasmuch as fewer men were now entering the medical profession as a whole in England, and that it was undesirable that the attractions of the medical services should be reduced, as those of the Indian Medical Service would inevitably be, if the proposals in the published despatches were carried out. The "*Indian Medical Gazette*" had two articles (in January and August, 1909) on similar lines. We would remark, in addition to what is stated in the articles above cited, that it is well known that, owing to the advance already made by Indian private practitioners, particularly in the cities and large towns of India, the private practice of members of the Indian Medical Service is considerably less than it was years ago. While this is most satisfactory as evidence of the progress made by the independent medical profession of this country, it seems to us a further reason for not adding unnecessarily to the growing difficulties of recruiting for the Indian Medical Service.

13. Lord Morley referred in his despatch of the 11th December, 1908, to difficulties in the matter of recruitment if further increases to the Indian Medical Service were allowed. We submit, however, that it is, on the other hand, necessary to take into account the fact that recruitment must be affected by proposals which tend to make the Indian Medical Service less attractive. Statistics of the examinations for the last five years show that there have been hardly more than two qualified candidates for each vacancy, and that on one occasion (February, 1907) there were only 25 candidates for 23 vacancies. We have no statistics for years immediately preceding 1904, but we are informed that in previous years the proportion was very much larger. We have also been informed by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, that the general standard of the candidates for the January, 1910, examination was below the average, and that the results were still worse at the examination of July, 1910.

14. We will now discuss the difficulties which have been pointed out by local Governments as regards giving effect to the proposed policy. In the first place, local Governments make it clear that civil surgeoncies, which form the bulk of the appointments held by Indian Medical Service officers, cannot possibly be held by private practitioners. We recognised, in paragraph 7 of our despatch of the 20th August, 1908, that difficulties might arise in connection with giving such appointments to locally recruited men, on account of the multiplicity of gratuitous services which are demanded of civil surgeons, and that patients entitled to such services might complain of neglect. We hoped, however, that these difficulties would not be insuperable and would tend to diminish with the increase in the number of practitioners who were qualified to hold such appointments and were anxious to hold them. We are constrained to abandon this opinion, as the reports of the local Governments make it clear that the proposal is impracticable. For instance, the Government of Bombay say :—

> "The question of appointing private practitioners to hold charge of mofussil civil surgeoncies is one of great importance. The difficulties of carrying on the duties of a civil surgeoncy with a man in charge who is entirely independent of Government seem to be insuperable. The civil surgeon is not only entrusted with the medical care of Government servants and their families, but he is also the final medical and surgical authority in a district containing often a million or more of souls; the administrator of a hospital, a jail and several dispensaries; the sanitary adviser of a municipality; the professional adviser of the civil servants and most of their families; the Government medical referee in the enrolment of the subordinate civil servants and police, and on questions relating to sick leave and retirements on pension caused by ill-health; and last, but by no means least, he is the final and expert adviser of the Crown on all matters pertaining to homicide, suicide, rape, infanticide, grievous hurt and all other medico-legal work of the gravest and most responsible character. It appears impossible for Government to exercise the necessary control over any private practitioner, and it is certain that, if he has any practice of his own, the interests of Government will be sacrificed to it. The ordinary duties of a civil surgeon, if efficiently performed, are of themselves sufficient to occupy nearly all his time, and most civil surgeons have little leisure to devote to private work. It cannot therefore be supposed that a private practitioner, with even a fairly large practice of his own, can possibly give that time to Government work which is necessary."

The other Governments are equally emphatic. Their letters show that the civil surgeon is the right-hand man of Government in respect of medical matters, and that his appointment is an administrative post which can only be held by a whole-time servant of Government. Of the many important duties of the civil surgeon, medico-legal work alone would require that he should be a whole-time officer. Jail work is also of a great importance, and, combined as it is at every point with medical work, must be performed by a Government servant. It is not work which a private practitioner would ever care to take up. The proposal referred to in our despatch of August, 1908, to break up the service of civil assistant surgeons and to make over such appointments to private medical practitioners has since been found to be entirely impracticable, and, for the reasons given in our despatch of the 26th May, 1910, we have abandoned it definitely. The Government of Burma has indeed appointed a private practitioner as civil surgeon in the Tharawaddy district, which is close to Rangoon, but the difficulties which they have experienced in obtaining a suitable man have served to illustrate the much greater difficulties which would occur if any attempt were made to employ private practitioners as civil surgeons in up-country stations. The work of civil surgeons, like that of civil assistant surgeons, is chiefly of an administrative character, and it is not the class of work which men who look chiefly to private practice can be expected either to do well or to be anxious to do at all. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the proposal to appoint Indian private practitioners as civil surgeons is, generally speaking, impracticable and that it should be abandoned.

15. Nor is it practicable to recruit locally, save in exceptional cases, European medical men suitable for civil surgeoncies. Lord George Hamilton, in urging that it would be "a great benefit to India generally that medical men should establish themselves in private practice in the country in the same way as they do in other parts of the Empire without entering the medical service connected with the army," seems to have had in mind the conditions which obtain in Great Britain and in the Colonies, where the population is of European race or birth. As a matter of fact, European doctors can never be expected to establish themselves in this country outside the largest towns, save in exceptional areas, such as Assam, where there is a considerable European population, and the appointment of such men to civil surgeoncies in those exceptional places would seem to be a matter of very doubtful advantage. It would merely mean the recruitment here and there of an individual man, who would have to be replaced by his employers by another recruit from England. It would be of no practical advantage to Government, and would in most cases cause considerable inconvenience to the employers who had brought the men out from England. Similarly, a European who had settled in a city or large town might, here and there, be willing to enter the service of Government, but it is by no means clear that such an arrangement would be of advantage to Government.

16. We agree with the local Governments that the only practical method of recruiting civil surgeons locally is to promote selected civil assistant surgeons to such posts as far as is practicable. This is, we consider, a perfectly legitimate and proper way of rewarding merit in men who have succeeded in their profession and who have been trained to administrative work. Civil assistant surgeons are, for the most part, men with qualifications superior to those of the ordinary private medical practitioner, with the exception of the pick of those engaged in practice in the cities and large towns. We think it desirable to lay stress on this point. Lord Morley's recent despatch on the subject of the Chair of Anatomy at Calcutta seems rather to suggest that he regarded the civil assistant surgeon as being inferior to the ordinary Indian independent practitioner, whereas, as a matter of fact, the reverse is the case. The civil assistant surgeon—unlike the military assistant surgeon, who is a warrant officer trained at Government expense in a Government medical college, and given a college certificate to enable him to work in Government employ and as a general practitioner—begins his career as a private medical student, pays for his own education, and must, previous to his entry into Government employ, have obtained either the M. B. degree or the licence (L. M. S.) of a recognised Indian University. Many civil assistant surgeons are extremely distinguished men, and a considerable number of them have European qualifications. These men would naturally object strongly to being considered inferior, as candidates for Government posts, to the ordinary practitioner who has neither their knowledge nor experience. It is to these men that any appointments which may

be withdrawn from Indian Medical Service officers should, in our opinion, be given, and it will cause great discontent and will lower the standard of efficiency if they are not given the preference which they deserve. A certain number of civil surgeoncies is already reserved for civil assistant surgeons, and it is possible that a few more may from time to time, without objection, be made over to them.

17. There is, however, a very decided and sharp line which indicates the limit of employment of these men in the posts referred to, and that is the obligation which rests upon Government to provide medical aid to their European officers in the various services. This matter, which is not referred to in our recent correspondence with your predecessor, is very clearly set forth in the replies of local Governments. Although it is nowhere laid down that European officers are entitled to attendance by European medical officers, it is perfectly natural that they should wish to be treated by such officers, just as it is natural that persons of other nationalities should wish to be treated by medical men of their own race. This is a matter of special importance in a country like India, where Europeans are living under what are, climatically, very trying conditions. Still more important is it that European officers should know that they can, without unreasonable expense, procure the services of European medical officers for their families. Anything which would spread a belief that Government were careless of the interests of their European officers in this respect would, we are convinced, have a very adverse effect upon the recruitment of the European services in general. Nothing ought to be done, therefore, which would lead to such a reduction of European civil surgeons as would have the disastrous result referred to, and we would deprecate with the strongest emphasis such a proposal as that made by the Punjab Government, against the wishes of their own officers and against their own judgment, but in deference to what they thought were the wishes of higher authorities, to give up to civil assistant surgeons such a number of civil surgeoncies as would lead to the unfortunate result alluded to. In this connection we would invite Your Lordship's attention to the memorials from Government officers forwarded with our despatch of the 24th February, 1910. We support these memorials strongly, and do not propose to take the action suggested by the Punjab Government.

18. We now turn to the case of civil appointments, other than civil surgeoncies, usually held by officers of the Indian Medical Service. These are posts held by high administrative medical officers (such as the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, surgeons-general and inspectors-general of civil hospitals), inspectors-general of jails, sanitary commissioners, deputy sanitary commissioners, professors, chemical analysers and officers asssigned to other special posts. It is, we think, obvious that the chief administrative officers of Government in the medical, sanitary, and, in some cases, the jail, departments should belong to that service. It is also necessary that the Government medical colleges and schools, which not only train the medical subordinates, civil and military, whom Government require for their own immediate work, but which afford at present the only opportunities for satisfactory medical instruction available in India, should be manned to a considerable extent by officers of that service, in order that discipline and a high standard of efficiency may be maintained. There would be no objection, however, provided that fully qualified local candidates were forthcoming, and subject to the limitations indicated in this despatch, in giving some of the professional appointments to such persons. It should, however, be understood that any such candidates must be fully qualified, and that the claims of civil assistant surgeons would receive adequate consideration. For the men who complain most that they cannot obtain Government appointments are not, generally speaking, the successful private practitioners, whose practice is far too good to allow of their taking up Government work, but men who cannot make a sufficient living for themselves.

19. We are of opinion, therefore, that when locally recruited medical men are required for appointments which are, or which have been in the past, held by officers of the Indian Medical Service, they should ordinarily be taken from the ranks of the civil assistant surgeons. We would recruit from amongst private medical practitioners European and Indian, resident in India, only in exceptional cases, and in such cases would appoint them, not as members of a service, but on special terms and for a specific period; as we have already done in the case of Maung Aung Tun, House Surgeon of the General Hospital, Rangoon, and of Mr. Bentley, who has been employed on special investigations in Eastern Bengal and in Bombay. When European medical men are required from England, we are convinced that it is both

expedient and in the long run economical to recruit them in the Indian Medical Service. To recruit in England a small number of men for isolated posts would give rise to administrative difficulties. To recruit a large number of them would practically mean the formation of a second European medical service, which would, as stated in paragraph 6 of our despatch of the 20th August, 1908, doubtless put forward claims to be treated precisely in the same way as the Indian Medical Service. Further, the recruitment of Europeans for particular posts, such as those of the bacteriological department, would probably result in our having to engage, on special rates of pay, precisely the same men who, if existing arrangements are maintained, would come into the Indian Medical Service in order to spend their lives on research, and who would be content with lower rates of pay as members of the service than they would demand if they were especially recruited for isolated posts.

20. Before leaving this question, we would invite Your Lordship's attention to Chapter VIII (pages 129-136) of the Report of the Decentralization Commission. The Commission considered the question of the civil medical department and discussed the proposals, made by the Government of Madras in 1899, but not accepted by the Government of India, for a completely separate cadre of Indian Medical Service officers for duty in that Presidency, and the proposal made in 1903 by the Government of Bombay for a separate civil medical service. The Commission was, however, of opinion that any such proposals would revolutionise the character of the Indian Medical Service and might lead to serious difficulties in recruitment, and would not, even if the members of such a service were given preliminary training with Indian troops, adequately provide for military requirements. The Commission had not before it the particular proposal now under discussion, *viz.*, that that portion of the civil cadre, which must, in the event of war, be retained for civil purposes, should be recruited, as far as possible, locally, but it is clear that it was impressed by the general advantages of the present system.

21. Finally, we give some statistics to illustrate the impracticability of making any reduction in the number of Indian Medical Service officers employed solely on civil duties, that is to say, those not belonging to the war reserve. Excluding eleven officers in the bacteriological department, who do not hold cadre posts, three officers in the assay department, to which we have decided to make no further permanent appointments from the Indian Medical Service, the Surgeon Naturalist and the whole of the civil leave reserves, there are at present 114 Indian Medical Service civil cadre appointments not included in the war reserve. Of these appointments 98 are under local Governments, 10 under the Foreign Department, and 6, including the Director General, Indian Medical Service, and our Sanitary Commissioner, under the Home Department. Of the 98 posts under local Governments, 29 are held by administrative medical officers, sanitary commissioners, inspectors-general of prisons and chemical analysers, 16 by professors at Government Medical Colleges, and 53 by civil surgeons, jail superintendents and the like. We have already referred to the posts held by administrative medical officers and heads of departments and to the professorial and other special posts. As for the remaining 53 appointments under local Governments, we would point out that, in the event of a mobilisation of the whole army, not only the war reserve of the Indian Medical Service, but all military assistant surgeons, would be withdrawn, and each of the local Governments would be left with only 7 or 8 Indian Medical Service officers, in addition to heads of departments and a few officers holding special posts, to conduct the ordinary civil medical administration, to hold charge of the larger jails and to cope with epidemic disease. Local Governments would, no doubt, be able to increase their medical staff by re-employing pensioned civil assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons, and they might succeed in securing the services of a few private practitioners. But we are strongly of opinion that the margin of European medical officers, which would be left at the disposal of local Governments in the event of the mobilisation of the army, would be the minimum which would be compatible with safety.

22. We sum up our conclusions as follows :—

(1) An independent medical profession trained on Western lines is steadily growing up in India, but it has yet to overcome its universal rival in the form of the *kaviraj*, *hakim*, *vaid*, *ojha*, and the like, who are trained according to indigenous methods and in whom the mass of the population still trust.

(2) Government can do much to encourage an independent medical profession in the various ways enumerated in this despatch.

(3) The giving up of a few appointments to private medical practitioners will have no appreciable effect on the development of an independent medical profession, and might, on the contrary, tend to hinder a healthy development.

(4) The present policy of reduction, which was inaugurated without previous reference to the local Governments, has already given rise to considerable uneasiness in professional circles, and, if carried further, is likely to cause a decided deterioration in the Indian Medical Service.

(5) The bulk of the civil surgeoncies must be manned by officers of the Indian Medical Service, exceptions being made in favour of civil assistant surgeons.

(6) The Government medical colleges and schools must, in the main, be manned by officers of the Indian Medical Service, but a few professorial posts can be made available to locally recruited men.

(7) European medical men cannot be expected to establish themselves in this country, except in cities and large towns and in special areas where there is a large European population, and it is, generally speaking, undesirable to recruit from among them.

(8) When European medical men are required, they should usually be recruited in the Indian Medical Service. Indians and Europeans recruited locally in special cases should be employed on special terms.

23. We now turn to the specific orders passed in Lord Morley's despatch of the 11th December, 1908, that there is to be no further increase in the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service, and further, that we should endeavour to reduce the present strength. We have considered that decision with special reference to the question as to how many of the superior medical appointments in India can safely be made over to men recruited in India. The Public Service Commission of 1887 discussed a similar question in regard to the Indian Civil Service, and it was decided that the officers recruited to that service should form a *corps d'élite*, a certain proportion of superior posts not assigned to that service being made available for the provincial civil service. The proportion of superior posts so made available was 16·6 *per cent.* Similar principles have been applied to the recruitment of other services. In the Public Works Department out of 434 superior posts, namely, those of executive engineers, superintending engineers, and chief engineers, 75, or 17 *per cent.*, are reserved for the provincial, and the remainder for the Imperial, service. In the Forest Service it is proposed to divide the higher forest appointments into major and minor charges, and to allot to men recruited in India 20 *per cent.* of the major posts. As regards the superior medical service the question has never been raised, owing to the necessity of providing for the employment in times of peace in civil work of the war-reserve of the Indian Medical Service. We find that, excluding plague and bacteriological appointments and appointments in the Assay Department, to which department, as has already been stated, it is proposed that medical officers should not be appointed in future, the total number of superior medical appointments actually in existence, or which it is proposed to create in the immediate future, is 464. Of these, 354 are actually held by officers of the Indian Medical Service in the civil cadre (240 by officers belonging to the war-reserve, and 114 by officers in civil employ outside the war-reserve), while 110 are held by, or are open to, medical men recruited in India. Of these 110 posts, 35 are held, or are to be held, by civil assistant surgeons, 55 by military assistant surgeons, 10 by uncovenanted medical officers (of whom no more are being recruited) or by private practitioners; while the balance of 10 has not yet been assigned, but may be given either to civil assistant surgeons or private practitioners. The military assistant surgeons are Europeans or Eurasians, but they all receive their medical education in India, and must, therefore, be classed as indigenous practitioners. The proportion of posts at present available for men recruited locally is, therefore, 23·7 per cent. It is, we consider, a very reasonable proportion and it compares very favourably with the percentages fixed in respect of other services.

24. The existing orders place us in a position of considerable difficulty. When a new appointment is proposed and we are convinced, after considering the possibility of providing for it otherwise, that it cannot be filled satisfactorily at the moment except by an officer of the Indian Medical Service, we cannot give effect to this decision without calling on some local Government to resign a civil surgeoncy held by an officer of the Indian Medical Service and to appoint in his place an assistant surgeon or a private practitioner. For example, the

No. 2.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, No. 243 (*Public*), *dated 22nd November*, 1912.

I have carefully considered in Council your predecessor's despatch in the Home Department, No. 21, dated 17th November, 1910, regarding the unofficial medical profession in India, and the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service.

2. I may say at once that after a full examination of the despatch and its enclosures I accept the view of your Government that the question of the steps to be taken to promote the growth of the unofficial medical profession must be treated as distinct from the question of limiting or reducing the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service, and that I am in general agreement with your Government on both questions. For this reason, instead of following in detail your predecessor's examination of the recent discussions in which these two questions have been considered in relation to one another, I propose to state, without direct reference to the previous correspondence, the conclusions to which I have been led by my own examination of the question.

3. In the first place, I am much impressed with the military considerations involved. The efficiency of the Army in the event of mobilisation requires that a War Reserve amounting to at least two-thirds of the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service should be available at short notice, and no more economical method of providing this War Reserve than the existing one has yet been discovered. There is also a large proportion of civil posts, including the highest administrative appointments, amounting to hardly less than one-third of the whole cadre, which it would be most unwise in time of stress to entrust to others than members of a trained and disciplined service. It is also, I believe, generally admitted that the attractiveness of the Indian Medical Service to young doctors is largely dependent on the number and character of the civil posts, and to diminish this number materially or to withdraw even a comparatively small proportion of the higher posts hitherto included in the cadre could not fail to have an unfavourable effect upon recruitment, and consequently upon the efficiency of the whole service, both on the civil and on the military side. Furthermore, in the interests of the western system of medicine generally, including those of the unofficial medical practitioners themselves, it is desirable, at least for the present, to maintain a system by which in every part of the country demonstrations of its practical value will be continuously afforded by medical officers of undoubtedly good qualifications. Moreover, it is impossible to disregard the special needs of European officers and their families. I am thus unable, under existing conditions, to contemplate any substantial reduction of the service.

4. I have read with interest and satisfaction that portion of Lord Minto's despatch (paragraphs 6-8), in which he indicated a variety of methods by which Government can assist, and in some cases are already assisting, the development of the unofficial medical profession. Perhaps the chief of these is the making provision for the registration of medical practitioners qualified to practise according to the western methods. The Government of Bombay have taken the first step in this direction by passing a Registration Act, and I trust that, before long, experience of its working may justify the introduction of similar legislation for other provinces. I may here observe that in my opinion the value of such legislation will to a great extent depend on the maintenance of some fixed minimum standard of attainment for all medical men.

5. I observe, however, that while your Government have come to the conclusion, in which I agree, that the constitution of the Indian Medical Service must remain for the present at least substantially unchanged, you, at the same time, indicate certain directions in which it may be possible and desirable to continue the policy of increasing, so far as is permitted by considerations of efficiency and the reasonable claims of European servants of Government residing in the interior of the country, the number of superior medical appointments open to men recruited in India. I welcome, as did my predecessors, every opportunity of taking a step, however small, in furtherance of this policy. Your despatch mentions that some more professorial appointments might be filled by local candidates provided they are fully qualified, and that it is possible that a few more civil surgeoncies may, without

objection, from time to time be handed over to Civil Assistant-Surgeons. In this connection it is to be remembered that a Royal Commission on the Public Services has been appointed, and that it would be undesirable to make any large change of the kind until the Commission has reported; in the meantime, proposals affecting individual appointments can of course be considered on their merits.

6. I also accept the view of Lord Minto's Government that there is ordinarily no advantage in recruiting a medical man from the United Kingdom, otherwise than through the Indian Medical Service. But I am not prepared to say that this course should never be adopted. Circumstances have arisen in the past in which there was immediate need for men of special experience who were not available in India either from the Indian Medical Service or otherwise, and I know of no reason to suppose that a case of the kind will never occur again. Such a case must be dealt with on its merits, and if a man has to be recruited specially from the United Kingdom for a particular post a special contract should be made with him, the terms of which in each case will require the closest scrutiny.

7. The present appears to me to be a suitable opportunity for considering the case of the Military Assistant Surgeons employed as Civil Surgeons. It is necessary to have a reserve of Military Assistant Surgeons; and, as with the Indian Medical Service, it is convenient and economical to employ this reserve in civil duties. Their professional efficiency is also advanced by this means. These men, however, are not recruited with reference to any qualifications for the important duties of a Civil Surgeon, and they are, as a rule, unsuitable for the work. It may, therefore, be desirable that as far as possible civil surgeoncies not reserved for the Indian Medical Service should be given to Civil Assistant Surgeons. I leave it to your Government to consider whether effect can usefully be given to this suggestion.

8. I pass now to the request of Lord Minto's Government that the existing orders under which there can be no further increase in the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service may be withdrawn, that in future the case of each new appointment may be considered on its merits, and that if I am satisfied that in existing circumstances it can only be filled from the Indian Medical Service no reduction of another Indian Medical Service appointment may be made when the new appointment is created. The orders in question were based on the belief that the development of the unofficial medical profession would be aided by leaving as many Government appointments as possible to private practitioners whether recruited in India or in England. As I have already said I am persuaded that this view is not supported by the recent investigations. But I still consider that the Indian Medical Service should be restricted to the military needs of the country, and this for two reasons, first, the necessity for economy, and secondly, the desirability of increasing, as far as may be, the number of important posts held by Indians. Whether any important step can be taken towards attaining this latter object is a question with which it will be easier to deal effectively after the Public Service Commission has issued its report. In the meantime it does not appear to me necessary to maintain an order which has served its purpose in causing a searching investigation to be made into the important subjects dealt with in this despatch, and which at the same time has, as you point out, caused some serious administrative inconvenience. I am, therefore, prepared to consider the case of each new appointment on its merits in accordance with your views, but it must be understood that any proposal for an increase in the civil posts included in the cadre of the Indian Medical Service will in future, be subjected to the closest scrutiny.

9. I have also decided, on consideration of paragraph 25 of your despatch, to accept the proposal that when sanctioned appointments in the Bacteriological Department are held by Indian Medical Service officers they should be treated for the time being as cadre appointments of that service.

10. Your Excellency's Government will understand that the conclusions now stated must be regarded as provisional, and that it is possible that the enquiries to be conducted by the new Public Service Commission may necessitate a re-examination of the whole question.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) CREWE.

No. 3.

Letter from the Government of India (Home Department) to the Most Honourable the Marquess of Crewe, K.G., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 2 of 1914 *(Medical), dated Delhi, the* 5*th March,* 1914.

We have the honour to refer to Your Lordship's Public despatch, no. 243, dated the 22nd November, 1912, regarding the unofficial medical profession in India and the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service. We are glad to learn that Your Lordship has accepted the view of Lord Minto's Government that the question of the steps to be taken to promote the growth of the unofficial medical profession must be treated as distinct from that of limiting or reducing the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service. Our predecessors' despatch of the 17th November, 1910, suggested a variety of methods by which Government could assist or, in some cases, was already assisting, the development of the unofficial medical profession in India, and we indicate briefly the subsequent developments of some of the questions then raised :—

(i) The questions of the registration of medical practitioners, of the growth of unofficial medical institutions and of penalising bogus medical degrees have been considered further, and we forward for Your Lordship's information a copy of our Home Secretary's letter of the 23rd May, 1913, which has been addressed to local Governments and Administrations on the subject. We feel no doubt that reforms on the lines indicated will commend themselves to all those who have the interests of medical education in India at heart, and we trust that before long something effectual will be done in the direction indicated.

(ii) In February, 1911, we consulted selected local Governments with regard to the suggestion to employ passed students of medical colleges, whether they enter Government service or not, as house physicians and house surgeons in Government hospitals, a plan which had commended itself to the Government of Bengal, but in view of the generally unfavourable replies received we decided not to proceed further with this specific proposal.

(iii) The suggestion to associate selected private practitioners with the staff of Government hospitals has been received favourably by the majority of local Governments.

(iv) The question referred to at the end of paragraph 6 of the despatch of the 17th November, 1910, has been disposed of by the issue of the resolution on the subject of gratuitous medical assistance in charitable hospitals and dispensaries, which Your Lordship had approved in your Public despatch, no. 252, dated the 6th December, 1912.

2. Your Lordship has left it to our discretion to decide whether effect can usefully be given to the suggestion that, as far as possible, civil surgeoncies not reserved for the Indian Medical Service should be given to civil assistant surgeons instead of to military assistant surgeons. This matter has received our careful consideration, but we are strongly averse from any reduction in the number of civil surgeoncies held by military assistant surgeons or of any redistribution of the proportion of posts held by this class of officer. There are altogether 712 military assistant surgeons in the cadre, of whom 164 are serving under local Governments, but the total number of civil surgeoncies reserved for them is only 51. The question of reducing the proportions of independent to subordinate posts held by military assistant surgeons, by the substitution of civil assistant surgeons in the independent appointments, was considered in 1903, when it was decided that no change was necessary, as it was feared that such a proposal might tend to discourage military assistant surgeons of the best type from becoming candidates for civil employment, and of seriously affecting recruitment for the Service. To that opinion we still hold. All military assistant surgeons in civil employ are liable to recall for active service, and they constitute an important part of the war reserve. Since they already fall short of the number required for complete mobilization, any reduction in their number would, in our opinion, be a grave mistake. Some of them possess exceptional qualifications, and the majority make up in administrative capacity what they may lack in professional ability, and given equal medical attainments,

the military assistant surgeon frequently makes a better civil surgeon that a civil assistant surgeon. We have under consideration proposals made by our Director-General of the Indian Medical Service to provide facilities for the better medical education of military assistant surgeons, and when effect is given to these recommendations the professional qualifications of these officers should be greatly improved.

3. There are several proposals pending before us for an increase of the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service, which we shall hereafter submit separately for Your Lordship's orders. In all these cases we hope that we will be able to show that, looking to the work to be done, the services of Indian Medical officers are indispensable. In view of the growing medical needs of the country which necessitate the employment of a larger staff of medical officers, some expansion of the Indian Medical Service is inevitable, and such expansion should not, in our opinion, be regarded from a different standpoint from the enlargement of any other cadre in response to the development of the work to be performed.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.
O'MOORE CREAGH.
R. W. CARLYLE.
HARCOURT BUTLER.
R. H. CRADDOCK.
W. H. CLARK.
W. S. MEYER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Circular letter from the Honourable Mr. H. Wheeler, C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India, to Local Governments other than Bombay and Bengal, Nos. 305-312 (Home Department, Medical), dated Simla, the 23rd May, 1913.*

I am directed to invite your attention to the question of legislating in order to penalise the use of bogus medical degrees. The Governor General in Council is satisfied that there is a growing opinion in this country in favour of the stricter supervision of persons who practise Western methods of medicine. Evidence of this opinion is to be found in the general acceptance accorded in Bombay to the Medical Registration Act which became law in that Presidency last year, and in the initiation of legislation on similar lines by the Government of Bengal. Both these provincial measures proceed on the principle of conferring privileges upon qualified persons rather than of inflicting penalties on the unqualified. They create representative Medical Councils which will maintain a register of all medical practitioners and of their qualifications; and they restrict the exercise of certain definite functions to those practitioners whom the Medical Council has registered. The Governor-General in Council, however, considers that it is now possible to take a step further, and to proceed by means of a general Act to prohibit all institutions not affiliated to any University nor recognised by Government, from granting any medical degrees and titles which bear a colourable resemblance to registrable qualifications and further to prohibit individual practitioners from advertising that they hold such degrees.

2. It is as much in the interest of the independent private practitioner as in that of officers of the Indian Medical Service and of the subordinate medical departments that the field of private practice should not be overrun with untrained or half-trained men, whose titles may convey to the ignorant that they hold degrees or qualifications to which their actual attainments give them no claim whatever. The mischief caused by the unscrupulous assumption of medical degrees by men who had no right to them was observed as long ago as 1882, but it did not assume serious dimensions for another twenty-five years. The same aspect of the general question was again brought to notice by the Government of Bengal in 1908 : but the fact that the evil was of comparatively recent development and practically confined to a single city, disposed the Government of India to a policy of caution. They approved the

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* Madras, United Provinces, Punjab, Burma, Bihar and Orissa, Central Provinces, Assam and Coorg.

principle of a provincial Medical Registration Act, but while recognising the evil of bogus degrees they suggested to the local Government that an opportunity of reform should be first afforded to those medical institutions whose privileges would be threatened by the further legislation which the Government of Bengal had in view; and of combining their forces into one improved college which might receive Government recognition. Unfortunately the experience of the past few years has shown that no such spontaneous reform can be expected; and the Government of India feel no longer any hesitation in proposing to undertake general legislation.

3. In putting their suggestions for legislation before local Governments, the Government of India think it well to remove certain possible misapprehensions. In the first place they have no desire to discourage the growth of independent medical institutions. They would rather wish to see such institutions extended; for, in Calcutta and probably elsewhere, the existing Government Medical Colleges are unable to meet the demands for instruction. Private institutions should provide valuable opportunities for professional and clinical work to private practitioners, which cannot fail to raise the standard and promote the development of an independent medical profession; and provided that a minimum standard of efficiency in equipment and training is insisted upon, the Government of India desire that every possible encouragement may be given to them.

4. In the second place the Government of India have no intention of legislating to prevent "Ayurvedic" Colleges and similar institutions from conferring degrees, nor to penalise *Kavirajs*, *Hakims*, *Vaids* and such practitioners in the exercise of their profession. On the other hand they consider that the public is clearly entitled to be protected against a practitioner who professes to treat his patients according to the European system of medicine under cover of spurious qualifications, whether conferred by one of the correspondence colleges of America, or by proprietary institutions such as exist in Calcutta or Dacca.

5. The Government of India have considered carefully whether the evil of bogus medical degrees should not be checked rather by provincial than by imperial legislation. They find, however, that private medical institutions in Calcutta are attended by pupils from almost every part of India, and particularly by students whose general educational attainments are inferior to those required for admission to the Government medical colleges of their own provinces: and that students from these institutions return to their homes and there compete with the better equipped candidates who have gone through a recognised course under qualified teachers. In these circumstances the Government of India think that if the evil is to be effectually combated, legislation in the Imperial Council is preferable.

6. The legislation which the Government of India have in view would penalise the conferment of any medical diploma or degree by any unrecognised institution and would permit persons who use such degrees or diplomas or notify that they possess them, to be prosecuted. If legislation were directed only against institutions which confer degrees without proper authority, the mischief caused by the use of bogus degrees issued by institutions outside India would remain untouched; and inasmuch as the object of penalising individuals who assume degrees to which they have no claim or which have been conferred by unrecognised institutions is not to penalise professional inefficiency, but to prevent fraud the Government of India think that the further remedy is justified.

7. Accordingly the Government of India propose that legislation be undertaken:—

(1) To prohibit—
  (*a*) Unauthorised persons or bodies from granting any degrees or diplomas or licences, or colourable imitations thereof, to practise the Western methods of medicine, which are recognised by the Indian Universities and the General Council of Medical Education and Registration in Great Britain; and
  (*b*) The issue by any person of any such degrees, diplomas or licences or colourable imitations of such documents; and
(2) To penalise—
  (*a*) The granting or issue of such degrees, diplomas or licences; and
  (*b*) The use of such degrees, diplomas or licences by medical practitioners.

8. If the principle of this legislation is agreed to, the Government of India would ask you to consider further whether a bill to effect the registration of medical

practitioners should not also be introduced, with the object of providing that the control of the registration of degrees in each province may be placed in the hands of a Medical Council (such as has already come into existence in Bombay) which will declare what degrees, licences, and diplomas are registrable, and will take disciplinary action against medical practitioners convicted of crime or of misconduct.

9. The Government of India anticipate indeed that before long it may be desirable that the work of these provincial Medical Councils should be co-ordinated by one supreme body, more particularly if the Councils, in addition to performing their ordinary functions under the Registration Act of the province, are given power to confer recognition upon those medical schools and colleges whose training, staff, syllabuses and equipment merit it or to establish, subject to their general supervision, a College of Physicians and Surgeons as at Bombay, on the lines of those in the United Kingdom, to appoint examiners and grant diplomas such as the M.R.C.S. or the L.R.C.P for persons whose means do not permit them to proceed to the University degree in medicine.

10. The Government of India have now indicated the scope of the legislation which they contemplate, and the directions to which, as at present advised, they are disposed to look for a further development of medical policy. They feel little doubt that reforms on such lines will commend themselves to all those who have the interests of medical education in India at heart, but they would be glad to be favoured with any criticisms which you may wish to offer, after consulting associations or persons whose opinions are of value with particular regard to the scope or aims of the proposed bill. I am to request that if possible a reply may be sent to this letter by the 15th October next.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Letter from the Honourable Mr. H. Wheeler, C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India, to the Governments of Bombay and Bengal, Nos. 313-314 *(Home Department, Medical), dated Simla, the 23rd May,* 1913.

With reference to correspondence ending with your letter No. (8196, dated 30th November, 1912) (486 Medl., dated 17th February, 1913), I am directed to forward for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor in Council a copy of a letter, Nos. 305-312, dated the 23rd May, 1913, which has been addressed to all local Governments other than the Governments of Bombay and Bengal, and to request that the Government of India may be favoured with the opinions of His Excellency the Governor in Council after consulting associations and persons concerned upon the proposals made therein.

EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER CAMPAIGN, 1919).

CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND COMFORTS FOR THE TROOPS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER CAMPAIGN, 1919).

The following correspondence is presented to Parliament in accordance with the undertaking given by the Secretary of State for India in answer to questions in the House of Commons on the 13th and 14th August. The Government of India's answers to all the Secretary of State's telegrams have not yet reached him. They will be presented when they have all been received.

No. 1.

From the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to the VICEROY, Army Department.
Dated 23rd July 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Press in this country have published Reuter's telegram of 6th July containing extract from Calcutta "Englishman" reflecting on arrangements made for health and provisioning of forces on N.W. frontier. Also Reuter's telegram of 11th July regarding statement in Allahabad "Pioneer" that medical and other arrangements were inadequate at opening of campaign but have improved. Please let me have a report by telegraph.

No. 2.

From the SECRETARY OF STATE to the VICEROY, Army Department.
Dated 28th July 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Complaints are being made in Parliament and Press as to the arrangements at Cholera Camp, Kohat. Absence of equipment, furniture, sheets, ice, &c. Please let me have a report by telegraph.

No. 3.

From the SECRETARY OF STATE to the VICEROY, Army Department.
Dated 30th July 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Reference my telegram of the 23rd July. Following allegations appeared in the Press here yesterday regarding medical arrangements:—

(1) Violent cholera epidemic in June apparently due to defective arrangements for water supply. News of the outbreak suppressed "for military reasons." (2) In one hospital there were no sheets, towels or blankets, no soda water or ice and no provision for washing, and at one time supply of bandages gave out. Condition of rooms indescribable and they were never cleaned. Beds touched one another and sick and convalescent cases intermingled. (3) Only two doctors available for 400 wounded taken to Peshawar. Operations had to be carried out under oil lamps. (4) General complaints about lack of ample rations. Above allegations are supplementary to those on which I am already telegraphing separately to you. Please investigate and report fully by telegraph as early as possible as allegations are causing considerable comment here.

No. 4.

From the VICEROY, Army Department, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.
Dated 27th July 1919. (Received 31st July.)

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 23rd July. We suggest that publicity be given to the following statement which has appeared in the public press in India, but which apparently has not been mentioned by Reuter. *Begins*:—

1. *Food, &c.*—Two essentials at this time of year are ice and mineral waters. Ice machines are working at the following places:—Rawal Pindi, Nowshera, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dardoni, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, and Quetta. Further

machines are under erection as follows:—Two at Landi Kotal, one additionally at Kohat, and one at Thal. Ice is forwarded daily from the nearest factory to station at present without machines, *e.g.*, up the Khyber Pass. As regards soda-water machines, 22 are already working on the frontier, and six more are on their way to the frontier. The total daily output of these machines will be approximately 90,000 bottles. This output is in addition to that of local factories. Each machine is being sent up complete with cylinders and bottles for one month's consumption, and a reserve of three months has been arranged for. Mineral waters are issued to all officers and men in hospital. The scale of rations for British and Indian troops is much superior to any previously granted for campaigns in India. That for British includes the following daily issues:—3 ozs. bacon, 10 ozs. potatoes, 6 ozs. of onions, 8 ozs. other fresh vegetables, 3 ozs. jam, 2 ozs. of condensed milk and 2 ozs. of tinned or dried fruit, 3 ozs. of oatmeal, and one extra ounce of condensed milk besides rice, curry powder, and lime juice are issued three times a week. Cigarettes or tobacco or cigars are issued weekly, with an allowance of sweets as a substitute for non-smokers. Under the new scale for Indian troops the meat ration has been doubled, and a daily issue of fresh vegetables, condensed milk, as well as weekly issues of cigarettes provided.

2. *Hospitals and Hospital Comforts.*—Orders have been issued to all generals in command that medical officers are to ask for whatever they deem necessary for the comfort of the sick and wounded in their charge and that their demands are to be met at once. Additional hospitals for 4,000 British and 8,000 Indian troops have been established in specially fitted barracks in proximity to the frontier, and electric lighting and fans where none already exist are being supplied to the former. Convalescent depôts for officers and soldiers have, in addition, been formed, mainly in the Murree Hills. Special arrangements have been made for the supply of fresh milk to the sick in hospital and cows for this purpose have been placed so far at the front as Dakka, Bannu, and Tank. Scale of equipment of Indian general hospitals have been reviewed and arrangements for providing additional equipment are in progress.

3. *Canteens.*--Arrangements have been made for the establishment of field force canteens for British and Indian troops at such places on the frontier as General Officer Commanding Forces may select, and the necessary personnel and stores have been despatched.

4. *Officers' Messes, &c.*—Special messes have been formed at the following places for the use of individual officers passing through Jamrud, Kohat, Bannu, Kalabagh, Mari, Indus, Tank, Darya Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Quetta, Rawal Pindi, and Peshawar. Others are about to be established at Kachi Garhi, Ali Musjid, Landi Kotal, and Thal.

5. *Rest Camps, &c.*—Rest camps for British and Indian troops *en route* to the front have been organised at Ambala, Lahore, Rawal Pindi, Nowshera, Peshawar, and Quetta. These messes and rest camps have been inspected by General Officers Commanding and special officers detailed from General Headquarters. Their reports indicate satisfactory working. In addition to the Monro canteens at Rawal Pindi, Lahore, Delhi, and other important centres, Monro canteens have been established for the use of British troops at Quetta and Peshawar, and are being largely used. The opening of a similar canteen at Kalabagh has been approved. Tea rooms are being established at various railway stations for the special use of Indian troops, and General Officers Commanding Forces are making similar arrangements at all stations and camps at the front where such an organisation may be needed. To ensure that the above arrangements for the health and comfort of the troops are working satisfactorily and up to the standard designed by the Commander-in-Chief in India, staff officers from general headquarters carry out under His Excellency's orders frequent tours of inspection on the frontier. *Ends.*

Since the above statement was published piped-water supplies to all camps in the Khyber Pass have been completed. The Directors of Medical and Veterinary Services, Director-General Military Works, India, the Inspector of Quartermaster-General's Services, the Director of Movements and General Staff Officers and the Supply Directorate at General Headquarters, have made such tours of inspection, and His Excellency, Commander-in-Chief in India, in company with the Director-General of Transportation and the Director of Staff Duties, is now on tour. The acting

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the St. John's Ambulance Association and of the Indian Branch of the Joint War Committee is now at the front visiting hospitals and arranging for the comfort of the sick. It is needless to add that the Red Cross Society has given and are giving every help in their power, and that additional comforts for the troops are being systematically forwarded to the front by the Comforts for Troops Organisation.

No. 5.

From the SECRETARY of STATE to the VICEROY, Army Department.
Dated 31st July 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

With reference to my telegram of 30th July. Medical arrangements North-west Frontier. Question in Parliament alleges that there were about 400 cases of cholera and over 100 deaths in the 6th Brigade at Ali Masjid. Medical arrangements and personnel altogether inadequate, and insufficient supply of anti-cholera vaccine and saline tabloids. Please report by telegraph.

No. 6.

From the SECRETARY of STATE to the VICEROY, Army Department.
Dated 2nd August 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 27th July. Medical arrangements on frontier. What was the date of your communiqué ? I await report on conditions prior to it.

No. 7.

From the SECRETARY of STATE to the VICEROY, Army Department.
Dated 5th August 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation of my telegram dated 28th July. Kohat Hospital and arrangements. Also it is alleged that food and cooking very bad, and absence of train accommodation for conveyance of convalescents to Hill Stations.

No. 8.

From the VICEROY, Army Department, to the SECRETARY of STATE.
Despatched 5th August 1919. (Received 6th August.)

(Telegraphic.)

In reply to your telegram of the 30th July. Taking the allegations in order (1) there is no indication as to place at which arrangements for water supply are alleged to have been defective, so we will deal with cholera outbreak as a whole. Firstly the conditions should be realised—we have six separate lines of operations covering a front of approximately 500 miles long, the local water supply is often by means of open irrigation channels, but piped-water supply for troops is installed in recognised camps. Cholera is endemic amongst civil population in whole area, and there has been the presence of large numbers recently enlisted transport and other followers without any water discipline or ideas of sanitation, together with insufficiency of supervision for above owing to shortage of experienced British officers and personnel. Arrangements for immediate supply of pure water in such a terrain are impossible to supervise in the case of troops compelled to march during conditions of abnormal heat, and it is to be remarked that incidence of disease was very small amongst British troops. The number of cholera cases reported to date, total 95 British and 1,374 Indian, mostly followers, that is to say, 0·59 per cent. and 0·88 per cent. respectively of total numbers employed. Protective measures as follows were initiated before outbreak occurred. Supplementary piped-water supply commenced, but work hampered by shortage of pumps, and pipes demanded from England, Mesoptamia, and elsewhere. Water for troops chlorinated. Additional outbreak details. In most cases incidence of disease occurred amongst followers, and news of outbreak was immediately reported to you on 9th July, periodical reports as to course of epidemic being telegraphed thereafter. News of outbreak was purposely not published in press for military reasons, and we approve of this action. It would have encouraged Afghan morale if news had reached them that we were hampered by disease, and it would have discouraged recruitment in India. As no specific hospital unit is mentioned reply to your No. 2 is impossible. Can you specify which hospital is referred to and approximate dates of alleged shortage of equipment. If Kohat, then please see our reply to your telegram of 28th July to follow later. The statement that there were only two medical officers available to attend the wounded is without foundation. Twelve were immediately available, whilst many more were close at hand with mobilised units. Between 15th May and 17th May, which included the dates between which the most severe fighting took place, approximately, 322 of all ranks of British and Indian were wounded on the Khyber line. The Director of Medical Services, Khyber front, reported to headquarters that the majority of the British wounded were in Station Hospital, Peshawar, within few hours of the action, and some actually transferred by ambulance train to Rawal Pindi within the course of the day. Electric light installation with well electrically lit operating theatre is provided at the British General Hospital at Peshawar. The Indian General Hospital has at present standard oil lamps, but electric lights are being installed. At no time has there been a shortage of rations. At the outbreak of hostilities the authorised reserves of 60 days for the field army stock complete, and indeed in excess in regard to some items. The full original scale of Indian field rations was issued at the outset, but was supplemented by additional items which had been included in the light of experience gained in Mesopotamia. Such of these extras as were actually included in the Mesopotamia scale were available in Karachi and Bombay Overseas Base Reserves were despatched to the Frontier within 48 hours of mobilisation on being ordered in accordance with our pre-arranged plans. This was followed by immediate purchase of articles necessary to complete rations to the present scale, the details of which you have had, which is varied in kind and scientifically balanced in regard to its nutritive properties. The bacon ration has proved a difficulty, and stocks obtained from Australia have not stood the Indian climate. Where shortage has occurred a substitute has been provided in preserved meat and pickles. Potatoes travel badly in intense heat, and in consequence it has not always been possible to maintain regular supply. For these likewise onions and tinned fruit were issued as substitute. The stocks of lime juice on Willcock's recipe, amounting to 31,300 gallons and 2,200 gallons at Bombay and Karachi respectively were available, and were despatched at once to the front at the outbreak of hostilities. These represented about two months' supply for the North-west Frontier Force as it stood at the time. The sour lime crop practically failed last year owing to shortage of rain, and no contract was made for lime juice until the present lime harvests began about June-July. Contracts have now been made for 37,000 monthly, and from middle of August onwards for an additional 10,000 gallons.

No. 9.

From the VICEROY, Army Department, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.
Despatched 5th August 1919. (Received 6th August).

In continuation of our telegram of the 5th instant, we think it desirable that you should be in possession of a broad outline of the position we have to meet. The Afghan outrage came upon us at a time when not only had we reduced ourselves to the narrowest margin of safety in respect of personnel and munitions of war, of which India had been stripped to support forces in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Persia, and France, but when we had still further to reduce our strength in demand to the popular demand for demobilisation in the interest of industrial reconstruction both at home and in India. Moreover, it occurred at a time when our military arrangements had been to a certain extent dislocated by special measures necessary to preserve order in the Punjab and elsewhere, and to deal with a situation which at one time threatened to spread over India. The same facts had affected our railway services, for considerable damage had been done to the railways themselves, and the whole railway administration of Northern India had been in a certain measure dislocated. The suddenness with which Afghan situation developed into a crisis and was at once followed by defection of our Frontier militia, together with the threat of a rebellion in Peshawar itself, deprived us of the measure of security on which we reasonably counted to cover our concentration, since not only had the advanced echelons of our Field Army to be diverted to replace militia, but they had actually to preserve order in the districts. Consequently, instead of being able to proceed on a deliberate system of rapid concentration, we were forced at once to send troops to every part of the Frontier, and so reverse our pre-arranged plan of concentration, which provided that the despatch of stores and equipment should precede that of troops. As regards hospitals, you, no doubt, realise that in a country like the North-West Frontier of India, where there are no public buildings that are capable of immediate occupation, there is no alternative but the evacuation of barracks and their conversion into hospitals. This had been planned in peace time, but it could not be carried out in a moment, especially during the hot weather. You must remember, too, that a very great percentage of our Indian soldiers were away on leave at the time of the outbreak, and their immediate recall threw an additional burden on the railways, already strained to almost their limits. Ice and soda-water are not Government issues in ordinary times of peace, and, consequently, on being faced with a hot-weather campaign, we were forced to buy plant in the open market which we had already drained to meet demands from Mesopotamia. The Commander-in-Chief has informed us that his experience in the Army has led him to the conclusion that a certain time must always elapse before the machinery to ensure smooth working of hospital and rearward services materialises, however elaborate be the pre-arranged schemes, and that the early days in France and Galliopli will bear this out. Although complaints brought forward in the Press are general in character, and, therefore, difficult to refute, there are two that are more specific. The first, that the wounded, after the action at Dakka, were left with only two doctors, must be characterised as a deliberate mis-statement, for it was reported to Headquarters by the Director of Medical Services with General Barrett that the majority of wounded were in the Station Hospital at Peshawar, and some actually transferred to Rawal Pindi by ambulance train within the course of the day. The second complaint deals with Kohat and the inadequacy of the hospital arrangements there. You can easily figure to yourself that when a station with hospital accommodation to meet the needs of a few battalions had to be expanded to requirements of a division owing to serious menace to our left flank by Nadir Khan's advance to Thal, there must necessarily be some delay and inconvenience, especially as the amenities of civilisation are not forthcoming in what is little more than a Frontier outpost. As soon as Nadir Khan had been dealt with, the British battalions were diverted to stations near the Frontier, where there were barracks for British troops. The Officer-in-Command assures me that everything that was possible was done. Outbreaks of cholera are unavoidable throughout India, and it is little to be wondered at that the Frontier has not been immune. We may consider ourselves fortunate that the outbreak has not been worse, for the best of discipline is not proof against the pangs of thirst and a thirsty man, especially a follower, in an Indian July does not pause to consider source at which he quenches his thirst. The points raised in your telegram, dated 28th July, will be reported on separately.

No. 10.

From the VICEROY, Army Department, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.
Despatched 6th August 1919. (Received 7th August.)

(Telegraphic.)

In reply to your telegram of the 28th July, remarks on the general situation in our two telegrams of 5th August are specially applicable to Kohat, where we had to rush up an unexpectedly large force to deal with the enemy on Barrett's left. Cholera started at Kohat on June 5th and ended about June 20th, and during that period there were 400 cases. Cholera hospitals were improvised with all possible speed on

June 7th, and were working satisfactorily on June 12th. Equipment was provided from general hospitals on the spot, purchased locally or obtained from Red Cross. For the period, June 5th to June 11th, there were 202 cases of cholera and 24 deaths. It is reported by Kohat that ice was deficient on one day only, owing to breakdown on railway, and that there was no deficiency in hospital furniture or sheets.

No. 11.*

From the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to the VICEROY, Army Department,
Dated 7th August 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Question in Parliament alleges representations made to General Staff, Simla, in 1917 regarding necessity for pipe line for water to camp site at Ali Masjid, but nothing done until outbreak of cholera recently. Please let me know facts.

No. 12.

From the VICEROY, Army Department, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.
Despatched 7th August 1919. (Received 8th August.)

(Telegraphic.)

In reply to your telegram of the 31st ultimo, we are inquiring as to actual number of cases of cholera 6th Brigade, and these will be sent later. Meantime it can be said that figures are exaggerated, because incidence of cholera occurred amongst personnel of Transport Corps collected at Ali Masjid who were not connected with 6th Brigade but were isolated there. The total cases of cholera all corps and transport units reported as occurring at Ali Masjid from commencement of outbreak on June 6th to termination on June 18th was 251, of which 15 were British, of whom 6 died, and 236 Indian, of whom 73 died. As to personnel and medical arrangements a casualty clearing station arrived at Ali Masjid the day after the outbreak to reinforce field ambulance already there. Until its arrival arrangements were not sufficient. Anti-cholera vaccine was always procurable in sufficient quantities. It should be explained that saline tabloids are really a compressed form of common salt, and this was always available and used effectively for hypertonic solution whenever there was any temporary shortage of saline tabloids. As soon as further information is obtained we will send a further telegraphic report giving fullest details.

No. 13.

From the VICEROY, Army Department, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.
Despatched 8th August. (Received 9th August.)

(Telegraphic.)

Referring to your telegram dated 2nd August. The communiqué was issued to the press on 14th July. For conditions prior to it please see our two telegrams of 5th August.

No. 14.

From the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to the VICEROY, Army Department.
Despatched 9th August.

(Telegraphic.)

Question in Parliament. Please furnish early report by telegraph as to how many men 6th Indian Brigade and attached troops were inoculated against cholera before being sent on service on the frontier.

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* Reply from Government of India not yet received.

No. 15.

From VICEROY, Army Department, to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.
Despatched 12th August 1919. (Received 13th August.)

(Telegraphic.)

With reference to your telegram of 5th August, hospitals for cholera cases at Kohat had to be suddenly improvised on 7th June. The arrangements for cooking were not satisfactory at the outset on account of scarcity of fully-trained cooks available for all purposes. Fully-efficient cooks were provided for the Indian hospitals by 12th June, and for the British hospitals by 20th June. The retention of convalescents at Kohat was not due to lack of train accommodation, but to the necessity for bacteriological examination before moving convalescents, who might be cholera carriers, to other stations in India.

No. 16.

From the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to the VICEROY, Army Department.
Dated 13th August 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 6th August. Specific allegations have been made that for a few days there were no arrangements made for feeding officers, no sheets or basins, that an officer's private basin was seized and all patients washed in it, that service of food was bad. I cannot reconcile this with Kohat's statement that there was no deficiency in hospital furniture and sheets. Please make further inquiry and report for inclusion in blue book this week.

No. 17.

From the VICEROY, Army Department, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.
Dated 13th August 1919. (Received 13th August 1919.)

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 9th August. Under normal peace conditions troops are not inoculated against cholera or before being sent on service unless cholera occurs amongst the civil population in the area where troops are stationed, or where they proceed on active service. Cholera had not been reported at frontier posts when mobilisation took place.

General Officer Commanding, North West Frontier, reported that the majority of the units in Ali Masjid were already inoculated previously to the outbreak, that the inoculation of the transport and labour corps was in process of being carried out when the outbreak occurred; also that the necessary vaccine was available, and that the inoculation of those not already protected was taken in hand.

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EAST INDIA (MILITARY).

PAPERS RELATING TO MAJOR-GENERAL C. V. F. TOWNSHEND'S APPRECIATION OF THE POSITION AFTER THE BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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EAST INDIA (MILITARY).

PAPERS RELATING TO MAJOR-GENERAL C. V. F. TOWNSHEND'S APPRECIATION OF THE POSITION AFTER THE BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA.

No. 1.

Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 1st April 1916.

(Telegraphic.)

Kindly telegraph any information you may have concerning the allegations which have been made here that owing to insufficient forces at his command Townshend formally protested against moving on Baghdad. Islington on my behalf stated in the House of Lords, in answer to a question whether Townshend was responsible for decision or had advised move to Ctesiphon, that prior to such move if Townshend had made any such representations he would have addressed them to Nixon, but that no such representation or advice had been made to us here. The Government sanctioned the advance on the advice of General Nixon and of the Government of India, as I had already stated in the House of Commons. Further, Islington stated that we had not been informed whether Townshend had been consulted by Nixon.

No. 2.

Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 4th April 1916.

(Telegraphic.)

Referring to your telegram [No. 1 above] we have no record of any such protest. The correct procedure would have been for the General Staff, 6th Division, to have recorded any such protest, if made in their War Diary. (*Vide* Field Service Regulations.) We have received no such record. But entries are made in the War Diary, 6th Division, dated 3rd October, referring to an appreciation which may be the origin of the allegation to which you refer. Army Headquarters received these on 14th December 1915. This appreciation appears to have been addressed to Chief Staff Officer, Force "D." We have no record of it and the Headquarters General Staff Diary makes no reference to it. In order to clear this point and to get a statement from Townshend, General Officer Commanding Force "D" is being referred to. We will make a further report on receiving an answer to this. We have received no War Diaries from the 6th Division later than October.

No. 3.

Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, 4th April 1916.

(Telegraphic.)

Referring to your telegram [No. 2 above], in a leading article in the *Times* on Saturday it is stated that before he moved a step from Kut Townshend had declared constantly that he had insufficient forces. This article also alleges that the strong objections which Townshend had made had been brought to the notice of the Government of India informally, and further asks whether it is to be understood that neither the Indian Government nor the Army Department, nor any responsible member thereof had ever informally seen the important document in which Townshend stated move on Baghdad with his then force could only be demanded by persons quite ignorant of the art of war, or that they could only have seen it subsequently to the commencement of the move? I read your telegram as justifying denial of suggestion which the *Times* conveys. Nixon is being called on to explain.

MS 217 2500—5/1916* E & S

No. 4.

Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 6th April 1916.

(Telegraphic.)

We agree that you are fully justified in denying the suggestion of the *Times*. We do not understand the meaning of the statement that the Indian Government were acquainted informally with the strong objections made by Townshend. We know nothing of the document referred to in the article, and subordinate commanders like Townshend do not communicate, either formally or informally, with the Government of India. General Nixon, besides being in chief command, was present on the spot in person. We do not think that it was incumbent on General Nixon to regard or forward opinions by subordinate commanders with which he was not in agreement. We were rightly and deliberately guided by Nixon's opinion alone, as he alone was responsible to us for results.

No. 5.

India Office to General Sir John Nixon, K.C.B., 4th April 1916.

I am directed to inform you that the attention of the Secretary of State for India has been called to statements made in the Press, and to reports current elsewhere, that prior to his advance on Ctesiphon, General Townshend, the Officer in immediate command of this phase of the operations, protested that the force at his disposal was inadequate for the purpose.

In this connection I am to invite your attention to the following passages from a leading article published in the *Times* of 1st April, viz. :—

> " Whoever knew or did not know General Townshend's grave warnings of the risk of an advance to Baghdad, these warnings were fully and repeatedly expressed to Sir John Nixon." And again : "There can be no doubt that before he moved a step from Kut, General Townshend had constantly declared that his force was insufficient."

I am to say that Mr. Secretary Chamberlain is far from assuming the accuracy of the reports current in the Press and elsewhere, but considers it necessary that he should have definite knowledge of the facts.

I am, therefore, to enquire whether any such communications as referred to in the *Times'* article were actually made to you by General Townshend, and if so, I am to request that you will, if possible, furnish copies of any such correspondence that has passed with him on the subject, or failing these, your report on the statements made.

If any representations were made to you by General Townshend, the Secretary of State for India would further wish to be informed whether they were reported to the Government of India.

No. 6.

Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 9th April 1916.

(Telegraphic.)

With reference to our telegram of the 4th instant [No. 2 above]. We have received the following telegram from General Officer Commanding Force "D" :—"The appreciation referred to in the entry in the General Staff Diary, 6th Division, is probably the following telegram (*begins*) :—'3rd October 1915, to Major-General, General Staff, Kut. By aviator's report you will see he had just left for Kut, and that the chance of breaking up the retreating Turkish forces, which have by now taken up a position at Suliman Pak no longer exists; that position is astride the Baghdad Road and the Tigris, and is estimated to be 6 miles of entrenchments. It is also probable that Baghdad has sent them reinforcements. See report by aviator which gives 6 barges 3 more steamers, 1 mahela, 105 bell tents, &c., also many men and many stores, &c ; another steamer 5 miles west of Suliman Pak. My opinion, if I may be allowed to express one, is that up to the battle at Kut, our object has been to occupy strategical position of

Kut, and to consolidate ourselves in the Vilayet. Ctesiphon is now held by the defeated Turkish Forces. Should it not be considered politically advisable by Government to occupy Baghdad at present on account of doubtful situation at Dardanelles, and possibility of our small forces being driven out of Baghdad by stronger forces from Anatolia, which would compel us to retire down a long line of communications teeming with Arabs, at present more or less hostile, whose hostility would become active on hearing of our retreat, then I consider that on all military grounds we should consolidate our position at Kut. The sudden (?) fall of water, which made our advance in ships most difficult, slow, and toilsome, upset our plans of entering Baghdad on the heels of Turks while they were retreating in disorder. If on the other hand it is the desire of Government to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run, it is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut by road should be carried out methodically by two Divisions or one Army Corps or by one Division supported closely by another complete division, exclusive of the garrisons of the important places of Nasiriyah Ahwaz and Amara. It is now quite impossible for laden ships to go up.' (*Ends.*) When opportunity offers reference will be made to General Kemball, who is at present engaged in active operations, meanwhile I am asking Townshend whether he has any further references on the subject. In case there is any point on which he is not clear I would suggest that the Secretary of State should consult General Nixon."

No. 7.

General Sir John Nixon, K.C.B., to India Office, 11*th April* 1916.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 4th instant [No. 5 above], asking whether General Townshend, prior to his advance on Ctesiphon, protested that the force at his disposal was inadequate for the purpose, and whether he fully and repeatedly expressed to me grave warnings of the risk of an advance to Baghdad and whether before he moved a step from Kut he had constantly declared that his force was insufficient.

General Townshend returned from sick leave in the middle of August and on the 28th September fought the battle of Kut-el-Amara. The pursuit of the Turks was carried out by General Townshend himself with his leading Brigade as far as Aziziah. On the 3rd October he forwarded to the General Staff his opinion as to how the further advance on Baghdad, should Government desire it, should be conducted. In this document he expressed the opinion that if the Government desired to occupy Baghdad, two Divisions, or one closely supported by another, exclusive of communication troops, were necessary.

At that time he had under his command his own division with four or five squadrons and three batteries of 18-pounders and four heavy guns. The pursuit expended itself owing to the difficulty of getting on, and all question of an advance to Baghdad was in abeyance.

About the same day I was informed that another division would almost certainly be sent, and this was communicated to General Townshend. Accordingly I continued, as the tactical situation required, to bring up what reinforcements were available in the country, and in due course increased the force under General Townshend by another brigade of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a horse battery, and to the Naval flotilla was added H.M.S. "Firefly," with a 4-inch gun. In addition, communication troops were provided for Kut.

The decision to send two divisions from France arrived on the 24th October, and General Townshend had proposed alternative schemes of advance with a view to the occupation of Baghdad, but General Townshend did not express to me the view that the force being placed at his disposal would be inadequate for the purpose.

From Kut I sent the Major-General, General Staff, by aeroplane to see General Townshend and discuss personally with him the plans submitted. Major-General Kemball thus visited him on the 19th October and the 5th November, and on return gave no inkling that General Townshend was in doubt as to the adequacy of the force that would be under his command. Whatever opinion General Townshend may have previously held before reinforcements were promised, it was quite clear that the final confirmation of the coming of two divisions from France had satisfied him that the conditions he mentioned at the beginning of the month were fulfilled.

No. 8.

Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 10*th April* 1916.

(Telegraphic.)

Our telegram of 9th April [No. 6 above]. Following received from General Officer Commanding Force "D." (*Begins*):—"The following telegram, in answer to a question I put to him, has been received from Townshend, dated 7th April. (*Begins*) 'To avoid any chance of misunderstanding I trust that this my reply may be permitted to go in my own words.* My opinion most certainly was that we were taking a grave risk in continuing a strategic movement against Baghdad with my weak Division alone, the British battalions of which were reduced to half their strength, and besides this the drafts to replace casualties at the battle of Kut consisted of raw recruits from India while there were no other troops to support me and the distance to the sea was over 300 miles. Further, the indications were that the Turks were holding and containing our troops in the Gallipoli area and that in order to save Baghdad they would without doubt send reinforcements to Mesopotamia. Notwithstanding the fact that General Nixon gave me his confidence and that the entire conduct of the operations commencing in May with Kurna and Amara up to the present time had been given to me by him it will be obvious that it was most difficult for me in my position as a subordinate commander to give my views to the Army Commander unless he asked for them. Nevertheless it seemed to me that it was my absolute duty to point out to him the risk of advancing with my present force to attack Ctesiphon, well known to be a strong position, and to occupy Baghdad. Having called his attention to the risk, my conscience was clear, and I was prepared to carry out any orders given me by him. Therefore, on the 3rd October, finding the Turks had rallied at Ctesiphon after the defeat at Kut, I telegraphed from Azizieh, where I had halted my pursuit. The words I used were as follows:—"If on the other hand it is the desire of Government to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run, it is in my opinion absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut by road should be carried out methodically by two divisions or one Army Corps or by one division supported closely by another complete division, exclusive of the garrisons of the important places of Nasirieh, Ahwaz and Amara." I consider this pointed out risk sufficiently and was all, in my opinion, that a subordinate commander could do. It would be contrary to discipline to protest in the full sense and meaning of the word. Further, I wish to say that I told Sir John Nixon previous to the battle at Kut that not only did I hope to defeat the Turks in their position at Kut but also, as at Kurna, to rout them completely, and that, if I saw the chance, as I did in May at Amara, I should take the risk of pushing on into Baghdad on the heels of the rout; but I halted at Azizieh on finding that the Turks had rallied at Ctesiphon in formidable numbers. The knowledge I had gained of the reinforcements the Turks had sent to Mesopotamia and the experience of the Kut battle made it clear to me that, compared with those at Kurna, I had very different troops to deal with, and that it was essential for me to be cautious and that in order to take Baghdad at least an Army Corps would be required. This I have mentioned to show my readiness to accept every responsibility for my actions, and that in the first instance I myself had contemplated getting into Baghdad." (*Ends*.) It has not been possible to refer to General Kemball as he is wounded.

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* All telegrams are paraphrased.

No. 9.

India Office to General Sir John Nixon, K.C.B., 11th April 1916.

With reference to your letter of the 11th April 1916 [No. 7 above], I am directed to forward for your information the attached copy of a further telegram, dated 10th April [No. 8 above], received from the Government of India, and to say that Mr. Secretary Chamberlain would be glad to receive any observations you may have to make as early as possible.

No. 10.

General Sir John Nixon, K.C.B., to India Office, 12th April 1916.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 11th instant [No. 9 above], enclosing the Viceroy's telegram of the 10th instant and asking for my observations on General Townshend's telegram of the 7th instant.

This telegram confirms what I said in my letter of yesterday that I received no representation from General Townshend subsequent to his telegram of the 3rd October. We are personal friends and I cannot but think that, had not his opinion been modified by the information concerning the sending of reinforcements, he would have found no obstacle in communicating with me.

The Turkish troops he met at Kurna were not the same as those he met and defeated at Kut, but still some of the Kurna men were there at Kut and the remainder consisted of troops whom our forces had defeated before at Shaiba and Nasiriyeh.

EAST INDIA (ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1919-20).

REPORT

OF THE

Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to enquire into the administration and organisation of the Army in India.

(CHAIRMAN: LORD ESHER.)

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE.

1. To enquire into and report, with special reference to post-bellum conditions upon the administration and, where necessary, the organisation of the Army in India including its relations with the War Office and the India Office, and the relations of the two Offices to one another.

2. To consider the position of the Commander-in-Chief in his dual capacity as head of the Army and member of the Executive Council, and to make recommendations.

3. To consider and to report upon any other matters which they may decide are relevant to the enquiry.

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REPORT

OF THE

ARMY IN INDIA COMMITTEE, 1919-1920.

To the Right Hon. E. S. Montagu, M.P.

Sir,

In forwarding you the first part of our Report we desire to point out a difficulty with which we are confronted at the outset of our enquiry. We cannot consider the administration of the Army in India otherwise than as part of the total armed forces of the Empire; yet we have no indication of the form of organization which may be set up in the future for the control of other parts of those forces, or of the whole.

We have, it is true, been told that proposals for the higher direction of our Imperial forces are under consideration, and we are aware of the circumstances under which an Imperial Cabinet was formed during the late war. But the bases of permanent Imperial control over the organised forces of the Empire are as yet unlaid, and we have therefore been obliged to take existing statutes and usage as the foundation of the proposals we have made in accordance with the terms of our reference. The remedies which we shall venture to suggest for such defects in the Army in India as may be disclosed in the course of our enquiry will therefore be made subject to the limitations we have indicated.

Novel political machinery created by the Peace Treaty has enhanced the importance of the Army of India relatively to the military forces in other parts of the Empire, and more particularly to those of the British Isles. We feel bound to assume that Western Europe will no longer be an armed camp containing national armies in a high state of preparation for war, and we note that conflicts fraught with the gravest consequences to the belligerent nations cannot in future take place within a few days or weeks of an order to mobilise. We realise, and the evidence of Lord Allenby confirms our belief, that the war has left Eastern Europe and what is commonly known as the Near and Middle East in a condition of grave unrest, with consequences to India, especially as regards her military and financial resources, that we are unable to ignore.

We are aware that, during the war, the necessary co-ordination of the fighting strength of the whole Empire brought into existence what has been called an Imperial Cabinet, performing real functions of Imperial Government, and accepted apparently without demur by the united peoples. The evolution of this novel constitutional instrument is for the moment arrested. If the principle of an Imperial Cabinet composed of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and the Dominions becomes rooted in our institutions, other changes connected with Imperial defence seem likely to follow.

An Imperial General Staff, an Imperial Naval and an Imperial Air Staff, possibly an Imperial Foreign Office, may become segregated under the leadership of the British Prime Minister of the day, but controlled by a body that from the nature of the case cannot be wholly responsible to the Parliament at Westminster. If India were again to be represented directly in a permanent Imperial Council or Cabinet, such as that summoned *ad hoc* during the war, the position of her Commander-in-Chief might assume a special aspect different from that which we have had to consider. Desirable

[2104] Ps 2095 (Ps 1924) Wt 20283/9 1000 10.20 [I.O.P.]

and perhaps vital as such an evolution of our institutions may be, the chances of its accomplishment are not immediate. We have, therefore, accepted for the purpose of our Report the relations of India to Great Britain and to the Empire as they stand to-day.

We desire also to mention that we have been requested, in considering our recommendations, to avoid, if possible, framing them in such a manner as may hereafter prove inconsistent with the gradual approach of India towards a Dominion status; and we observe that the Indian Constitutional Reforms recently proposed have in view the relaxation of the control of the Secretary of State, as well as of Parliament, over the Government of India.

We are at the same time confronted with evidence of the continued reluctance of the India Office to relinquish into the hands of the Government of India greater freedom in the administration of the Army, even in cases where this could be done without compromising the administration of the Army at home or contravening the sound principle of uniformity in military policy. We are strongly of opinion that greater latitude should be allowed to the Governor-General in Council and to the Commander-in-Chief in India in matters affecting internal military administration, in order to secure greater efficiency, and especially the greater contentment of the Army in India.

At the same time we lay stress upon the importance of maintaining constant and intimate touch between the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London and between their general staff officers.

Taking, then, existing institutions and the present conditions in India as the basis on which to work, we consider that we shall be laying the foundations of a sound Imperial military system, if the plans we propose are consistent—

(1) with the control by the Government of India of Indian military affairs;

(2) with giving to the Government of India a voice in questions of Imperial defence, and

(3) with allowing the Imperial General Staff through its Chief to exercise a considered influence on the military policy of the Government of India.

Keeping these principles in mind, we propose to submit our Report to you in several parts, and to report on each separately. Part I. is forwarded herewith, and deals with matters upon which a great mass of evidence already exists in documents laid before us. We have therefore not thought it necessary to travel once more over ground investigated by numerous committees and commissions, and by eminent Viceroys and Commanders-in-Chief in past years.

We have limited our enquiry upon these matters to obtaining the views of distinguished soldiers of recent war experience, and we have found that their conclusions are in general agreement with the recorded opinions of Lord Lytton and Lord Kitchener.

At the outset of our inquiry it was necessary to decide whether formal evidence should be taken. After consideration we determined that it was undesirable to add to the mass of documentary evidence already available. We consequently decided to take counsel with high officers, military and civil, and certain independent persons whose views and experience could simplify our task, but not to record their evidence formally. We have thus obtained expressions of opinion given with complete freedom, and, coupled with the experience of the members of the committee, they have been of great value to us in forming our conclusions.

We desire to remind you that the subsequent Parts of our Report, dealing as they are bound to do with matters of administrative detail, would be largely influenced by the decision at which you may arrive to accept or reject the proposals we have made in Part I. So convinced are we of the desirability of obtaining a decision of His Majesty's Government on the principles laid down in Part I. before proceeding to the laborious examination of the numerous questions covered by our reference, that we have thought it imperative to place Part I. of our Report in your hands before the committee proceeds to India. It would facilitate the work of the committee, and would render their complete report of greater value to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of India, if we could obtain from you at an early date an indication of the advice you are likely to tender to His Majesty's Government upon the principal questions covered by Part I. of our Report.

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient Servants,
ESHER.
M. F. O'DWYER.
H. V. COX, Lieut.-Genl.
CLAUD W. JACOB, Lieut.-Genl.
J. P. DU CANE, Lieut.-Genl.
G. FELL.
WEBB GILLMAN, Maj.-Genl.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, Brig.-Genl., *Secretary*,
3rd November 1919.

PART I.

SECTION I.

The India Office.

1. The relations between the India Office and the Government of India are presumably based upon the importance of keeping the control of Parliament as far as possible intact over Indian expenditure. The theory, sound in itself, in view of the bureaucratic form of government in India, has proved to be illusory in practice. The business of Parliament is too great and too complex to enable any effective control to be exercised by the House of Commons over Indian expenditure. In practice, therefore, the control of the India Office has been merely the control of one bureaucracy over another.

The working of this system undoubtedly causes delay in dealing with military questions that frequently require rapid settlement, both in the interests of efficiency and of the contentment of the Army in India. We, therefore, recommend that greater latitude should be allowed to the Governor-General in Council in deciding questions of a military character, provided they do not influence by reflex action the administration of the British Army at home.

2. From 1909, and particularly during the war, the rule was relaxed under which all communications of a military nature between the Commander-in-Chief and the War Office passed through the India Office. During the war the Commander-in-Chief in India communicated direct with the War Office. We consider that this freedom of communication should now be established as a permanent right on a regular official basis; but should be limited to communications between the Commander-in-Chief and the Imperial General Staff. The Secretary of State for India should be kept fully informed of such communications.

3. In order to facilitate what we consider of primary importance, namely, the free and intimate relation between the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and in order that the Secretary of State for India should also be fully informed upon all questions of military policy affecting India, we recommend that the Secretary in the Military Department of the India Office should always be an officer with Indian experience, of high military rank, appointed on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff by the Secretary of State for India. It would be convenient and desirable that this officer should be a Deputy Chief of the

Imperial General Staff in order that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff may have the benefit of experienced advice on Indian matters. Furthermore, he should have the right of attending the meetings of the Army Council when questions affecting India are discussed. Although we strongly advocate that questions of administration regarding the Army in India should be mainly settled in India itself, and should only be referred to the India Office under the circumstances which we have previously noted, we are of opinion that the Secretary in the Military Department of the India Office should have attached to his Department two officers specially conversant with "A" and "Q" questions, in so far as they affect India.

4. We are unable to see any advantage, from the point of view of India, in retaining upon the India Council in London the services of an officer of high military rank. It is undesirable that the Secretary of State for India should be left in any doubt as to the quarter from which military advice should be offered him. The principle upon which we think it important to insist is that the sole responsible military adviser of the Secretary of State should be the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. This advice could be tendered either through his Deputy Chief established in the India Office, or directly by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself, who should be authorised to attend any meeting of the Council of India at which military questions of first importance are to be discussed.

5. We recommend in Section III. that the Commander-in-Chief in India shall be appointed with the concurrence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and that the Commander-in-Chief shall be the sole military adviser of the Government of India. If this system can be established, the chain of military responsibility for questions of an Imperial character will be complete. On the one hand, the Commander-in-Chief will look to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for supreme direction in all questions of Imperial military policy in which India is concerned; and, on the other hand, the Governor-General will look to the Commander-in-Chief for military advice upon questions in which India only is concerned, and also upon questions of a wider military character with confidence that the Commander-in-Chief will be in a position to express upon the latter the considered views of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

6. We believe that, under the plan thus proposed, the Government of India will retain its statutory control over the Army in India, that the Governor-General will be assured of undivided counsel upon military questions, and that uniformity of military policy will at last be established between Great Britain and India.

SECTION II.

Defence Committee.

7. Our attention has been called to the Committee of Defence set up in India by the Governor-General during the war. Its composition and functions follow those of the Committee of Imperial Defence in this country as they were understood to be after it was reconstituted on a new basis in 1902 and before the establishment of its permanent secretariat in 1905.

That Committee was consultative and not executive. It had no administrative functions. It could not prescribe a policy or give directions. Its duty was to advise. It interfered with no existing authority. It possessed no fixed constitution, and the persons composing it were selected by the Prime Minister from among his colleagues and their technical assistants, with the addition of any person whose advice he might desire to obtain upon the matters about to be discussed. The Committee, in short, contained no *ex officio* member except the Prime Minister himself, and this flexibility, as Mr. Balfour pointed out at the time, gave it an advantage of first-rate importance in dealing with the manifold subjects that gather round the problem of national defence.

8. Such, we understand, was the body upon which the Governor-General modelled the Defence Committee in India, and we are firmly convinced that, taken in conjunction with the existence of the War Book, which had been prepared in 1914, it contributed valuable assistance towards bringing India into line with Great Britain during the war, and that it should not be allowed to disappear.

We recommend that its Secretary should be a member of the Governor-General's Private Secretariat, and that he should have charge of the records and be responsible for the preparation and upkeep of the War Book.

9. The War Book, designed by Sir Maurice Hankey some years before 1914, was planned with a view to the instant mobilisation of all government departments at home on the outbreak of war. For the first time in this country the attention of all Departments of Government was drawn to the fact that war was not the sole business of the Admiralty and the War Office, but that it was the concern of practically every Department of State. The Defence Committee, by its composition and its method of working, first suggested this somewhat novel conception of modern war, but the War Book stereotyped it and fixed it indelibly in the minds of the whole Civil Service.

The War Book prepared in India in 1914 has been laid before us. It is a work of such value that we strongly recommend that it should be constantly revised and kept up to-date by the officer we have designated, who will at the same time be the Secretary of the Defence Committee.

We would suggest that the Secretary of the Indian Defence Committee should be placed in direct touch with the Secretary of the Imperial Defence Committee in London, so that as far as possible the measures concerted by the latter should be applied by the Governor-General in India, so far as they are appropriate to local conditions.

SECTION III.

The High Command.

10. The definition of the High Command in India in future requires a few preliminary words of explanation. We have before observed that our attention has been drawn to the importance of keeping in view in any proposals we may make, the gradual approach of the Government of India to a Dominion status. We have also kept before our minds the possibility that in the near future Imperial control over the military policy of the Empire may take a form other than that which obtains at the present time, leading to the establishment of a real Imperial General Staff deriving its authority, not from the War Office and the British Parliament, but from an Imperial Council such as that contemplated in 1907, which materialised in the course of the late war, in what has been called an Imperial Cabinet.

We have, however, felt ourselves obliged to base the recommendations we are about to make upon existing facts. We are unable to admit any close resemblance between the principles which are applied to army administration in this country, governed as it is under democratic parliamentary institutions, and the conditions that obtain in India, where the government remains of a bureaucratic character with such parliamentary checks as are found to be possible. No analogy exists between the Government of India and that of any European country. It appears to us, therefore, that army administration in India must conform to the principles laid down by the statutes upon which that Government is based, which place the control of the Army in India in the hands of the Governor-General in Council.

11. We have endeavoured to superimpose upon the existing fabric of Indian army administration the general staff idea. In other words, while leaving the control of the Army in India to the Governor-General in Council, we have tried to knit closer the relations between the high command in India and the high command as it now exists at the centre of the Empire. We have considered and rejected the proposal to establish in India a civilian Member of the Executive Council responsible for the Army, and an Army Council with collective responsibilities, as unsuited to Indian requirements at the present time. Among the numerous recommendations that have been made in former years for the reconstitution of the War Department, we have adopted that of Lord Lytton, that the Commander-in-Chief should be himself the only military member of the Viceroy's Council, and we have not thought it conducive to good administration, that upon the Executive Council the Commander-in-Chief should have any military colleague or competitor entitled to deal with the administration of army affairs.

12. We recommend that in future the Army Department and the Headquarters Staff should be consolidated under one head, and with a single secretariat, which is not at present the case, and that the Commander-in-Chief should be in that capacity considered to be the administrative, as well as the executive head of the Army, subject only to the Governor-General in Council, in whom the supreme control of the Army is vested by statute. Every trace of the duality of functions resulting from the same officer being Commander-in-Chief and Member-in-Charge of the Army Department should be swept away.

13. We are of opinion that the financial responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief should not be divorced from his executive responsibilities, and that, while his purely military status should be in no way affected, it should be recognised that he possesses a personal and professional interest in and responsibility for the economical administration of Army funds. We are in agreement with the view that the Commander-in-Chief should be looked upon by all His Majesty's Indian subjects and feudatories in India as the depository and representative of a personal authority, second only to that of the Viceroy; and we are strongly of opinion that any change in the position of the Commander-in-Chief, which would have the effect of weakening that authority, is inadvisable.

14. We propose that a Military Council should be established, composed of high staff officers and others, to assist the Commander-in-Chief in the performance of his administrative functions. This body would have no collective responsibility. Its members, however, would be individually responsible for the branches they would be called upon to administer.

15. We hold the position of the Secretary to Government in the Army Department, as it is generally understood, to be inconvenient and undesirable, as rendering possible an interference with the sole right of the Commander-in-Chief to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council.

16. We purpose to deal in Part II. of our Report with the personnel of the Military Council and their respective functions, responsibilities and powers.

17. We are in agreement with the General Staff view that the Commander-in-Chief in India should be more directly in touch with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with a view to obtaining increased efficiency as regards the organisation, equipment and training of the Army in India, so as to develop the military resources of India in a manner suited to Imperial necessities. We have already stated that, in our view, the Commander-in-Chief in India should have the established right to communicate in peace with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London with regard to strategical plans, war organisation, training and the selection for commands and senior staff appointments. But we are not prepared to dogmatise as to whether the Government of India or the Imperial Government at Whitehall is to be responsible for the military safety of India. It is obvious that, if the gradual approach of India to a Dominion status is to be taken as an axiom, this question can be resolved only by the exercise of judgment, tact, and the principle of "give and take." We, however, are strongly of opinion that, while unity of administration is for the present out of the question, unity of conception on broad lines of military policy, such as those for which an Imperial General Staff should be responsible, is essential in the interests of India herself and of the Empire as a whole. For this reason we suggest that the Commander-in-Chief in India should be appointed by His Majesty's Government on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and that the same procedure should be observed in the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff in India. Should this recommendation be approved, given a close co-operation and correspondence between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief in India, we believe that as much will have been done towards securing unity of military purpose as can be profitably accomplished at the present time.

18. We have said that, in our opinion, the Commander-in-Chief should be the sole military adviser of the Government of India. So important a function carries with it a necessity that the Commander-in-Chief shall be in the closest relation to the Governor-General in Council during the progress of hostilities and at all moments in peace when military questions of the first importance come under discussion. At the same time we cannot disregard the importance of personal inspection from time to time of the larger army formations by the Commander-in-Chief himself. During his absence from headquarters under peace conditions, we therefore recommend that he should delegate to his Chief of the General Staff such functions as he thinks may be properly exercised by that officer during his absence. We do not contemplate that under any circumstances the Commander-in-Chief should himself take the field in war. In our view the command of military operations, whether on a large or small scale, should always be entrusted to an officer specially selected for that purpose. We are too well aware of the inconvenience and danger created in 1914 by stripping the War Office of its most experienced advisers and administrators, to desire to see

a repetition in India of so unfortunate an incident. To the personal influence of the recognised head of the Army of India, especially over Indian troops, we have already alluded, and while we are anxious that it should not be supposed that we depreciate the value of his making himself thoroughly acquainted with the sentiments and requirements of officers and troops in all parts of India, we desire to make clear that, during moments of tension, it would not be consistent with the efficient discharge of his highest duties to absent himself from the council table of the Governor-General.

19. We are convinced that the Commander-in-Chief, as being an "Extra-ordinary" Member of Council, could be relieved of considerable technical responsibility. There appears to us no sound and valid reason why his signature should be obtained to despatches from the Government of India upon questions which have no military significance or importance, or that he should be required to study and record his opinion on cases which relate exclusively to the civil administration. We are sure that a liberal interpretation of the necessities of Indian administration would lead to an appreciable reduction of his duties. We, therefore, recommend that he should be excused attendance at the Executive and Legislative Councils except when the business under discussion affects military interests.

20. We have refrained from exploring in detail the functions which, in our view, should in future be imposed upon the Military Council which we have recommended. We believe that this can best be done after the visit of the committee to India.

21. The recommendations we have made in Part I. of our Report are based upon general principles to which the whole committee have given their adherence, upon a mass of documentary evidence that has been at their disposal, and upon the conferences between the members of the committee and officers and others with profound experience of the working of army administration in India, previous to the war, during the war and since the armistice.

We offer these recommendations to the Secretary of State for India in the hope that he will obtain for them the early sanction of His Majesty's Government, in order that the labours of this committee may not, like those of so many others, be thrown away.

ESHER.
M. F. O'DWYER.
H. V. COX, Lieut.-Genl.
CLAUD W. JACOB, Lieut.-Genl.
J. P. Du CANE, Lieut.-Genl.
G. FELL.
WEBB GILLMAN, Maj.-Genl.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, Brig.-Genl., *Secretary*.
3rd November 1919.

To The Right Honourable E. S. Montagu, M.P.

Sir,

Throughout this Report, we have been guided by the consideration that the army in India, as in all civilised States, furnishes the ultimate sanction for the security of the people against external aggression and for the maintenance of internal tranquillity. We are impressed by the necessity of maintaining this instrument, placed as it always must and should be in the hands of the civil power, in the highest state of efficiency. Whatever form the future Government of India may take, however it may be democratised, and whatever advance may be made on the part of the various sections of the Indian community towards national and imperial unity, the army cannot fail to remain a vital attribute of government in the hands of the dominant authority.

The proposals made by us in Part I having been in the main approved by you, we have in Part II attempted to deal with the difficult question of Supply, to explain in detail the functions which, in our view, should be imposed upon the Military Council, the constitution of which we recommended in Part I, and to make certain proposals regarding Military Finance.

We propose that a Military Council should be constituted for the purpose of assisting the Commander-in-Chief, with a view to relieving him, not of his responsibility, but of manifold duties which, without impairing that responsibility, he can, and should, delegate to his staff officers at Army Headquarters. We desire to impress upon the Commander-in-Chief and upon the officers in question the absolute necessity of carrying out loyally and to the full this principle of delegation. All sound administration is based upon it. No administrator, however able and however conscientious, can interpret responsibility in the sense of giving personal attention and sanction to every act of administration, if the accomplishment of his task is to stand the test of efficiency.

In the constitution of the Military Council, in the functions we have allotted to its various members, and in the handling of this difficult question of military supply, we have all been guided by the supreme consideration of the efficiency of the army in war, coupled with a due regard to the best interests of the Indian tax-payer. We aim at establishing a system which, while it will work simply and economically in time of peace, will be adaptable, without undue friction and disturbance, to the conditions even of such a war as that in which the Empire has recently been engaged.

We lay stress upon the importance, as it appears to us, of organising in India a system of military administration which will establish a chain of responsibility from the Commander-in-Chief himself through his Military Council to the military commands, and so down to divisional units, in order that the test of war, whenever it is applied, shall find ready to hand a body of men expert in administration as well as in command, ready to meet its exigencies. While we are anxious to see officers from their youth up trained in administration as well as in general staff duties, we are conscious that, under a voluntary system such as ours, it is impossible to rely wholly for the administration of the army upon the soldier. There are certain spheres of administration into which a civilian element must not only be introduced, but should be cordially welcomed. This axiom especially applies to the region of provision and production of material, which is essential to the military needs of an army in peace time and in the field. The provisioning of an army with all that it requires, which is ordinarily covered by the term "supply," has been considered carefully by us in consultation with the most experienced authorities, both in India and at home. There has been much conflict of opinion and we have been furnished with advice in divers forms. Powerful arguments, supported by experience in war and by knowledge of Indian conditions, have been used in the course of our discussions in favour of various solutions of what is admitted to be a complicated problem.

The recommendations which we have made in Part II have been signed by us, but we regret that in regard to Section I a divergence of views has occurred.

While detracting from the constructive value of our Report, this divergence of opinion will not, we venture to hope, prove a serious obstacle in attempting to arrive at a decision upon the functions to be vested in the Commander-in-Chief.

We are all agreed in our recommendations regarding the composition and functions of the Military Council, except to the extent that the minority desire to see added to it a member, with the title of Surveyor-General of Supply, to whom they would entrust those functions of production and provision which the majority advocate placing under a separate Member of the Executive Council.

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient Servants,
ESHER.
M. F. O'DWYER.
H. V. COX, Lieut.-Gen.
J. P. DU CANE, Lieut.-Gen.
CLAUD W. JACOB, Lieut.-Gen.
H. HUDSON, Lieut.-Gen.
G. FELL.
WEBB GILLMAN, Maj.-Gen.
UMAR HAYAT.
K. G. GUPTA.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, Col., *Secretary*,
19th May 1920.

PART II.

SECTION I.

Production and Provision.

The responsibility for provision and production is a question to which we have given the most earnest consideration, and regarding which we have taken a great deal of evidence, both in England and in India. We do not intend to enter into the arguments adduced in support of the various systems proposed for the home army, since in the first place such matters are outside the scope of our enquiry, and in the second place the problem of the most efficient method of supplying the army in India, as it presents itself to us, is different from that at home.

2. The main factors which distinguish the two problems are these. In the first place there is an essential difference between the systems under which the two armies are administered. In the United Kingdom there is a civilian Secretary of State for War, responsible to Parliament, who presides over the Army Council, a body possessing collective responsibility for the administration of the army. In India, under the proposals put forward by us in Part I of this Report, the sole responsibility to the Governor-General in Council for command and administration will remain with the Commander-in-Chief, assisted by a small military council possessing, as such, merely advisory powers. In view of the very heavy burden of work which this arrangement will still leave upon the Commander-in-Chief, who will also remain an extraordinary Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, we consider it desirable to relieve him of duties which can be performed by others.

Secondly, there can be no comparison between the industrial conditions of the United Kingdom and of India. At home, provision and production are comparatively easy, since there are numbers of highly organised and efficient firms with whom orders can be placed to meet the army's requirements. In India, industrial development is in its infancy, and reliance has to be placed on a number of specialised Government factories, the administration of which presents considerable difficulties and calls for the exercise of business capacity.

Thirdly, the demands of the army in India for munitions of all sorts closely affect industrial development, which it is now the policy of Government to stimulate. This factor does not exist in the United Kingdom, where army requirements in normal times represent only a fraction of the country's productive power.

While, therefore, we are in favour of assimilating, so far as practicable, the system of administration at Army Headquarters in India to that in force at the War Office, we are satisfied that the conditions in India differ so widely from those in the United Kingdom that the organisation for production and provision demands an independent examination, free from those considerations which have determined the issue at home.

3. Turning now to the Indian problem, we think it desirable to sketch briefly the past history of the arrangements for supply. Prior to 1906 there were two Members of the Executive Council, the Commander-in-Chief, who was responsible for command and executive work, and who had under him three principal staff officers—the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the Principal Medical Officer—and the Military Member, also a soldier, who was responsible for the administrative work of the army, and who had under him the Director-General of Ordnance, the Director-General of Supply and Transport, and the Director-General of Military Works. This Member, therefore, combined the functions of administration and supply, besides being the authority to whom the Commander-in-Chief had to refer for sanction all such proposals as required the orders of Government. Under this arrangement the Government of India had two military advisers. This system was abandoned in 1906 in favour of an arrangement under which a department of Military Supply was created and placed in charge of another soldier, with the rank of major-general, who also had a seat on the Executive Council.

We do not think it necessary to enter into the merits of the controversy which resulted in this decision. In 1909 this department was abolished and the present system was introduced, under which all the work connected with the administration of the army, the formulation and execution of the military policy of the Government of India, the responsibility for maintaining every branch of the army, combatant and non-combatant, in a state of efficiency, and the supreme direction of any military operations based upon India, are centred in one authority, the Commander-in-Chief and Army Member.

4. We have already recommended, in Part I of this Report, that the Commander-in-Chief should have the sole right to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council, and that he should have no military colleague upon the Executive Council. We consider, however, that recent experience and the changing conditions of India render it one of the first essentials of a sound organisation to relieve the Commander-in-Chief, as far as is consistent with his office, of the heavy burden which at present devolves upon him. As already stated, he now has the sole responsibility for the efficiency of the army in all its branches. He exercises command over a very large force in India, and he has, in addition, considerable administrative responsibilities for the large portion of the Indian Army now employed overseas. He is the sole adviser of the Governor-General in Council on all questions of military policy, and is in supreme direction of all operations based on India. As a Member of the Executive Council, he shares with his colleagues the responsibility for all the decisions of Government, whether on civil or military matters. We believe that certain proposals put forward in this part of our Report and in Part I will, if accepted, go some way towards affording the Commander-in-Chief relief, and we now proceed to consider how it is possible further to reduce his work and so set him free to devote his time to his various duties as Commander-in-Chief, as a Member of the Government, and as sole military adviser to the Governor-General in Council.

5. It is at this point that we regret to find a divergence of opinion among the members of the Committee. The majority, consisting of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Cox, Lieutenant-General Sir Claud Jacob, Sir Godfrey Fell, Major-General Sir Webb Gillman, and Sir Krishna Gupta, for the reasons given in paragraphs 6–16, strongly incline to the view that production and provision and the administration of the Royal Indian Marine should be entrusted to a civilian Member of the Executive Council. The minority, composed of Lord Esher, Lieutenant-General Sir John Du Cane, Lieutenant-General Sir Havelock Hudson, and Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, favour a solution, for the reasons given in paragraphs 17–23, which places production and provision under a civilian member of the Commander-in-Chief's Military Council, and the Royal Indian Marine directly under the Commander-in-Chief.

6. The majority hold that the necessary relief could not be afforded to the Commander-in-Chief by entrusting production and provision to a special civilian officer working directly under him as a member of the Military Council. It is claimed for this arrangement that, while relieving the Quartermaster-General of work which, having regard to his already heavy duties, he cannot conveniently perform, it would leave unimpaired the sole responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief for the efficiency of the army. They do not, however, recommend the adoption of this organisation, for the following reasons:—

In the first place, they do not consider that such an arrangement would afford the Commander-in-Chief sufficient relief to enable him to discharge the many functions entrusted to him. So long as the ultimate responsibility for production and provision remains with him he cannot divest himself of all the work connected therewith, although he may delegate the administrative details to the special supply officer on his staff. There is a limit, too, to the extent to which, under any system of government, large administrative questions can be left to the disposal of a subordinate officer. Consequently all questions which, owing to their financial importance, their contentious nature, their intrinsic difficulty, or their bearing on other departments of Government, would be beyond the capacity of the supply officer to decide, would have to be referred for the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, thereby adding considerably to his labours. Moreover, many questions relating to factory administration and supply are of such importance as to require discussion in the Executive Council; and it is, they consider, very desirable to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of the obligation to study and present to the Council cases which, by reason of their technical nature and their unfamiliarity, he can only master with considerable effort and at an expenditure of time which he can ill afford. The indications are that these questions will be more numerous and more difficult in the near future. Labour questions in India, as elsewhere, are daily becoming more complex and more insistent, as evidenced by the increased frequency of industrial strikes, and will closely affect the working of the Government factories, and, indeed, all sources of production. The growth of trade unionism in India will also present difficult problems for solution. They desire to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of the task of handling these and many other related subjects.

Secondly, under the organisation which they propose, the Commander-in-Chief will still have the sole responsibility for the specifications and issue of all stores, lethal and non-lethal, required by the army, for satisfying himself that the army's requirements are fully and promptly met, for fixing scales of reserves, and for holding all stores and reserves. They do not consider that the transfer to another authority of the functions of production and provision contravenes the doctrine that the responsibility for the maintenance, training, and administration of the army should be concentrated under a single head. For example, under the existing system, the Commander-in-Chief, though responsible for the efficiency of the army, can have no responsibility for the production or provision of the large quantities of stores which have now to be procured from the United Kingdom. They can see, therefore, no objection in principle to his being dependent upon an outside agency for supply in India, just as he is now dependent upon an outside agency for supply from the United Kingdom. His position in relation to the supply agency in India will, in fact, be analogous to that of the War Office in relation to the great armament firms.

Their view is that while the Commander-in-Chief should remain solely responsible for demanding what is required for the efficiency of the army, and for seeing that his demands are met, to the extent that they may have received the sanction of Government, it is essential that he should be relieved of the administrative work involved in the production and provision of supplies. They go further, and consider it undesirable that he should be in a position to concern himself with the details of this work, at the expense of his purely military duties and of his duties as a Member of the Governor-General's Council, which, even with the limitations that have been proposed, are fully sufficient to occupy his whole energies. The arrangement which they advocate will, in their opinion, ensure this result; and they hold strongly that the alternative arrangement, under which production and provision would be entrusted to a member of the Military Council, would fail to afford the necessary relief to the Commander-in-Chief.

It has been suggested that, if provision and production were placed under a civilian Member of the Military Council, subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, this organisation could, on the outbreak of a war of any magnitude, be formed into a separate and independent department of Government under a Member of the Executive Council. They do not consider that this would be a sound arrangement in India, which is peculiarly liable to be plunged without warning into hostilities, and where, in consequence, the bulk of the army has to be constantly maintained in a state of readiness for war. Frontier operations now involve the employment of larger forces and of greater quantities of material than used to be the case. They therefore hold that it would be wise to maintain in peace time an organisation for production and provision, capable of rapid expansion without the dislocation entailed by the creation, on the outbreak of war, of a separate department of Government and the transfer to it of these functions.

7. Other considerations which, they hold, tell in favour of entrusting supply to an agency outside Army Headquarters and under a civilian head, are that, as was recognised by His Majesty's Government in 1906, the duties connected with supply are essentially civil in character, and are, therefore, in their opinion, more likely to be efficiently and economically performed by a department under a civilian. This consideration applies also to the administration of army factories, the personnel of which it is generally agreed should be almost entirely civilian. Again, the creation of an agency outside Army Headquarters would relieve a number of soldiers of work which is not military in character; and would enable expansion to be carried out, on the outbreak of war, without the imposition of extra work and responsibility upon the Commander-in-Chief and his staff at a time of great stress.

8. Holding, then, that it is a matter of primary importance to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of production and provision and entrust them to an agency outside Army Headquarters, they turn to the question of the nature of this outside agency.

9. Under the Indian system of government, every department of Government must be placed under a Member of the Executive Council. The head of the supply agency must, therefore, be either the Member in charge of one of the existing departments of Government or a Member specially appointed for this purpose. The evidence which has been taken on this subject in India shows that it would be impracticable to hand over the responsibility for production and provision for the army to any of the existing departments of Government, or to any of the departments as they may be reconstituted as a result of the Reforms Scheme. It follows that the supply department must be administered by a separate Member of the Executive Council appointed for this purpose.

10. It may be argued that the experience of 1906–09 showed that there would not be enough work to occupy a full time Member of Council. Whatever may have been the case in 1906–09 it can hardly be contended, in the light of the experience gained during the war, and of the increasing volume and complexity of the work of production and provision, that the task of supplying and equipping a large army, and of dealing with the administration of the many departments connected therewith, would not give sufficient occupation to a Member of Council. New standards have been created. Recent experience has shown the paramount necessity of rendering India more nearly self-supporting in the matter of munitions of all kinds, lethal and non-lethal, thus minimising the risks attendant upon dependence for essential stores upon the mother country, with which its sea communications may at any time be interrupted or severed. Men's eyes have been opened to the vastness of the requirements of modern warfare, to the necessity of organising the Empire's resources in peace time in such a way as to be capable, on the outbreak of war, of expansion with a rapidity and to an extent never contemplated before 1914. The need for stimulating local manufactures, and for placing the control of large purchasing operations, *e.g.*, for textiles, foodstuffs, &c., under expert management, has been emphasized. It was the recognition, at the instance of the present Commander-in-Chief in India, of the supreme importance of these matters that led to the creation of the Indian Munitions Board, that is, in effect, to the partial adoption, as a temporary war measure, of the separation of functions which they now recommend as a permanent measure. It would, they think, be a retrograde measure to replace permanently under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief the multifarious activities which have, during the war, occupied the energies of the Indian Munitions Board and its large staff. These activities impinge at many points on the civil administration of the country, and can therefore be more appropriately discharged by a civil department of Government.

The situation has been altered greatly by the recent grant of free rations to the Indian Army, and the consequent necessity for making large wholesale purchases of foodstuffs and for arranging for distribution to the depôts under the control of the Quartermaster-General, and by the supply to the Indian Army of clothing in kind, in lieu of the previous system under which regiments made their own arrangements for clothing their men. In short, the problems of supply have become far larger and more important, from both the administrative and the financial standpoints, than they were in pre-war days.

11. The majority next turn to a wholly different consideration. One of the matters which were referred for the advice of the Committee is the administration and organisation of the Royal Indian Marine. It is proposed to deal with this question in greater detail in a later Part of this Report. For the present the issue concerns the position of this service in the scheme of Indian Government and the arrangements for its administrative control.

The Royal Indian Marine is at present administered by the Commander-in-Chief through the Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department, an official who, under the proposals put forward in this part of this Report, will disappear. There has been ample evidence to show that this arrangement, as can readily be understood, is distasteful to the service, and also, it is understood, to the Admiralty, who are interested in its efficiency. For this reason, as well as on grounds of principle, they think it desirable to relieve the Commander-in-Chief and Army Headquarters of all responsibility for the administration of the marine service. They anticipate that the administrative work connected therewith is not likely to decrease in volume. There are many directions in which progress and development are needed in the interests of efficiency, and indeed are demanded by Indian public opinion. There is no existing department of Government to which the administration of the marine service could suitably be transferred; but they consider that it might appropriately be handed over to the proposed new department. Much of the work relates to the administration of the dockyards, which are large workshops for construction and repairs, and execute refitting work needed by the Royal Navy in Indian waters, in addition to their work for the Indian Government. The administration of the dockyards presents problems similar in character to those involved in the administration of the ordnance and other factories. They recommend, therefore, that the administration of the Royal Indian Marine should also form part of the duties of the proposed Member of Council.

12. Again, in view of the predominating importance of the army in India, to which reference has been made in paragraph 37 of this Part, they consider it desirable that it should have more than one representative in the Viceroy's Executive Council. The administration of the army will be one of the chief responsibilities, if not the most important, which will remain to the Government of India under the Reforms Scheme, and its cost at present absorbs nearly half the revenues reserved for imperial, as opposed to provincial,

purposes. In other words, the responsibility for the expenditure of nearly half of the total revenues of the Government of India now rests upon the shoulders of one man, namely, the Commander-in-Chief. The amount required for the upkeep of the army has already aroused considerable criticism in the Legislative Council. It is not possible to indicate the exact share of the funds provided in the army budget which will, under these proposals, be administered by the new department; but the amount will certainly be considerably in excess of that administered by any of the other great spending departments of the Government of India, and covers precisely those heads of army expenditure which afford the widest scope for economy. They consider that the creation of a separate department of Government responsible for production and provision would undoubtedly result in increased efficiency and consequent economy, thus tending to minimise criticism, and that the Indian tax-payer would welcome this scheme, as affording the best guarantee that his interests are safeguarded. With these considerations in view, they think it desirable that the Commander-in-Chief, as head of the largest spending department in India, should have the assistance of a civil colleague, who would share with him, in a clearly defined sphere, the interest in and responsibility for the welfare and efficiency of the army and the expenditure connected therewith, and assist him in demonstrating the necessity of such expenditure to the Council and the outside public.

13. In arriving at their conclusions, they have not overlooked various disadvantages which may be urged against the scheme which they advocate. It has been suggested that the proposed organisation would deprive the Commander-in-Chief of the power, on his own initiative, to speed up production to suit the requirements of the moment. They consider, however, that production is more likely to be speeded up, at a time of strain, if it is under the administration of a department whose special function it will be to meet the requirements of the army, than under the present system, which throws upon the Commander-in-Chief the whole responsibility for organising the means of increasing production, at a time when his purely military duties should claim all his time and energies. It has also been suggested that, having regard to the necessary limitation of funds available for the army, there might be a risk of the civil Member pressing upon the collective Council the needs of his own department for more funds; and that his demands, if accepted, would reduce the sum available for other military measures, which the Commander-in-Chief might perhaps regard as more urgent or important. To this they would reply that they consider it necessary that the control of the military budget should remain in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, who would allot to the new department such portion of the funds at his disposal as will enable it, on the basis of the ascertained cost of manufacture or purchase, to meet the needs of the army as estimated by him. They do not contemplate the possibility of the Government of India allocating to this department money which the Commander-in-Chief might need for other purposes in connection with the army.

14. Lastly, apprehension may be felt that the Commander-in-Chief might find himself hampered at times in the execution of his office by differences of opinion between himself and his civil colleague. They do not think, however, that there is any real danger of this occurring. Under the Indian constitution, no one Member of Council can overrule another in matters which are within the latter's purview. Where differences of opinion occur between two Members of Council in matters which concern both their departments, the procedure for adjusting these differences is clearly laid down, and secures to the Commander-in-Chief the opportunity of laying his case fully and personally before the Council as a whole. It works, it is believed, quite smoothly in practice in the case of other departments of Government, the Members in charge of which must naturally at times view problems from different and possibly irreconcilable standpoints. In the case of the two Members who would be chiefly concerned, under the proposed organisation, with military matters, it is reasonable to assume that their community of interest in and responsibility for the efficiency of the army, and the clear definition of their respective functions, would tend to minimise, if not to remove altogether, opportunities for friction and disagreement. Should such unfortunately occur, they would be settled, as in the case of similar differences of opinion between other Members, by the decision of the Viceroy and his collective Council.

15. They therefore recommend the creation of a new department of Government to deal with the supply of the army, and they consider it essential that the Member in charge should be a civilian, in order that there may be no danger of a second military opinion on the Executive Council. This provision meets, in their opinion, the principal objection which was taken to the organisation for military supply which was set up in 1906. They feel confident that the creation of the proposed department will result in increased efficiency and economy in the administration of the army and marine services.

It is difficult to find a title which accurately defines the functions of the new department. They suggest that it be called " the Department of Munitions and Marine."

16. Under the organisation which they recommend, the new department, under a civilian Member of Council, would be responsible for meeting the demands of the Commander-in-Chief for supplies, including foodstuffs and forage, for stores of all kinds in bulk, and for the administration of the ordnance and clothing factories, as well as of the Royal Indian Marine. The Quartermaster-General would remain responsible, under the Commander-in-Chief, for the holding and issuing of all military stores; for specifications and issue of all armaments,

ammunition, provisions, forage, fuel, clothing, equipment, general stores and material; for fixing scales of reserves of the above to be held in depôts, garrisons, mobilisation stores and war reserve; and for local purchases of such supplies as are not provided in bulk by the new department. A table is attached outlining the organisation which they consider would be suitable for the proposed new department, though this may require amendment in the light of experience.

17. The minority of the Committee, composed of Lord Esher, Lieut.-Generals Sir H. Hudson and Sir J. Du Cane, and Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, desire to record their disagreement with the arguments, and their dissent from the conclusions, contained in the foregoing paragraphs.

They feel obliged to challenge these conclusions and arguments on the ground that the proposal based on them, namely, the setting up of a separate department for production and provision under a Member of the Executive Council, is irreconcilable with the fundamental principle of concentrating the command and administration of the army in India under the Governor-General in Council in the hands of a single responsible authority.

They hold that the proposed creation of a separate Member of the Executive Council for the production and provision of military supply leads directly to that system of dual control which was abandoned in 1909. They are convinced that sooner or later friction between the Commander-in-Chief and the Member of Council for Production would be certain to arise, that economical use of the financial resources of the army would not be secured, and that the principle of sole responsibility for the welfare and efficiency of the army would be violated.

They are unable to assent to a proposal which disregards the first principles of sound financial administration and places a Member of Council in charge of a department of State in the anomalous position of being held responsible for the expenditure of funds forming a portion of the military budget, the estimates for which were not prepared and administered under his sole authority and control.

18. They hold that, while there are strong reasons why certain aspects of production and provision of military supply, namely, factory administration and contracts, should be under civilian control, especially under the conditions prevailing in India at the present time, this result can best be achieved by placing them under a civilian member of the Military Council of the Commander-in-Chief. They recommend that a civilian, who would be called the Surveyor-General of Supply, should be added to the Military Council as the head of a branch which will be provided with the technical officers required by military necessities. The Surveyor-General of Supply, as a member of the Military Council, would be in constant touch with his military colleagues, and would have ample opportunity of acquainting himself both with the requirements and the administration of the army. He would have no interests divergent from those of his colleagues, and, without circumlocution or undue delay, he would be in a position to associate himself with them in the economical use of army funds.

19. While they are anxious to relieve the Commander-in-Chief as far as possible from the burden that has evidently been imposed upon him of recent years, primarily owing to the special conditions that arose during the war, they are not convinced that the plan proposed by the majority is necessary to attain that result. They consider that the other means which have been recommended elsewhere in this Report should suffice to achieve this object. These other means are: the abolition of the "duality of functions resulting from the same officer being the Commander-in-Chief and Member in charge of the Army Department,"[1] the delegation of responsibility to the heads of branches who are members of the Military Council, the co-ordinating functions of the Secretary, and the considerable measure of relief it is proposed to afford to the Commander-in-Chief from attending the Executive and Legislative Councils.

As regards the last-named they consider that further relief could be afforded if the Secretary, Army Headquarters, or one of the members of the Military Council, were authorised to attend the meetings of the Executive Council, and were empowered, when the Commander-in-Chief is absent, or whenever summoned by the Governor-General, to explain questions of military administration which are under discussion. They also recommend that the Secretary, Army Headquarters, should be a Member of the Legislative Council, where, following the analogy of a Parliamentary Under Secretary in this country, he could represent the Commander-in-Chief, give explanations and take part in discussion.

20. They do not agree that the system proposed by the majority is necessary in order to ensure rapid expansion of the organisation for production on the outbreak of war. They hold that any peace system which is not extravagant in establishment must necessarily be profoundly modified for a great emergency such as the recent war. The primary duty of a War Department in peace is to organise and prepare for war, and in war to conduct war. In peace the War Department should be responsible for its own supply and for the accumulation of reserves. The mobilisation of industry and the concentration of national effort in a great emergency are outside its scope. The peace system should be adequate for the ordinary purposes for which the army in India is maintained and the normal contingencies that it may be expected to meet.

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[1] *Vide* Part I., Section III, para. 12.

They further hold that, under the system that they advocate, the function of production in a great emergency should be separated from Army Headquarters, and that this could be done without dislocation. The branch under the suggested Surveyor-General of Supply, *plus* the necessary technical services, should be detached and expanded. A plan for this should form an important part of the mobilisation arrangements, and should be the special study of the Surveyor-General of Supply.

21. They also desire to draw attention to the fact that it has recently been decided not to establish a Ministry of Supply at home, mainly on the ground that the unnecessary duplication of Government departments inevitably leads to uneconomical administration, and is therefore unjustifiable.

Without wishing to labour the point, and while fully recognising that conditions in India and at home are in many respects dissimilar, they wish to emphasise the desirability, where possible, of assimilating the organisation in India and at home, for the following reasons:—

(*a*) The centre of gravity of probable military operations has shifted from West to East. In the future we must contemplate the possibility of our armies operating in the Middle East, based partially on India and partially on home. It is essential that the general headquarters of a field army should be able to work smoothly and without confusion with both the Indian and home military authorities.

(*b*) Differences in system make it difficult for officers to pick up their work quickly when interchanged, and the importance of such interchange of officers between home and India has been frequently emphasised.

The differences between the constitutional positions of the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief in India do not affect this question. What is desirable is that in each case the subordinate branches should deal with similar subjects, so that staff officers will know with whom they have to deal.

22. They do not propose to reply at further length to the arguments used by their colleagues in support of the suggestion to place production and provision for the army under a separate Member of the Executive Council, because they consider the whole field of objection to be covered by the comments upon the principle involved in that suggestion which they have made in the preceding paragraphs. They are convinced that in the present circumstances of India, and having in mind the complicated changes of government upon which India is now entering, their proposal to place supply under the Commander-in-Chief will conduce to the highest efficiency of the army as an instrument in the hands of the civil power, by simplifying military administration, and by securing unity of control. They are of opinion that the Department for Military Production and Provision, which the majority of their colleagues propose to place under a separate Member of the Executive Council, can without essential alteration form a branch under the Commander-in-Chief, in charge of a civilian member of his Military Council. This is the course (stated in para. 18) which they strongly recommend should be followed. The organisation proposed is shown on the attached table.

23. As regards the administration of the Royal Indian Marine, they see no reason why the arrangements proposed in Section II, para. 41, for the Royal Air Force should not apply equally in the case of this service, nor should they in any way conflict with the recommendations for the organisation of the Royal Indian Marine, which are made later in Part VII of this Report.

SECTION II.

Composition and Functions of the Military Council.

24. In paragraph 14 of Part I of our Report we recommended the establishment of a Military Council, composed of high staff officers and others, to assist the Commander-in-Chief in the performance of his administrative functions. In making this recommendation we were influenced by the desire to lessen the burden of work which at present devolves upon him. We now proceed to discuss the constitution of the Military Council and to define its functions.

25. The Commander-in-Chief will be President, and the Chief of the General Staff, Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Financial Adviser will in any case be members. In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief the Chief of the General Staff will preside. The remaining heads of branches, whose claims for membership of the Military Council are now for consideration, are the Director-General of Ordnance, Director-General of Military Works and Director of Medical Services.

26. Our attention has been called to the fact that in the recent war general officers commanding armies in the field had attached to their staffs senior officers of high military and technical qualifications, such as the General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery, the Engineer-in-Chief, &c., who advised them on all questions in connection with the efficiency of their arm for war

27. We consider that Army Headquarters, India, would benefit by an analogous organization, and we recommend that senior officers of certain services should be affiliated to the General Staff, and that their functions should be to advise on all questions relating to their arm in war and on the training of their arm in peace and war.

Four of these officers, who should hold the rank either of major-general or of colonel on the staff, should be allotted to the following branches respectively:—cavalry, artillery, engineers and pioneers, and infantry. Suitable officers of lesser rank should, in addition to their other duties, advise the General Staff on questions concerning signals, machine-guns, tanks, gas and other armaments or equipments.

28. These officers should be the means by which the training of their arm is co-ordinated throughout the army in India, and should be the responsible advisers to subordinate commanders for this purpose. They should be the eyes and ears of the General Staff, and should be assisted by officers, possessing the necessary technical experience, to enable them to give advice, from the point of view of the military user, on the armanent and equipment suitable for their branch of the service.

Though we propose that for the sake of convenience these officers should be designated Inspectors, we recommend that powers of independent inspection should not be given to them, and that any inspection of troops which they desire to carry out should only be done by arrangement with subordinate commanders.

29. Prior to the war, the functions of the Director-General of Ordnance included the provision and maintenance of approved scales of reserves of all arms, of all kinds of ammunition, of vehicles (other than transport) and of technical equipment of artillery and engineer units: provision of guns, machine guns, small arms ammunition, technical and ordnance stores and vehicles: and inspection of the same.

He was assisted in the performance of these functions by the Directors of Artillery, of Ordnance Stores and of Ordnance Inspection, and by the Director of Ordnance Factories, who was located at Calcutta.

During the war these functions were curtailed by the appointment, under the Quartermaster-General, of a Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores, a Major-General, who is responsible for the maintenance and issue of stores; and by the transfer to the Indian Munitions Board of the administrative control of the Ordnance factories.

Though in 1920 the Ordnance factories were handed back temporarily to the Director-General of Ordnance, we have recommended in Section I of Part II that they should, in common with all army factories, be placed under a civilian head, who would be either a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council or a member of the Commander-in-Chief's Military Council, and who would be responsible for the production and provision of army munitions and for administering army contracts.

We also consider that the maintenance of approved scales of reserves of armaments, ammunition and equipment, and their issue should devolve on the Quartermaster-General, who should also be responsible for seeing that the articles are of suitable quality.

30. If our proposals are accepted, the pre-war functions of the Director-General of Ordnance will be so curtailed that we consider the appointment in India of an officer of this status is no longer required.

The remaining functions are mainly technical, and we recommend that they should be performed by a Director of Armaments in the branch of the Quartermaster-General. This director would be responsible for inspection from the point of view of the purchaser, and would place his subordinate inspectors in the factories and contractors' works to watch the processes of manufacture on behalf of the purchasing department. He would also approve the finished article.

This inspection would, of course, be independent of any tests which the manufacturer may consider necessary from his point of view.

The inclusion of the Director-General of Ordnance in the Military Council consequently becomes no longer necessary.

31. The Director-General of Military Works is responsible for—

(1) The construction and upkeep of barracks and other military works in cantonments.

(2) Communications, including telephones, and defences.

(3) Mechanical plant for works purposes.

(4) Provision of accommodation other than as in (1).

His duties with reference to military engineering in connection with war have been negligible in the past.

For this officer we propose to substitute—

(*a*) An Inspector of Engineers and Pioneers, who should advise on all engineer operations in connection with war, the training of engineer and pioneer services both in peace and war, and their technical equipment.

(*b*) A Director of Military Works.

In considering this latter officer's duties we are of opinion that, though he should be responsible for plans, specifications, inspection, and the financial questions involved in the construction and upkeep of barracks and other military works in cantonments, including roads, ranges, &c., the actual work of construction and upkeep could in many cases be carried out by a civilian agency, as is suggested in our remarks on Engineer Services in Section IV. of Part IV.

As, moreover, the work in connection with telephones should devolve on the Inspector of Signals, whose appointment is suggested elsewhere in this Report, we consider that those duties of the Director of Military Works which cannot be performed by a civilian agency should be limited to:—

(1) Specification of plans and scrutiny of estimates for accommodation; and inspection of buildings, &c.

(2) Construction and repair of works of an important military character, such as defences, and of those roads near the frontier the upkeep of which is necessitated mainly by military considerations.

(3) The holding and distribution of engineering stores, including electrical and mechanical plant.

We consider that the Quartermaster-General should be able to undertake the control of this directorate without being unduly overburdened, since we recommend that he should be relieved of all responsibility for production and provision.

Under the organisation now suggested, the Director-General of Military Works disappears, and no question therefore arises as to his inclusion in the Military Council.

32. With regard to the Director of Medical Services, there are two alternatives — (*a*) to make him a full member of the Military Council; (*b*) to place him under one of the principal staff officers, who, following the practice in force hitherto at home, would be the Adjutant General.

We recommend that the Director of Medical Services should not be a member of the Military Council, and that he should be placed under the Adjutant General. Our principal reasons for this conclusion are that it is difficult to ensure the proper co-ordination of work at Army Headquarters unless every branch of it is placed under one or other of the principal staff officers. The number of such officers through whom the Commander-in-Chief has to work should be as few as possible.

It is very desirable to put an end to the present system which permits of the Director of Medical Services, in that capacity, issuing orders in the name of the Commander-in-Chief, without the knowledge or concurrence of the staff at Army Headquarters.

We wish to add that the Adjutant General should make a point of having the Director of Medical Services with him at his periodical conferences with the Commander-in-Chief, whenever the question for discussion is of a technical medical or sanitary character; and the Commander-in-Chief will no doubt for his part send for and consult the Director of Medical Services whenever he wishes to ascertain his views on such matters first hand.

33. We have now to consider the arrangements for the performance of the secretarial duties of the Military Council and of Army Headquarters, and the status of the officer responsible for them.

Under the existing organization, there has been a high military officer holding the post of Secretary to the Government of India in the Army Department. He is responsible to the Viceroy for the proper working of the Army Department. All proposals requiring the orders of the Government of India have to be referred to him for that purpose, and he is required to examine them from the administrative standpoint and with special reference to their bearing on the general civil administration. It is his duty to see that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed. He has the statutory right of access to the Viceroy, whom he sees as a rule every week, and to whom he takes army cases requiring His Excellency's orders. He has the statutory right also to submit cases at any stage to the Governor-General. His position is exactly analogous to that of the civil Secretaries to Government in other departments; but he has certain additional functions. For example, he is Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department and in this capacity administers, on behalf of the Government of India and under the direction of the Army Member, the Royal Indian Marine, the executive head of which is located at Bombay. He deals with questions relating to chaplains of all denominations in the field, and with questions affecting the pay and allowances of Roman Catholic and Wesleyan chaplains and other chaplains not on the establishment. He also controls a small section dealing with medals. He corresponds weekly with the Secretary Military Department at the India Office. He is also a Member of the Legislative Council. Finally, he is a member of the Commander-in-Chief's Advisory Council.

34. In paragraph 15 of Part I of our Report we have stated that we hold the position of the Secretary to Government in the Army Department, as it is generally understood, to be inconvenient and undesirable, as rendering possible an interference with the sole right of the Commander-in-Chief to offer military advice to the Governor-General in Council. We now recommend that this appointment should be abolished, not only on the above ground, but also because its existence conflicts with our recommendation (paragraph 14 of Part I of our Report) that the members of the Military Council should be individually responsible for the branches which they are called upon to administer. We consider that this object would be secured by providing that the Commander-in-Chief should delegate to them such executive powers as he may decide; and that each member of the Military Council should, in respect of the subjects pertaining to his particular branch, exercise the power of disposing of cases on behalf of the Government of India analogous to that possessed by the civil Secretaries to the Government of India, to the extent to which the Commander-in-Chief, by special or general order, may delegate such powers, and subject to the observance of financial rules. They should have the power of making unofficial references to other departments of the Government of India. They should not, however, be Secretaries or Joint Secretaries to the Government of India; orders in the name of the Government of India should not issue over their signature; nor should they have the statutory right of access to the Viceroy which is conferred on Secretaries by rules 5 and 6 of the Rules of Business of the Government of India. But we consider that, if the Viceroy desires detailed information regarding any particular case, the Commander-in-Chief should depute the head of the branch concerned to take the papers and explain them to His Excellency.

35. At the same time, it is clearly necessary to provide for the maintenance of close liaison between Army Headquarters on the one hand and with the civil departments of the Government of India and with Local Governments on the other hand, and to ensure that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed. We also think it desirable to afford Army Headquarters assistance in connection with cases involving legislation, and in the preparation of despatches to the Secretary of State.

36. For the performance of all these duties we propose that there should be a Secretary Army Headquarters, whose functions should be—

(1) To sign and issue letters, conveying the orders of the Government of India, which have been prepared by heads of branches. The case dealing with the subject matter must be sent to the Secretary Army Headquarters, at the same time as the draft letter or orders.

(2) To issue Army Orders, Army Instructions (India), and Gazette Notifications.

(3) To maintain liaison with the civil administration; to satisfy himself that the Rules of Business of the Government of India are observed, especially with reference to the necessity for consulting such other departments of Government as may be concerned with the measure under discussion; and to call the attention of the head of the branch to any departure from these rules.

Note.—In connection with the issue of letters or orders, the branch concerned should be responsible for the policy and wording, but it should be open to the Secretary Army Headquarters to suggest, to the head of the branch responsible for the subject matter, any points in which the wording might be more fully or clearly expressed.

(4) To arrange for and control the secretarial work of the Military Council.
(5) To control the entire clerical and subordinate establishments of Army Headquarters.
(6) To render assistance in the preparation of despatches to the Secretary of State.

All communications intended for Army Headquarters will be addressed to the Secretary Army Headquarters, who will distribute them to the appropriate branch or branches.

37. In view of the predominating importance of the part which the army in India plays in the administration of the country, of the large share which it absorbs of the public revenue, and of the numerous ways in which its welfare, contentment and efficiency react upon the whole body politic, we consider that the Secretary Army Headquarters should be an official of high status and wide administrative experience. We also recommend that he should be a civilian. It would not, in our opinion, meet the administrative requirements of the case to make him merely the Secretary to the Military Council, and as such subordinate, in a sense, to the high staff officers who constitute that Council. We therefore propose that he should be a member of the Military Council, and that his full designation should be "Civil Member and Secretary Army Headquarters." He should be appointed by the Viceroy in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. He should not have the statutory right of access to the Viceroy, but we anticipate that the Viceroy will desire to see him at regular intervals in order that he may keep His Excellency in touch with those aspects of army administration which affect the general civil administration, and the relations between the army and the various Local Governments. We consider that this procedure has many advantages, and that it is open to none of the objections of principle which can be urged against the present system, under which the Secretary in the Army Department, himself a soldier of high rank, has the statutory right to take army cases to the Viceroy, and to tender advice on them which may not be in consonance with the views of the Army Member.

38. Our recommendations regarding the future administration of the Royal Indian Marine will be found in Part VII of this Report. The other non-secretarial duties hitherto performed by the Secretary in the Army Department should, we consider, be reallotted by the Commander-in-Chief among the Army Headquarters Staff.

39. We have thus arrived at the following as the composition of the Military Council:—

President	The Commander-in-Chief.
Members	The Chief of the General Staff. The Adjutant-General. The Quartermaster-General. The Financial Adviser. The Civil Member and Secretary Army Headquarters.

If the proposal made in paragraphs 17 to 23 of this Part is accepted, it will of course involve the inclusion of a Surveyor-General of Supply in the Military Council.

40. *Functions of the Military Council.*—The Council can have no collective responsibility. We consider that, with reference to the duty of assisting the Commander-in-Chief in the performance of his administrative functions, the following classes of cases should be referred for discussion by the Military Council:—

(*i*) All important cases which require the sanction or orders of the Secretary of State, except cases which only require such sanction or orders under financial rules.
(*ii*) All cases which, by reason of their intrinsic importance or their bearing on the general administration of the country, are likely to necessitate consideration eventually by the Governor-General in Council.
(*iii*) All cases which the Commander-in-Chief may decide should be brought before the Military Council.

In addition, it should be one of the principal duties of the Military Council to watch the progress of military expenditure, with a view to securing the economical use of army funds; to prepare, and maintain up to date, a comprehensive programme of schemes for the welfare and improvement of the army; and to advise regarding the order in which these schemes should be financed, with reference to the funds available.

The functions of the present Advisory Council will be merged in those of the Military Council as now outlined.

41. We have not hitherto dealt with the position at Army Headquarters of the Military Secretary and of the Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force in India. We consider that the Military Secretary should not in future be a personal staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief, who should, however, have an Assistant Military Secretary in lieu of one of his existing A.D.C.'s. We recommend that the Military Secretary should be the head of a separate branch, should work directly under the Commander-in-Chief and should not be a Member of the Military Council. We note that he is now *ex officio* secretary to the recently instituted Selection Board, and we consider that this should always be one of his functions. He should also maintain the list and records of officers qualified for staff appointments.

We recommend that the Air Officer Commanding the Royal Air Force should have direct relations with the Commander-in-Chief, to whom he should be responsible, as he is now, for the efficiency of the Air Force in India. He should administer the budget of the Air Force, subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief. He should be permitted to correspond direct with the Royal Air Force authorities in England on technical subjects, including the supply of technical stores for which provision has been made in his budget, or for which special sanction has been obtained.

If hereafter the strength of the Royal Air Force in India increases to a degree which is likely to render this arrangement unsuitable, the position of the Air Force and its commander will require reconsideration.

As regards the Royal Indian Marine, it will be seen that the minority recommend that it should be administered directly under the Commander-in-Chief. If, on the other hand the view of the majority prevails, the Royal Indian Marine will be placed under the proposed new Member of Council.

SECTION III.

Military Finance.

42. *Financial Advice and Control at Army Headquarters.*—We have examined the system now obtaining in India, under which financial advice is given and control is exercised by an officer of the Finance Department, situated at Army Headquarters and acting in the dual capacity of representative of the Finance Member and of Financial Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief. We have also compared it with the system in force at the War Office, under which responsibility for the compilation of accounts, for audit (other than Treasury audit), and for financial control, is centred in the Assistant Financial Secretary, who is an officer of the War Office and not of the Treasury. The evidence which we have received indicates that the system in force in India, which was adopted on the recommendation of Lord Kitchener, is well suited to the conditions of Indian army administration. We agree, and recommend its continuance.

We do so the more readily because we understand, firstly, that the Financial Adviser considers himself, and is regarded by the military heads of branches, as a colleague and not as a hostile critic; secondly, that he abstains from offering advice on the purely military aspects of matters with which he has to deal; and, thirdly, that in cases where the Financial Adviser finds himself unable, on financial grounds, to advise the acceptance of a proposal put forward by the military authorities, the Commander-in-Chief has the final opportunity of considering the grounds of the Financial Adviser's objection, and of stating his own views, before the case is submitted to the Finance Member. Subject to this second condition, we consider that the more closely he is kept in touch with the daily work of Army Headquarters and the policy of the Commander-in-Chief the greater will be his usefulness.

If our proposals for the creation of a Military Council are accepted, we recommend that the Financial Adviser should be a member of that Council.

43. *Financial assistance to branches at Army Headquarters.*—During the war financial officers were posted to certain branches at Army Headquarters with the object of assisting the military authorities in the financial side of their work. This arrangement was not altogether satisfactory, since it was not obligatory on the military authorities to consult their attached financial officers. The financial officers, too, had no definite powers or responsibility, and were merely required to offer advice in cases which were referred to them for that purpose.

44. We recommend that there should be, in each of the principal spending branches at Army Headquarters, a financial officer who should have definite functions and responsibilities assigned to him. These officers should be subordinate to the Financial Adviser and work in close co-operation with him and the Military Accountant-General. They should have the title of Deputy Financial Adviser. There should be one such officer, with a suitable staff, in the Adjutant-General's branch, and two in the Quartermaster-General's branch, of whom one should deal solely with Military Works. This latter appointment will entail the abolition of the special appointment of Examiner, Military Works Accounts, and a complete reorganization, which we think very desirable, of the expenditure and accounts procedure of the Military Works Services.

It will be the duty of these Deputy Financial Advisers to help the executive in the administration of the grants placed under their control (regarding which we make certain recommendations later), and for this purpose they will have to maintain the necessary statistics. For example, the Deputy Financial Adviser in the Adjutant-General's branch will require prompt information regarding the progress of expenditure on the pay and allowances of regimental units and other formations, and regarding variations in the strength of troops in India. Every month he should place before the Adjutant-General a statement showing whether, apart from any new measures for which provision was not made in the budget, the progress of expenditure and the strength of troops actually on duty in India indicate the probability of an excess over the budget grant or a saving in it. If there is an excess, it will be his duty to bring it promptly to notice, with a view to an additional grant being obtained from Government, if it cannot be met by reappropriation. In the event of a saving, the money will be available for reallotment on fresh expenditure according as the Commander-in-Chief, with the advice of the Military Council, may decide. For example, it may be utilised to meet excesses under other grant heads, or to finance new schemes which have been approved and for which no provision exists in the budget.

The Deputy Financial Adviser in the Quartermaster-General's branch will require efficient assistants, termed Assistant Financial Advisers, to watch the expenditure of the various Directors under the Quartermaster-General. These assistants should also be in charge of the expenditure on grass farms and dairy farms, and on mechanical transport workshops, and will be responsible for seeing that cost accounts are properly maintained. In the same way there should be a Deputy Financial Adviser attached to the Royal Air Force, who should also be responsible for seeing that cost accounts are maintained in its manufacturing establishments. Each of these Deputy Financial Advisers will also be responsible for assisting the head of the branch in framing his budget estimate.

45. *Financial arrangements in connection with Production and Provision.*—It will be seen from Section I of this Part that alternative arrangements have been suggested for the administrative control of the army factories, of contracts for purchases of supplies of all kinds in bulk, and of the Royal Indian Marine. Whichever of the two systems be adopted, we recommend that there should be a separate Controller at the headquarters of Government, who will maintain the accounts of ordnance factory expenditure, and will also function as a Deputy Financial Adviser, and will render assistance to the executive in the financial administration of the factories. He should pay special attention to the proper maintenance of cost accounts. A second Controller, with similar duties, may be required in connection with the clothing factories, though it may be found possible for one Controller to exercise his functions in respect of both groups of factories.

A system was introduced, with effect from the 1st April, 1919, under which separate finance and accounting offices were established in each of the ordnance factories, with a central office attached to the headquarters of the Director of Ordnance Factories. The function of these offices was to maintain cost accounts, to furnish statistics connected with these accounts to the factory superintendents and to the Director of Ordnance Factories in such a manner as would be of the greatest assistance to the administration, and to help the administration in the preparation of estimates and with all financial work generally. We consider that these arrangements are satisfactory and should be extended to the clothing factories as soon as possible.

With regard to the contracts for the purchase of stores and supplies of all kinds, we recommend that the accounts and audit should be concentrated under a Controller at headquarters, whose financial advice should be at the disposal of the authority responsible for making the contracts.

As regards the Royal Indian Marine, under whatever Member of Council the supreme control may be placed, the greater part of the administrative work will be in the hands of the Director, whose headquarters will be at Bombay. He will require financial assistance, and we recommend that he should have attached to his office a Controller, who should not only maintain the marine accounts, including those relating to the dockyards, but should also discharge the duties of a Deputy Financial Adviser.

46. *Financial advice in Commands and Divisions.*—At present financial advice in Commands and Divisions is given by the Deputy Military Auditors-General, who are located at the headquarters of the Commands, and by the Divisional Controllers of Military Accounts respectively. If it be found possible hereafter to delegate to the commanders of these formations wider administrative powers, it may be found necessary to appoint whole-time financial advisers to assist them in the exercise of these powers. For the present, however, we do not consider this necessary, since there would not be sufficient work to occupy fully officers who had no other duties to perform. We recognise that it is possibly open to objection to combine the functions of accounts and audit with those of financial advice, and that officers of the Military Accounts Department have hitherto had no opportunities for obtaining higher financial training, and for this reason cannot be altogether satisfactory in their capacity as Financial Advisers. We consider, however, that the arrangements which we have mentioned for attaching Deputy Financial Advisers and Assistant Financial Advisers to the several branches of Army Headquarters will afford the necessary training to a considerable number of officers of the Military Accounts Department, who will thus be well equipped in the future to render financial assistance to commands and divisions.

47. *The Military Accountant-General.*—We do not propose any change in the present arrangements under which the Military Accountant-General works under the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters and in the closest co-operation with him. The Military Accountant-General's main function, apart from administering the department of which he is the head, should be to see that the estimates are prepared, and the accounts maintained, in such a form as will be of the greatest help to the military authorities and to the Finance Department of the Government of India.

We have carefully considered whether the Military Accountant-General and his department should not come directly under the control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who would thus have the same administrative relations with this department as he now has with the Indian Finance Department. We think, however, that the balance of advantage lies in retaining the present system, which ensures that the Financial Adviser is kept closely in touch with, and exercises, under the Finance Member, a certain measure of control over, the department which deals with the pay and audit arrangements of the army in India. This system enables the Commander-in-Chief to obtain information without delay regarding defects in these arrangements which react unfavourably on the contentment and efficiency of the army, and to ensure that action is taken to remedy such defects. This would prove more difficult if the responsibility for the work of the Military Accounts Department were removed from the Financial Adviser, and placed under the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who is not so easily accessible, and in fact does not accompany the Government of India and Army Headquarters to Simla during the summer months.

Moreover, to divorce the Financial Adviser from all responsibility for the work of the Military Accounts Department would result in a weakening of his control over military expenditure. The evils of such an arrangement have been apparent during the last few years in respect to Military Works expenditure, which has been brought to account by an officer directly subordinate to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and not subordinate to the Financial Adviser.

We are, however, impressed by the desirability of securing that the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall exercise more definite authority over the audit staff of the Military Accounts Department. At present he has no direct relations with the personnel of the Military Accounts Department, even those employed on purely audit duties. We understand that the question of the method by which the Comptroller and Auditor-General should exercise his responsibility for the audit of all public expenditure in India is at present under consideration by the Government, and we have no desire to anticipate or prejudge the conclusions at which they may arrive. But, even though no fundamental changes may result from this examination of the matter, we consider that the Comptroller and Auditor-General should at least have a voice in the selection and posting of the Military Deputy Auditors-General, and should have under his direct administrative control a sufficient number of senior audit officers, whether military or civil; to enable him to satisfy himself by test audits regarding the correctness and completeness of the audit of military expenditure.

48. *Preparation of the military budget.*—The rules which govern the preparation of the budget estimates are contained in paragraphs 28 to 36 of Army Regulations, India, Volume III. We consider that the present procedure is not satisfactory. The chief defect in the system is that the bulk of the work of preparing the estimates devolves either upon the Controllers of Military Accounts in divisions, *e.g.*, in respect to pay charges, ecclesiastical charges, miscellaneous services, conveyance by road, river, sea and rail, rewards for military services, pensions and receipt grants; or upon the departmental officers at divisional headquarters, *e.g.*, upon the Assistant Directors of Supply and Transport of Divisions in respect to supplies of food and forage, transport and compensation for dearness of food, and upon the Deputy Directors of Medical Services of Divisions in respect of medical services. The heads of branches at Army Headquarters are only responsible for preparing so much of the budget estimates as refer to the personnel of their own branches, and, in the case of the Quartermaster-General, the cantonment budget. Certain Directors prepare their own estimates; but though several of them work directly under the Quartermaster-General, he is not responsible for scrutinizing the consolidated budget of the departments and services which he administers.

49. Another defect is that, although in the budget the grants are shown as at the disposal of various military authorities, in practice the latter do not really administer the grants thus allotted to them. For example, the grant for the pay charges of troops is shown in the budget as under the control of general officers commanding divisions and independent brigades. In practice these officers have no power to administer this grant nor to utilize savings in pay charges to meet other expenditure. The budget is to this extent misleading and fails to represent the facts correctly.

A third defect is that estimates are not prepared with sufficient accuracy, and frequently fail to take into account consequential expenditure in other directions. For instance, it sometimes happens that a scheme for administrative reorganization, placed before Government by the branch concerned, ignores the expenditure which will result from the provision of the necessary buildings.

50. The present form, too, of the military accounts renders it impossible to ascertain readily what is the cost of a particular arm of the service or of a particular formation. For instance, it is not possible to say what is the total cost to Government of the mechanical transport service, since all charges on account of stores and equipment and food, etc., are lumped together under the prescribed grant heads of the supplying departments (Supply and Transport, Clothing, Ordnance, etc.), and these grant heads do not indicate how much of the provision refers to the supply of stores and equipment to the mechanical transport.

51. We recommend that the heads of the principal departments of the army should prepare their own budgets for all the services and departments which they administer, receiving for this purpose assistance from the Deputy Financial Advisers who we have proposed should be attached to their branches.

52. Not only do we wish to impose upon the heads of branches the responsibility for the preparation of their budget estimates, but we also desire to make them directly responsible, under the Commander-in-Chief, for the administration of the grants allotted to them. The budget grants should be definitely allotted to the authorities responsible for the various services. Portions of the grants should be reallotted, under the general control of the head of the branch, to the various Directors. For example, the grant for mechanical transport should be administered, under the Quartermaster-General, by the Director of Mechanical Transport, the grant for the purchase of animals by the Director of Remounts, etc. The budget should be so framed as to show clearly the amount of grant at the disposal of each officer.

53. The military budget ordinarily offers little scope for reappropriation of funds. During the war, a large sum of money was provided annually as a reserve to meet unforeseen expenditure, other than that entailed by active operations. We do not recommend the continuance of this system, which weakens the control of the Commander-in-Chief over military expenditure and affords less incentive to the spending authorities to keep their expenditure within their grants. We consider that greater elasticity will result if our proposal is adopted to make the heads of branches responsible for administering their own grants. It will be their duty to watch the progress of expenditure of these grants, with a view to effecting savings, which can then be utilised, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, to meet excesses under other grant heads

or to finance new schemes. In order that full advantage may result from this system, it is essential that the accounts shall be maintained in such a form as will afford prompt and regular information regarding the progress of expenditure. At present the military accounts system is defective in this respect, but we understand that steps are being taken to improve it.

54. We also consider it very desirable that information should be promptly and readily afforded to the Government of India regarding the progress of expenditure at home in connection with indents for stores, etc. Great inconvenience is caused by the fact that such information is not furnished until towards the close of the financial year, and then only in such a condensed form as to afford little assistance.

55. We also recommend that there should be a "block vote" for each arm of the service, fighting and ancillary. For example, in the case of regimental units, there should be a "block vote" for their pay, food and forage, clothing and equipment. Similarly, in the case of the Royal Air Force or of the mechanical transport, there should be a "block vote" for pay, food, clothing, equipment and stores. After these "block votes" have been settled, the sums should be distributed among the prescribed budget heads; *e.g.*, the various sums allotted for food and forage should be brought together under the appropriate grant head, *viz.*, "Grant 4—Supply and Transport," and all the sums allotted for clothing should be brought together under "Grant 6—Clothing." There should, however, be an appendix to the budget, showing under one head the total sum of money allotted for each arm of the service under the various heads.

56. With regard to purely manufacturing concerns, such as the ordnance and army clothing factories, the procedure to be adopted in allotting budget grants should, we consider, be as follows. Each administrative authority at Army Headquarters who requires stores from the factories, *e.g.*, the Quartermaster-General in respect of clothing and equipment, and the Air Officer Commanding in respect of the service under his control, will allot an appropriate portion of his "block vote" to the authority which supplies the articles required. The aggregate of these allotments will, in the budget, be placed at the disposal of that authority, who will arrange his programme of manufacture accordingly and will reallot the necessary sums to the various factories. Any additional indent on a factory, or the cancellation of any indent already passed on to it, will be accounted for by a simultaneous addition to, or reduction in, the funds placed at the disposal of the factory.

57. We suggest that it might afford a direct incentive to the economic administration of the factories if savings (within certain defined limits) effected in the "on-costs" during the course of the financial year (but not savings due to unforeseen reductions in the cost of raw materials, etc.) should be available for expenditure, during that year or within a reasonable period after its close, on the improvement of their working and efficiency. We attach great importance to this recommendation, and we consider that, if it is adopted and if cost accounting is efficient, it will result in considerable economies in manufacturing costs. It will also benefit the army, as the lower "on-costs" of manufacture of an article effected in any year will reduce the price charged to the army for that article in the following year. If at any time a factory is unable to use the savings resulting from economical management, the money will be available for reallotment. The rate of "on-costs" to be provided in the budget in respect of all articles manufactured in ordnance or army clothing factories should contain a reasonable allowance, on a percentage basis, for depreciation of machinery and plant; and this sum should be at the disposal of the factory authorities to expend at their discretion on repairs and replacements.

We think that a similar system, under which savings in "on-costs" should be available for expenditure on improvements, should also be applied to grass and dairy farms.

We understand that many of the proposals outlined in the preceding paragraphs have already received the approval of the Government of India, and we think that they should be introduced at an early date.

58. If it be decided to adopt the proposal to entrust production and provision, and the administration of the Royal Indian Marine, to a separate Member of Council, we recommend that the spheres of financial responsibility of this Member and of the Commander-in-Chief respectively should be defined as follows. When the military estimates for the following year are being prepared, the Commander-in-Chief will furnish his colleague with an estimate of the quantity of munitions, stores, clothing, foodstuffs and forage which the army will require, indicating where possible the

approximate dates at which delivery should be made. The Member in charge of the Department of Munitions and Marine will then inform the Commander-in-Chief of the estimated cost of these various supplies. He will base his estimates on the ascertained cost of manufacture during the current year, modified if necessary with reference to such factors as probable alterations in the cost of raw materials, etc., and in the case of purchased articles by the anticipated trend of market prices. These estimates will be incorporated under the appropriate grant heads in the military budget estimates. When the budget estimates are finally accepted and passed, the Commander-in-Chief will transfer to the Member for Munitions and Marine the whole sum included in the budget for production and provision, and this amount will be administered by that Member, subject to the usual control of the Finance Department.

If in the course of the financial year it is found that savings (other than those referred to in paragraph 57) can be effected—for example, through an unforeseen fall in prices of foodstuffs or a reduction in the quantities of food or other articles required by the army—these savings will be replaced at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief for expenditure on other objects. If, on the other hand, an unforeseen rise in the price of purchased articles or of raw materials, such as textiles, appears likely to cause an excess over the sum allotted to the Member for Munitions and Marine for the purpose of supplying the army's requirements, the latter will report the circumstance to the Commander-in-Chief, who, unless he is prepared to meet the deficiency from savings under other grants, will, with the assistance of his colleague, approach the Government of India for an additional grant. If the Commander-in-Chief in the course of the year finds that he requires larger quantities of supplies than he originally estimated, it will be necessary for him to obtain, either by reappropriation or by an additional grant from Government, the requisite funds and to place them at his colleague's disposal.

59. If the administration of the Royal Indian Marine is transferred to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine, we recommend that the Marine budget should be entirely separated from the Military budget, and be solely administered by the Member in charge of that department.

60. We recommend that the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters should also be the Financial Adviser to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine, in which he will be represented by a competent Deputy Financial Adviser. This arrangement, which we have ascertained will be practicable, will secure the closest liaison in matters of finance between Army Headquarters and the new Department, and will enable the Financial Adviser to exercise general control over the whole military and marine expenditure, and to ensure that the necessary adjustments, to which reference has been made, are carried out without friction or delay.

61. *Pay arrangements.*—We have received evidence showing that great dissatisfaction at present exists with regard to the arrangements for disbursement of pay to officers and men of the army in India. We recognise that many of the complaints are due to a partial break down of the system under the abnormal strain of war conditions, the shortage of accounts establishments and the employment of a large body of untrained officers and clerks. But the inevitable delays incidental to the war do not wholly account for the universal feeling of dissatisfaction which prevails at present. We consider that the main defect of the present system is that the accounts of officers and men are prepared, as a rule, at a great distance from the station at which they are serving. This inevitably causes delay and gives rise to misunderstandings which could be promptly and easily removed if there were closer relations between the individuals concerned and the disbursing authorities. We have learnt with satisfaction that the Government of India propose to make a radical change in the system under which accounts are prepared. In future there will, we understand, be trained military accounts-clerks attached to each unit and formation. These clerks will prepare the pay accounts of the officers and men, which will thereafter be sent to a disbursing centre for the issue of a cheque. This cheque will be issued without waiting for audit of the claims, the audit being taken up after payment, and any overpayments or short payments adjusted in the next bill. The clerks of the Military Accounts Department will also assist the regimental authorities in the maintenance of proper accounts of regimental stores and equipment. The proposed arrangements appear to us to be a great improvement on the existing system, and will have the further advantage of relieving regimental officers of much office work and correspondence, which now take up time which should be spent in training the men. We consider that staff officers should prepare their own salary bills, which, after payment by the disbursing office, should be subjected to audit in the ordinary course.

We understand that the arrangements sketched above for the disbursement of pay will not affect the system under which pay is drawn in the field in the form of advances, and the accounts are maintained at the base; and we hope that, in so far as may be practicable, efforts will be made to ensure that any divergence between the peace and the war systems will not involve the risk of dislocation and breakdown on the outbreak of war.

62. *Audit of pay and allowances.*—We have also received numerous complaints regarding the minuteness and rigidity of audit, and we consider that there is considerable justification for these complaints. It must, however, be remembered that the primary duty of an auditor is to apply the strict letter of the regulations to all claims with which he has to deal; and although it must be admitted that the audit by the Military Accounts Department has, especially prior to the war, been unduly narrow, and has perhaps sometimes exceeded its proper functions, we consider that the principal reason why so many disputes occur between the audit authorities and the individuals whose claims come under their review is that the Army Regulations, India, dealing with pay, allowances, leave, pensions, etc., are hopelessly complex, bristle with anomalies, and are often obscure, if not positively contradictory. We hope that certain recommendations, contained in other parts of this Report, will render possible a considerable simplification of these regulations; and we recommend that, if our proposals are accepted, the task of revising them be taken up without delay.

63. *Revision of Regulations.*—We go further, and recommend that the revised regulations should be framed on different lines and in a different spirit. In our opinion, one of the main defects of the existing regulations on these subjects is that they attempt to provide by rule for every contingency which may occur. We consider that the method to be followed in revising them should be that the regulations should, in addition to showing clearly the rates of pay, etc., and the conditions of service, lay down broad principles and leave their application to exceptional cases to be decided, on the merits, by competent financial authority. We recognise that it is impossible to make the Army Regulations, India, as brief and simple as the corresponding regulations at home. The causes which lead to the volume and complexity of the regulations in India are that there are both British and Indian troops serving under different conditions as regards pay, promotion, etc.; that there are various services which are manned partly by officers belonging to Home establishments and partly by officers belonging to Indian departments; and that Indian service, unlike service at home, renders long periods of furlough necessary, and these in turn necessitate elaborate rules governing furlough allowances and the acting arrangements in place of officers absent on leave.

With regard to the spirit in which the regulations should be conceived, we consider that the fault of the present system is that, generally speaking, the regulations appear to be framed on the assumption that every individual will endeavour to take advantage, whenever possible, of the Government which he serves, and that the regulations must therefore be so rigidly worded and must contain so many safeguards as to defeat this object. This spirit of distrust on the part of the Government has, perhaps inevitably, led to a regrettable tendency on the part of officers to put forward claims and demands in excess of their dues, in the hope that they will be passed. Thus the relations between the Government and a large body of its servants are, in this respect, most unsatisfactory. We consider that serious disciplinary notice should be taken of any attempt to evade the rules or to take unfair advantage of them. But we believe that far better results will be obtained if the regulations are framed in a spirit of trust, and on the assumption that the individuals whose pay and allowances and privileges are governed by them are honourable men who will not attempt to obtain more than is their just due.

64. *Summary of recommendations.*—It will be convenient to summarise the recommendations put forward on the subject of military finance. They are:—

(*a.*) That the system under which financial control is exercised at Army Headquarters should be continued.

(*b.*) That the Financial Adviser should be a Member of the Military Council.

(*c.*) That there should be a Deputy Financial Adviser in each of the principal spending branches of Army Headquarters and in the Royal Air Force, with functions as described.

(*d.*) That, whatever arrangement is made for production and provision, there should be at headquarters a Controller of Ordnance Factory Accounts, who would also act as Deputy Financial Adviser to the authority responsible for administration. This

Controller's functions might extend to the clothing factories; but, if this is not found practicable, there should be a separate Controller for the latter.

(*e.*) That the system under which separate finance and accounting offices are attached to the ordnance factories should be extended to the clothing factories.

(*f.*) That the accounts and audit relating to contracts should be concentrated under a Controller at headquarters, who should also act as Deputy Financial Adviser to the administrative authority.

(*g.*) That a Controller should be attached to the office of the Director, Royal Indian Marine, at Bombay, to maintain the marine accounts and to act as Deputy Financial Adviser to the Director.

(*h.*) That for the present no change should be made in the arrangements under which financial assistance and advice are given in commands and divisions.

(*i.*) That no change should be made in the status and duties of the Military Accountant-General.

(*j.*) That the Comptroller and Auditor-General should exercise more definite authority over the audit staff of the Military Accounts Department.

(*k.*) That the responsibility for preparing their estimates and administering their grants should be definitely placed on the heads of branches at Army Headquarters and on the officer commanding the Royal Air Force.

(*l.*) That the military accounts should be maintained in such a form as will enable the heads of branches to watch the progress of expenditure, with a view to savings being made available for other objects.

(*m.*) That prompt information should be afforded to the Government of India regarding the progress of expenditure at home on stores, etc.

(*n.*) That there should be a block vote for each arm of the service and for the Royal Air Force.

(*o*) That savings effected in the "on-costs" of factories should be available for expenditure on the improvement of the factories.

(*p.*) That the spheres of financial responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief and the Member for Munitions and Marine (if this department is formed) should be defined on the lines indicated.

(*q.*) That the Financial Adviser at Army Headquarters should also be the Financial Adviser to the proposed Department of Munitions and Marine.

(*r.*) That a radical change, on the lines proposed by the Government of India, should be made in the system under which pay is disbursed.

(*s.*) That the regulations dealing with pay, allowances, leave, pensions, etc., should be revised.

ESHER.
M. F. O'DWYER.
H. V. COX, Lieut.-Gen.
CLAUD W. JACOB, Lieut.-Gen.
H. HUDSON, Lieut.-Gen.
G. FELL.
WEBB GILLMAN, Maj.-Gen.
UMAR HAYAT.
K. G. GUPTA.

I agree with my colleagues except that I consider that the Financial Adviser should be an official of Army Headquarters, and not of the Finance Department, and that, if a separate Department is set up for Supply, the same official should not act as Financial Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief and the Supply Member.

J. P. DU CANE, Lieut.-Gen.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, Colonel, *Secretary*,
19th May, 1920.

LIBRARY OF THE

DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

Commander-in-Chief.

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.*

Military policy.

Operations of war.

Policy in respect of scales of armament and equipment.

Allotment of military resources.

War establishments.

Intelligence and censorship.

Training and education.

International law.

Administration of the General Staff branch, and of grants for above services.

Affiliated to the General Staff.

INSPECTOR OF CAVALRY.

INSPECTOR OF ARTILLERY.

INSPECTOR OF ENGINEERS AND PIONEERS.

INSPECTOR OF INFANTRY.

INSPECTOR OF SIGNALS.

COMMANDANT MACHINE GUN CENTRE.

ADVISER ON TANKS AND ARMOURED CARS.

CHIEF INSTRUCTOR GAS SERVICES.

Advice on training, organization, scale and design of equipment.

Co-ordination of training.

Assistance in preparation of training manuals.

Inspection of training schools and depôts.

Liaison with research and invention.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL.*

Organizing, recruiting, maintaining and mobilizing the military forces and their reserves.

Furlough and leave.

Pay and pensions.

Discipline; military and martial law.

Medical services and sanitation.

Auxiliary forces.

Ceremonial, salutes and precedence.

Regimental records.

War medals.

Administration of the Adjutant-General's branch, and of grants for above services.

Affiliated to the Adjutant-General's Department.

JUDGE ADVOCATE-GENERAL.

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.*

Specification, inspection, maintenance and issue of provisions, forage, fuel, clothing, armaments, ammunition, equipment, general stores and material, and reserves for the above.

Services responsible for:—Transportation and Movements, Supply and Transport including Farms, Armaments, Military Works, Equipment and Ordnance Stores, Remount, Veterinary, Cantonment Magistrates, and Accommodation.

Purchase of minor supplies not provided in bulk by the Civilian Member responsible for production and provision.

Administration of the Quartermaster-General's branch, and of grants for the above services.

SECRETARY, ARMY HEADQUARTERS.*

Correspondence of Army Headquarters.

Central registry.

Control of procedure at Army Headquarters.

Secretarial work of the Military Council.

Liaison with other Departments of the Government of India and with Local Governments.

Editing of Indian Army List and of all Army Regulations, India.

Issue of orders of the Government of India, Army Orders, Army Instructions (India), and Gazette Notifications.

Control of clerical and subordinate staff at Army Headquarters.

Administration of grants for above services.

FINANCIAL ADVISER.*

Advice on financial matters.

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING ROYAL AIR FORCE.

Administration of the Royal Air Force and of the grants for it.

MILITARY SECRETARY.

Appointments, promotions and retirements of officers.

Confidential reports.

Compilation of the staff list, and custody of records of staff officers.

Honours, rewards, decorations, and patronage.

Secretary to Selection Board.

DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES OF MEMBER FOR MUNITIONS AND MARINE.


Member of Council.*
Secretary to Government (Production and Provision).
Dep. Secretary to Government (R.I.M.).
Controller, Ordnance Factories.
Controller, Clothing Factories.
Military Technical Adviser. (Liaison with A.H.Q.)
Controller of Contracts.
Director, Royal Indian Marine. (Status of Secretary to Government.)

Administration of Army Factories, Contracts and the Royal Indian Marine.

Responsibility for meeting army demands in bulk for provisions, forage, fuel, clothing, armaments, ammunition, general stores and material.

Administration of grants allotted to him by the Commander-in-Chief for the above services.

DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES IN THE CASE OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SURVEYOR-GENERAL OF SUPPLY UNDER THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.


Commander-in-Chief.
Air Officer Commanding Royal Air Force.
Military Secretary.
Chief of the General Staff.*
Adjutant-General.*
Quarter-master General.*
Surveyor-General of Supply *
Secretary, Army Head-quarters.*
Financial Adviser.*
Director, Royal Indian Marine.

The duties of the Surveyor-General of Supply would be the same as those of the Member for Munitions and Marine, with the exception of the administration of the Royal Indian Marine.

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* Member of the Military Council.

To THE RIGHT HON. E. S. MONTAGU, P.C.

Sir,

We beg now to forward to you the further and concluding Parts (III–IX) of our Report. The enquiry upon which these portions of our Report are based was mainly conducted in India, although our recommendations have been fully discussed and finally settled after the return of the Committee to this country.

These portions of our Report deal mainly with questions of administration, and with certain specific questions of organisation with which we have been asked to deal. Although our terms of reference include the words "where necessary the organisation of the Army in India," we have not conceived it to be part of our duty to enquire into or to submit recommendations regarding the numbers and composition of the Army in India, nor the specific purposes for which that army is required in view of the greater responsibilities assumed by the British Empire in consequence of the Treaties of Peace recently concluded. We have made recommendations, at your request, in regard to the formation of a Territorial Force in India, but we were not invited to express an opinion upon the ratio of British to Indian troops.

Parts III to IX cover a wide field. They deal with matters of administration vitally affecting the contentment of the Army in India. We hope and believe that the suggestions which we have made will contribute to the well-being of the British and Indian soldiers under the control of the Government of India.

In the concluding Part of the Report we have drawn attention to the effects upon Indian finance of the recommendations which we have made. It is impossible for us to form even an approximate estimate of the cost to the Indian tax-payer, but we are convinced of the necessity of raising the standard of living for British and Indian soldiers of all ranks, if the spirit of both is to be maintained at the high level which the interests of the Indian Empire demand.

One of our Indian colleagues, Sir Krishna Gupta, has reminded us, in a note appended to this Report, of the momentous declaration of policy made in August 1917, with a view of placing India on the road to the attainment of a Dominion status. That we had not overlooked this Proclamation was made clear in the letter which we addressed to you in connection with Part I of our Report. A Dominion status implies responsibilities as well as privileges, and this obvious reflection has been borne in mind by us throughout the whole of our enquiry and the recommendations which we have based upon it.

Another of our colleagues, Sir Umar Hayat Khan, holds strong opinions on the subject of the conditions of enlistment in the Indian Army, and views with grave apprehension any suggestion to convert it into a short-service army on the lines of some continental armies. We understand that, though there is no intention of proceeding so far as this, still in order to secure an effective reserve to cover wastage in the field it may be necessary to shorten the period of service with the colours. We hope that any change in this direction will be introduced with caution, since we hold that every unit of a voluntary army should contain a considerable proportion of well-trained and seasoned men.

We have endeavoured not to trench, more than was absolutely necessary, upon matters which clearly lie within the sphere of the General Staff. Where we have done so, it has been at the request of Army Headquarters.

Our recommendations have been made with the view of enabling the Government of India and yourself to form practical conclusions upon a series of problems that have given rise to some controversy in the past, and to place them in a light which may minimise controversy in the future and lead to their easy solution.

As the detailed recommendations in regard to actual increases of pay to the army will be the subject of discussion between the Secretary of State in Council and the Government of India, we have judged it to be more convenient to include them in an Appendix* to this Report.

We desire gratefully to acknowledge the assistance which you have rendered us, which has been afforded to us by the officials of the India Office under your control, by the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief and officers of every rank and degree in India, as well as the valuable services which have been rendered to us by our secretaries, Colonel C. M. Wagstaff and Major T. W. Lloyd.

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* Not printed.

Our colleague, Lieut.-General Sir John DuCane, Master-General of the Ordnance, has asked to be excused from signing Parts III–IX, on the grounds that he was prevented from going to India with the Committee, and that owing to his heavy official duties he has been unable to attend regularly the meetings that have taken place since the Committee returned. We appreciate the reasons which have actuated him.

It is a matter of deep regret that we have not had the advantage of the presence, during the later stages of our discussions, of our colleague, Lieut.-General Sir Claud Jacob, who was unavoidably detained in India, but our conclusions have been submitted to him, and it is a matter of satisfaction to us to feel that they meet with his general approval.

We are,
Sir,
Your obedient servants,

ESHER.
M. F. O'DWYER.
H. V. COX, Lt.-Gen.
H. HUDSON, Lt.-Gen.
G. FELL.
WEBB, GILLMAN, Maj.-Gen.
UMAR, HAYAT.
K. G. GUPTA.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, Colonel,
Secretary.

22nd June, 1920.

PART III.

Decentralisation and Liaison.

In Part II of this Report we have shown that it is necessary to relieve the Commander-in-Chief and promote the more rapid conduct of business. One method of effecting this is to secure decentralisation at Army Headquarters from the Commander in-Chief to his principal staff officers, and from them to their directors or assistants. We consider further that the same principles of devolution and decentralisation should be extended so as to include the whole of the army organization in India.

Before making any definite suggestions on these points, it will be convenient to review the evolution of the present systems of command and staff in India.

The System of Command in India.

2. The "Command" system in India was first introduced in 1895, on the abolition of the old Bengal, Bombay and Madras armies. Four Commands were formed in that year, viz., Punjab, Bengal, Madras and Bombay, each under a lieutenant-general, who was responsible for the administration as well as for the training of troops in his command.

3. In 1904, as a consequence of Lord Kitchener's redistribution and reorganization, the Madras Command was abolished, and the army was divided into three Commands—Northern, Eastern and Western, corresponding to the Punjab, Bengal and Bombay Commands.

4. In 1907, on the delegation of administrative powers to divisional commanders, Lord Kitchener considered that the retention of similar powers by the lieutenant-generals of Commands merely led to delay in the despatch of business. The Command system was therefore abolished, and India was divided into two armies—Northern and Southern—each under a general officer, who was charged with command, inspection and training, but was not accorded any administrative responsibility.

5. It appears that Lord Kitchener, in drawing up his reorganization and redistribution scheme in 1903, intended that the army should be organized in divisional areas, each to include one or more definite war formations, together with the garrison troops necessary for the internal security of the area in war; in other words, each divisional area was to be self-contained and self-administered.

This system was based on the assumption that the necessary concentration of troops would actually be carried into effect and that divisional commanders would be able to exercise close control. This concentration, which was dependent on the entire readjustment of accommodation, involved a large and very expensive building scheme, and was never completed. Thus, in practice, it was the exception rather than the rule for the whole of the troops of war formations to be located in peace within their own divisional areas under their divisional commanders; while internal security troops, when required, had in many cases to be brought into these areas from outside. The tendency was therefore towards an increased dispersion rather than concentration.

Further, for purposes of internal security, India was divided into a number of smaller areas within the divisional spheres. It was intended in 1904 that brigade commanders should be provided for such areas, and also, in order to secure continuity of command and administration, that the general officers, with their staffs, should continue to perform their normal duties on and after the mobilization of the field army. These brigade commands were never created. With the abolition of the three Commands in 1907, the means for securing in time of war continuity of command and administration disappeared. In practice, therefore, the command of an internal security area fell, on the mobilization of the field army, to the senior regimental commanding officer in that area. The result was that, when the divisional commander and his staff went on service, an improvised staff had to assume responsibility for administration and internal security.

6. This system proved unsatisfactory both in peace and on mobilization for war. We have been told that in peace divisional commanders were overwhelmed by the large administrative responsibilities imposed on them, and that their staffs were insufficient to meet the immediate requirements of administration or to provide for continuity on mobilization. Also, owing to the dispersal of troops in their areas, commanders were unable to exercise any degree of close control or to devote sufficient attention to their primary duty, viz., the training of troops for war.

At the same time, the elimination of administrative responsibilities from the higher command of armies entailed an additional burden on Army Headquarters, where the administrative machine was clogged by a mass of minor detail. Floating in the background, in a somewhat nebulous atmosphere, were the two army commanders, whose duties were confined to questions of training, discipline and efficiency of units, and, to a limited extent, to the appointment and promotion of officers, but who were without any responsibility whatever for administration.

7. Such was the system at the outbreak of the great war.

Early in the war both army commanders took the field, and in 1916 a successor was appointed to command the Northern Army, and in 1917 a successor to the Southern Army Commander was appointed, but the Quetta, Lucknow and Burma Divisions remained directly under the Commander-in-Chief. The duties of these army commanders remained as before, but a major-general in charge of administration with a small staff was added, to enable them more effectively to undertake the inspection of administrative units and services. They still remained, however, without actual administrative responsibilities.

8. In 1918 financial powers were given to these army commanders, and they were also authorised to deal with all administrative questions, except those involving matters of policy or of new principle, or those relating to the war. To assist them their staffs were again increased.

The Staff System in India.

9. The essential difference between the staff systems :—

(a) as laid down in King's Regulations ;
(b) as laid down in Field Service Regulations ; and
(c) as now practised in India ;

lies in the degree of division between the functions of command and administration.

10. Under the staff system as laid down in King's Regulations, each general officer commanding-in-chief has on his staff a general officer in charge of administration, to whom he delegates powers to deal with all administrative matters not involving questions of policy or principle. He is thus relieved of all responsibility in such matters.

The general officer in charge of administration :—

(i) Corresponds direct with the War Office.
(ii) Exercises the financial powers of a general officer commanding-in-chief.
(iii) Has the power to delegate his financial authority, within certain limits.
(iv) Is responsible to the Army Council for the proper expenditure of money.
(v) Deals direct with local heads of services and departments.

The result is that all administrative responsibility rests on him ; he issues orders to the heads of services and departments, who in their turn give their orders to their subordinate representatives, leaving subordinate commanders to formulate their requirements, but relieving them of the responsibility for meeting such requirements.

11. Under the staff system as laid down in Field Service Regulations, there is no general officer in charge of administration. The responsibility for providing the requirements of the forces in the field rests with the various directors or heads of administrative services and departments, subject to the general control and supervision of the three principal staff officers. The latter are responsible for the issue of all orders of the commander to the various services. These in their turn are responsible for the provision of administrative requirements.

12. Under the staff system as now practised in India, the responsibility for administration rests on army and subordinate commanders, who have representatives of the administrative services to advise and assist them. These representatives carry out the orders transmitted to them by the commander through his staff.

13. In the Commands and in some divisions in India, general officers in charge of administration were appointed during the war, but were not given the same powers or responsibilities as a general officer in charge of administration in the United Kingdom. In India they co-ordinate the work of the adjutant-general's and quartermaster-general's branches, and are responsible to their commanders, but not directly to Army Headquarters, the channel of correspondence, except on technical matters peculiar to a particular service, being through the Command or division. They are, in fact, senior staff officers who co-ordinate administrative work, and who in virtue of their position and experience relieve the general officer commanding of all detail, though not of responsibility.

14. The staff system now obtaining in India appears to us well suited to local conditions.

Proposals for organization of Commands.

15. The military conditions and requirements in India are not analogous to those either of the United Kingdom or of an expeditionary force. In India the areas of commands and districts are infinitely greater and communications are less rapid. External conditions demand a state of readiness for war, while internal unrest may at any time require immediate action. It is therefore essential to have a wide distribution of subordinate commands, with commanders fully acquainted with local conditions, ready to grapple with any situation, and armed with adequate powers. We consider that this can best be effected not merely by increasing the responsibilities of a few high staff officers at Army Headquarters, but also by widening the powers of subordinate officers ; in other words, by large and real decentralisation.

16. In establishing a system of command in India, regard must be had to the following considerations :—

(a) The distance to be covered and the paucity of communications, which limit the size of an area that can be controlled from one centre.

(b) The desirability of making the boundaries of military districts coincide with those of civil administrations.
(c) The necessity of limiting the numbers of subordinate commanders to be dealt with by superior authority.
(d) The limitations imposed by considerations of accommodation, and by the necessity for providing internal security garrisons. Financial stringency is an obstacle to the provision of new accommodation, so long as barracks or lines remain unoccupied. Consequently, the distribution of troops must be governed rather by existing accommodation than by existing military requirements. These factors necessitate a large measure of dispersion in peace.

17. We have examined a paper, prepared by the General Staff, in which it is proposed that India should be divided into fourteen separate areas, to be called "districts."

It is evident that if Army Headquarters is to exercise effective control, and is not to be overloaded with work, some link must be introduced between Army Headquarters and Districts, in order to avoid a return to the state of affairs which existed before the war. The General Staff consider that for this purpose four Commands should be formed, each under an Army Commander, graded as a general officer commanding-in-chief, with an adequate staff. These Commands, will comprise districts, each containing a certain number of brigade commands. Burma should form an independent district. Districts should be classified as first or second class, according to their importance.

18. If this plan is adopted, the army and district commanders should be responsible for the command and administration of the troops in their areas, as well as for internal security. The boundaries of each command and district should, usually, coincide with those of civil administrations. In those districts in which war formations are located, the general officer commanding the district should also command the war formation. But in order to ensure continuity of administration on the war formations proceeding on service, the staffs in peace should be so constituted that a proportion, including the general officer in charge of administration, would remain behind to administer the district.

19. Some further decentralisation will be effected by the system of grouping ndian units which it is proposed to introduce.

20. These proposals appear to us generally suitable, and likely to promote the policy of decentralisation which we have in view.

Internal Security and Liaison between the Military and Civil Authorities.

21. The functions of the army are to repel external aggression and to maintain internal security. For the proper discharge of the latter duty, it must keep close and constant touch with the civil authorities, who share the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. They should therefore be kept regularly informed of such military matters as :—

(a) An unhealthy spirit among the troops.
(b) Attempts from without or within to tamper with the troops, to excite disaffection, or to spread political propaganda.
(c) Ill-feeling between the troops and the local civil population.

22. It appears that, at present, there is no regular system of communicating information on such points between the army and the civil authorities.

It is true that, since the outbreak of the war, the civil administration of each province prepares and forwards for the information of the Government of India a fortnightly report on the general political situation in its area, and copies of these reports are furnished to Army Headquarters, to the Commands, to divisions, and in some cases to brigades. In addition, a weekly summary of the political situation in India as a whole is drawn up by the Director of Central Intelligence and circulated to heads of provinces and certain military authorities. On the other hand, the army furnishes no corresponding information to the civil authorities. Cases have been mentioned to us in which the civil Government was seriously embarrassed by the absence of information as to seditious influences at work in particular units, as to the results of enquiries into cases of mutiny and sedition within the army, and as to the return to civil life of men discharged from the army on suspicion of seditious tendencies or of communicating with the enemy.

23. We understand that the General Staff are now considering measures for remedying these defects, and establishing close and regular liaison with provincial Governments. The point has been kept in view in the new scheme of Commands, each of which will comprise and deal with one or more complete civil administrations in matters of internal security, hitherto centralised at Army Headquarters.

24. But it is not enough to establish a system of liaison between the superior military and civil authorities. To be really effective, the system must be extended to the local civil and military officers, on whom arrangements for internal security must ultimately devolve.

With this object we make the following general suggestions :—

(*a*) Periodical summaries of military external and internal intelligence, likely to have a bearing on the internal situation, should be furnished by Army Headquarters to provincial Governments, which should be responsible for communicating such items as they consider necessary to the local officers concerned.

(*b*) Periodical conferences should be held between the local civil and military officers for the discussion of matters of common interest.

(*c*) There should be closer relations and more regular correspondence between different provinces on matters which are likely to affect the internal security of more than one province.

(*d*) As a large portion of the Indian Army is now employed overseas in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persia, &c., where movements and influences hostile to the British Government in India may be at work, it is desirable that these areas also should be brought within the sphere of the Indian military and civil intelligence agencies, so that information bearing on the Indian Army, or on political movements likely to affect India, may be made promptly available in India.

(*e*) As in recent years many seditious and revolutionary movements in India have been initiated and organised in Europe, America, Africa, and the Far East, and one object common to all of them is to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army, information from those areas should also be obtained by the Government of India, and promptly transmitted, as far as necessary, to the civil and military authorities concerned.

(*f*) The intelligence collected under the above heads should be collated and disseminated by one responsible authority in India.

Propaganda.

25. In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavoured to outline the steps that should be taken to ensure co-operation between civil and military authorities in obtaining indications of local feeling, and the earliest information of attempts to spread disaffection. We think, however, that these in themselves will be inadequate unless suitable measures are taken to bring before the army and the classes from which it is drawn, in clear and simple language, correct information as to the progress of events and the policy of Government. We consider that there should be a central bureau at the headquarters of the Government of India, in close touch with local Governments and with the authority referred to in paragraph 24 (*f*), and that this agency should be responsible for the collection and timely dissemination of such information.

We are also led to believe that there have been in some cases friction and misunderstanding between the press and Army Headquarters, owing to the fact that information upon matters affecting the army has not been freely communicated to the press. The value of the press in India as a medium for information appears to us to have been neglected in the past. We earnestly commend to the notice of the Government of India the importance of keeping the army and the public adequately informed of the trend of current events, through the press and other channels.

PART IV.

Closer Relations between the British and Indian Armies.

1. A question to which we have devoted much attention is the possibility of establishing closer relations between the British and Indian Armies. The subject is a wide one, and we propose to divide it into appropriate sections.

The first section relates to the British officers of the cavalry and infantry. We then proceed to examine, in Section II, the question of the administrative services, namely, the Supply and Transport Corps, and the Ordnance, Veterinary and Signal Services.

Next, we devote separate sections to the Medical and Engineer Services. The last two sections relate to closer co-operation in training and military education, and to the distribution of certain high appointments in India between the British service and the Indian Army.

SECTION I.

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS.

2. At the request of the Committee, Army Headquarters circulated to units of the Indian Army the following scheme for producing closer relations between British officers of the British and Indian Armies.

In the covering letter, in which remarks were invited, it was explained that the scheme was purely tentative, and that it did not commit the military authorities or the Government of India in any way.

Scheme for producing Closer Relations between British Officers of the British and Indian Armies.

1. It is not necessary to labour the point that something in the direction of fusion of the British officers' cadre of the Indian Army with that of the British Army is much to be desired.

2. It may be noted, however, that any system of fusion must provide that Indian regiments shall always have in their senior ranks officers with a thorough knowledge of Indian soldiers and Indian conditions.

3. The advantages claimed for fusion, as a principle, are:—

(*i*) That it would go far to prevent the deterioration, mental and physical, which sometimes sets in when officers have served continuously in India.

(*ii*) It would prevent the final decision as to prolonged service in India having to be made by officers when still very junior.

(*iii*) It would produce officers well fitted by experience to serve either with British or Indian troops.

(*iv*) Officers who have done a tour of service with Indian troops might be earmarked as a first reserve in case of necessity for the officers' cadre of the Indian Army. This would go far to solve an existing difficulty.

(*v*) Fusion in any degree must tend towards the removal of a feeling of inequality between the services.

(*vi*) Uniformity of discipline, training and ideals would be produced.

4. It would appear, at first sight, that the more complete the fusion, the better; but further consideration shows that the condition mentioned in paragraph 2 militates against the adoption of one cadre throughout, and that, while the two services continue to be regulated on systems so different as regimental promotion in one case and promotion by a time-scale in the other case, the limitations to the application of the one cadre principle become considerable.

It is impossible to say, especially at present, what chance there is of either service changing its system of promotion.

Examination of the matter seems to show that while it would not be wise at the present time to put forward proposals which could not be carried out without the subversion of one or the other systems, a great step towards fusion is possible without disturbing existing conditions.

5. The scheme given below ensures fusion by putting all the British officers of the two greater parts of the Imperial Army (*i.e.*, the British and Indian Armies) on to one list up to 12 years' service, and again after command of an Indian unit (or 26 years' service if not in command); while the condition mentioned in paragraph 2 is satisfied by the retention of the Indian cadre for what may be termed the "central period" of an officer's service.

6. The following are the proposals in detail:—

(*a*.) Before leaving Sandhurst, all cadets will be given the option of electing for a term of service with Indian troops. Vacancies on the Indian establishment will be allotted according to place on the Sandhurst exit list (except to King's India Cadets). If accepted, the young officer will be posted to a British regiment which has a battalion in India, and to that battalion. Urdu should be taught to all cadets at Sandhurst.

After one year, if well reported on, he will be seconded in his British regiment, and posted to an Indian regiment, with which he will remain for four years, the first year being on probation. During the first year he will have to pass the necessary language test. At five years' service he will be reposted to the home battalion of his British regiment. Should there be no battalion of his regiment at home, he will be attached as supernumerary to another battalion.

(*b*) On completing six years' service he will be given the option of either remaining with his British regiment or of volunteering for a second term of four years with Indian troops (if possible with the same Indian group as before). If he so volunteers, and is accepted by the Government of India, he will be again seconded in his British regiment.

It will also be permissible for an officer of the British service of six years' service, who has never served with Indian troops, to volunteer for a tour of four years' service with them, and on its completion to come under the condition of sub-paragraph (*c*) below.

(*c*) On completion of ten years' service he will return for two years' service with his British regiment at home, or with some other regiment as provided in paragraph 6 (*a*). On the expiry of this period he must elect either to remain with his British regiment or to join the "Indian cadre" for further service with Indian troops. In the latter case, and if accepted by the Government of India, he will remain with Indian troops, until he either completes command of his Indian unit or is reported unfit for it. On completion of command he will either be placed on the list of those selected for promotion to substantive colonel or will be retired. If unfit he will, unless the War Office or the Government of India wish to retain his services, be retired. These principles will be applied *mutatis mutandis* to officers in departmental and staff employ.

(*d*) On completion of command and promotion to colonel, or, if not in command, on attainment of 26 years' service, an officer's name will be brought on to the general list of officers of the British service; and he will be eligible for staff or other employment equally with others, whether in India or elsewhere.

(*e*) During his third term of service with Indian troops the officer will return home for service with his British regiment (his former one, if possible), to which he will be attached as supernumerary for one year. This year should commence not less than a year before, as far as can be foreseen, he comes up for consideration for second-in-command of his regiment.

(*f*) An officer who at 12 years' service elects, and is accepted for, a third term of service with Indian troops will cease to have any claim to return to his British regiment, except under paragraph 6 (*c*).

(*g*) All officers of the British service who have done a tour of service with Indian troops, and who have not elected to join the Indian cadre under sub-paragraph (*c*), but who are reported on as fit for employment with Indian troops, and who have qualified in Urdu, should be noted in records and shown in the British and Indian army lists as qualified for employment with the Indian Army in case of need.

7. It will be seen that, when this scheme is in full working, promotion by a time-scale will only be necessary after an officer has 12 years' service. So long as promotion to captain is by time-scale, it will be necessary to make temporary adjustments between the two services by the grant of local rank in India. The following arrangement is proposed:—

So long as an officer is borne on the cadre of his British regiment, his promotion will, in the ordinary course, be governed by vacancies in that regiment, but when, under the time-scale in force for the time being in the Indian Army, he would be eligible for promotion before it falls due in his British regiment, he will be given local rank while serving with Indian troops. But, on returning to his British regiment, he will take the rank to which his place on the cadre of that regiment entitles him, even though this may mean reversion to a lower rank than he has held under the time-scale with Indian troops. On electing, after 12 years' service, for a further and final term of Indian service on the cadre of an Indian unit, an officer will come again on to the Indian time-scale and will remain subject to it until his term on the Indian list is complete.

Further fusion than that outlined above, although probably desirable, is only possible if both armies adopt one system of promotion.

8. The above scheme appears to be applicable to the cavalry branch of the Indian Army with slight modification. It will sometimes be necessary in the cavalry to attach the officer during the periods of duty at home as supernumerary to a regiment which is not the one on whose rolls his name is borne; *vide* paragraph 6 (*a*). His rank would be regulated by his place in the latter.

9. The scheme does not appear to present any difficulties as regards the filling of staff appointments. The matter can be considered separately, but the claims of officers on the Indian cadre to their fair share of staff appointments should be secured.

10. *Pay.*—A comparison has been made of the emoluments drawn by—

(*a*) Officers of the British Army serving at home.

(*b*) Officers of the British Army serving with British troops in India.

(*c*) British officers serving with the Indian Army.

In all cases the rates are subject to revision in the future. But it seems clear that Government, both at home and in India, is committed to the present ratio between the three scales, and that ratio must, therefore, be taken as the basis on which to formulate the scheme. It can be seen that the pay and staff pay of the British officers serving with the Indian Army are in every case considerably higher than the pay of the British officer serving at home or with British troops in India.

This should render it easy to secure a constant flow of officers to the Indian Army who are suitable for service with Indian troops; on the other hand, the officer reverting to his British regiment for a period after a tour of Indian service will suffer a marked drop in his emoluments. It must be remembered, however, that these periodic terms of service with British troops at home will largely take the place of the old expensive spells of furlough out of India. In the past these furloughs have frequently absorbed the whole of an officer's savings, and have even left him in debt.

As all the above transfers are on duty, officers and their families would receive free passage and transport to and fro.

It is not considered that any absence from India, other than as above laid down, is necessary during the first twelve years of service, except on accumulated privilege leave, the rules for which might stand as at present. Sick leave is of course excepted. It is thought that, during the first ten years, any sick leave from India exceeding nine months, except as the result of wounds or illness contracted on service, should involve return to the officer's British regiment at home. This return would not debar an officer from volunteering for a second tour of service with the Indian Army when qualified for it. English pay should be drawn on sick leave.

During what has been called the "central period" of an officer's service, viz., when he is serving on the Indian cadre, the period of attachment spent at home will not prejudice his eligibility for furlough under the rules for the time being in force. During such furlough an officer should draw the pay and allowances of a British service officer of corresponding rank at home, in lieu of the existing furlough pay of the Indian Army.

11. *Pensions.*—It is not considered that the first two tours of service in India should entitle an officer to any participation in the possible benefits of Indian pension, but any subsequent service with the Indian Army should entitle an officer to the benefits of an Indian pension, such benefits in this case to be calculated for the present on his whole service.

12. *Safeguarding rights of officers already substantive in the Indian Army.*—It is impossible to deprive these officers of the right to continue on their existing terms of service. They should, however, be permitted, and encouraged, to proceed home on duty for a year's attachment to British troops after five years' service, for two years after ten years' service, and for one year before promotion to second-in-command.

Officers who have accepted the scheme, and who proceed home for a period or periods of attachment to a British regiment, should draw during such periods the British pay and allowances of their rank. They will also be permitted to draw British pay and allowances during any subsequent furlough at home.

Officers who do not accept the scheme will draw, while on furlough, the furlough pay in force for the time being for the officers of the Indian Army. Exchanges should be permitted between the services, under suitable safeguards.

3. The replies from units, which reached the Committee a short time before they left India for England, show that the objects of the scheme are generally approved, but that important questions, requiring prolonged consideration, have arisen as to how they can best be attained.

4. The most important suggestion that has emerged from the enquiries relates to the affiliation of British with Indian regiments. It is evident that it is only in conference with the War Office that this suggestion can be properly examined, and we have already had some informal discussions on the subject with its representatives.

5. It is equally evident that, with the best will on both sides, affiliation of units alone may not furnish a complete solution of the whole problem. We therefore mention the following suggested modifications of the original scheme, which, in our opinion, go a long way towards establishing closer relationship between units and officers of both services, and cannot fail to be of benefit to the officers of the Indian Army:—

Cadets whilst at Sandhurst would elect, as at present, for appointment on probation to the Indian Army, would be sent out to India on the Unattached List, and would be posted to a British unit serving in India. After a year's service with that unit they would be posted for a probationary term to an Indian unit and, after 4 years in the Indian Army, would have to elect for either the British service or the Indian Army. If admitted to the Indian Army, an officer would be required to spend one more year in the rank of lieutenant, and one year in each of the ranks of captain and major, with a British battalion (or unit of a group), allied for the purpose to his Indian Army unit. These periods of attachment should be at home;* and during them the officer would be either on the establishment or supernumerary, as may be decided. Under this proposal, an officer would throughout the whole of his service in the Indian Army keep up his connection with the British unit to which his Indian unit is allied. If it can be arranged that officers of the British service be permitted to take the place of officers of the Indian Army so attached, we consider that both services would benefit.

An example may make the scheme clearer. It is assumed that the 6th Jats is allied to the Border Regiment. A gentleman cadet elects, at Sandhurst, for the Indian Army. He is placed on the Unattached List on leaving the College, and subsequently joins the 2/Worcestershire Regiment in India as an attached officer. He serves for a year with this battalion, and is then transferred to the 6th Jats. At the end of 5 years' total service he elects and is accepted for the Indian Army. After, say, 6 years' service his turn comes for a tour of duty with British troops at home; he then goes, not to his original British battalion, the Worcesters, but to the battalion to which the 6th Jats (his Indian Army unit) is allied, *i.e.*, the Border Regiment. Similarly, during his service in the ranks of captain and major, he spends his tours of duty with British troops at home with the Border Regiment.

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* NOTE.—Such tours of duty would, of course, include free passage for the officer and his family both ways.

6. To investigate thoroughly the whole matter would take a considerable time. We do not consider our Committee to be well suited for the detailed examination of such a matter; and we cannot delay the presentation of our Report in order to undertake prolonged enquiry into it. We therefore recommend that the matter should be further examined, in the light of these remarks, by a combined committee of War Office and India Office representatives, to whom, we hope, the information we have collected and tabulated may be useful.

SECTION II.

CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN DEPARTMENTS.

7. In our view, the war has shown the necessity for assimilating, so far as practicable, the organisation and system of administration of those services which are concerned with the feeding of the Army, with its transport, with the holding and issue of stores, with the care of the sick, including animals, and with signalling. We show later why, in our opinion, the problem of medical administration in India presents peculiar difficulties. For this reason, we omit the medical services from consideration in the present connection, and confine ourselves to examining the question of the extent to which it is practicable and desirable to amalgamate, or at least to establish closer relations between, the following services, namely, the Royal Army Service Corps and the Supply and Transport Corps; the Royal Army Veterinary Corps and the Army Veterinary Service in India; the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Stores Section of the Indian Ordnance Department; and the Signal Corps at home and in India.

8. India has now been admitted into partnership with the Empire, and the Indian Army has fought, alongside troops from other parts of the Empire, in every theatre of war. Its responsibilities have thus been greatly widened, and it can no longer be regarded as a local force, whose sphere of activity is limited to India and the surrounding frontier territories. It must rather be treated as a part of an Imperial army, ready to serve in any part of the world. It follows that the organization of its auxiliary services should, if confusion is to be avoided, conform closely to that of the rest of the forces of the Empire.

9. Apart from the advantages of uniformity in administrative methods, we consider that nothing but good can result from establishing close relations between the superior personnel, which will afford officers opportunities for the interchange of ideas, for studying the local conditions prevailing in different parts of the Empire, and for widening their administrative experience. There is reason to believe that certain Indian services have suffered in efficiency owing to the necessarily restricted character of their activities. They have tended to become narrow in outlook, and to adhere to practices which have been abandoned elsewhere in favour of more up-to-date methods. These divergences of system led to inconvenience during the war, when Indian services were serving alongside the corresponding British services in the same theatre.

10. We have endeavoured, in framing our detailed recommendations, to apply certain general principles which, in our opinion, should govern the reorganization of the personnel of these services. These may be stated as follows:—

(1) To secure the presence in the Indian services of a sufficient number of British officers and subordinate personnel possessing an adequate knowledge of the country, its customs and languages.

(2) To assimilate administrative methods, so far as practicable, in the home and Indian services.

(3) To adopt a common basis for determining, throughout these services, the pay of British officers serving on tours of duty in India, in order to remove existing anomalies and secure uniformity of system and simplification of accounts.

(4) To ensure the regular interchange of British personnel between home and India.

11. We consider that the services in India should, generally speaking, consist of—

(*a*) British personnel, maintained by the War Office and sent out to India for tours of duty; and

(*b*) Indian personnel, enlisted in India for service with Indian formations, and employed to replace British personnel, as far as is compatible with efficiency.

The whole, while in India, must be administered by the Government of India.

12. In our recommendations for closer relations between these services we have made suggestions under which certain personnel of the Indian Unattached List* will be permitted to transfer to the British service. We realise that this may interfere with the prospects of those on this list who may decide not to elect for transfer. We suggest that it may be necessary in their case to substitute a time scale of promotion.

Royal Army Service Corps and Supply and Transport Corps.

13. Before considering the possibility of amalgamation of these two corps it is necessary to compare the conditions which obtain in each.

(*a*) *Recruitment.*—The Royal Army Service Corps is recruited wholly from the British service, and the Supply and Transport Corps wholly from the Indian Army.

(*b*) *System of Promotion, &c.*—In the Royal Army Service Corps, officers are promoted to fill vacancies in the fixed establishment of the corps. In the Supply and Transport Corps, officers are promoted according to the time scale of the Indian Army, irrespective of appointments or ranks required for units; they are also graded departmentally in 6 classes, partly by length of commissioned service and partly by length of departmental service; advancement up to Class 4 is by the former and thereafter by length of service in each class.

(*c*) *Comparison of Service.*—The following table compares the army service of officers of the Royal Army Service Corps list and that of officers of similar service and rank on the Supply and Transport Corps list. It is of interest as showing how equally the two systems of promotion in rank have worked in practice :—

	Army Service (in years).	
	R.A.S.C.	S. & T.C.
Senior Colonel	34	32
Junior Colonel	27	32
Senior Lieutenant-Colonel...	27	32
17th Lieutenant-Colonel	26	31
Junior Lieutenant-Colonel	25	26
Senior Major	25	25
30th Major	19	21
50th Major	19	19
100th Major	17	18
Junior Major	15	15
Senior Captain	15	14
20th Captain	13	12
Junior Captain	5	4

The Royal Army Service Corps is likely to be blocked by peace conditions, while in the Supply and Transport Corps promotion in rank is being slowed down gradually to the pre-war scale of the Indian Army. The effect cannot be accurately foreseen, but the two services are never likely to be nearer together in this respect than now.

(*d*) *Comparison of Pay.*—The Supply and Transport Corps pay is much better than that of the Royal Army Service Corps. In the ranks of lieutenant-colonel, major and captain, the former is almost double the latter. In the rank of lieutenant, the Supply and Transport Corps pay is nearly 50 per cent. better than that of the Royal Army Service Corps.

14. We have considered the extent to which, having regard to the factors mentioned above, it is possible to apply the general principles advocated at the beginning of this Section.

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* A list containing all British other ranks of departments serving continuously in India.

It is not practicable to effect complete fusion of the officer cadres of the two services at the present time, owing to (*a*) the much higher rates of pay of the Supply and Transport Corps, and (*b*) the necessity of safeguarding existing rights of officers who are permanent in that corps.

15. But though complete fusion is not yet practicable, we think it desirable to move in the direction of a unification of the two corps, in view of the necessity for assimilation to be as complete as possible in the services of supply and transport. With this object, we put forward the following recommendations :—

(i) *Method of unification.*—The officers' cadre of the two corps should be unified into one Indian establishment, by stopping recruitment for the Supply and Transport Corps, and appointing Royal Army Service Corps personnel to the vacancies as they occur at the bottom of the former list.

(ii) *Title of Corps.*—The designation "Supply and Transport Corps" should disappear and be replaced by "Army Service Corps, India." This corps should include those of the existing Supply and Transport Corps personnel whose names will be borne on a special Indian list.

(iii) *Maintenance and control of the Corps.*—The War Office should maintain up to strength in India the Royal Army Service Corps personnel as fixed by the Government of India, but the latter should exercise administrative and financial control over them in India.

(iv) *Entry into the Corps.*—British officers and other ranks, whether employed in India or at home, should be borne on the list of the Royal Army Service Corps, with the exception noted in sub-paragraph (vii) below ; but in the future officers of the Indian Army should be permitted to enter the Royal Army Service Corps for continuous service in India. Such officers should be borne permanently on the establishment of the Army Service Corps, India, and shown in italics on the home list of the Royal Army Service Corps. Their promotion should be regulated by vacancies in the latter corps, and they should be entitled to the pensions and other benefits of the Indian Army.

Except as provided for above, British officers and other ranks should be able to join the Royal Army Service Corps from any regular unit, British or Indian, at home or abroad, on the same conditions as before the war.

(v) *Special Indian conditions of service.*—Officers should not serve more than five years in India without a period of at least one year on duty at home. All officers of the Royal Army Service Corps posted to India for the first time for a tour of service should pass an examination (to include a language test), which would entitle them to a special Indian allowance while serving in India. To qualify for command of a unit in India, an officer of the Royal Army Service Corps must have completed at least one tour of Indian service.

(vi) *Pay.*—In view of the fact that the officers of the present Supply and Transport Corps are called upon to spend the whole of their service in India, it cannot be reasonably claimed that the rates of pay for the officers of the Royal Army Service Corps under this scheme should be identical with the present rates of the Supply and Transport Corps. Their pay should be arranged on the following basis :—

(i) British pay of rank, as for the British service in India (*vide* paragraph 24 of Part V).
(ii) Corps pay at English rates, expressed in rupees.
(iii) Allowance for special qualifications (see sub-paragraph (v) above).

(vii) *Transfers of Supply and Transport Corps Officers.*—On the introduction of this scheme, all officers who are permanently in the Supply and Transport Corps should be permitted, within a fixed period, to transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps under the following conditions :—

(*a*) They will take their place on the Royal Army Service Corps regimental list according to army service.
(*b*) They must unconditionally accept the regulations regarding pay, promotion, service and pensions of the Royal Army Service Corps.

Officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps, and who, on transfer, have served more than five years in India (that period being the ordinary tour of foreign service for Royal Army Service Corps officers), should be permitted to reckon their time in India as a tour of foreign service for purposes of the foreign service roster.

Officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who do not transfer to the Royal Army Service Corps should be placed on a "special Indian list," and should continue to serve under the present conditions of the Supply and Transport Corps. No fresh admissions should be made to this list, which would gradually disappear.

It is important that the proposed arrangements should not penalise officers of the present cadre of the Supply and Transport Corps in their claims to succeed to the higher appointments of their own corps.

(viii) *Pensions.*—Pensions (except for officers of the Supply and Transport Corps who do not transfer) should be on the British scale.

(ix) *British Subordinate Staff, Supply and Transport Corps.*—The subordinate staff of the Supply and Transport Corps should be placed on a "special list, India," and continue to serve on as non-commissioned officers or warrant officers, Supply and Transport Corps, till the end of their service. No further admissions should be made into this part of the Corps, which will disappear in time. The duties at present carried out by the subordinate staff of the Supply and Transport Corps will be gradually taken over by personnel serving on ordinary Royal Army Service Corps engagements, and receiving a special allowance based on principles similar to that alluded to in sub-paragraph (v).

(x) The Indian establishment of the Supply and Transport Corps should continue to be a local service, forming part of the Army Service Corps, India. Indian officers with the Viceroy's commission might suitably be employed on supply duties.

(xi) It is to be noted that, as all ranks of the Royal Army Service Corps in India will be on their own list and under their own rules, promotion will be by vacancy and not by time, except in cases of lieutenants of 11 years' service.

(xii) The question of a reserve of officers for the Army Service Corps, India, is dealt with in Part VIII of this Report.

Veterinary Service.

16. Before the war, the duties of the Army Veterinary Service in India were limited to the care of animals of the British and non-silladar units. It also supervised generally the arrangements for the care and treatment of all other units. Its control was no doubt extended as the war progressed.

17. The service contained (*a*) a fixed establishment of officers of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, detailed by the War Office, as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, for tours of service in India; (*b*) a few warrant and non-commissioned officers of the unattached list, *i.e.*, men taken, not from the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, but from mounted units in India who had elected for permanent service in India; and (*c*) a few Indian subordinates; making in all about 90 other ranks. The actual number required even for the limited veterinary services of the Army in peace time amounted to 1,562, and the difference was made good by detailing subordinate personnel from various regimental or corps units.

Such a scheme has the following obvious disadvantages:—

(*a*) Subordinate personnel, *i.e.*, shoeing-smiths (British), syces, line orderlies and transport dressers, detailed for duty in veterinary hospitals, belonged to regimental or corps establishments, and were thus counted as effective twice over. They were not permanently under the veterinary authorities for training or discipline.

(*b*) On mobilization, field veterinary units had to be improvised from such material as might be available. During the war it was found necessary to take men for this purpose with but few qualifications and no training.

18. We have seen a scheme, which is now under the consideration of the Government of India, for the reorganization of the veterinary services in India on the following lines:—

(*a*) One self-contained Army Veterinary Corps to be formed in India, responsible for the veterinary services of the army in India, including the Remount Department, but excluding horse-breeding operations.

(*b*) This Corps to be termed the Army Veterinary Corps, India, and to include both British and Indian personnel, the whole of the latter being enlisted for service in the Army Veterinary Corps, India.

(*c*) This Corps to form the nucleus for expansion on mobilization, and in war to undertake the whole of the veterinary services in the field.

(*d*) The British personnel to be found from the home establishment, and be detailed for service in India on conditions similar to those obtaining in other corps. The present continuous service "unattached list" personnel would be allowed to die out, or be absorbed into the Royal Army Veterinary Corps. As an alternative, it has been suggested that, within a fixed establishment, other ranks of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps might be allowed to elect for continuous service in India, in which case the absorption of the present unattached list men would be unnecessary.

(*e*) Depôts for the Army Veterinary Corps, India, to be formed for the training of all personnel, excepting veterinary assistants who are graduates of veterinary colleges in India, and to perform also all duties connected with recruitment and records.

(*f*) The provision of all veterinary medicines, necessaries and equipment to be withdrawn from the Indian Medical Service, and, with the budget provision, to be controlled by the Veterinary Service alone.

The scheme, as outlined above, seems to us to be suitable.

19. We consider that the question of the admission of a certain number of duly qualified Indians to commissions in the Veterinary Service in India should not be overlooked. The scheme to which we have referred aims at extending the present functions of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps in India so as to provide a trained veterinary service for Indian cavalry and transport corps. Such an extension, highly desirable in itself, affords an additional reason for opening the superior service in India to Indians possessing the necessary qualifications. Moreover, the opening out of fresh opportunities should stimulate interest in veterinary work, and help to attract educated Indians to a profession for which there is much scope in India.

It is understood that the charter of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps, like that of the Royal Army Medical Corps, provides that only persons of pure European descent can hold officers' commissions in the Corps. We recommend that the question of removing this restriction be considered, and that Indians, who obtain the necessary professional qualifications by passing successfully through the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, should be allowed to compete on equal terms for admission to the Royal Army Veterinary Corps. It would probably be desirable in this case to arrange that Indians, thus admitted, should be ear-marked for continuous service in India.

In any case we recommend that a certain number of appointments in the Army Veterinary Corps, India, should be reserved for Indians so qualified, under conditions similar to those obtaining for Indian officers with the King's commission serving in the army. If in any year the number of Indian applicants for employment in this Corps is in excess of vacancies, the appointments should be filled by competition *inter se*.

Ordnance Services.

20. We recommend that army ordnance duties in India should be performed by British personnel belonging to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, assisted by locally enlisted Indian personnel. We suggest that this joint service should be designated the Army Ordnance Corps, India.

21. The British personnel, both officers and other ranks, required for duty in India should be maintained by the War Office and be sent out on tours of duty. While in India this personnel would be administered by the Government of India.

22. The officers and other ranks now belonging to the Indian Ordnance Department should be permitted to transfer to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, but those who do not transfer should be borne on a special list for promotion.

British officers belonging to the Indian Army should, if qualified, be eligible for transfer to the Royal Army Ordnance Corps; but if so transferred they should forfeit all claim to Indian Army allowances and pensions.

We consider that the same rules as regards granting commissions from the ranks to British personnel should be in force in India and at home.

23. We recommend that pay should be arranged on the following lines :—

(*a*) British pay, as for the British service in India.

(*b*) Extra pay, calculated on a rupee basis, at rates similar to those laid down for corresponding appointments at home.

(c) A special allowance to officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers who have passed an examination including a language test.

24. Pensions for British personnel, except in the case of those belonging to the Indian Ordnance Department who do not transfer, should be on the British scale.

Corps of Signals.

25. Under the existing system, the Signal Service in India is maintained by attaching to it, from both British and Indian units, such personnel as are required. These men, however, remain on the strength of their original units.

We consider that this system is unsatisfactory, and that the Corps of Signals in India should correspond as nearly as possible to the Corps of Signals at home, and that personnel should be definitely posted to the Corps.

26. We recommend that this Corps should be constituted on the following general lines :—

(*a*) The Signal Service in India should form a separate Corps and be designated the Corps of Signals, India. It should be composed partly of British and partly of Indian personnel, and should be under an Inspector of Signals, who should be the technical adviser to the General Staff. The corps will require a depôt organization in India.

(*b*) The designation, organization, and where possible the equipment, should be the same for all signal units with both home and Indian formations.

(*c*) There should be a signal training centre or centres in India for the purpose of training officers and other ranks of the Corps of Signals, India, and of assimilating British and Indian methods of training. These centres could function as depôts, and could also undertake the training of instructors and assistant instructors for units other than those belonging to the Corps of Signals.

(*d*) The establishment of British personnel should be maintained by the War Office.

(*e*) Officers, whether belonging to the British service or the Indian Army, should be eligible for tours of duty with the Corps of Signals, India, under the same conditions as are laid down for the Corps of Signals at home. British officers, whilst serving in the corps either at home or in India and belonging to either the British service or the Indian Army, should be allowed to interchange for periods of service. A cadre of officers for permanent service in the Corps of Signals, India, should be maintained.

(*f*) British other ranks should be borne on a fixed establishment and should be sent out to India for duty in the same way as other British troops.

We suggest that promotions up to, but exclusive of, the rank of serjeant should be made within the Indian establishment.

27. The Corps in India should be diluted with Indian personnel, as far as is compatible with efficiency.

28. Appointments to units, as well as higher appointments, should be distributed proportionately amongst officers of the British service and the Indian Army.

An officer of the British service should not, however, get command of a unit unless he has served a previous tour with the Corps of Signals, India, possesses a knowledge of Indian conditions and has passed a language test.

29. Pay should be made up as under :—

(*a*) British pay of rank, as for British officers and other ranks in India.

(*b*) Corps pay, calculated on a rupee basis, at rates similar to those laid down for similar appointments at home.

(*c*) A special allowance to British service officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers who have passed an examination, which will include a language test.

(*d*) Indian Army officers should continue to draw the Indian Army allowance.

Telegraph Personnel.

30. The telegraphs in India are managed by the telegraph branch of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, assisted by 600 military telegraph operators and 100 wireless operators, who, before the war, were attached from British units in India. We recommend that in the future these operators should belong to the Corps of Signals, India, which should be augmented for this purpose.

In the war these 700 operators became available for use by the army in the field, and were under the orders of the Chief Signal Officer, a system which proved satisfactory.

31. Detailed arrangements concerning depôts of stores and personnel, limits of responsibility, &c., should be worked out in peace time, so that officers, men, transport and stores may be in readiness to move as required at short notice.

In order to fulfil these requirements, we recommend that one or more suitably organized line of communication battalions should be formed, consisting of the military telegraph wireless personnel referred to, as well as of selected civilian personnel belonging to the Indian Telegraph Department.

We suggest that in peace time military operators should draw from army sources their military rates of pay and corps pay, and should receive additional pay from the Telegraph Department according to the nature of their duties.

When employed on active service, all telegraph personnel should be placed definitely under the orders of the commander in the field.

SECTION III.

THE MEDICAL SERVICES.

32. The suggested unification of the two medical organizations, viz., the Royal Army Medical Corps, which now serves British troops, and the Indian Medical Service, which is not only responsible for the medical charge of Indian troops, wherever employed, but also provides the superior civil medical service of the Indian Empire, presents great difficulties.

33. If the two services were purely military, their unification could be carried out on the lines suggested for services such as the Royal Army Service Corps and the Supply and Transport Corps, or the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Indian Ordnance Department. But the Indian Medical Service, though primarily a military service, is also the channel of recruitment for the civil medical service. The latter contains over 60 per cent. of the total personnel of the Indian Medical Service, all of whom are liable to recall to military duty. It is this double rôle that has given rise to the serious practical difficulties which have blocked the various attempts made in the past to create a unified service.

34. In connection with the general question of a closer union between the British and Indian Armies, it has been represented to us by the Secretary of State that the question is nowhere more acute than it is in the case of the Indian Medical Service and the Royal Army Medical Corps, but that there are two very great difficulties, both of which require earnest consideration. The one is that in any Indian medical service there must be room for the growing number of efficient Indian doctors. The second is that a military career in India, in itself, is not sufficient to attract the best doctors, and that it is very difficult, from the medical point of view, to separate the needs of the civil official population from the needs of the army.

The first difficulty can be easily solved. The proportion of Indians in the Indian Medical Service, which was only 7 per cent. before the war, has steadily risen in recent years, and now amounts to over 10 per cent., excluding a large number of temporary appointments—some 900. At present, permanent recruitment is being carried out in the ratio of one-third Indian and two-thirds British; and there should be no difficulty in maintaining this or some similar ratio of Indians in future.

The second difficulty is, however, more serious.

35. The desirability of unification was prominently brought to notice in the recent war, when officers trained in two separate organizations had to work in the field side by side. Accordingly in January 1919, at the instance of the Secretary of State, the Government of India appointed a committee, presided over by Sir H. Verney Lovett, "to examine and report on the question of the reorganization of the medical services in India, both civil and military, from the standpoint that it is desirable that there should be unified medical service for India."

36. At this stage it is desirable to make it clear that the expression "unification of the medical services" is used in two senses :—

(a.) By the Government of India, the Verney Lovett Committee and the Secretary of State, as meaning the unification of the superior military and civil medical services.

(b.) By the military authorities and the heads of the Royal Army Medical Corps, who are concerned only with the army, as meaning the unification of the two military medical services only.

37. The Verney Lovett Committee proposed the creation of a unified service, to be known as the Indian Medical Corps, which would be responsible for all medical services in India, both civil and military, and would be composed of:—

(a) The present Indian Medical Service, supplemented *at the start* by volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps.

(b) Men selected by the Secretary of State from the present temporary officers of the Indian Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps.

(c) Candidates from the medical schools in the United Kingdom, to be selected by a half-yearly competitive examination, separate from that for the Royal Army Medical Corps, in which Indian candidates with Indian qualifications would be given special facilities to compete.

This unified service was to displace the Royal Army Medical Corps; and a large portion of the cadre, as in the case of the Indian Medical Service at present, was to be employed in peace time on civil duties under Local Governments. These officers were to be divided into—

(a) An ordinary war reserve } both liable to recall to military duty.
(b) A special war reserve }
(c) All others, who would be liable to recall only in a national emergency, and then only to hold certain posts as specialists or consultants.

Under this scheme, the military and the civil branches of the proposed Indian Medical Corps were to be administered, under the Commander-in-Chief and certain civil departments of the Government of India respectively, by two separate Directors appointed from the Corps. Promotion was to follow the rules in force for the Royal Army Medical Corps, including selection for the post of lieutenant-colonel; and on attaining that rank an officer was to choose finally between (a) medical administration (military), (b) medical specialisation, (c) permanent civil employ.

38. The Verney Lovett Committee recognised that the proposed scheme could not be accepted unless it commended itself not only to the Government of India, but also to the War Office, which is concerned with the proposals in so far as they affect British troops in India and involve the elimination of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

39. Before we discuss the proposals of the Verney Lovett Committee, we must refer to two other schemes. The first, which is advocated by a large body of military opinion as well as by senior officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, is that the latter should take over medical charge of the whole army in India, leaving the medical care of the civil population to a separate civil medical service.

This scheme is also favoured by a large section of Indian opinion, which desires that the civil medical service should have an entirely separate organization, though it might draw a small portion of its personnel from the military service and its civil members might be made liable for military duty in case of serious emergency. This point of view has been summarized as follows:—

(a) Steps should be taken to institute a civil medical service, which would absorb all the civil posts at present held by the Indian Medical Service, and would be recruited from the independent medical profession, the civil medical officers (other than Indian Medical Service), and the Indian Medical Service, the last being restricted to 10 per cent. of the cadre.

(b) The Indian Medical Service, which would then be exclusively military, should be recruited by simultaneous competitive examinations, or by separate competitive examinations in India.

This summary expresses the views of those who object to the civil medical services of India being an adjunct of a military service—all the civil personnel being liable to recall in time of war, thereby disorganizing the entire civil medical organization—and who also resent the so-called monopoly of the most highly-paid civil appointments by a service which is primarily military. They see no objection to all the military medical work being taken over by the Royal Army Medical Corps, provided that a certain proportion of Indians are admitted to the latter.

40. But while a unified military and a separate civil medical service are advocated, though for different reasons, both by a large body of military opinion and by certain

Indian politicians, there is, we believe, on the other hand an important section of Indian opinion which is strongly opposed to the breaking up of the present Indian Medical Service. This section advocates a third scheme, under which the Indian Medical Service would be retained on the military as well as on the civil side, with a personnel of 40 per cent. Indians and 60 per cent. British; officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps would be attached to the Indian Medical Service if and when they came on tours of service in India; and the present liability of Indian Medical Service officers in civil employ to revert to military duty, for which they should keep themselves duly qualified, would be retained.

41. An important factor in the problem is the declining popularity of the Indian Medical Service, which began in 1909, and which has been more marked in recent years, and may be attributed to the following causes:—

(*a*) Recent constitutional changes in India, which will place the civil medical services in the provinces under the control of Indian Ministers.

(*b*) The increased cost of living in India, combined with the decrease of opportunities for private practice, owing to frequent transfers, to the increasing competition of private practitioners, and to the regulations restricting fees (which have, however, recently been relaxed).

(*c*) The difficulty in obtaining leave, owing to war conditions and to the service being below strength.

(*d*) The paucity of war honours and rewards to Indian Medical Service officers, as compared with the sister service. This undoubtedly has had a depressing effect on the service, and, we believe, affords a reasonable ground for complaint.

(*e*) General uneasiness as regards prospects.

The cumulative result has been a steadily increasing difficulty in obtaining recruits of the right stamp from the medical schools of the United Kingdom. This was apparent even before the war, but it has been aggravated by the shortage of qualified medical men caused by the war.

The Royal Army Medical Corps has apparently been able to supply its own immediate deficiency by selecting for permanent appointment officers who had obtained temporary commissions and done well during the war. The Indian Medical Service, for one reason or another, has been less successful in obtaining British recruits in this manner; and we understand that there is, or soon will be (when those whose pension is due are allowed to retire), a shortage of nearly 200 officers in a total cadre of 775. In fact, the Indian Medical Service may now be said to be at the nadir of its reputation, as the Royal Army Medical Corps was some twenty years ago; and just as in 1897 the War Office (paragraph 7, Verney Lovett Report) proposed that the duties of the Royal Army Medical Corps in India should be permanently taken over by the military side of the Indian Medical Service, the cadre being expanded accordingly, so we now find a strong body of opinion advocating the converse proposal, that the Royal Army Medical Corps should absorb the military side of the Indian Medical Service, thus securing a unified military service and leading up to the complete severance of the civil medical service.

42. The question of the future organization of the Indian Medical Service involves, therefore, not only military but also administrative issues of much importance, and requires close examination in both its military and civil aspects.

43. We have shown that three separate schemes have been put forward:—

(1) That of the Verney Lovett Committee, viz., the elimination of the Royal Army Medical Corps from India, and the creation of a unified Indian Medical Corps, to serve both the army and the civil population.

(2) The proposal to entrust the medical charge of the Indian Army, as well as of the British Army, to the Royal Army Medical Corps, thus making the Indian Medical Service a purely civil medical service.

(3) The proposal to retain both the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Indian Medical Service, but to split the latter up into two separate services, the one serving the Indian Army and the other the civil population.

44. We now proceed to discuss these three schemes in their order.

We consider that the Verney Lovett Report puts forward the only feasible scheme for a unified military and civil medical service; but we feel unable to support that scheme because it would, after the first selection had been made, permanently exclude the Royal Army Medical Corps from India. Such exclusion would, we believe, adversely affect, especially at the present time, both the large body of British troops in India, whose health has hitherto been so admirably safeguarded by the Royal Army Medical Corps, and the service itself, which would be shut out from the wide field of medical experience that India affords. Moreover, even if those objections were not considered fatal to the Verney Lovett scheme, we believe that the proposed Indian Medical Corps would, certainly for some years to come, find it impossible to provide the full establishment of officers required for British as well as for Indian troops, since it cannot now attract sufficient candidates even for existing needs from the medical schools, and it is most unlikely that under present conditions it would obtain any large numbers of volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps.

The other proposals of the Verney Lovett Committee for assimilating the conditions of promotion, study leave, special training, &c., for the two services seem to us generally suitable, and have been adopted in our final recommendations.

45. As regards the second scheme, looking at the problem as purely a military one, there would seem to be no objection in principle, and obvious advantages in practice, in having the same medical organization for the *whole* army in India as for the rest of the Imperial forces. Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps would, as at present, come to India for tours of duty; but their number in India, now only 320, would have to be increased to over 1,000. It would probably be advisable, in order to encourage the necessary knowledge of Indian languages, customs and conditions, to allow a certain proportion to elect for continuous service, or at least successive tours of service, which in the case of the British element should entitle them to higher rates of pension.

If this scheme were adopted, it would be an essential condition that the Royal Army Medical Corps should be opened to Indians and arrangements made for the admission of a reasonable proportion of Indians.

At the start, officers of the Indian Medical Service, whether civil or military, could doubtless be given the option of joining this expanded Royal Army Medical Corps and of retaining their existing rates of pay, pensions, &c.

46. We cannot, however, recommend this scheme, because, even if the War Office were prepared to allow the admission of Indians to the Royal Army Medical Corps, we see two very serious objections, (*a*) the complete separation of the civil from the military medical service, with the undesirable consequences referred to later, and (*b*) the loss of a reserve of 300 to 400 medical officers, with military training and holding the King's commission, whom the Local Governments would furnish from the civil side in an emergency.

With regard to the latter point, we do not consider that an equally well-qualified reserve could be supplied from the United Kingdom, or from the civil medical services of the provinces, or from a special reserve to be formed from the existing temporary Indian Medical Service officers. We believe that it would be unwise to count on any substantial assistance from the United Kingdom. Expert opinion, too, is doubtful as to the readiness of private practitioners, or of members of the civil medical services in India, to come forward, even if liable by the terms of their engagement; while out of the 900 or more temporary Indian Medical Service officers employed in the war, we understand that only a small proportion have proved themselves so fit for active service as to justify selection for permanent appointments. Nor are we satisfied that under present conditions the Royal Army Medical Corps could provide the 775 British and 300 Indian medical officers estimated to be required for the peace establishment. Finally, such a solution would be unfavourably criticised, unless the present rule restricting admission to the Royal Army Medical Corps to candidates of pure European parentage were abrogated and facilities given for the admission of Indians in reasonable numbers to the Royal Army Medical Corps.

47. Military opinion, as represented to us by many witnesses of high authority and recent experience in the field, was practically unanimous in holding that the Royal Army Medical Corps, owing to its superior organization and military training in peace time, its skilled subordinate personnel (which the Indian Medical Service still lacks), and its capacity for rapid expansion in war, had proved itself on the administrative side more efficient in the field than the Indian Medical Service. It was maintained that the officers of the latter service lacked the necessary training for work in the field, though quite as efficient professionally as the Royal Army Medical Corps in the wards, and also as specialists and consultants. This defect is attributed to their inferior military

training under the antiquated regimental hospital system (now abolished), their ignorance of the principles of military administration in the field, and their lack of familiarity with the latest developments of military hygiene, of preventive medicine, and of military medical science.

48. We believe that the above criticism is generally accurate. The responsibility, however, does not rest entirely with the Indian Medical Service. On its behalf it is urged that its military side has suffered in the past from the fact that the Director of Medical Services in India has always belonged to the sister service, and has not been sufficiently alive to the medical needs of the Indian Army, or has not pressed them successfully on the Government of India.

It is admitted by some of its senior officers that the Indian Medical Service has not in the past received adequate military training, and that such defects as came to light on active service were due partly to that cause, and partly to the fact that men recalled from civil employ were often employed without reference to their aptitudes and capacity. However this may be, it is clear that, though in theory a military service, the outlook of the Indian Medical Service in the past has been mainly civil, and that the best officers have secured civil appointments as early as possible, and have lost touch with the military side of their profession. They are consequently at a disadvantage when recalled on the outbreak of war, or reverted towards the end of their service, to hold military administrative appointments. We shall endeavour to suggest later how this defect can be remedied.

49. As regards the third scheme, namely, the organization of a separate military medical service for the Indian Army (the Royal Army Medical Corps being retained for the British Army) and a separate medical service for civil requirements, we agree with the Verney Lovett Committee (para. 54) that it presents few advantages, while it has all the disadvantages consequent upon the separation of the civil medical service from the military medical service. It appears that such a division of the Indian Medical Service into two separate services was carried out twice before, but on both occasions it was found to be unworkable in practice, and the two services were speedily reunited. Though such a division might now find favour with a section of Indian opinion, we do not think that it merits serious consideration. This Corps would be working side by side with the Royal Army Medical Corps, an arrangement which would perpetuate all the disadvantages of the present system, with little corresponding gain.

50. We have referred to the undesirability of forming a separate civil medical service. Our view is based on the following considerations :—

(1.) The separation would probably entail a large increase of expenditure, because :—

(*a*) It would be necessary to maintain a larger military cadre, in the absence of a trained military reserve.

(*b*) Officers in military employ would have to be paid higher salaries, owing to the loss of opportunities on the civil side.

(*c*) Officers on the civil side would have to be paid higher salaries, owing to the loss of military rank and of the prestige and protection which it affords.

(2.) A purely civil medical service would inevitably, under the new conditions in India, tend to become provincial, and would thereby deteriorate in quality.

(3.) A purely military medical service would probably suffer in efficiency from the lack of the wide experience afforded by civil practice.

(4.) It would be increasingly difficult to obtain a reasonable proportion of well-qualified Europeans in such a service, though a strong European element is essential—

(*a*) For medical attendance on the European servants of Government and their families, who have been led to expect that they will be treated by men of their own race, and whose expectations it is particularly desirable not to disappoint at the present time.

(*b*) For the maintenance of western standards of research, efficiency and discipline in the civil medical services of Government.

(5) It would be unwise to break up a service which has such fine traditions and has rendered such services to India as the Indian Medical Service.

(6) As far as we are in possession of their views, both the Government of India and Local Governments are opposed to the creation of a separate civil medical service.

51. We have now completed our examination of the three schemes which have been put forward for the reorganization of the medical services in India, and have shown

why, in our opinion, none of them is altogether suited to the requirements of the army on the one side and of the civil population on the other.

We have explained that the Verney Lovett scheme for a unified military and civil medical service cannot be recommended, because it involves the exclusion from India (where one-third of the British Army is usually quartered) of the Royal Army Medical Corps; and that the absorption of the military side of the Indian Medical Service by the Royal Army Medical Corps is equally undesirable, because, in addition to many practical difficulties and probable political objections, it would involve the deterioration, and eventually the disappearance, of the Indian Medical Service as an all-India service. We have also indicated grave objections to the third scheme.

52. Having started with the hope of devising a scheme for the amalgamation of the two services into one, we have been reluctantly forced to the conclusion that such amalgamation is impracticable—at least, in present conditions. In connection with the even wider question of the relations between the British and Indian Armies, while aiming at closer liaison, at assimilation of conditions, uniformity of ideals and interchange of officers, we have not thought it desirable, in view of the present and probable future status of India in the Empire, to aim at complete unification or amalgamation.

53. As long as there are separate British and Indian Armies, we see no objection to the continuance of separate medical services for the two armies; but it is essential to eliminate friction and jealousy and to secure as nearly as possible uniformity of training, of methods and of ideals.

54. We hold that in India there is ample scope both for the up-to-date technical training, wide administrative experience and close contact with the latest medical developments which the Royal Army Medical Corps is in a position to supply, and for the special knowledge of Indian epidemics and diseases and the familiarity with local conditions which the Indian Medical Service has peculiar facilities to acquire.

55. We consider that the following proposals, if accepted, will maintain the Indian Medical Service in its position as the premier civil medical service in India, will improve its efficiency as a military service, and will secure more harmonious working and closer co-operation between it and the Royal Army Medical Corps:—

(1) There should be a joint examination, as was formerly the case, for both services in medicine and surgery, the subjects common to both. Candidates for the Indian Medical Service should take in addition the extra subjects, indicated in the syllabus to the Verney Lovett report, which are considered necessary for that service.

(2) The commissions for successful candidates should in both cases bear the same date, which might be that either of their joining, or passing out from, the Royal Army Medical Corps College, Millbank.

(3) There should be joint preliminary training, as at present, at Millbank; but Indian Medical Service Officers between five and ten years' service should, like Royal Army Medical Corps officers, return to Millbank for subsequent courses, till such time as adequate facilities for such training are provided in India. We agree with the Verney Lovett Committee as to the need of providing such facilities.

(4) The rules and the periods of service for promotion up to the rank of major should be similar for both services.

(5) No Indian Medical Service officer should be eligible for civil employ till he has completed at least two years' service on the military side, and has been certified by the Director Medical Services as fully qualified on that side.

(6) The selection of officers for civil employ should be made by a Board, consisting of the Director-General Indian Medical Service as President, the Director Medical Services, and not more than two lay members to be nominated by the Government of India.

(7) An Indian Medical Service officer should select finally between military and civil employ in his 16th year of service; and if he elects for, and is finally posted to, civil employ, he should be debarred from further military employ, except as in (9) (c) below, and from higher rank than that of lieutenant-colonel, to which he would rise automatically under the time-scale for the time being in force.

(8) Promotion to lieutenant-colonel for Indian Medical Service officers in military employ should be subject to selection, as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

(9) Officers in civil employ shall be classified as:—

(a) Ordinary war reserve—up to ten years' total service.
(b) Special war reserve—up to sixteen years' total service.
(c) All others.

Officers in category (*a*) would be liable to recall to military duty in an ordinary emergency, and those in (*b*) only in a greater emergency.

Officers in category (*a*) and (*b*) should be required to keep up their military training by periodical return to duty with troops; a period of three months every three years is suggested. Officers in class (*c*) should only be recalled in a very serious emergency, for work as specialists and consultants, subject to the sanction of the administrations under which they are serving and to the extent agreed upon. They should, on recall, be given suitable temporary rank, on the analogy of the private practitioners employed by the War Office during the war.

(10) Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps should be posted to India in the various grades for tours of duty as at present, and should be entitled to a reasonable share in the higher military administrative appointments.

(11) In view of the fact that the Director Medical Services is the head of both the military medical services, the post should be held by an officer of the Army Medical Service and the Indian Medical Service alternately.

(12) Exchange of officers between the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Indian Medical Service should be allowed, as at present.

(13) Interchange of duties between officers of both services, *e.g.*, charge of British and Indian station hospitals, field ambulances on manœuvres, &c., should be encouraged.

(14) If a fixed proportion of Indians be recruited for the Indian Medical Service, that proportion should be maintained in the military and civil branches.

(15) On the analogy of other Indian services, the pay of the Indian Medical Service should be substantially higher than that of the Royal Army Medical Corps when employed in India. This is necessary in order to attract recruits to the Indian Medical Service. Similarly, the Indian Medical Service pensions should be on a higher scale.

SECTION IV.

ENGINEER SERVICES.

A.—Functions.

56. In India the Director-General of Military Works is responsible for all duties in connection with the Military Works Services. He is also *ex officio* inspector of engineer units, and of pioneer battalions as regards their technical training. It is doubtful, however, whether even before the war he had the time, or a sufficiently intimate knowledge of details, to perform the functions of an inspecting officer satisfactorily in addition to his other duties. During the war, in 1916, an Inspector of Engineers and Pioneers was appointed to relieve the Director-General of Military Works of his inspection duties. As his duties during the war were limited to those of inspection, the question of studying engineering in connection with operations of war still remains to be developed. To attain this object we have suggested, in Part II, the appointment of a senior officer of the Royal Engineers who shall be the means by which the training of field engineer units is co-ordinated.

57. In addition to the usual duties in the field for which engineer personnel is required, there are various technical services, required either in peace or war, whose recruitment from or affiliation with engineers must be considered. These services are:—

Transportation, Signal, Telegraph, Postal, Survey and Map Production, Printing, Searchlight, Meteorological, Forestry, Quarrying, Camouflage, and Gas.

58. We consider that many of these services should be classified as engineers, and we make the following recommendations:—

(*a*) Transportation units for the construction of railways, ropeways, &c., require personnel of the engineering professions, and we are of opinion that construction units should therefore be engineers. The personnel for operating railways, ropeways, &c., are not strictly speaking engineers, but, as operation cannot be a separate organization from construction, we consider that all transportation units employed in peace or war should be engineers.

As regards railways, there are in existence certain regular companies of Railway Sappers and Miners, which have in peace time been suitably employed under the Railway Board. For work in the more forward areas in war we recommend the employment of these companies, increased by railway specialist personnel, who should be maintained on a reserve basis in peace time, so as to form one or more railway reserve battalions. We consider that in peace these railway companies should be given constant employment in railway construction, in order to maintain their efficiency. If so employed, they are comparatively cheap units to maintain, because the work done by them is assessed at contractors' rates, and is credited to the army budget.

(*b*) The postal department is a branch of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. In war, such personnel as are required are placed at the disposal of an army in the field, and should be placed definitely under the orders of the army commander. There would not appear to be any necessity to classify the postal personnel as engineers.

(*c*) We consider that units of the following services should continue to be engineers:—survey and map production, printing in forward areas, and searchlight.

(*d*) Meteorological personnel should be found by the Royal Air Force.

(*e*) Personnel of units required in war for forestry, quarrying, camouflage and gas should be engineers.

General employment of R.E. officers.

59. Prior to 1914 more Royal Engineer officers were employed in Military Works than in any other engineering service, almost all the high appointments open to them being in this branch. The experience gained in the war has led to the increase in the number of field engineer units, many of which are of recent creation; and we consider that in the future more attention should be paid to the training of engineers for field duties than in the past, and that experience in these duties should be a necessary qualification for the higher engineer appointments.

We are also of opinion that, though much of the training in the Military Works branch is beneficial to an officer in war, a considerable portion of it is of little value from a military point of view, and could adequately be performed, especially in areas of minor military importance, by some civil agency such as the Public Works Department.

In view, however, of the fact that under the Reforms Scheme certain works may be entrusted to local bodies, we are strongly of opinion that no work of imperial importance should be handed over to these bodies, and that no Royal Engineer officers should be placed under their orders.

B.—Organization.

Engineers and Pioneers.

60. In the foregoing paragraphs we have recorded our views as to the general functions of the engineer services. Before we consider how these services should be organized in order to perform adequately these functions, we desire to state our opinion on the question of the amalgamation or otherwise of engineers and pioneers in Indian divisions.

In approaching this question, we have noted the recommendation made by the Committee presided over by Lord Rawlinson, which considered the amalgamation of these services at home to be desirable. In India, however, the conditions are different. Firstly, some of the pioneer battalions are of long standing, with old and cherished fighting records, and deserve to be treated differently to pioneer battalions of the home organization, which were formed only after the commencement of the recent war. There are consequently grave objections, from a sentimental point of view, to amalgamation. Secondly, at home all recruits belong to one homogeneous race; in India, in order to get enough men, it is necessary to draw from many different races and different castes men who will not intermingle, and have to be enlisted for different classes of work. Thirdly, the disposal of pioneer officers, if amalgamation is decided on, would present great difficulty; their technical training is not sufficient to admit of their commanding engineer units, and their replacement by Royal Engineer officers would cause inconvenience and expense to the State. Lastly, during the recent war engineers and pioneers in Indian divisions have worked together as a whole or by companies, under the orders of the Commanding Royal Engineer of their division, to the satisfaction of all concerned. The sapper and miner companies provided the skilled, and the pioneer the semi-skilled, portion of the personnel required for the work in hand, and their combined work produced good results.

While, therefore, we realise the advisability of similarity in home and Indian organization, we are of opinion that in India it is neither necessary nor advisable to amalgamate pioneers and engineers.

We also consider that the primary rôle of pioneer units should be efficiency in pioneer work, and their secondary rôle that of infantry, and we recommend that the footnote on p. 18, Field Service Regulations, 1914, Part I, be revised accordingly.

61. We recommend that the Commanding Royal Engineer of an Indian division in war should have at least the rank of colonel, that the divisional battalion of pioneers should be placed under his orders, and that his engineer field companies should consist of three companies of sappers and miners. In the pre-war organization of an Indian division only two sapper and miner companies were allotted, and the experience of the war has shown that a third company is essential. We are, further, of opinion that the total strength and composition of engineers and pioneers in a division in war should approximate to the total number of Royal Engineers decided on in the war establishments of a division at home, and that the present strength of a sapper and miner company requires an increase both in officers and men both in peace and war.

We lay stress upon the desirability of training engineer and pioneer units together in peace, though it is realized that, owing to lack of accommodation, this can be arranged in only few commands. All these units should be employed as much as possible on work that is remunerative to the State.

Army Engineer Units.

62. We consider that the question of the various engineer units to be maintained either in peace or war does not come within the terms of our reference, and that this subject should be dealt with locally. At the same time, we desire to emphasise the fact that the army in India should be provided adequately both with those engineer units whose maintenance in peace has become necessary, and also with the cadres of such other units as will be required on mobilization.

Nomenclature.

63. In view of the variety of units performing engineer work, we consider that the term "Sappers and Miners" is inapplicable to all, and we suggest a more comprehensive term such as "Indian engineers," the words "Sappers and Miners" being added in brackets after those units which belong to that branch. The following are specimens of the designations suggested :—

3rd Field Company, Indian Engineers (Sappers and Miners).
B Railway Company, Indian Engineers.
1st Searchlight Section, Indian Engineers.
4th Base Park Company, Indian Engineers.

Depôt Organization.

64. The Sappers and Miners are at present organized into three separate corps, with headquarters at Roorkee, Kirkee and Bangalore, each corps having originally been formed to enlist and train suitable men in the provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras respectively. Their retention as separate corps is due to caste and enlistment necessities. Each corps has its own depôt establishment, instructional schools and workshops. The strength of each corps has been enormously expanded to meet the requirements of war and, in our opinion, these corps will be fully occupied in providing such field companies, field troops and bridging trains as will be required in future by the army in India. These Sapper and Miner corps will not be competent to provide in addition a depôt organization for other engineer units, and we consider that at least two more depôts are required, namely :—

(*a.*) For railway units.
(*b.*) For special engineering services, such as electric-light personnel; electrical and mechanical units; survey units; litho-photo and printing sections; camouflage units; engineer park companies; works battalions, &c.

Organization at Army Headquarters and in Commands, &c.

65. In Part II we recommend that, in the organization at Army Headquarters, the field engineer training should be co-ordinated by a senior Royal Engineer officer affiliated to the General Staff, and that the Military Works Services should become a directorate under the Quartermaster-General. In Commands, however, we consider that it is desirable to have a chief engineer, who would be responsible for the training within his Command of engineer and pioneer units, and for the execution of military works and the financial responsibility in connection therewith. For carrying out the Works duties he should be assisted by district or area engineer commanders. Where necessary, he should also have under his orders an organization for issuing engineer stores, which could on mobilization develop into an engineer base park. In lower formations, we recommend that Commanding Royal Engineers should be freed as much as possible from duties in connection with the Military Works Services, in order to enable them to pay proper attention in peace to the training of the engineer and pioneer units under their orders.

Decentralisation of Responsibility.

66. Within Commands the financial responsibility for engineer works should, as far as possible, be delegated to Chief Engineers, so as to admit of a greater amount of inter-departmental correspondence on technical matters, and thereby to relieve general officers commanding of much clerical work.

67. We also suggest that the system of administering the Barrack Department might be made similar to that at home.

SECTION V.

CLOSER CO-OPERATION IN TRAINING AND MILITARY EDUCATION BETWEEN THE HOME AND INDIAN ARMIES.

68. In order that the systems at home and in India may be organized on similar lines, the following conditions should be observed as far as possible :—

(a) Similarity in the organization of the General Staff and in the distribution of its duties at the War Office and at Army Headquarters, India.
(b) Similarity in the conduct of staff duties, in the application of the principles of war during training, and in war establishments.
(c) Similarity of organization, syllabus, and system of training at the Camberley and Quetta Staff Colleges, and at other military educational establishments.

69. As regards 1 (a), we understand that the proposals under consideration by Army Headquarters, India, for the organization of the General Staff are so similar to what is understood to be the system of training and military education at the War Office that uniformity between these two headquarters is assured.

70. As regards 1 (b), we have been informed that Army Headquarters, India, have already accepted in principle the proposals on the subject of loans, attachments and interchanges of officers and other ranks, formulated by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the 15th November, 1919. We recommend that these proposals be put into effect, not only by interchange with the army at home, but also with those of the self-governing Dominions.

71. As regards 1 (c), one result of the recent war has been to assimilate the systems of training at all military educational establishments. For the future, all that appears to be required is to put into operation the scheme, which has already been accepted in principle, for interchange of instructors at the Staff Colleges and at other educational establishments.

72. To promote the close assimilation of training methods, it is essential that constant communication should take place between the War Office and Army Headquarters, India, regarding new proposals affecting organization and training.

SECTION VI.

APPOINTMENTS.

73. We have been requested to examine the arrangements under which officers of the British service and Indian Army are selected for certain high appointments to commands and staffs. The absence of any *data*, giving in a convenient form the existing rules or conventions on the subject, has caused us considerable difficulty. Appendix XXII to Army Regulations, India, Volume II, purports to supply this information in tabular form, but much of the information is out of date, and the qualifications laid down are, in our opinion, sometimes unsuitable. We therefore attach a table in which we include the alterations that we suggest.

74. We do not regard as within the scope of our deliberations the question of the actual distribution of staff appointments and commands as between the British service and the Indian Army. We feel, however, that unless a fair proportion of these high appointments is reserved for officers of the Indian Army, its advantages as a career will be appreciably diminished. Under existing practice, if the Commander-in-Chief belongs to the British service, two of his three principal staff officers (C.G.S., A.G., Q.M.G.) should belong to the Indian Army. We consider that this practice should be maintained, and that similarly, if the Commander-in-Chief belongs to the Indian Army, two of the principal staff officers should come from the British service. We note with satisfaction that the War Office agrees that a due proportion of the appointments open to major-generals in countries, other than India, where Indian troops are serving, should be allotted to officers of the Indian Army. We consider that this principle should be extended to commands above the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and to staff appointments.

A.—COMMANDS.

No.	Appointment.	Present (*vide* A.R.I., Vol. II, App. XXII).		As proposed by the Army in India Committee.		
		Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Remarks.
1	Commander-in-Chief	Nothing laid down.		The Cabinet, on the nomination of the Secretary of State for War in consultation with the Secretary of State for India.	...	The tenure should be for 4 years.
2	Army Commander ...	(i) War Office, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, in the case of an officer of the British service. (ii) Secretary of State for India, on the nomination of the Government of India, in the case of an officer of the Indian service.	*	(i) In the case of an officer of the British service, the Secretary of State for War with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India. (ii) In the case of an officer of the Indian Army, the Secretary of State for India, on the nomination of the Government of India, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War.	Not below the rank of lieutenant-general.	
3	District Commanders, and all commands tenable by officers of the rank of major-general.	(i) War Office, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, in the case of an officer of the British service. (ii) Viceroy, on the nomination of the C.-in-C., in the case of an officer of the Indian service.	*, (1), (2)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	Major-general.	
4	Brigade Commanders	(i) War Office, after consultation with the C.-in-C., in the case of major-generals of the British service. (ii) Viceroy, on the nomination of the C.-in-C., in the case of Indian Army officers, and of colonels of the British service (with the concurrence of the War Office when not on the Indian establishment).	*, (1), (2), (8*a*), (9*a*)	(i) In the case of officers of the British service, the War Office, with the concurrence of the C.-in-C. (ii) In the case of officers of the Indian Army, the Government of India, on the nomination of the C.-in-C.	Not below rank of colonel or brevet-colonel, and not over 53 years of age.	

B—STAFF APPOINTMENTS.

No.	Appointment.	Present (*vide* A.R.I., Vol. II, App. XXII).		As proposed by the Army in India Committee.		
		Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Remarks.
5	Chief of the General Staff.	Secretary of State for India (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British service) on the nomination of the Government of India.	*, (1)	As for the C.-in-C.	Two of these three should not belong to the same service as the C.-in-C., and their rank should ordinarily not be lower than lieut.-general.	The C.G.S. should receive the same pay and allowances as an Army Commander. If major-generals are appointed, they should be given the temporary rank of lieutenant-general.
6	Adjutant-General in India.		*, (1), (2), (9), or (12), (25)	As in the case of Army Commanders.		
7	Quartermaster-General in India.		*, (1), (2), (9), or (12), (25)			
8	Director of Medical Services in India.	(i) War Office with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India, in the case of an officer of the British Service. (ii) Government of India, in the case of an officer of the Indian Service. N.B.—Before any officer is nominated on the occurrence of a vacancy, the Government of India will report the vacancy to the Secretary of State for India with their opinion whether it should be filled from the British or Indian Service, and the Secretary of State for India will decide this question in consultation with the Army Council.	(23), (*y*)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	Rank not below major-general.	To be held alternately by an officer of the R. A. M. C. and I.M.S.
9	Secretary Military Department, India Office.	Not included	None laid down	Secretary of State for India, on the recommendation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.	Officer of the Indian Army not below rank of major-general.	
10	Major-general in charge of administration. (Commands.)	Not included	None laid down	As in the case of Army Commanders.	Major-General.	
11	Military Secretary ...	Commander-in-Chief ...	*, (2), (*d*)	Government of India, on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	Officer of the Indian Army not below the rank of colonel or brevet-colonel.	Same tenure as for other staff officers. Title to be Military Secretary, Army Headquarters.
12	Bdr.-General, Gen. Staff.	Viceroy (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British Service not on the Indian Establishment) on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(1), (2), (8), (26)	As in the case of Army Commanders.	To follow the practice obtaining at home.	
13	Bdr. - General in charge of administration.	None laid down	None laid down	As in the case of Brigade Commanders.	Ditto.	
14	Directors at A.H.Q.—					
	(*a*) Director of Supplies and Transport.	Viceroy (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British Service) on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(2), (15)			
	(*b*) Dir.-Gen. Ordnance.	Viceroy, on the nomination of the Commander-in-Chief.	(2), (14), (*d*)			
	Dir.-Gen. Mily. Works.		(2)			
	Dir.-Gen. Army Remount Dept.		(15)			
	Dir. Army Clothing.		(3), (15), (*a*)			

No.	Appointments.	Present (*vide* A.R.I., Vol. II, App. XXII).		As proposed by the Army in India Committee.		
		Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Nominating and sanctioning authorities.	Qualifications.	Remarks.
	(*c*) Dir. Mily. Operations. Dir. Staff Duties Dir. Mily. Training. Dep. Adj.-Gen. Dep. Qr.-Mr.-Gen.	C.-in-C. (with the approval of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British Service not on the Indian establishment).	*, (1), (2), (8) (24)	As in the case of Brigade Commanders	To follow the practice obtaining at home.	
	(*d*) Dir. of Farms.	C.-in-C....	(2), (8), (15), (*e*)			
	Dir. of Ord. Inspection.		(2), (14), (*d*), (*e*)			
	Dir. of Ord. Stores.		(2), (14), (*d*), (*e*)			
	Other Directors not shown.					
15	(*a*) G.S.O. 1 ...	C.-in-C. (with the concurrence of the War Office in the case of an officer of the British service not on the Indian establishment).	(2), (8), (24)	As for Brigade Commanders.	Ditto.	
	A.A.G. ...		...			
	A.Q.M.G. ...		...			
	(*b*) D.D.M.S. ..	C.-in-C....	(30)	Ditto.	Ditto.	
	A.D.M.S. at A.H.Q.		(31)			
	D.D.E. and O.S.		Nothing laid down.			
	D.D.G.M.W. ...		(2), (*e*)			

QUALIFICATIONS UNDER APPENDIX XXII, A.R.I., VOL. II.

* Open to officers of the British service on the Imperial establishment.

(1) Not tenable by an officer on the cadre of a corps.

(2) Rank not below colonel.

(3) Rank not below major.

(8) Not over 54 years of age.

(8a) Not over 54 years of age; but major-generals of the British service may be appointed up to the age of 55, and such officers will vacate at the age of 58 or on completion of four years' tenure, whichever is earlier.

(9) Five years' service in India.

(9a) Five years' service in India; but, for the purpose of this rule, one year's service in India in the rank of field officer counts as two years' service in a lower rank.

(12) Three years' service in India as a regimental field officer who has during a campaign in India—

(*a*) commanded a regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery or a battalion of infantry; or

(*b*) served on the staff as a field officer, provided that a medal was granted for such campaign or that the officer was honourably mentioned in despatches.

(14) British service officer.

(15) Officer of the Indian Army.

(23) Ordinarily from the British service, but the Government of India may nominate an officer of the Indian Medical Service.

(24) Higher Standard Hindustani.

(25) Lower Standard Hindustani.

(26) Higher Standard Hindustani; but when the G.O.C. Army is an officer of the Indian service, the Lower Standard only Hindustani is required.

(30) Indian Medical Service officer.

(31) One each from Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service.

(*a*) Appointments to the Clothing Department will be for three years in the first instance. Tenure not limited.

(*d*) Five years' tenure.

(*e*) May be held by a lieutenant-colonel.

(*y*) The tenure of this appointment by a surgeon-general of the British service is unlimited, while that of I.M.S. officers is limited to five years (counting from the date from which the full consolidated salary has been continuously drawn unless reappointed for a second tour of duty); subject in all cases to vacation at the prescribed age limit.

PART V.

Conditions of Service in the Army in India.

SECTION I.

British Officers (including Indian Officers with King's Commissions).

One of the subjects to which we were enjoined to devote particular attention is the amelioration of the general conditions of service in the Indian Army, as regards both British and other ranks. We had not proceeded far in our investigations before we found it necessary to include in our enquiry the conditions obtaining in the British service in India.

We have given considerable attention to this subject, and we have become aware that a spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction is noticeable in both armies. This spirit is no doubt in great part due to the war and its aftermath, such as frequent transfers, the prevalence of high prices, and the fluctuations in the exchange value of the rupee, and also to changes in the political organisation in India. Close investigation has, however, shown that there are other causes, many of long standing, which we think can and should be removed at once.

Before we proceed to make our recommendations, we will endeavour to indicate briefly what, in our opinion, are the principal causes underlying the undoubted feeling of discontent which prevails throughout the army in India.

2. Taking first the case of the British officers, we note that the pay in both services has recently been increased. There are still, however, certain anomalies in the pay of British officers of the Indian Army which require to be removed, and we deal separately with these in a later Section.

3. The delays experienced by officers in obtaining what they believe to be their just dues are a fruitful source of dissatisfaction. These delays, as we have shown in Part II, Section III, are not altogether the fault of the Military Accounts Department, which in India is responsible for pay, accounts and audit. Apart from temporary causes, such as congestion of work arising out of the war and the recent fluctuations in the sterling value of the rupee, they are largely due to the complexity of the regulations governing pay, leave, travelling allowances, &c. Until these regulations have been revised and simplified, there will continue to be friction between military officers and those responsible for dealing with their personal claims; and in the Section dealing with Military Finance we have emphasised the necessity for a complete revision of the regulations.

4. A serious ground for discontent is the difficulty experienced by officers in obtaining suitable accommodation for themselves and their families. Even before the war there was room for considerable improvement. With the increase in the number of officers serving in India, the lack of accommodation assumed very serious proportions; and though a certain amount has been done by Government in the direction of building temporary quarters in some stations, especially in northern India, the supply has by no means overtaken the demand, with the result that officers, and married officers in particular, are put to the greatest inconvenience and discomfort. We recognise that it would have been difficult for Government to provide quarters in adequate numbers and sufficiently promptly to meet the ever-increasing demands of an expanding army. To the extent that the present shortage is due to the large number of officers in excess of the authorised establishment, this particular ground for discontent will disappear gradually, as conditions revert to the normal. But, apart from the inadequacy of the quarters available, there can be no doubt that the standard of accommodation before the war was far below what is suitable, and, as we shall show later, the same remark applies with even greater force to the accommodation provided in the barracks and married lines of British troops, in Indian lines, and in hospitals. In the matter of improving accommodation, little was possible during the war, when the Government of India were straining every nerve and devoting all their resources to the raising, training, and equipping of a new army. Nevertheless, we note with satisfaction that some progress has been made, even under war conditions,

with the supply of electric light and fans in barracks and hospitals, and with improvements of the latter. The progress made in these directions during the next few years will be the measure of the contentment, and to a great extent of the efficiency, of the army in India; and we urge that considerations of finance should not be allowed to postpone work of so urgent a character. Had the necessary measures been taken in the years before the war to improve the conditions under which officers and men had to live, both in health and in sickness, there would be less legitimate discontent than now exists, and the ultimate cost to Government would have been far less.

5. In the preceding paragraphs we have mentioned two of the main factors which operate to cause dissatisfaction and resentment in the minds of British officers serving in the army in India. But no examination of the matter would be complete which failed to take into account a certain feeling of despondency which prevails among many of the British officers of the Indian Army at the present time. To understand this feeling it is necessary to bear in mind that the army to which they belong, and of which they were proud, was shown in the early stages of the war to be inferior to the British Army in training and equipment, and consequently in efficiency. In spite of these drawbacks, the Indian Army rendered great service to the Empire at a time of dire peril, and played a gallant part in stemming the German onslaught in the west in the winter of 1914–1915. Then came the decision to transfer the bulk of the Indian troops from France to Mesopotamia. The history of the Mesopotamian campaign is known to all. Such defects as existed in the organisation and administration of the Indian Army came prominently to notice. The later phases of the campaign more than atoned for previous failures; but the credit which the Indian Army gained for the ultimate victory of our arms, both in Mesopotamia and in Palestine, could not wholly wipe out from the minds of numbers of keen and devoted officers the stigma which, through no fault of theirs, had by that time attached to Indian army administration. They were also taught, by criticisms in the press and elsewhere, to attribute to the Government which they served a disregard of their interests; and the want of close liaison between Army Headquarters and the troops contributed to strengthen the belief that the Government of India and Army Headquarters were indifferent to the welfare of the Indian Army. Later, too, many Indian Army officers who had begun to earn high reputations, and to fill staff appointments and commands of considerable importance on the western front, found themselves recalled to India, and in many cases on their arrival were assigned posts of less importance than those which they had held in the field, while they lost the opportunities for earning distinction and gaining promotion which were in their grasp in other theatres of war.

6. This general feeling of soreness, accentuated no doubt by war strain and the inability to obtain leave which resulted from the Afghan war and the Waziristan operations following closely after the armistice, the British officers have not yet lost, nor will they lose it until they feel sure that their own Government is doing its best to uphold their interests and to redress their grievances. We may mention that our attention has been called to what is considered to be an attitude of undue reticence, adopted by the military authorities in India, as to their policy and intentions regarding matters which affect officers of the Indian Army and the conditions of their service. The fact that any important proposals have to be referred by the Government of India for the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council is responsible for this reticence, and it is a matter for regret that the position is not better understood in the Indian Army. At the same time, we think that there are many matters in respect of which Government and the military authorities in India might, and should, take officers into their confidence, while maintaining a proper reserve in regard to questions the decision of which does not rest in their hands.

7. Recent changes and reforms have no doubt proved another unsettling factor in the minds of British officers of the Indian Army; but this feeling, it is to be hoped, will pass away in time. For the present it contributes to the unpopularity of service in India, and we therefore feel bound to notice it.

8. All these circumstances have combined to produce a condition of affairs which calls for immediate remedy. It is impossible to ignore the signs of the times, or to shut our eyes to the fact that, whereas the Indian Army formerly attracted the pick of the Sandhurst cadets, there is a reluctance at present on the part of cadets and their

parents to elect for that army. This reluctance is particularly noticeable in the case of those families which have a long and honourable connection with the Indian Army. To some extent this may be attributed to the fact that the rates of pay of officers in the British Army, as recently revised, now afford a living wage; and that consequently a young officer who has no private means is no longer obliged to seek a career in the Indian Army. It is true that the latter still offers pecuniary advantages somewhat in excess of the British service, but it is equally true that these advantages are far smaller than they used to be, and are no longer, in our opinion, sufficient to turn the scale in favour of an Indian career.

9. The problem before us, then, is to render service in the Indian Army sufficiently attractive to secure a constant flow of the best of the Sandhurst cadets, and to ensure that officers who have elected for that army, and British service officers while stationed in India, remain contented throughout their service.

House Accommodation.

10. We have already indicated two directions in which reforms are urgently needed, firstly, the simplification of the regulations dealing with pay and allowances; and secondly, the provision of suitable accommodation for all officers. We realise that the latter problem is one of no small difficulty, but we are strongly of opinion that the Government should recognise definitely its obligation to provide accommodation for all its military officers, as well as for messes of units. The grant of lodging allowance, as in England, will not meet the case, for the necessary accommodation does not exist. The decision as to the best methods of relief is a matter for the Government of India, and these methods will no doubt vary in different parts of the country. The alternatives appear to be (*a*) to build; (*b*) to buy; (*c*) to hire. The first would be very expensive, and a combination of (*b*) and (*c*), according to local circumstances, would probably be preferable.

The following suggestions are put forward as practical solutions of the difficulty:—

(i) In addition to providing a sufficient number of bungalows to accommodate officers remaining in the plains during the hot weather, huts might be erected for use in the cold weather only: and such officers as remain in the plains during the summer should be permitted to share quarters in the bungalows, the occupants paying rent on the scale laid down in clause (ii) below, the total not to exceed the assessed rent of the bungalow. Thus rent would be paid for the huts only during the winter.

An arrangement of this kind would also tend to prevent heavy expenditure on building in a cantonment which it may be advisable to abandon later.

(ii) The rent of Government quarters should be assessed in the usual way; but the total should not exceed 5 per cent. per annum of pay of rank for unmarried officers' quarters, and 10 per cent. for married quarters.

(iii) Bachelors' quarters, to hold four to six officers, might be built, by Government or private enterprise, near messes, thus releasing bungalows for married officers.

(iv) The legal machinery for obliging landlords to keep their houses in proper repair should also be rendered more speedy, effective and easy of application.

(v) If officers (married or single) are obliged to live in camp, because no house accommodation is available, tents should be supplied free by Government on an adequate scale.

We are also of opinion that, following the home arrangements, the necessary furniture should be supplied and kept up in all Government quarters, and hire be charged for its use. The rate of hire might be that adopted by the Public Works Department, viz., 10 per cent. on original value.

Before leaving the subject of officers' quarters, we wish to draw attention to the importance of installing electric fans and light in all cantonments in the plains as soon as possible. Officers will, we feel sure, be willing to pay reasonable rates for these comforts in their houses, and the effect upon their health and spirits cannot fail to be beneficial.

Pay and Pensions.

11. As regards pay, we consider that certain recommendations which we have made in Section II of this Part will, if adopted, go far towards maintaining throughout all the regimental ranks the relative advantage of service in the Indian Army over service with the British Army. We consider it essential that this advantage in favour of the Indian Army should be maintained also in regard to pensions,

since we are aware that the prospect of a higher pension plays a great part in the selection of an Indian military career.

Concessions in Kind.

12. Apart, however, from pay, there are certain concessions in kind which are enjoyed by officers of the British service in the United Kingdom, but are denied to them and to British officers of the Indian Army while serving in India. In considering to what extent similar concessions, or allowances in lieu, should be given in India, we have not overlooked the fact that the higher pay given in India is intended, *inter alia*, to compensate for the loss of these concessions or allowances. Nevertheless, there are certain matters in respect to which we consider that a more liberal policy should be adopted, for we feel convinced that if British officers are to serve contentedly in India additional attractions are necessary, and these, we think, should take the form of concessions in kind.

13. In the British service in India, officers who are required to maintain chargers receive an additional allowance of Rs. 30 a month for each charger. In the Indian Army, all officers are required to maintain chargers, in varying numbers, according to their rank and to the arm of the service to which they belong; and their pay in theory includes an allowance of Rs. 30 a month for each charger which they have to maintain. The cost of keeping a charger has risen greatly since this rate was fixed, and evidence points to the conclusion that it is now at least Rs. 60 a month in most stations. It is obvious that the Indian Army officer who draws, in the lower ranks, only Rs. 100 a month higher pay than a British service officer of corresponding rank, and has to spend Rs. 60 a month out of that Rs. 100 to maintain a charger, is only Rs. 40 a month better off than an officer of the British service. This advantage is too small to compensate for the disadvantages of continuous service in India with Indian troops. Moreover, the horse allowance of Rs. 30 a month included in the Indian Army officers' pay was intended to cover in part the cost of purchase. Its inadequacy for this purpose is patent; and the result is that the young Indian Army officer has to start his career by providing himself with a charger, and is then continuously out of pocket by the difference between the cost of its upkeep and the sum included in his pay for that purpose.

In the United Kingdom, mounted officers are provided with chargers by Government, which also pays for their upkeep. We recommend the adoption of a similar arrangement in India. But we see no reason why all officers in the Indian Army, other than cavalry officers, should be mounted, and we consider that in infantry regiments and similar units only the following officers should be mounted and should have one charger each:—the commanding officer, second-in-command, company commanders, adjutant and quartermaster, a total of 8. In cavalry regiments we recommend that all officers, including the commanding officer, should have two chargers each.

14. Subject to these limitations, we strongly recommend, for both the British service and the Indian Army:—

(1) That Government should provide each mounted officer free of charge with the authorised number of chargers.
(2) That Government should provide forage free of charge for the upkeep of such chargers.
(3) That Government should provide an Indian groom for each horse; such grooms to be enlisted soldiers, paid, rationed and clothed by Government.
(4) That, in the case of officers of the British service, the horse allowance now given in addition to pay should be withdrawn.
(5) That no reduction should be made in the pay of officers of the Indian Army in consideration of Government relieving them of the cost of providing and maintaining chargers. The reason for this recommendation will, we believe, be made clear by a study of the Section dealing with the adoption of a uniform scale of pay for officers of the two services.
(6) That saddlery and horse-kit should be issued free by Government, and be borne on regimental charge.

It is for consideration, however, whether under modern conditions there is the same necessity to provide all staff officers with chargers. In many theatres of war a pool of horses was formed to enable officers of the staff and departments of divisions and higher formations to carry out such mounted duties as were necessary. A pool of motor cars was also formed to enable them to perform those duties for which horses were not needed. A somewhat similar system might be adopted in India, both in peace and in the field.

15. Other concessions which we recommend for all British officers are the following:—

(1) Officers should have the right to purchase from Government rations, fuel, oil and other articles stocked by Government departments, for themselves and their families.

(2) Tents should be provided free by Government and be kept in unit or arsenal charge. They should be issued for use on manœuvres and field training, as well as on active service, and transport for them should be provided free by Government. No deduction should be made from the pay of officers of the Indian Army in return for the free provision of tents, notwithstanding the fact that this pay theoretically includes a sum on account of tentage.

This tentage allowance has been for so long merged into pay that it is not easy to ascertain exactly what it was given for, and thus it has had for years past little or no relation to its original object.

(3) Officers of the British service should be allowed a soldier servant from the ranks, as in the United Kingdom. Officers of the Indian Army should be allowed an Indian soldier servant from the ranks, special enlistments being made for the purpose, if necessary.

Travelling and Detention Allowances.

16. The present arrangements under which British officers draw travelling and detention allowances are complicated, unpopular and uneven in operation.

When travelling by rail, officers pay their own fares and draw a certain sum in cash, as laid down in Army Regulations, India, Volume X, paragraph 29 (A). This sum is expressed in terms of fares, and varies according to factors such as the railway line over which the journey is performed, the rank of the officer travelling, and the nature of the duty on which he travels, whether permanent transfer or temporary or inspection duty. There is also a scale of allowances for an officer's wife and family.

Officers also draw detention allowance at Rs. 5 a day, under the conditions specified in Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraphs 254 and 254 A. Ordinarily, however, an officer is not entitled to any detention allowance for the day on which he commences or terminates a journey, nor if he returns to headquarters on the same day.

In lieu of the present arrangements, we recommend the adoption of a system under which warrants, to cover the officer, his servants and baggage according to an authorised scale, and, where admissible, his family, should be issued for all journeys on duty; and the officer should draw in addition an allowance at the rate of Rs. 5 for a single day or part of a day on which he travels, and Rs. 10 for a night away from his headquarters, but not both.

We also recommend the grant of a free passage home, for an officer of the Indian Army and his family, once at the end of his service, either on retirement or on unemployment.

Medical Attendance.

17. Another matter which has been brought prominently to our notice relates to the insufficiency of European medical officers. In the past there has been an implied understanding that the British officer, while serving in India, has the right to expect that his wife and family will be treated, when sick, by men of their own race. We find that considerable anxiety is felt by married officers of the Indian Army and their wives in regard to medical attendance in the future. It is recognised by these officers that the Indian Medical Service is being recruited more and more from Indians, and that in consequence there is increasing probability of their wives and daughters being stationed in places where European medical aid is not procurable without much delay and great expense. This risk they are most anxious to minimize; and they consider that it is the duty of Government to take measures to assist them. We entirely agree. We strongly urge that hospital accommodation for the wives and families of British officers should be provided in places where European doctors are available, either in station hospitals for British troops or in civil hospitals. We recommend that, until such arrangements are complete, a British medical officer should be placed in visiting medical charge of outlying places where officers' wives and families are stationed.

We also consider that the establishment of maternity homes at suitable centres is deserving of every encouragement, that convalescent homes for officers in good climates are urgently needed, and that the matter of their provision should be taken up as soon as possible.

Transfer to Half-pay List.

18. Our attention has been called to the regulation (A.R.I., Vol. I., para. 723) under which an officer whose transfer to the half-pay list has been caused by medical unfitness resulting from military duty is, on restoration to full pay, only allowed to reckon up to one year of the time spent on half-pay for promotion and pension. This regulation appears to us to bear very hardly on officers who have spent more than one year on the half-pay list as a consequence of wounds received or illness contracted on active service; and we recommend that the limit of time should be abolished, with retrospective effect from the beginning of the war.

Family Pension Funds.

19. In the course of our investigations in India we became aware that there is considerable dissatisfaction with the present methods of management of the two military provident funds, which consist of the subscriptions and donations of officers, viz., the Indian Military Service Family Pension Fund (now closed to new entrants and its successor, the Indian Military Widows' and Orphans' Fund.

The complaints are briefly as follows :—

(*a*) That the 4 per cent. interest given by the Secretary of State on balances is too low, having regard to rates of interest now obtainable.

(*b*) That no accounts, beyond a statement after the quinquennial actuarial audit, are published; that even this statement is not circulated to all subscribers and is not in a form intelligible to men unaccustomed to deal with financial problems.

(*c*) That the subscribers, whose money forms the funds, have no voice whatever in its management.

(*d*) That the rule under which a wife who divorces her husband loses all benefits from the fund is unjust.

We put forward the following suggestions :—

(1) We understand that the rate of interest is for the present to be 5½ per cent. instead of 4 per cent. We recommend that any benefits which may accrue from this or subsequent increases should be devoted to increasing pensions rather than decreasing subscriptions, and we are in a position to say that this is the general feeling in the Indian Army.

(2) A simple and intelligible annual balance sheet should be published as soon after the close of the financial year (31st March) as possible; and the opportunity should be taken of explaining very briefly the principles on which the funds are managed, the advantages compared with those obtainable from an insurance company, and mentioning also the benefits admissible under the Royal Warrant.

(3) It would be a source of satisfaction to the officers of the Indian Army if a small committee, nominated officially from among their own number, were given facilities to examine the affairs of the funds once a year at the India Office, and so be in a position to inform their comrades that they are satisfied (as far as laymen can be) that the funds are being managed in the best interests of the officers of the Indian Army. This committee might consist of the Secretary, Military Department, India Office, a pensioned officer to be nominated by the Secretary of State, and an officer on furlough to be nominated by the Government of India. Their report should be included in the same document as the balance sheet, and a copy of the complete document should be sent to every subscriber to the funds.

(4) We agree that the rule mentioned in clause (*d*) above is inequitable. We suggest that a clause should be included in the regulations, providing that in such circumstances, the surrender values of the pension of the wife, and of the children if committed to her charge, should be paid to the wife.

SECTION II.

Applicability to India of a Uniform Scale of Pay of British Officers.

20. In paragraph 2 of Section I of this Part we referred to the existence of certain anomalies in the pay of British officers of the Indian Army. It has been suggested that the British officer at home, in the Colonies, in India, or in the Indian Army, should be paid, under Royal Warrant, a universal rate of pay (which may be called A), with an automatic overseas allowance when serving out of the United Kingdom (termed B), and an Indian allowance, to compensate for service in the Indian Army (which may be called C). Thus the British service officer serving in India would receive A *plus* B; while the British officer in the Indian Army would receive A *plus* B *plus* C.

Three main difficulties stand in the way of the complete adoption of this system. Firstly, fluctuations in the sterling exchange value of the rupee render it practically impossible to express A in terms of rupees: consequently it would be necessary to adopt an arbitrary rate of exchange which might, in the course of time, differ materially from the actual market rate, and this would almost certainly give rise to doubt and misunderstanding as to the equity of the process of calculating Indian rates of pay. Secondly, the basic British rate, A, is liable to periodical revision with reference to the rise or fall in the cost of living at home; and it might thus happen that an officer's pay in India was automatically raised or lowered with reference to conditions at home which did not affect his expenses in India to any marked degree. Thirdly, it is impossible to secure a uniform system of pay so long as promotions in the British service depend on regimental vacancies, and in the Indian Army are governed by a time scale.

These objections appear to be so valid that we are forced to reject the proposal, in the form in which it has been placed before us.

21. In effect, however, the system under which the scales of pay of British officers serving in India have recently been fixed is based to a large extent on the principle referred to in paragraph 20. That is to say, although pay is consolidated and expressed in rupees, the amount has been fixed with reference to the sterling rates of pay at home, increased in recognition of such factors as service in India, loss of home allowances, and, in the case of the officers of the Indian Army, with the addition of "staff pay." That element of the consolidated rupee pay which represents the excess over the home scale of pay is not, however, "automatic," but varies from rank to rank. Taking the rupee at 2*s.* for the purpose of illustration and comparison, and converting the authorized rupee scale of pay into sterling at that rate, element (B) ranges from £190 in the case of a 2nd-lieutenant of the British service to £736 in the case of a lieutenant-colonel in command.

22. We consider that the method of fixing scales of pay in India, as described in the preceding paragraph, is the only practicable one, in view of the difficulties already referred to, and that the pay must, as in the case of the other services, be fixed on a rupee basis. But an analyis of the consolidated scale of pay of the British service officer in India, and of the pay of rank (exclusive, that is, of "staff pay") of the British officer of the Indian Army, indicates certain anomalies which it is desirable to eliminate. It will be seen that the rates vary only in the following ranks, the scales in all other ranks being the same for both classes of officers.

Ranks.	British service (consolidated pay).	Indian Army (pay of rank).	Remarks.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Captain on promotion	750	700	Indian Army officer is worse off by 50
Captain after 15 years' service ..	850	750	" " " " 100
Major	950	900	" " " " 50
Major after 5 years' service as such ..	1,050	950	" " " " 100
Lieutenant-Colonel	1,250	1,150	" " " " 100

In a few years there will be no captains in the Indian Army with less than 9 years' service, at which period an officer, if a captain, will draw Rs. 750 a month, or the same as the British service captain from date of promotion until he attains 15 years' service.

In the other four cases, the relative inferiority of the Indian Army officer is compensated for by the higher staff pay which he is probably drawing by that time, *viz.*, Rs. 200 a month as company commander, instead of Rs. 100 as company officer.

The system, however, under which "staff pay" is drawn by British officers of the Indian Army requires examination. It is not properly "staff pay," since most of the officers are holding regimental and not staff appointments; in effect it is an additional allowance for serving in the Indian Army. Every officer, from the most junior upwards, draws it; but its real nature has been obscured by the fact that, although every officer on joining the Indian Army draws this so-called "staff pay" of Rs. 100 a month (in the infantry) as a company officer, the "staff pay" is increased to Rs. 200 a month in the case of a company commander, Rs. 250 in the case of the second-in-command, and Rs. 600 in the case of the commanding officer, while the adjutant and quartermaster draw Rs. 200 and 150 a month respectively, in lieu of their Rs. 100 as company officers.

23. We consider it desirable to separate the present "staff pay" into two elements, *viz.*, (1) an Indian Army allowance of Rs. 100 a month, to be drawn by all British officers of the Indian Army (excluding departmental or staff officers on consolidated rates of pay) up to and including lieutenant-colonels commanding regiments, and by Indian Army officers serving in departments (other than those on consolidated pay), and (2) command, or additional regimental pay, at the following monthly rates:—

	Rs.	
Commanding officer...	400	Command pay.
Second-in-command...	150	
Company commander	100	
Adjutant	100	Additional regimental pay.
Quartermaster	50	

24. Coupled with this proposal, we recommend an exact assimilation of the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army with the consolidated pay of the British service officer.

The following table shows the effect of these proposals in respect of infantry officers of the Indian Army:—

Rank.	British service consolidated pay.*	Present scale.			Proposed scale.				Increase on present rates.
		Indian Army pay of rank.	Staff pay.	Total.	Pay of rank.	Indian Army allowance.	Command Pay.‖	Total.	
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
2nd Lieutenant	425	425	100	525	425	100	...	525	...
2nd Lieutenant after 2 years' service	475	475	100	575	475	100	...	575	...
Lieutenant									
Lieutenant after 7 years' service	550	550	100	650	550	100	...	650	...
Captain	750	700	100	800	750	100	...	850	50
Captain after 9 years' service	750	750	100 200†	850 950†	750	100	100†	850 950†	...
Captain after 15 years' service	850	750	200†	950	850	100	100†	950 1,050†	...
Major	950	900	200†	1,100	950	100	100†	1,150	50
Major after 5 years as such	1,050	950	200† 250‡	1,150† 1,200‡	1,050	100	100† 150‡	1,250† 1,300‡	100 100
Lieutenant-Colonel	1,250	1,150	200† 250‡	1,350† 1,400‡	1,250	100	100† 150‡	1,450† 1,500‡	100 100
Lieutenant-Colonel in command	1,600¶	1,150	600§	1,750	1,250	100	400§	1,750	...

* Includes company command pay, where applicable. † If company commander. ‡ If second-in-command. § Command pay.

‖ The adjutant and quartermaster will draw Rs. 100 and Rs. 50 a month respectively, in addition to Indian Army pay of rank and Indian Army allowance.

¶ Includes Rs. 350 command pay.

Officers serving with Indian cavalry draw a higher rate of "staff pay" than officer of the infantry branch. The rates are as follows:—

	Staff Pay.
2nd-Lieutenant	150*
Lieutenant	150*
Lieutenant after 7 years' service	150*
Captain	150*
Captain after 9 years' service	150* 250†
Captain after 15 years' service	150* 250†
Major	150* 250†
Major after 5 years as such	250† 300‡
Lieutenant-Colonel	250† 300‡
Lieutenant-Colonel in command	700§

* As squadron officer. † As squadron commander. ‡ As second-in-command. § As commanding officer.

The adjutant draws Rs. 250 a month and the quartermaster Rs. 200 a month, as compared with Rs. 200 a month and Rs. 150 a month in the infantry.

It will be seen that the "staff pay" of cavalry officers is Rs. 50 a month higher than the corresponding rate in the infantry, and Rs. 100 higher in the case of the commanding officer. These higher rates are presumably due to the fact that cavalry officers have to maintain two chargers each (three in the case of the commanding officer), whereas infantry officers have to maintain only one. Incidentally, we recommend that in future the commanding officer of an Indian cavalry regiment should be required to maintain only two chargers, instead of three as at present.

We have already recommended that Government should relieve all infantry officers of the cost of upkeep of a charger, for which a sum of Rs. 30 a month is included in their pay, and all cavalry officers of the cost of upkeep of two chargers, for which a sum of Rs. 60 a month is included in their pay. The evidence which we have received shows that the cost of maintaining a charger is not less than Rs. 60 a month at the present time. We consider therefore that cavalry officers, who under our proposals will be relieved of the cost of maintaining two chargers, should be treated exactly the same as infantry officers in respect of pay of rank, Indian Army allowance, command pay, and additional regimental pay.

The following comparative table shows the effect of these proposals, in typical cases of each rank in the cavalry:—

Rank.	PRESENT.				PROPOSED.				Difference.
	Pay of rank.	Staff pay.	Deduct cost of keeping chargers.	Nett emoluments.	Pay of rank.	Indian Army allowance.	Command pay.	Total.	
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	R.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	
Lieutenant (squadron officer)..	475	150	120	505	475	100	..	575	+ 70
Captain after 9 years' service (squadron officer)	750	150	120	780	750	100	..	850	+ 70
Major (squadron commander)..	900	250	120	1,030	950	100	100	1,150	+ 120
Major after 5 years as such (second-in-command)	950	300	120	1,130	1,050	100	150	1,300	+ 170
Lieutenant-Colonel (in command)	1,150	700	180	1,670	1,250	100	400	1,750	+ 80

25. In the foregoing paragraphs we have shown *inter alia* how it is proposed to effect an assimilation of the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army with the consolidated Indian pay of the British service officer. There will, however, be in the future a certain number of Indian officers serving in the Indian Army and holding the King's commission; and it is necessary to consider what difference, if any, should be made in their pay as compared with that of British officers.

26. The Secretary of State has laid down the principle that the pay of European officers of the civil departments in India should include an item to be called "overseas or expatriation allowance," which will be drawn by Europeans only whilst serving in India, and by Indians only when serving outside India. This allowance ranges, in the revised scales of pay of the Indian Civil Service, from Rs. 150 to Rs. 250 a month, and in those of the Indian (Imperial) Police Service from Rs. 125 to Rs. 250 a month. The periods on the various rates of overseas allowance are shown in the following table :—

Indian Civil Service.	Rs.	Police.	Rs.
7 years	150	6 years	125
4 years	200	4 years	150
Thereafter	250	3 years	200
		Thereafter	250

In both services there are appointments above the time-scale, which are filled by selection, and the holders of which draw the same rates of pay, whether Europeans or Indians.

27. It appears impossible to resist the view that a similar principle should be applied in the case of the Indian Army, that is to say, that Indian officers with King's commissions should receive rather less emoluments in India than the British officer. At the same time, it is undesirable to make any great reduction in the emoluments of Indian officers, in view of the fact that they will have to live in the same style as the British officers, pay the same mess subscriptions, and conform generally to the same standard in respect of entertaining, sports, games, social obligations, &c. To this extent their standard of obligatory expenditure is perhaps more definitely fixed than is the case with Indian officers of other services, such as the Indian Civil Service and the Police, who can regulate their style of living, within certain limits, to suit their own tastes and pockets.

28. For these reasons we recommend that the overseas allowance of British officers of the Indian Army, which will not be drawn by Indian officers with King's commissions, should be at lower rates than in the case of either the Indian Civil Service or the Police service, and we suggest the following :—

2nd Lieutenant... ...	Rs. 100 a month.
Lieutenant	
Captain	
Major...	Rs. 150 a month.
Lieut.-Colonel	„ 200 „ „

In staff appointments and commands, the pay of which is consolidated, Indian officers will draw the full pay equally with British officers. In departments in which the emoluments are regulated by Indian Army pay of rank *plus* departmental pay, Indian officers will draw the pay of rank admissible to them while in regimental employment, that is, without the overseas allowance, and departmental pay in addition. Indian officers will also draw the Indian Army allowance under the same conditions as British officers.

29. We also recommend that the Indian pay of British service officers should be expressed in similar terms, so as to indicate what portion of the excess of their Indian pay over the sum of their pay and allowances at home represents overseas or expatriation allowance. The balance of this excess represents roughly the estimated difference in the cost of living in India as compared with that at home, taking into account the various allowances admissible at home but not drawn in India.

30. The following table shows the pay of rank and overseas allowance admissible under this proposal to officers of various ranks, in both the British service and the Indian Army. It omits Indian Army allowance, command pay, and additional regimental pay, which will be admissible to British officers and Indian officers with King's commissions alike, as shown in the table in paragraph 24 :—

	Pay of rank.	Overseas Allowance.	Total.
2nd Lieutenant...	325	100	425
2nd Lieutenant after 2 years' service	375	100	475
Lieutenant			
Lieutenant after 7 years' service ...	450	100	550
Captain	650	100	750
Captain after 9 years' service ...			
Captain after 15 years' service ...	750	100	850
Major...	800	150	950
Major after 5 years' service as such...	900	150	1,050
Lieut.-Colonel	1,050	200	1,250

31. We recommend that British officers of the Indian Army, serving temporarily with Indian troops outside India, should continue to draw the overseas allowance, which should of course be admissible in all cases to Indian officers with King's commissions when serving outside India.

Effect of the Foregoing Proposals.

32. It will be observed that the first effect of the foregoing proposals will be to increase the emoluments of five officers in each regiment, holding the appointment of company or squadron commander or second-in-command, by Rs. 100 a month (or in some cases by Rs. 50 a month), and the emoluments of captains of less than nine years' service (a rapidly disappearing class) by Rs. 50 a month. We think that there are good grounds for recommending such increase, since the present scale is open to the criticism that it does not provide for a sufficient periodic rise during the years between attaining nine years' service and promotion to lieutenant-colonel. For instance, a captain of nine years' service, who is also company commander, draws Rs. 950 a month, and receives no increase till he is promoted major at eighteen years' service, when he gets Rs. 1,100. He then waits five years for a further rise of Rs. 50 a month. For purposes of comparison, the following extract from the table showing the revised rates of the Imperial Police service is instructive :—

Indian Army.	Police.	Rs.
Captain after nine years' service and company commander, Rs. 950	After 9 years	800
	10 "	850
	11 "	900
	12 "	950
	13 "	1,000
	14 "	1,050
	15 "	1,100
	16 "	1,150
	17 "	1,200
	18 "	1,250
Major and company commander, Rs. 1,100	19 "	1,250
	20 "	1,300
	21 "	1,300
	22 "	1,350
	23 "	1,350

It will be seen that while a captain of nine years' service and company commander may remain for ten years on Rs. 950 a month, and on promotion to major will draw Rs. 1,100 a month for the next five years, the police officer will rise during the same period from Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,350 by annual increments of Rs. 50 up to Rs. 1,250 and then biennial increments of the same amount.

We consider that the relative advantage of the Police service during the above-mentioned years affords a strong ground for supporting the slight increase in the emoluments of the British officers of the Indian Army which we have proposed in paragraph 24.

33. Our proposals will, however, have other consequences which require careful examination.

In the first place, it will affect the total emoluments of officers, both of the British service and of the Indian Army, holding staff appointments in India. At present, under paragraph 14, Army Regulations, India, Volume I, a British service officer holding a staff appointment in India draws the Indian Army pay of his rank *plus* the staff pay of the appointment, as laid down in paragraph 1, Army Regulations, India, Volume I. As Indian Army pay of rank is in some cases lower than the British service rate of Indian pay, this method of calculation involves certain inconveniences. The result, however, of adopting the proposal to level up Indian Army pay of rank to the British service scale of pay of the corresponding rank would be to increase the total emoluments in each case (British service and Indian Army) of the officer holding the staff appointment. For example, we take the case of a lieutenant-colonel appointed to be general staff officer, 1st grade (staff pay Rs. 700).

He now draws Indian Army pay of rank = Rs. 1,150 *plus* Rs. 700 staff pay = Rs. 1,850. If the Indian Army pay of rank were assimilated, as we propose, to the scale of Indian pay of the British service, a general staff officer, 1st grade, would receive, if a British service officer, Rs. 1,250 *plus* Rs. 700 = Rs. 1,950, and if an Indian Army officer, Rs. 1,250 *plus* Rs. 100 Indian Army allowance *plus* Rs. 700 staff pay = Rs. 2,050. Therefore there would be an increase in emoluments of Rs. 100 in one case and Rs. 200 in the other case, for which there appears to be no justification; and the rates of pay would be different for the two services, which is undesirable.

34. For these reasons, we propose that the pay of staff appointments should be consolidated, at the following monthly rates:—

		Rs.
Present rate of staff pay Rs. 700.	General Staff Officer, 1st grade ... Assistant Adjutant General ... Assistant Quartermaster-General ... Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	1,850
Present rate of staff pay Rs. 400.	General Staff Officer, 2nd grade ... Deputy Assistant Adjutant General Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General	1,350
„ „ „ „ „	Brigade Major	1,200
Present rate of staff pay Rs. 250.	General Staff Officer, 3rd grade ... Staff Captain	1,000

These consolidated rates are, with one exception, the same as those which a lieutenant-colonel, a major after five years as such, and a captain of nine years' service or over would draw respectively under the present system, and are, in our opinion, adequate. A brigade-major at present draws Indian Army pay of rank, *plus* Rs. 400 staff pay. We recommend that, in accordance with the home practice, a brigade-major should receive rather lower emoluments than a general staff officer, 2nd grade, and we propose a consolidated pay of Rs. 1,200 a month.

35. The next point to be examined is the effect which our proposals will have on the emoluments of Indian Army officers, serving in departments, whose pay is governed by Indian Army pay of rank, *plus* departmental staff pay. The departments affected are:—

Cantonment Magistrate's Department.
Judge Advocate General's Department.
Remount Department.
Supply and Transport Corps.

The rates of departmental staff pay admissible in addition to Indian Army pay of rates are laid down in Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraph I (*a*), (*d*), (*g*) and (*h*).

As we do not recommend an increase in the total emoluments of departmental officers, it will be necessary to reduce the rate of departmental staff pay, with reference to the facts that every officer in the Indian Army will, in future, draw Rs. 100 a month as Indian Army allowance, and that the pay of rank has in several cases been increased. We consider that departmental staff pay should in future be termed "departmental pay," if indeed it is not found possible hereafter to consolidate the rates of pay in these departments.

36. Next, the question of the effect of the foregoing proposals on the leave pay of officers requires consideration.

We have examined this question and find that in no single case will the leave allowances, out of India, of an officer of the British service or of the Indian Army be affected, except that those officers of the Indian Army whose emoluments we propose to raise (*vide* paragraph 24 *ante*) will of course benefit to that extent while on privilege leave.

37. There remains for consideration the case of the officer who acts for another officer, whether in staff or regimental employ, absent on leave.*

A.—Indian Army.

During the privilege leave portion, the officiating officer draws no extra pay. During the furlough portion he draws his Indian Army pay of rank, *plus* half the staff pay of his own appointment *plus* half the staff pay of the officiating appointment.

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* Throughout this section we employ the term "furlough" to cover all forms of leave other than casual and privilege leave.

We recommend that this rule be altered, and that the officiating officer should draw, during the furlough portion of the absentee's leave, the full consolidated pay of the officiating appointment, and that the full command pay of his own regimental appointment be similarly available for the officer acting for him, and so on all down the chain of acting appointments. The same principle should govern all kinds of command pay, that is, the officer acting for an officer holding a higher regimental appointment should draw the full command pay of the latter's appointment.

An examination of this question shows that our proposal would not add appreciably to the cost of furlough arrangements, and that the higher cost will be chiefly due to the increased remuneration proposed for certain classes of officers, not to the effect of granting one officer, acting for another officer absent on furlough, the full consolidated or command pay of the appointment.

B.—British Army.

The extra cost to Government would be somewhat greater in the case of a British service officer officiating in a staff appointment, the pay of which we propose to consolidate. The following instances illustrate this point :—

—	Present. [Indian Army pay of rank *plus* half staff pay of officiating appointment.]	Proposed.
	Rs.	Rs.
Lieutenant-Colonel acting for a G.S.O., 1st grade ..	$1,150 + \frac{700}{2} = 1,500$	1,850
Major after 5 years, acting for a G.S.O., 2nd grade ..	$950 + \frac{400}{2} = 1,150$	1,350
Major acting for a Brigade Major	$900 + \frac{400}{2} = 1,100$	1,200
Captain after 15 years' service acting for a Brigade Major	$750 + \frac{400}{2} = 950$	1,200
Captain of 9 years' service acting for a G.S.O., 3rd grade ..	$750 + \frac{250}{2} = 875$	1,000

38. The examination of these matters has, however, led us to investigate the necessity for granting furlough to an officer holding any of the above staff appointments, during his tenure of them. We have come to the conclusion that there is no reason why an officer in a staff appointment should, subject to the exception noted below, be allowed to absent himself on furlough while holding the appointment. If he requires leave in excess of the privilege leave admissible to him, we consider that he should vacate the staff appointment, and revert to the scale of furlough allowances admissible under the rules governing his case.

The exception referred to is that staff officers should, we consider, be permitted once during their tenure of the appointment to take two months' privilege leave combined with one month's furlough, the latter on the allowances admissible to officers of their rank.

The increased cost to Government of the acting arrangements consequent on the absence on furlough of the permanent incumbent of a staff appointment would therefore be negligible.

39. There are, however, other officers of higher rank whose claims to combined leave are governed by Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraph 344, and Volume II, paragraph 226. Typical examples are army, divisional and brigade commanders, and all officers holding major-general's appointments.

There is a good deal to be said for the view that officers of and above the rank of major-general, and brigade commanders of lower rank, should not be altogether precluded from taking furlough during their tenure of command or staff appointments, since they are men of considerable seniority who may require a period of rest and recuperation and change of climate. We therefore recommend that they should be permitted to take furlough once during their tenure of a command or staff appointment, but not at the end thereof, that it should be permissible to combine privilege leave with this furlough, but that the total period of absence on furlough or combined leave, should not exceed eight months. If an officer holding one of these appointments finds it necessary to take leave for more than eight months at a time he should vacate his appointment.

The existing rule (paragraph 344, Army Regulations, India, Volume I), which regulates the allowances of such officers while on furlough, is inoperative under the revised scales of pay. In every case it gives a rate of allowance in excess of the maximum admissible (£1,000 a year). We recommend that a furlough rate of allowance out of India be fixed for the officers under consideration.

We also recommend that, as in the case of other staff appointments, the officer appointed to officiate for the absentee should draw, during the furlough portion of the latter's leave, the full pay of the appointment.

40. Finally, we recommend that all officers of the Indian Army below the rank of major-general should draw, while on furlough out of India, the British pay and allowances admissible to officers of the British service of corresponding rank while on furlough out of India. We see no reason why these rates should not be made applicable to officers of the Indian Army also, thus removing one more existing anomaly.

41. Our attention has been called to the rule in paragraph 358, Army Regulations, India, Volume I, which dates back to 1886, and which permits the grant to officers of the Indian Army of leave in India for one year at a time, extensible to two years, on full military pay and half staff pay of appointment. We do not consider it necessary to grant furlough in India in excess of six months (which might be combined with privilege leave to the amount due, but subject to a maximum limit of 8 months' absence); and we recommend that during such furlough officers should draw Indian Army pay of rank *plus* Indian Army allowance, but not half the staff pay of the appointment.

42. We recommend that in future leave be of three kinds only—

(1) Casual leave (or station leave).
(2) Privilege leave.
(3) Furlough, which may be granted either on private affairs or on medical certificate.

We also recommend that the right to accumulate privilege leave up to ninety days be abolished, and that such leave be limited to two months a year (instead of sixty days as at present); except that when an officer in regimental employ has been refused privilege leave on public grounds for two consecutive years, he may be granted three months' privilege leave in the third year, the grant of such leave being at the discretion of the divisional commander.

Summary.

43. The various recommendations made in this section are summarised below :—

(*a*) That the present system of fixing the pay of officers of the army in India in rupees be continued.

(*b*) That the pay of rank of officers of the Indian Army be assimilated in all cases to the consolidated pay of British service officers in India of corresponding rank and length of service.

(*c*) That all officers of the Indian Army be given, in addition to pay of rank, an Indian Army allowance of Rs. 100 a month, except when serving as departmental or staff officers on consolidated rates of pay.

(*d*) That all regimental officers of the Indian Army, both in the cavalry and in the infantry, should draw in addition "command pay" or "additional regimental pay" at the rates shown in paragraph 23.

(*e*) That the present "staff pay" of the Indian Army be abolished.

(*f*) That the consolidated pay of British service officers in India, and the pay of rank of British officers of the Indian Army, should be considered to include an element of "overseas or expatriation allowance," at the rates proposed in paragraph 28. This allowance to be drawn by all British officers while serving in India, and by Indian officers with the King's commission while serving out of India; and by British officers of the Indian Army serving temporarily with Indian troops or formations outside India (*e.g.*, in Mesopotamia or Palestine).

(*g*) That the pay of staff appointments be consolidated, and fixed at the rates proposed in paragraph 34.

(*h*) That the present rates of "departmental staff pay" be revised, with reference to the proposed increase in the pay of rank of certain officers of the Indian Army and the proposed grant of Indian Army allowance, so as not to entail higher emoluments than are drawn by such officers at present.

(*i*) That "departmental staff pay" be termed in future "departmental pay," but that the question of consolidating the pay of departmental officers be considered.

(*j*) That the present rules governing the pay of officers officiating in furlough vacancies be rescinded; and that in future the officiating officer should draw, during the furlough portion of the absentee's leave, the full consolidated pay of the officiating appointment, or the full command pay of the regimental appointment, as the case may be, and so on all down the chain of officiating appointments. The absentee officer to be restricted, during the same period, to the furlough allowance admissible under rule.

(*k*) That officers holding staff appointments should be ineligible for furlough during the tenure of their appointments, subject to the exception stated in paragraph 38.

(*l*) That certain officers of high rank should, however, be permitted to take furlough or combined privilege leave and furlough, not exceeding eight months, once during (but not at the end of) their tenure of their commands or staff appointments.

(*m*) That a rate of furlough allowance be fixed for the officers mentioned in clause (*l*).

(*n*) That all officers of the Indian Army, below the rank of major-general, should draw while on furlough out of India the British pay and allowances admissible to officers of the British service of corresponding rank while on furlough out of India.

(*o*) That officers of the Indian Army be restricted to furlough in India not exceeding six months (which might be combined with privilege leave up to a total maximum of eight months), and that these officers draw during such furlough their Indian Army pay of rank *plus* Indian Army allowance.

(*p*) That leave in future be of three kinds only:—

(1) Casual (or station) leave.
(2) Privilege leave.
(3) Furlough, either on private affairs or on medical certificate.

(*q*) That, subject to the exception stated in paragraph 42, privilege leave be limited to two months a year.

44. We think that the proposals which we have outlined have the following advantages:—

(1) The assimilation of the British service Indian pay with the pay of rank of the British officer of the Indian Army will result in closer relationship between the two services, and will remove certain existing anomalies.

(2) The slight increases in the total emoluments of certain officers of the Indian Army are desirable, having regard to the slow rate of augmentation between ten years and twenty-four years of service, and to the very slight advantage which the Indian Army officer has, under the new scales of pay, over the British service officer.

(3) The separation of the present "staff pay" of the Indian Army officer into the two elements of "Indian Army allowance" and "command pay" is in accordance with the object for which this additional pay is given, and will remove the confusion resulting from the two being merged together as at present.

(4) The introduction of the element of "expatriation allowance" into the Indian pay of British service officers and into the pay of rank of British officers of the Indian Army is necessary, in view of the principle applied to other services, and also affords a simple method of regulating the pay of Indian officers with King's commissions.

(5) The proposal to grant to an officer, acting in a staff appointment in place of an officer on furlough, the full consolidated pay of that appointment, and to a regimental officer acting as a commanding officer, company commander or second in command, the full command pay of the appointment, will tend to a simplification in the calculation of pay admissible, and will do away with the present cumbrous rule under which an officer draws half the staff pay of his substantive and officiating appointments.

(6) The proposal to make furlough inadmissible (with one slight exception) during the tenure of staff appointments, up to and including those of general staff officer, first grade, and analogous appointments, is a corollary to the above, and will lead to a simplification of the leave rules.

(7) The proposal to regulate the leave allowances of British officers of the Indian Army in the same way as those of officers of the British service will also lead to simplification of rules and reduction of clerical and accounts work, and will be a further step towards the establishment of closer relations between the two armies.

SECTION III.

BRITISH TROOPS.

We turn now to the question of improving the conditions of service of British troops.

Troopship Accommodation.

45. We would bring to notice the conspicuous difference that exists even nowadays between the accommodation on board troopships for officers and their families and for the non-commissioned ranks and their families. Troop decks are often below water line, crowded, and ill-ventilated. Meals are served in an uninviting way. Family quarters are cramped and afford little privacy. Latrine, lavatory and bath accommodation, especially for families, is often insufficient, and deck space for exercise is inadequate.

This sharp contrast with the comfort of the officers' accommodation is not in accordance with the spirit of the times, and is undesirable at such close quarters as obtain on a ship. War conditions have no doubt been responsible for much of the discomfort described above; but we consider that, when regular trooping arrangements can once more be made, it will be well to take steps to place the accommodation and comfort of the non-commissioned ranks on board ship on a considerably higher level.

Accommodation in Barracks.

46. We have visited the lines of British troops in several parts of India, and have made enquiries from a considerable number of witnesses as to the conditions under which British soldiers and their wives and families serve and live in India. As a result we express the opinion that, generally speaking, the standard of accommodation for single men is not as good as in England; and that the institutions for their general welfare and recreation are by no means so good as to compensate for the discomforts of life in barracks in India. Married soldiers and their families are worse off than in England in respect of comfort, as well as in pecuniary matters.

47. We make the following recommendations as regards barracks :—

(i) That it should be recognised that the British soldier in India must, especially in summer, spend a large portion of each day in his barracks, and that therefore the barracks cannot be regarded solely as dormitories. A portion of each barrack (or group of barracks close together) should be set apart and furnished as a reading and writing room, well lighted, and furnished with fans for the hot weather. At present a man can neither read nor write after dark anywhere in most barracks, and there is no inducement for him to stay there. We consider that in India, where the British soldier is cut off from the ordinary amenities of civil life, it is the duty of the Government which he serves to see that his immediate surroundings in and around barracks shall be on at least as high a level of comfort and efficiency as in England; and more, that the matter is, in our opinion, one which cannot be postponed without the risk of undesirable consequences.

(ii) The washing and bathing facilities in India are (as a rule) markedly inferior to those in England, and this is the more to be deplored in a country where good arrangements for such matters are an absolute necessity. The bathing arrangements as they existed in the British cavalry lines at Risalpur when first occupied appear to be exactly what is wanted.

Married Quarters.

48. In no cases seen by us do married quarters come up to the home standard; in most cases they fall much behind.

The number of rooms is inadequate, as a rule, even for a married couple without children. The bathroom accommodation is too small, and no storerooms or cupboards are provided. Quarters are often dark and gloomy. The kitchens which we have seen are either so far from the quarters that they cannot be used, or so small that the two families (for whom they are often meant) cannot cook in them at the same time.

The scale of furniture provided is far below the scale allowed in England. As a result, married men either have to hire inferior furniture at exorbitant rates from local shops, which they can ill afford to do, or see their wives and children living in conditions not differing much, except in the matter of fresh air, from slum lodgings in London.

Families in India do not draw rations; and the allowance for a soldier's wife is Rs. 8 (16*s.*) a month, with Rs. 2.8 (5*s*) for each child.

We strongly recommend that kitchens should be improved; that wives and families of soldiers in India should receive free rations on a suitable scale; and that the planning and furnishing of married quarters should be brought up to a standard approaching as nearly as possible to that which obtains at home.

Regimental Institutes.

49. The state of regimental institutes in India is far from satisfactory. The Army Institute Fund has no money at present, because the territorial units which garrisoned the country during the war would not subscribe to it. The consequence is that the furniture is decayed and inadequate, and funds are not forthcoming to meet the large capital expenditure that would be necessary to put matters on a satisfactory footing. The institutes are often gloomy and unattractive, the lighting allowance being inadequate. The library allowance of Rs. 176 a year is not sufficient to do much more than keep existing books in repair.

There appears to be a consensus of opinion that the Royal Army Temperance Association is no longer necessary for the class of men who now fill the ranks of the British Army, and that the space it takes up in barracks could be more usefully employed.

At the same time, the young soldiers of the present day are very dependent upon outside amusements and recreation. It seems to be agreed that the kind of institution that appeals to them is something of the type of a Gymkhana Club, having facilities for outdoor games attached to it, and with a cinema theatre and dancing room as part of its internal attractions. We venture to suggest that opportunity should be taken to apply to the army in India the system introduced at Aldershot, to which His Majesty the King referred in the Royal Message to Lord Rawlinson on the 25th May, 1920. His Majesty wrote:—

> "I have been struck by the advance made in providing for the recreation and amusement of the troops. The Queen and I were especially pleased to find that steps are being taken to include the married families in these schemes. The provision of clubs for the married woman and play grounds for the children is a new and admirable development."

We recommend that there should be a room for sergeants, and that a part of the club, or perhaps a room in the regimental institute, should be set apart for the married families. It is very important that such an institution should be as central as possible and entirely undenominational; that there should be no religious meetings or services in connection with it; also that, with proper safeguards, it should be managed by soldiers for soldiers.

General Remarks.

50. We have had the advantage of seeing the proceedings of a committee, held under the presidency of Major-General J. M. Walter in October 1919, to consider matters such as those referred to above, and wish to record our complete agreement with the recommendations made therein.

We consider, however, that, while it is clearly the duty of Government to see that the soldiers and their families are comfortably housed, properly fed, and have in their own lines and quarters such means of recreation and employment (apart from work) as will assist them to get through the long Indian day, the provision of such elaborate and initially expensive institutions as garrison clubs is more perhaps than it can be called upon to undertake. We suggest that the Government of India should make a loan sufficient to meet the initial expense of starting these institutions on a satisfactory footing, and we urge that this be given. It would then be the business of the local authorities, with the aid of an Indian Canteen Board, to keep them in good order.

We should like to mention here that everyone with whom we have conversed on these subjects has represented that obligatory "church parade" service is a fruitful source of discontent. This result may be due in some measure to the fact that the chaplains who minister to the troops are not always selected with reference to their special qualifications for this duty, a matter which we deal with in Section IV of Part VIII of this Report. The general view, however, is that attendance at church should be voluntary.

We wish, in conclusion, to point out that the outlook of the present-day soldiers upon life is widely different from that of their predecessors of the old army. They have neither their deep-seated discipline nor their long-suffering patience. They and their wives look for a higher standard of comfort and a somewhat different class of recreation. Their reasonable aspirations must be met, and their idiosyncrasies must be sympathetically studied, if they are to be a contented army while serving in India.

SECTION IV.

INDIAN OFFICERS.

General Remarks.

51. In common with others, Indian officers are feeling the effect of high prices. A large number have served in France and have paid visits to England, and in consequence their ideas of comfort have risen considerably. They also realise that, whatever may be the case as regards their sons, about whose education we make recommendations later in this Section, they themselves, as a class, can never rise higher in rank than risaldar major or subadar major. Their disabilities are due to the want of the education which is now one of the essentials of good leadership. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that these men have displayed a devotion to duty which is beyond praise, and that it is largely due to them that the discipline and loyalty of the rank and file of the Indian Army have survived the test of the great war.

Pay.

52. We therefore make in Appendix I (Item 1)* recommendations as to an improvement in their pay, which we consider should meet the case, and should reassure them as to the value that is put upon their services by the State. We consider that the increases in pay should be incremental, should be granted at the discretion of commanding officers of units, and should be dependent upon efficiency.

We recommend that the rank of risaidar in the cavalry should be abolished, and that all risaldars should be on the same scale of pay.

Additional Regimental Pay.

53. We are of opinion that the extra duty pay now drawn by the Indian adjutant and Indian quartermaster of a unit, viz., Rs. 17.8 a month, is quite inadequate. They are the two hardest-worked Indian officers of their unit, and their responsibilities are heavy. They are usually the best educated and the smartest of the younger Indian officers, and therefore the two appointments should be better paid than they are now. We make a specific recommendation in Appendix I (Item 2),* which also includes the case of certain Indian non-commissioned officers.

Pensions.

54. As regards pensions of Indian officers, we understand that the Government of India are about to submit for the Secretary of State's approval an increased scale, based upon the rule in Article 474, Civil Service Regulations, as modified by Government of India Finance Department Resolution No. 1085 E.A., dated 15th November, 1919. We agree with the principle that the pension of Indian officers should follow the lines of the Civil Service Regulations, and be calculated on a proportion of the pay drawn previous to retirement.

The Government of India are also recommending an increase to the special invalid pension for Indian officers after 15 years' service. We concur.

Outfit Allowance.

55. It has been generally represented to us that an Indian non-commissioned officer on promotion to jemadar, has to incur expenses for outfit which are estimated at about Rs. 250 and Rs. 400 in infantry and cavalry respectively, while the present pay is Rs. 60 and Rs. 70 a month respectively. This often results in indebtedness for years.

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* Not printed.

We consider that sword, belt and tent should be a free issue, and kept on regimental charge; but that an Indian officer should be permitted to keep his sword and belt, without payment, on honourable retirement. The first issue of uniform on promotion from the ranks should be free, and the uniform should be the property of the officer.

Badges of Rank.

56. We may mention here that the method of wearing badges of rank requires settlement. At present it is impossible to say whether an Indian officer (*a*) has the King's commission, and is therefore entitled to salutes from British as well as Indian soldiers; or (*b*) is an Indian company officer, and therefore entitled to salutes only from Indian soldiers.

We suggest that Indian officers with the King's commission should wear badges of rank exactly as worn by British officers, and that all others should wear them elsewhere.

Soldier Servants.

57. The Indian officer is not allowed a soldier servant by regulation. We think that this should be permitted and regularised.

Status and Allowances when Travelling.

58. We think that the status and allowances of an Indian officer travelling by rail on duty require more consideration than they have received in the past, and we make specific recommendations on the subject in Appendix I (Item 3).

Educational Facilities for Sons of Indian Officers.

59. Our investigations have left us in no doubt that the education of their sons is a matter which is greatly troubling the minds of all Indian officers to-day. They see the sons of wealthy zemindars and others reaping the advantages of an education which costs more than they can afford, and which enables the former to go up for Sandhurst and a King's commission, or to compete for the many good civil appointments now open to Indians. They represent with much force that, as Indians are now admitted to positions in the army which were not open to themselves, they have a right to expect that Government will not overlook their services, and will make it possible for their sons to enter where the doors are shut to them. We believe that it will be much to the benefit of their country if the sons of these brave and loyal gentlemen are given opportunities to fit themselves to compete on something approaching equal terms with the sons of the more wealthy classes.

60. We therefore welcome the scheme for the establishment of the "Kitchener College," which seems likely to meet the need. We note with satisfaction that the sons of deceased or living Indian officers are to head the nomination list for the College, and that the special terms offered to this class are such as to be within the means of all Indian officers.

We hope that the College, in addition to being eventually the main channel for direct commissions to jemadar, will also be capable of educating up to the standard required for entry to Sandhurst, as otherwise the earnest desire of the risaldars or subadars, to see a road by which their sons can climb higher than the fathers, will be doomed to disappointment. If these efforts prove successful, the proposed college will some day be found to be insufficient. It will then be necessary either to increase its capacity or to found similar colleges at other centres. Later in this part of our Report we deal with education as conducted in regimental schools. If these schools are to provide primary education of a character to lead up to an institution such as the proposed college, and so possibly to Sandhurst, a further argument is provided for putting them on to a sound basis.

Our Indian colleagues have raised the question of the institution of an Indian Sandhurst, but they agree with us that the time is not yet ripe for the consideration of such a scheme.

Family Pensions.

61. We have given the subject of family pensions prolonged consideration, Indian officers have represented to us that the present pensions are not sufficient to enable the family of a deceased Indian officer to live nowadays in even tolerable comfort, or to keep up anything like the position that it held during the officer's lifetime. In the case of the non-commissioned officer and sepoy, they assert that it is not

even sufficient to keep the widow from the borders of starvation. They all lay emphasis on the duty of Government in respect of the sons and daughters of men who have lost their lives in its service. On the other hand, we recognise the force of the argument that the pension is not, as in England, a pension to the widow, but is, as its name expresses, a contribution to the family generally by way of compensation for the loss of one of its breadwinners; and that any attempt to place it on the basis of a widow's pension, as known in England, fails to recognise the connection of the Indian family with the land, and its corporate organisation and system of mutual support. In reply, it may be argued that the recent flood of casualties from war and disease has swept away these props, and has, at all events in the Punjab, produced so many widows and orphans that old customs have failed to prevent a large number from coming perilously near to great poverty, and sometimes to actual hunger. The veil which hides Indian family life from outside intrusion is a bar to that perfect knowledge which should precede decision; but we feel strongly that any Government which sends a married soldier of any race to a war in which he loses his life should be actually responsible for providing a pension sufficient to keep his widow and children from want, and should not make its contribution dependent upon the intricacies of a family system into which it cannot penetrate.

As regards the Indian officer's family pension, we recommend that there should be only one rate, viz., the higher; for we can see no good reason for a variation in pensions, whether the officer (or soldier) died of disease contracted on service, or attributable to the effects of service, or was killed in action.

We also recommend a small pension for each child of the deceased officer till a boy is 18 years of age, and in the case of a girl till she marries.

We make a specific recommendation in Appendix I (Item 4).*

Our recommendations as to the family pensions of other ranks will be found in the next Section.

House Accommodation, &c.

62. It has been represented to us by several Indian officers that they are not consulted when standard plans for regimental lines are evolved or altered. We have no doubt that their predecessors were consulted when these plans were originally drawn up, but we agree that Indian officers should be kept in touch with any proposed improvements, and consulted as to local variations. We think that this might be done, as regards the men's lines as well as the Indian officers' houses, by means of a standing station committee of Indian officers, to be presided over by a staff officer in each cantonment. We recommend that lighting in all Indian officers' houses should be free, on an approved scale, and that the necessary furniture should be supplied free, and kept on Government charge. Where there is a piped water supply, it should be extended to Indian officers' houses. We have inspected the room allowed in the latest pattern of Indian lines as a meeting place for Indian officers, and we found it suitable. We recommend the addition to it of a kitchen, to enable Indian officers to dine together, or to extend hospitality to their friends. We desire to draw attention to a plan for an Indian officer's house, prepared by our colleague, Major Sir Umar Hayat Khan, and reproduced in Appendix II.*

Rewards for Languages.

63. We consider that it will be to the advantage of the army for Indian officers to be encouraged to learn English; and several have expressed the opinion that they should be treated in this matter somewhat on the same lines as British officers who learn oriental languages. We agree, and make specific recommendations as to rewards for passing examinations in English in Appendix I (Item 5).* In view of the large proportion of the Indian Army which is now, and will be for some time to come, serving overseas, it is for consideration by the Government of India whether this system of language rewards for Indian officers might not be profitably extended to other languages than English.

Indian Officers to be represented on Committees.

64. It seems to us desirable that Indian officers should be represented on committees which deal with administrative matters affecting them and other Indian ranks.

We have already recommended their serving on barrack committees. We consider that they also should be nominated to cantonment committees and to station hospital committees.

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* Not printed.

Status of Pensioned Indian Officers.

65. We have been impressed by the fact that every Indian officer who has appeared before us has expressed his opinion that the status of the pensioned Indian officer in his native district is no longer what it was, and that he now often meets with discourtesy from subordinate civil officials who are natives of his own country. Several officers have stated that, while British officials are too hard worked to give much time to their requests, their affairs and those of their men receive but scant attention from subordinates.

In these days, when the Indian Army is taking a far larger share than hitherto in overseas military duty on behalf of the Empire, it is all the more necessary that the affairs of absent soldiers should be promptly and sympathetically dealt with. They should also be treated with courtesy in their own districts.

66. With these objects in view, we make the following recommendations:—

(i) That in districts with a considerable military population, the lists of registrars, honorary magistrates and honorary civil judges should include a liberal proportion of retired Indian military officers.

(ii) That in such districts, if nomination to district boards obtains, a pensioned military officer should be nominated to each board.

(iii) That the relative position of Indian military officers in civil or mixed durbars should be enhanced and regulated.

(iv) It is understood that, in the Punjab, a military officer has been nominated to the Provincial Legislative Council to represent the army. It is suggested that this principle might be adopted in other Provinces which have an adequate military connection.

(v) We have made enquiries as to the vitality of the branches of the "Indian Soldiers Board" and their activities in rural districts. We are doubtful whether these branches generally are yet doing the good work which was expected of them. We consider that this board and its branches, if the latter function properly, should do much to remove the feeling of Indian officers and soldiers that their interests are not well cared for by the civil authorities of their districts, both when they are absent on duty and after they retire.

67. We understand that it is proposed to reorganise the whole of the Indian Army on what will be, as far as practicable, a territorial basis. Under this scheme, units will be grouped much in the same manner as at home. The training or depôt organization of each group will be permanently located in the territorial area from which the classes composing it are, in the main, recruited. Should this scheme materialize, these depôt organizations, working in close co-operation with the local branches of the Indian Soldiers Board, should be able materially to further the object which we have in view.

Order of British India.

68. We conclude this section by remarking that it seems to us that the close of the great war is a suitable time to increase the establishment of the Order of British India, to which it is the ambition of every Indian officer to belong. We recommend that this should be done, either by increasing the numbers in its two present classes, or by creating a third class of the Order.

SECTION V.

INDIAN OTHER RANKS.

Pay.

69. All witnesses belonging to the Indian Army, British and Indian, whom we have seen urge that the pay of the Indian non-commissioned officers and men should be raised. The pay of the sepoy on enlistment is Rs. 11 a month, and has been at this rate since 1911. In addition to this sum, he gets at present Rs. 4 a month war bonus, making a total of Rs. 15 a month. We understand that, when serving overseas or on service on the frontier, he draws in addition field *batta* of Rs. 5 a month, making a total of Rs. 20. Before the war he got free rations only on service; he now receives them always.

70. The Rs. 4 bonus is a temporary war allowance, specially extended beyond the period of the war. It may be taken to represent the increase in prices, or the fall in purchasing power, of the sepoy's basic rate of pay. It was given in April 1918, and so has been drawn for two years. We recommend that it be made permanent, and that it be incorporated in the pay of the sepoy. It remains to be considered whether any further increase is necessary. It is to be remembered that prior to 1917, while the sepoy's pay was Rs. 11, Rs. 3.8 of this sum was reckoned to be the cost of his food; and that to prevent his having to spend more than that sum on his food he received compensation (in cash) when the cost of the staple articles of his diet rose above Rs. 3.8. Thus Rs. 7.8 represented his actual nett pay in cash. On the universal grant of free rations the sepoy retained the Rs. 3.8, so that his pay in cash (with the Rs. 4 war bonus) became exactly double what it was in 1914. The value of the ration, at present prices, adds another sum of about Rs. 14 a month to the total cost to the State, making in all a minimum sum of Rs. 29 a month.

71. The Indian soldier has seen the world during the last six years in a way he never has before. His ideas of comfort have risen, and he has acquired certain tastes to which he was previously a stranger. He is well aware of what has been done for the British soldier in the way of amelioration of conditions of life and pay since the war began, and he is now apt to compare his own pay with that of his British comrades.

72. We have not found that recruiting generally is languishing, except as regards one or two classes, though it is doubtful whether the physique and social status of the men joining now are what they were before the war. But we have to reckon with the fact that Indians, especially Sikhs, are taking to work as mechanics in large numbers. Pay far beyond that which the army can offer is obtainable now by Indians with even a small knowledge of machinery. There are many well-paid openings in the Far East of which they are taking advantage; while India has before her a period of industrial and agricultural development which will attract many thousands of young men of the martial classes.

73. Our enquiries have made us aware that there was a general expectation that the end of the war would be made the occasion of a definite rise in actual pay, over and above the war bonus, the inclusion of which in pay had been somewhat discounted. This expectation was, we think, a natural one, and should not be left out of consideration.

Times are changing rapidly in India, as elsewhere. At such a juncture it is well to have a contented army.

74. We regard this question as one of the most difficult with which we have to deal. We have indicated briefly some aspects of the problem. It is, however, of such importance that it is desirable to state briefly the principal considerations which we think may be urged against the grant of increased pay to Indian other ranks.

75. The arguments which may be used to show that no further increase is necessary are as follows :—

(a) That, with the addition of the war-bonus of Rs. 4 a month, which we recommend should form a permanent addition to pay, the sepoy will receive in cash just double the nett pay which he drew up to 1916, and that this is sufficient.

(b) That it would be unwise to grant a permanent increase of pay in order to meet a possibly transient increase in the cost of living.

(c) That in any case the serving sepoy is not himself much affected by a rise in prices, since he is fed and to a large extent clothed by the State; and that as regards his dependents, it has never been contemplated that the pay of a youth of 18 or 19 to 24 or 25 should suffice for the entire maintenance of a wife and family, who in practice usually rely for support largely upon their share in an agricultural holding, cultivated by other members of the family. It is not the case, again, that all sepoys are married; and it is probable that the proportion of unmarried sepoys will be higher in the future.

(d) That recruitment since the war has not shown signs of falling off, in spite of the abnormal numbers recruited during the war. It must also be remembered that the terms still offered hold out no definite promise that the war-bonus will be made permanent. Those who are now enlisting do so, therefore, for Rs. 11 a month, *plus* a temporary addition of Rs. 4 a month, paid six-monthly in arrears.

(*e*) That an increase to the pay of the sepoy would inevitably result in an increase to the pay of other employees of Government, such as police and forest subordinates and the like, thus imposing a further heavy burden on Indian revenues.

76. We admit the force of these arguments; but in order to present a complete picture we think it desirable, even at the risk of repetition, to recapitulate briefly the main considerations which tell in favour of an increase of pay. These are:—

(*a*) That the Indian Army expects a substantial increase, and that it would be impolitic to disappoint this expectation, especially at a time like the present when political agitators aim at undermining the army's loyalty.

(*b*) That the general rise in the cost of living renders the present scale of pay insufficient to enable the sepoy to support a wife and family, or other dependents.

(*c*) That the industrial and agricultural development of India offers other and more lucrative employment to youths of the martial classes, and that this competition will adversely affect recruitment for the army, unless better terms are offered.

77. After the most earnest consideration, we have formed the conclusion that it is necessary, in order to secure the contentment of the Indian Army, to improve the terms of service of Indian other ranks, and our specific recommendations will be found in Appendix I (Item 6).*

Good Service and Good Conduct Pay.

78. We consider it desirable to quicken up the scales of good service and good conduct pay. We make specific suggestions in Appendix I (Item 7).*

Family Pensions.

79. Most of the considerations which we have stated in the preceding Section, in connection with the family pensions of Indian officers, apply to other ranks also. We consider that the present rates of family pension for sepoys are inadequate. We recommend the abolition of the lower rate, and think that there should be one flat rate for all other ranks, *plus* an allowance for each child, on the same principles as for Indian officers. Our complete recommendation will be found in Appendix I (Item 8).*

Several Indian officers have pointed out the great inconvenience to holders of family pensions, especially women and old folk, who have to appear at the nearest treasury, often a considerable distance from their homes, in order to draw their pensions. It is for consideration whether these pensions might not be everywhere paid through the agency of the Post Office, under the supervision and with the assistance of the village authorities and the local branch of the Indian Soldiers Board.

Railway Concessions.

80. We support a request that has been put forward by several Indian officers that Indian non-commissioned officers should be given " intermediate " class warrants instead of 3rd class, when travelling alone on duty. This follows the rule under which a British non-commissioned officer, under the same conditions, travels on a 2nd class warrant in India.

It has been brought to our notice that at present an Indian soldier is entitled, under para. 78, Volume X, Army Regulations, India, as amended by Indian Army Order, October Appendix 1917, to free passage by rail to his home for his family, if he is going on pension; but that this is not permitted to men who resign the service at their own request. This bears hardly on men who are obliged to resign the service for urgent private reasons, and who may be, and often are, a very long way from their homes, as, for example, the men of the Gurkha regiment stationed at Quetta. In view of the necessity for providing strong reserves for the Indian Army, we think that this concession might be granted on two conditions—(i) after not less than 4 years' service; and (ii) to the families of those men only who undertake to join the reserve.

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* Not printed.

Station Hospitals.

81. We find from the evidence given before us that the institution of the station hospital system is not generally popular with the Indian ranks of the Indian Army. The Indian soldier misses his old friends, the regimental doctor and his assistants, and dislikes being placed in a ward in the station hospital with men of other units and classes. He feels also that he has no one whom he knows and trusts and to whom he can apply for medical advice for his family. While these objections to the new system are natural, we consider that the advantages of the station hospital far outweigh its disadvantages. When the system was introduced into the British Army, a good many years ago, almost the same objections were raised. It has long survived its unpopularity in the British service, and we believe will do so in the Indian Army. In India it is still in its infancy, and station hospitals are not as yet fully equipped, so that the advantages are not as obvious as they will be later on. We recommend, however, that a medical officer, detailed from the station hospital, should be "attached" to each regiment, and changed as seldom as possible. We consider that all regimental lines should contain a dispensary, which should be visited daily by this medical officer or by a sub-assistant surgeon, that families should be treated from this dispensary, and that the "daily sick" should be seen there. We hope that, if these arrangements are made, the present dislike to the system will disappear.

Lines.

82. We have heard a great deal from witnesses as to the shortcomings of Indian lines, and we are aware that there are still many which are much below modern standards of living accommodation. On the other hand, we have inspected lines constructed on the latest sanctioned plans, and we do not find that these leave much to be reasonably desired. We recommend, however, that the reconstruction programme, initiated some ten years ago by General Sir O'Moore Creagh, should be vigorously pursued and completed as soon as possible. This is so important that we suggest that special financial arrangements should be made to carry it into effect.

83. The following improvements, which are not included in the latest standard plans, should be introduced, and we place them in what we consider to be their order of urgency :—

(i) A *charpoy* and kit box (or locker) to be provided for each man.
(ii) Free lighting, on an adequate scale, throughout the lines.
(iii) Increase in the number of family quarters, which is all the more necessary as the Indian Army now spends so much more time overseas than formerly. We recommend an increase up to 90 and 120 married quarters in cavalry and infantry respectively, and in other units in proportion.

Religious Teachers.

84. It has been generally represented to us that the status and emoluments of the religious teachers of units of the Indian Army are insufficient to ensure their possessing, and exercising, the requisite influence over the sepoy in moral and religious matters, as well as in the encouragement of a spirit of loyalty. We entirely agree, and make certain recommendations on the subject in Appendix I (Item 9).* In the past these teachers have been treated as "followers." We think that they should have relative rank with, but junior to, jemadars, and that there should be one for each class of the strength of a company or over.

Regimental Offices and Clerks.

85. The contract allowance system, under which regimental offices, &c., are administered, was never easy to manage, and has now become unworkable, owing chiefly to the higher rates of pay of skilled clerical labour, and the increased cost of all office material. As a result, the office fund is usually in debt, and has to be assisted by other funds which should be employed for the direct benefit of the men. We recommend that the contract allowance should be abolished, and that all clerks should be enlisted and given reasonable allowances in addition to their regimental pay ; that actual office rent paid should be refunded by Government, in cases where no office is provided rent free ; that hot and cold weather charges should be borne by Government, and that the necessary office furniture should be supplied and kept up by

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* Not printed.

Government. Stationery should be provided free on a suitable scale; also type-writers should be supplied and maintained free of charge, in the proportion of two per regiment.

We recommend a more extended installation of telephonic communication between military offices, and between civil and military offices.

We consider that the arrangements made for the training of Indian military clerks for units during the war should be continued as a permanent measure.

Regimental Schools.

86. Indian Army schools are at present quite inefficient. The reasons are not far to seek, viz.:—

(i) The want of an educational policy.
(ii) The absence of any system of training for teachers.
(iii) The inadequate pay allowed for the teaching staff; the head teacher is paid Rs. 25 (£2. 10*s.*) a month.
(iv) The insufficient allowance—Rs. 30 (£3) a month—for text-books, prizes, stationery and equipment.
(v) The failure of the State to provide proper school accommodation, library, lighting, &c. The present allowance for all these is only Rs. 10 (£1) a month.

We consider that this condition of affairs should be remedied as soon as possible. A badly paid and therefore discontented teacher can do infinite harm. It is of great importance to the State that the young soldier and the children of soldiers should be educated on sound and loyal principles. As things are, there is little to prevent the regimental school being a centre for discontent and even disloyalty.

87. We recommend that the principle already laid down in the case of the British soldier—that education is to be a part of military training—be accepted in the Indian Army; and that while the responsibility for this education, as for other military training, should be placed on the officer commanding, he should be given the means to discharge it, as recommended above. It is also suggested that an Indian wing of the proposed Army Education Corps should be created; the personnel of this wing to consist of Indian officers and non-commissioned officers, trained as teachers, and posted to units, as at home. Sons of soldiers, preferably, or other boys of martial races, should for the present be educated and trained as teachers at suitable schools and colleges, and some of these should be posted to Army Headquarters and to commands and divisions, for inspection duties.

Eventually the proposed Kitchener College and similar institutions should provide most of these teachers. The adoption of these proposals would provide, *inter alia,* for the elementary education of the sons of Indian soldiers, who would be sufficiently well grounded to proceed, with the help perhaps of military scholarships, to higher educational institutions.

Canteens.

88. It has been suggested to us that an Indian Army Canteen Board might be started for the Indian Army, either as a branch of the Army Canteen Board or as a separate institution. We recommend experiment on a cautious scale.

Grants of Land.

89. We are aware that land-hunger is no new thing, but we have been impressed by the intense desire to acquire land which now pervades all the Indian ranks of the army, particularly in northern India. We understand that 178,000 acres in the canal colonies of the Punjab are about to be distributed among those Indian officers and other ranks who have rendered distinguished service during the late war. In the Punjab, grants are being made of 2 rectangles (1 rectangle = 25 acres) to Indian officers, and 1 rectangle to other ranks. A certain amount of land is also being given in other provinces; and where land is not available *jangi inams* are substituted. These assignments are of the value of Rs. 10 a month for officers and Rs. 5 a month for other ranks, and continue for three lives. We recommend that deserving cases from the great war, which have not been included in the present distribution, should be noted for land grants in parts of the country to be opened up for cultivation by canal projects now under execution or consideration. We are of opinion that any such grants made in the future should be on "service terms." We also recommend that the matter of grants of land

abroad to deserving Indian officers and soldiers should be kept in view by the Government of India; and that if, as seems possible, grants of land in British Guiana or East Africa are to be made to Indian settlers, any deputation sent to these, or other, countries to make enquiries should be accompanied by one or two selected Indian officers.

Clothing.

90. We have heard many complaints of the khaki clothing, which is now a free issue. It is alleged that in some cases it is of inferior material, that it is badly cut, and that the dye is not fast. We have made enquiries into the matter, and we are of opinion that, while the complaints are justified, the present inferior quality is due to the necessity, on grounds of economy, of using up war stocks of varied kinds, and we believe that, when these stocks are exhausted, the present grounds of complaint will disappear. We recommend, however, that the allowances for refitting clothing in regiments should be on a more liberal scale than at present. We also consider that a return to the pre-war system, under which units purchased and made up their own khaki against a cash allowance, would be a retrograde step and very undesirable.

Hindustani Clothing.

Before the war it was the custom in most regiments to have an order of dress, which was not recognised by regulation, for "walking out" and for hot weather drills and duties, except guard duties. This dress usually consisted of a white cotton coat and trousers, or *dhoti*, of the same material, with either a white cotton or khaki regimental pattern *pagri* and boots or Indian shoes. It has been represented to us by several Indian witnesses that this custom, if revived now, would, owing to high prices, involve a great expense to the Indian soldier.

It must be remembered that before the war the sepoy paid for all his khaki clothing, receiving a grant in aid, and therefore the then comparatively cheap cotton suits saved his khaki, and so his pocket. But now the khaki is a free issue, and the cotton suits would mean additional expense to him. We consider this very undesirable. We recommend that it should be forbidden to institute, or to cause to be worn upon any duty whatever, any unauthorised pattern of dress of this kind. As, however, a hot weather fatigue dress of some sort is required in order to save the more expensive and thicker khaki uniform, we suggest that it might well consist of what has been widely introduced during the war for this purpose—viz., thin khaki shirts and khaki drill shorts. The regimental *pagri* and regimental *putties*, with boots or Indian shoes, complete this "fatigue order" of dress. It should be issued and maintained by Government free of cost to the soldier.

Injury Pensions.

91. It has been represented to us that the regulations governing the grant of injury pensions produce discontent and in some cases actual hardship. A reference to Army Regulations, India, Volume I, paragraphs 1058, *et seq.*, will show, we think, that they are too limited in scope and lack elasticity. A comparison between these regulations and those contained in the Royal Warrant, dated 6th December, 1919, for the pensions of soldiers disabled in consequence of the great war, confirms this view. For example, we find that the schedule attached to this Warrant provides for no less than nine degrees of disablement, each degree in turn being sub-divided into many classes of "specific injuries." The Indian regulations provide for three degrees only, and these are so expressed as to afford little guidance to medical boards when classifying injuries. They do not take into consideration the effect of disablement on the dependents of the disabled men, by providing for compensatory allowances for his family.

92. We have discussed this question with a representative of the Ministry of Pensions, to whom we are indebted for certain valuable suggestions, and who has placed at our disposal the pension schemes devised to meet the needs of such special units as the King's African Rifles, certain West Indian corps, and the Maltese Active Service Battalion. It is true that the recent Royal Warrant and the above-mentioned schemes were framed to meet an exceptional situation caused by the late war, but the experience gained has been so wide that the principles evolved from them must be of value.

It does not, however, follow that it would be wise to apply to India in detail the Royal Warrant as it stands. For instance, in the Indian Army many of our men are recruited from countries outside India, *e.g.*, the Gurkhas from Nepal, and to enforce attendance at periodical boards, involving long and tedious journeys, would be vexatious.

Again, it must be remembered that caste restrictions, and not the physical capability of the individual, govern the selection of a trade; and that it would be unjust, for instance, to assume that because a man possessed two sound arms he could add to his livelihood by learning a trade requiring only the use of his arms.

93. The following points should be considered when revising the existing regulations:—

(*a*) The adoption of the percentage method of assessment. This has been followed by all other countries, and has proved easy of working.

(*b*) The preparation of a schedule of specific disabilities to which definite assessments can be assigned.

(*c*) For disabilities other than those specified, assessment should be made according to a percentage, based on comparison with the normally healthy man.

(*d*) In cases where—
    (1) the disability is scheduled, or
    (2) the disability is not scheduled, but the condition is permanent and can never improve,

a life pension should be awarded at the then appropriate rate. In such cases, if the condition gets much worse, it would be open to the pensioner to apply for a higher rate on this ground.

(*e*) In all other cases, even though it is possible that the condition may subsequently improve, a life pension should be given at the appropriate rate.

(*f*) There should be a basic rate of disability pension, in respect of each scheduled disability, sufficient for a pensioner of the lowest rank, to which should be added—
    (1) an allowance for service, graded according to length of service,
    (2) a graded allowance for higher rank.

Corporal Punishment.

94. Our two Indian colleagues would like to add a recommendation to abolish corporal punishment in the Indian Army, on the ground that it was abolished many years ago in the British service. We understand that it is a question which is now receiving the attention of Army Headquarters, from which we are confident that it will receive sympathetic consideration.

PART VI.

Possibility of establishing a Territorial or Second Line Force in India.

This is one of the questions on which the Secretary of State laid special emphasis when he met the Committee on 9th October 1919. He then asked us to consider the alternative of developing from the existing Indian Defence Force (Indian section), established on a temporary basis during the war, something comparable to a "second line" or territorial army.

2. We have had the matter under earnest consideration. We have discussed it with H. E. the Viceroy and various heads of provinces, with the military authorities, with retired Indian officers, with prominent Indian politicians and publicists, with the chief organiser of the Bengali battalion, which is drawn from classes not hitherto enlisted, and with the commandant of the Calcutta University Corps, admittedly the most successful of the Indian Defence Force units so far formed.

3. Compulsion for the regular army was ruled out during the war in spite of the gravity of the case, and there is no question of introducing it as the basis of any territorial force. There is, however, a strong feeling among educated Indians that they should be given greater opportunities of organizing themselves voluntarily for the defence of their country. That feeling has been stimulated by the spectacle of the citizen armies raised in western countries during the war, by the

recent facilities given for the grant of King's commissions to Indians, and by the increased control of large branches of the civil administration which the Reforms Scheme offers to Indians. It is, therefore, expedient to test the strength and endurance of that aspiration, which is an honourable and legitimate one, and if possible to utilise it for the gradual creation of a force, which would be of practical assistance to the regular army, both in maintaining internal order and in combating external aggression. Unless it can be made in time to serve one or both of those objects, it would be a useless and expensive experiment.

4. At this stage it may be well to examine the facilities hitherto given to the classes in question, both in the regular army and in the auxiliary forces. Up to and during the first half of the great war, the regular army was recruited almost exclusively from the rural agricultural population and mainly in northern India. Little effort was made to enlist the urban classes as combatants, because they showed no keenness to serve and were regarded as not likely to furnish good material. As the war progressed and the drain on the rural classes became more and more severe, the field of recruitment both in town and country was steadily extended; and in the last two years of the war, in northern India at least, practically everyone outside the lower menial classes was eligible for enlistment.

The following statement shows by provinces (*a*) the total population, (*b*) the number of combatant recruits raised during the war:—

	Population in millions.	Number of recruits raised.
Punjab	20	326,000
United Provinces	47	142,000
Madras	40	46,000
Bombay	20	36,000
North-West Frontier and Baluchistan...	3	33,000
Burma	12	13,000
Behar and Orissa	33	8,000
Bengal	45	7,000
Central Provinces	13	5,000
Assam	6	1,000
Ajmir	½	7,000
	240	624,000

Some of the new rural classes made good, others did not, and the experience gained will be most valuable for future guidance. The urban classes, though they supplied many men for auxiliary services, failed to produce any appreciable number of combatant recruits, and the military authorities were on the whole not satisfied with the few that came forward. This was not unexpected, for these classes had no military traditions, no previous connection with the army, and were as a rule reluctant to undertake a career novel to them and involving hardship and danger.

5. It was probably the expectation of such a result that led the Government of India to provide another means of helping in the defence of the Empire by the formation, early in 1917, of the Indian section of the Indian Defence Force.The conditions governing that force are set out in the Army Department communiqué of 27th March 1917.

The main conditions were:—

(*a*) Enrolment to be voluntary, for general service in India, age limit 18 to 30; physical standards, as in the Indian Army; the menial classes, and also, in order not to interfere with regular recruitment, the classes from which the Indian Army is ordinarily recruited, were excluded.

(*b*) Six units, each of 1,000 men, to be raised at Calcutta, Madras, Poona, Allahabad, Lahore and Rangoon.

(*c*) Recruitment to be open for 6 months, up to 28th August 1917; the recruits to undergo 90 days' continuous training, in companies of 250 at a time, under a British officer and an instructional staff from the Indian Army; to receive, while under training, pay and allowances, uniform and rations as in the Indian Army, and to be subject to the Indian Army Act and the rules and regulations under the Indian Defence Force Act.

H. E. the Viceroy, in referring to the scheme at the closing of the legislative session in March 1917, said:—

"The Act is confessedly a war measure and therefore temporary, but it will prove a most valuable experiment. We shall have to reorganize our Indian Army after this war, and some form of second line will probably be required. In the Indian Defence Force raised temporarily during the stress of war, there may be the germ of such new second line."

6. During the first two months from the passing of the Act only 300 men were enrolled. The Government of India, in their Resolution of 21st May 1917, recorded their disappointment "that such a scheme............should, in spite of its modest dimensions, prove a hopeless failure at such a time and in a country which, whatever its deficiencies, is not lacking in man power," and called on the leaders of public opinion to take all possible steps forthwith to make the recruitment worthy of the name and aspirations of India. This appeal gave some stimulus to recruitment, and by 28th August 1917, when the 6 months' period closed, the number enrolled had risen to 2,432, of whom, however, over 70 per cent. came from Madras and Burma. The six units already mentioned, and the Bengal Light Horse Squadron, were organized between August 1917 and January 1918, and commenced training. To complete the strength of units, recruitment was reopened on 12th April 1918, at the gravest crisis of the war; and when the King-Emperor and the Premier appealed to India to arm itself against the Turco-German menace from the west, the Government of India, Local Governments and many prominent Indians again appealed to patriotic sentiment. The Government of India agreed to the strength being raised to 12,000, and explained that the primary duty of the force would be to support the civil power in the event of internal disorder, but that, when the units attained their full strength and the requisite degree of efficiency, it was hoped that they would be able also to assist in securing internal communications in the event of general mobilisation. The response was again disappointing, and up to June 15th 1919, the total applicants were 11,316, of whom only 3,699 were found fit for enrolment, or about half of the sanctioned establishment of 7,232 (Madras having been raised to a strength of 2,000). Of the 3,694 enrolled, 1,621 were in Madras and 868 in Burma, none of the other provinces having furnished more than a company. The total number actually trained was 2,200.

7. It must in fairness be said that the condition of three months' *continuous* training created considerable difficulty for men with fixed occupations. However, the scheme cannot be regarded as other than a failure, the main causes of which probably are those already mentioned at the close of paragraph 4, and in one case racial or sectional feeling, which made it necessary, we are told, to withdraw ammunition from a company under training, lest the rival sections might open fire on one another. The conclusion to be drawn from the experiment is that some at least of the more enthusiastic advocates of the territorial movement probably overrated the practical strength of the desire of the urban classes to share in the burden of defence, and underrated the difficulties of arousing a military spirit and creating a sense of discipline and sacrifice among those classes.

8. The history of the Bengali regular battalion has a practical bearing on the general question. It had long been the ambition of patriotic Bengalis to remove the reproach that Bengal was lacking in fighting qualities. Accordingly during the war, when the field of recruitment was extended, sanction was given in 1916, at the instance of many leading men of the Presidency, to the raising of a regular battalion in Bengal. The task was one of great difficulty owing not only to the absence of military traditions but to the ignorance of military needs and conditions. But a band of enthusiastic and high-minded Bengali gentlemen set vigorously to work, and by June 1917 the battalion was raised and training began. In all, nearly 7,000 men were enrolled, but owing to the inferior physique of many of the recruits, their breakdown in training, resignations, etc., it was not found possible to maintain more than a single battalion.

To stimulate martial feeling, the battalion was sent to Mesopotamia in August 1917, and every effort was made to render the experiment a success, by specially selecting the officers and enlisting the sympathy of the military authorities at the front. Unfortunately, owing to internal jealousies (which led to the murder of two Bengali officers), the unfitness of many of the men for hard work in the field, susceptibility to disease and the difficulty of enforcing discipline, the battalion was never fit to be sent to the front during the war.

The question of disbanding the battalion is now under consideration, and nearly all the men are anxious to be discharged.

9. Another experiment, which so far promises better results, has been made since 1917, when sanction was given to the formation of six university corps, varying in

strength from 1,125 in Calcutta to 125 in Patna, in the areas served by the universities of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, Lahore and Patna. The total sanctioned strength is 2,625; there were 2,916 applicants up to 15th June 1919 and 1,823 enrolments, viz.: Calcutta 533, Bombay 485, Allahabad 309, Lahore 496. A total of 980 men has been trained.

The Calcutta University Corps is the strongest in numbers and most forward in training. It appears that, even with an insufficiency of officers and instructors (now being made good), the corps has made healthy progress; the men have improved much in physique under the training, are quick to learn from European instructors (whom they prefer to Indian non-commissioned officers), are steadily overcoming the caste difficulties which stand in the way of training, are becoming more amenable to discipline, and turn out smartly on parade. We have not had information as to the progress of other university corps, but having regard to the failure of the non-university corps in Bengal, and the very meagre success of the Bengali battalion, we consider the success attained by the Calcutta University Corps a hopeful indication that these corps are likely to furnish the best material, as well as the surest foundation on which to build.

10. We have dwelt in some detail on the position in Bengal, because it is undoubtedly the province in which the martial spirit is regarded as most backward, and because it illustrates the difficulties of forming a force of any value in areas where the military spirit has never existed or has died away.

We found some differences of opinion on the question whether recruits should be given the option of enrolling for local service in their provinces or for service anywhere in India. It was stated, though with some hesitation, that territorial units might be employed in the last resort in helping to suppress local disorders, and even in repressing religious riots; and that, as they would be drawn from the well-to-do classes, they would have a strong interest in maintaining security and public order. We confess to some scepticism on this point at the present time. We have been informed that some students who were members of the Indian Defence Force took part in the Punjab disorders of last year; on the other hand, we were told that, during the similar riots in Calcutta, several of the students in the Calcutta University Corps offered their services, which it was not, however, necessary to accept. Obviously the attitude of the men will depend on the extent to which a sense of discipline and obedience has been instilled by training, on their confidence in their officers and on their *esprit de corps;* and we are here again drawn to the conclusion that those qualities will be more readily forthcoming, and more speedily developed, in university corps, than in the miscellaneous aggregation of individuals collected in a general territorial unit.

11. When the question was discussed with the heads of provinces, their general view was that the force would be of little or no practical utility, and might be a source of embarrassment; that one or two corps could be raised in each province, especially if they were not to be called on to serve outside the province; that for some years to come they would not be sufficiently disciplined to be relied on for internal security, and therefore could not relieve regular troops; that there would be difficulties in working the scheme in rural areas, where also it might prejudice regular recruiting; that the formation of university corps offered the greatest prospect of success; and that they would be willing to see the experiment tried of raising a few territorial units, including university corps, in urban areas, provided that they form part of the military organization, and are administered by the military authorities, and that no financial responsibility is thrown upon provincial governments.

As to the last point, we agree with the military authorities that the money to be spent on this experiment should not be regarded as money spent on the army from the standpoint of military efficiency, and that the military budget should therefore be increased proportionately.

12. In forming our conclusions, we have been impressed by the fact that the highest military authorities in India accept the principle of a national defence force and are of the opinion that it is one to be encouraged. They have told us, however, that we must not shut our eyes to the practical difficulties. They add:—"Not only have we to bear in mind the risks that we run in organizing a force that may be used against us in one way or another, but we have to create or revive the necessary military qualities in a collection of different races who are striving under-

our control to evolve a common nationality, and with it the ideal of national participation in the defence of their country. . . . We do not want to run more risks than is necessary; we do not want to interfere unduly with religious or local customs and ideals, and we do not want the country generally to get tired of what is admittedly an experiment, before the desired result is attained."

13. After full consideration, therefore, we recommend the creation of a territorial force on cautious lines as a measure of education; and we proceed to indicate the lines on which the experiment might be made, having regard to the results of past experience and of our present enquiries :—

(1) The proposed force must not impair the efficiency of the regular army, or compete with it in recruiting among classes from which the army has hitherto been drawn. While it will primarily be limited to the urban population and the universities, other classes on which the army has hitherto not drawn will not be excluded.

(2) The formation of the force should not be made a reason for reducing the strength of, or expenditure on, the regular army.

(3) It should be co-ordinated with the regular army and be under the control of the military authorities; the establishment of a unit should be the same as that of a regular unit; the organization and training should be carried out with a view not only to aiding the civil power in maintaining internal security, but also to sharing eventually in the duty of defence against external aggression.

(4) The co-operation of provincial governments should, as far as possible, be secured, and local advisory associations should be established to assist in recruiting and in providing funds and facilities for subsidiary purposes which cannot be met from the military grants.

(5) Enlistment should be voluntary, between the ages of 18 and 30, with liability for general service in India, and for a period of 4 years, which may be extended if recommended by the commanding officer.

(6) Training of cadets in schools should be limited to physical training and drill without arms.

(7) University companies should be encouraged, but strictly limited to the students and staff; the men should take their discharge on completion of the university course, but should be eligible for transfer to a non-university unit. Rural units or companies should be discouraged, if likely to compete with regular recruiting.

(8) Liability for general service in India should be insisted on from the start; without it there is little prospect of this force ever becoming an asset of any military value.

(9) Training should be arranged for all units by the military authorities, in consultation with the advisory committees, so as to interfere as little as possible with normal avocations or studies.

(10) Pay and allowances should be at Indian Army rates during periods of annual training or embodiment; in the case of university corps, for the period of the annual camp only.

(11) A limited number of specially selected British officers—*e.g.*, commanding officer, second-in-command and adjutant—with an instructional staff of non-commissioned officers, should be attached to each unit. The commanding officer and second-in-command might be replaced by Indians as the latter become trained; and in time Indian officers holding King's commissions and possessing military experience might also be employed with these units. The adjutant and instructional staff should always be drawn from the regular army. Special facilities should be given by the military authorities for the training of officers for appointment to, and promotion in, commissioned ranks, on lines similar to the Indian Defence Force (British section).

(12) The force should be under the Commander-in-Chief, general control being exercised through a Director of Auxiliary Forces at Army headquarters and the local military authorities; it should take the place of the present Indian Defence Force (Indian section) which being only a temporary war organization disappears. Local governments and associations should be consulted as regards the recommendations for commissions and promotions among officers.

(13) The form of the commission to be granted in this force is a matter that will require careful consideration. Advanced political opinion, which in this respect is strongly supported by our colleague Sir Krishna Gupta, asks for the grant of King's commissions to the territorial officers; but Indian officers now holding the Viceroy's commission would undoubtedly resent the grant to these officers of a status which for good reasons is withheld from themselves. We feel that it would be premature to make any definite recommendation at this stage, as so much must depend on the manner in which the experiment develops.

14. The next question is, how many units should be raised? In this case, as in that of the selection of Indian cadets for King's commissions, it is most important that the first experiment should be on lines that promise success, and success will be undoubtedly endangered if the scheme is started on too ambitious lines. The representatives of educated opinion whom we have consulted generally recognise this danger, and do not ask for more than a few units in the larger provinces. It has also to be remembered that the cost of the regular forces is absorbing a rapidly growing share of the public revenues, and it would be unfair to the taxpayer to spend in addition large sums on what is admittedly an experiment undertaken mainly for its political or educational value. Moreover, the experience of the war goes to show that no great rush of applicants for enlistment is to be expected. From a consideration of all the circumstances we suggest that, to start with, some 12 units, mounted or dismounted, might be raised in the following areas—

Bombay, Madras, Bengal with Assam, United Provinces ...	2 each.
Punjab, Bihar, Burma and Central Provinces	1 each.

In each of the four large provinces, one of the units might be a university corps, and in the remaining provinces the single unit might be composed partly of university and partly of general companies. The force might be styled the "Indian Territorial Force."

15. We do not think that any new unit should be sanctioned till the first units have been reported adequate in numbers and efficiency for the immediate purpose in view, viz., assisting the civil power in maintaining internal security, and are also capable of helping the regular forces in a grave emergency by taking over some of the duties of furnishing guards, protecting communications, etc.

The principle laid down in the Reforms announcement of the 20th August 1917, and embodied in the new Government of India Act, is specially applicable here, viz., that the British Government, upon whom lies the responsibility for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judge of the time and measure of each advance, and it must be guided "by the co-operation received from those on whom new opportunities of service will be conferred, and the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility." If loyal and public-spirited Indians, whose active co-operation is essential to the success of the scheme, keep these principles steadily in view, then, in time, the force may develop into an asset of no small military value, and capable of playing a worthy part in the defence of the Indian Empire.

PART VII.

The Royal Indian Marine.

1. The Indian Marine Service Act of 1884 defines the purposes for which the Royal Indian Marine Service exists, viz., the transport of troops; the guarding of the convict settlements; the suppression of piracy; the survey of coasts and harbours; the visiting of lighthouses; the relief of distressed and wrecked vessels; and other local objects. The suppression of piracy has, however, never been handed over to the service as a definite duty.

2. As regards the transport of troops, the Royal Indian Marine is responsible for, and has always successfully performed, what may be called the interior transportation work of the Indian Empire by sea, and in addition assists in trooping work as far as Suez. The Indian Marine Service Act is not in force west of Suez; and this is a defect which should be remedied, since any disciplinary action taken by the commander or officers of a Royal Indian Marine ship west of Suez is *ultra vires.*

Royal Indian Marine vessels are also used to convey political officers and other high officials to and from the Persian Gulf and islands off the Indian coast, both when proceeding to take up appointments in such places, and on inspection duty.

3. The Royal Indian Marine manages the great dockyard at Bombay, and the smaller ones at Kidderpore and Mandalay. The Bombay dockyard is largely used by the ships of the East Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy. The Royal Indian Marine also builds customs and police launches and tugs for the Government of India and provincial Governments, and even when it does not undertake the building, is always consulted as to plans and construction. The Royal Indian Marine has charge of the marine survey of India, with headquarters at Bombay, and a survey ship with a ship's company of 110. The actual survey party consists of 10 officers and 4 men, and is in charge of marine survey from the Persian Gulf to the Mergui Archipelago, exclusive of Ceylon and Aden. The service also keeps a vessel for police duty at Port Blair, the convict settlement on the Andamans. The service is in charge of the lighthouses on 1,200 miles of the Madras coast, on a portion of the Calcutta coast, and on the whole of the Burmese coast, and is also responsible for the floating lights in the Persian Gulf. The officers of the Royal Indian Marine are particularly well qualified to undertake this work on account of their knowledge of the coast and of Indian conditions. It would probably be advantageous if the lighting of the whole coast were handed over to them.

4. The service contains about 225 officers of all ranks, executive and engineering, recruited from training ships such as the "Conway" and "Worcester," and from the mercantile marine, by nomination of the Secretary of State. The officers of this service, as a result of their having been employed as naval officers during the late war, have recently received the privilege of having their commissions signed by the King and recognised by the Admiralty. Some took their part in front line combatant work with credit. Officers of the service are normally employed in peace time as Port Officers and Assistant Port Officers at all the principal ports of India.

The subordinate part of the service consists of about 2,000 Indians, who man the vessels belonging to the Royal Indian Marine. This does not include dockyard hands at Bombay, Kidderpore, or Mandalay.

5. We have seen the scheme prepared by Lord Jellicoe, as a result of his recent visit to India, in which he advocates the expansion of the present Royal Indian Marine into an Indian Navy. This proposal is, we understand, under the consideration of the Government of India, and is, in any case, outside our terms of reference. We have been informed, however, that the Government of India, while unable, at present, to accept the scheme for an Indian Navy as put forward by Lord Jellicoe, recognise that the Royal Indian Marine should be expanded so as to enable it to undertake certain fresh responsibilities, the most important of which is the policing of the Persian Gulf.

Whatever the decision on this point may be, we feel bound to consider the position of the Royal Indian Marine in the scheme of Indian government, and the administrative arrangements for its control.

6. At present the executive head is the Director, who is usually a senior officer of the Royal Navy, nominated by the Admiralty with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for India. The Director has to submit his proposals to the Secretary in the Army Department, who is a soldier, and who takes his orders on marine questions from the Army Member. He resides at Army Headquarters (Delhi and Simla), while the Director lives at Bombay. The Admiralty have no responsibility for the training and efficiency of this Service, though by the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884, Section 6, they are authorised to take it over, if considered necessary, in time of war.

The budget of the Royal Indian Marine is controlled by the army authorities, as a separate section of the military budget.

7. It is clear that the Royal Indian Marine is, and must remain, an Indian service, so long as it is paid and maintained by the Government of India. But it would be much to its advantage that the Admiralty, who have furnished its head, and who took over its ships, and directed much of its work, in the great war, should view the service with favour and be ready to give it all the assistance in their power.

8. In Part II of this Report we have discussed two alternative proposals for the administration of the Royal Indian Marine. Whichever scheme is adopted, we recommend the following reorganisation :—

(i) The officer appointed to be Director, Royal Indian Marine, should be a rear-admiral on the active list. His headquarters and official residence should be at Bombay. He should have the status of a Secretary to the Government of India. He would thus be directly subordinate to the proposed civilian Member of Council for Munitions and Marine or to the Commander-in-Chief, as the case may be, and like other Secretaries would have the right of direct access to the Viceroy.

(ii) The office of the Director should be in Bombay, but there should be a Royal Indian Marine officer, holding the appointment of Deputy or Assistant Secretary to Government, with a small clerical establishment, at the headquarters of the Government of India.

(iii) The Director should have two Deputies, both officers of the Royal Indian Marine; one his second-in-command, the other the Superintendent of the Dockyard at Bombay.

It would be the duty of the Director, or one of his Deputies, to attend at the headquarters of Government, when any sufficiently important case was under consideration. In other cases the Director would depend for liaison, and for the transaction of ordinary business, upon his representative at headquarters.

We believe that this arrangement would satisfy both the Royal Indian Marine Service and the Admiralty, and would obtain for the former a much higher status in the Government of India than it has hitherto possessed, while it would ensure its constitutional subordination to that Government.

9. The pay of the officers of the Royal Indian Marine has recently been considerably improved. The rules for their leave and pensions require reconsideration.

10. It is evident that if this service is not only to maintain its past standard of usefulness, but is to develop in the future, the conditions of recruitment, training, service, pay, and pension of the Indian personnel must be radically altered and much improved. At present recruitment for both deck hands and engine room is without any system whatever. Crews and stokers are engaged haphazard in Bombay ; or the *serang* (boatswain) of a ship is entrusted with the duty of collecting a crew, which is becoming more and more difficult. Both crews and stokers are discharged whenever a ship is laid up; the only training is picked up at sea; the pay is inferior to that of the merchant service; and though a certain percentage of the men are supposed to be pensionable, they never earn a pension in practice, as their service is broken up by periods between discharges and re-engagements. It is not surprising that it is becoming increasingly difficult to get men for both deck and engine room, and ships often have to be held up for want of hands, or go to sea short-handed.

We recommend that men should be regularly recruited by an agency for the purpose, as in the army. The headquarters of recruiting should be at Ratnagiri on the Bombay coast, but the agency should also investigate the possibility of finding new classes of men for sea-going service. As far as possible, lads should be taken on young to join a training ship and for training ashore; and later they should be drafted to ships by a Royal Indian Marine central agency at Bombay. Their pay, pension, and leave rules, (the last being very important), should be thoroughly revised, and the question of a reserve should be examined. Good conduct pay and special qualification pay should be given. The question of uniform and of its upkeep should also receive attention.

Further, we consider that suitable Indians should be given opportunities for education in the higher branches of seamanship, marine engineering etc., with a view to qualifying themselves for admission to the superior ranks of the marine service. It is only by methods such as those described above that Indians can become efficient sailors, and that a judgment can be formed as to how far they should ultimately rise in their profession.

11. We think it desirable that the policing of the Persian Gulf should be taken over by the Royal Indian Marine. The climate is enervating, and the nature of the duties is such as can be performed by Indians, thus setting free British sailors. The Indian, trained and led by British officers, will be a match for any enemy that he is likely to encounter there. A few British naval ratings, such as first-class petty officers for gunnery and drill instructors, supplied by the Admiralty, will be necessary for a few years.

12. We consider that, if the status of the Royal Indian Marine were raised as suggested, and the conditions under which its Indian personnel is enlisted, trained, paid, and pensioned were improved, the Government of India would have a service well suited to undertake all present requirements as regards marine work in peace time, and well adapted for any development in the direction of becoming a fighting service, should this be found desirable hereafter.

PART VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS.

1. We were authorised, before the Committee proceeded to India, to report, without waiting till our return to England, on such matters as required an early decision and could, in our opinion, be dealt with in India. We therefore examined in India a number of questions which were referred for our advice, and acquainted the Government of India with our views. We propose to summarise briefly in this Part the recommendations which we made. It is understood that Lord Esher and Lieut.-General Sir J. Du Cane, who did not accompany the Committee to India, have no responsibility for these recommendations.

SECTION I.

Future Conditions of Service in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

2. At the outbreak of the war the Indian Army Reserve of Officers contained only some 40 officers. During the war it was greatly expanded, and at the time of the armistice with Germany numbered 4,470. This vast expansion represented India's contribution towards Imperial requirements in the matter of officers, rather than a reserve limited to the needs of the Indian Army.

3. The regulations under which these officers were commissioned were framed at a time when expansion to this extent was not contemplated. They not only fail to provide for the systematic training of officers, but are defective in many other respects. They divide the Indian Army Reserve of Officers into only two branches—cavalry and infantry. A long period of service in the reserve, with promotion on a time scale up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, irrespective of military training and efficiency, is open to serious objection. The existing reserve would, if the present regulations remain in force, consist, after a few years have elapsed, chiefly of field officers, while the requirements of the army are limited mainly to junior officers.

4. At the present time India contains a large number of officers who have relinquished temporary commissions in the regular army. This number, for some years to come, will continue to increase. Such officers, owing to their training and experience, form a potential reserve of great value. They retain the rank they held on

demobilisation, while officers of the Indian Army Reserve, under extant regulations, not only retain their commissions on release from army service, but are also automatically promoted in rank according to the Indian Army time scale. No valid reason can be adduced for the retention of this difference of treatment, and we accordingly advised that those who obtained temporary commissions in the United Kingdom, and those who received commissions in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers during the war, should be placed on an equal footing in this respect.

5. The matter has acquired prominence owing to the proposal of the Government of India to perpetuate the existing liability of all European British subjects in India under the Indian Defence Force Act. We accordingly recommended that the regulations relating to the Indian Army Reserve of Officers should be recast on the following lines, which follow closely proposals which were put before us by Army Headquarters:—

(1) All officers now holding commissions in the Indian Army Reserve of Officers should be required to relinquish their commissions on release from army service; and on such relinquishment should be permitted to retain their rank, on conditions similar to those laid down for ex-officers of the regular army who held temporary commissions during the war.

Officers of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers who are thus asked to relinquish their commissions should be clearly informed of the reasons for this course, and that those who are still within the age limit and otherwise qualified should be eligible for appointment in the new reserve of officers or other suitable formations. We recommended also that the Gazette notifying relinquishment of commissions should be followed with the least possible delay by the Gazette notifying admission to the new Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

(2) A new reserve of officers for the army in India should be formed, with a fixed establishment to be calculated for each arm and branch of the service on the basis of the probable requirements in the event of war, viz.:—

Staff.
British cavalry.
Artillery.
Engineers.
British infantry.
Indian cavalry.
Indian infantry.
Supply and Transport Corps.
Medical services.
Veterinary service.
Ordnance Department.
Army Remount Department.
Miscellaneous duties.

It will be seen that the new reserve of officers would be organised with reference to the needs of the army in India, whereas the existing reserve is for the Indian Army alone.

In advocating this change, we were influenced by the consideration that, as officer reinforcements have to be provided from some source or other for all units serving in India, British and Indian alike, it would be cheaper and more convenient to provide them from India, especially as, at present, a supply is likely to be available from amongst the large number of ex-officers now in India. The question of incidence of cost will be one for adjustment between the Home and Indian Governments.

(3) Selection should be made in the first instance from ex-officers who are of military age, as defined in the Indian Defence Force Act or in any enactment which may take its place, and are considered suitable for, and desire to serve in, the reserve. Establishments should be completed and maintained from ex-officers and others suitable for training as officers.

(4) The new reserve should consist of two categories, the first including only those who undertake to be available on mobilisation of the field army in India; and the second, those who are willing to undergo training as officers, but who cannot be regarded as available except in a grave emergency.

(5) All officers selected for the reserve should be appointed, so far as practicable, to units or formations, and should be required to undergo the periodical training prescribed for the arm or branch to which they are allotted. Training for the reserve should exempt an officer from liability to undergo the periodical training required under the Auxiliary Forces Bill, should this become law.

It was strongly represented to us that ex-officers should not be compelled, without their own consent, to serve in any rank below that of officer, except perhaps in the case of specially constituted units, *e.g.*, an Officers' Training Corps. or a corps such as the Bihar Light Horse. We felt that there was much force in this contention, and we were glad to learn that the Government of India shared this view and were endeavouring to give effect to it.

(6) Officers should not ordinarily remain in the cavalry, field artillery or infantry reserve after the age of 31, since, although in some cases it may be advantageous to retain officers of merit and experience beyond that age, it is necessary to provide for the steady recruitment of younger men. An officer after the age of 31, if specially qualified, might be permitted to join the second class of the reserve; or to accept a commission in some local forces, if such be constituted; or to continue in the reserve, but undergo the training required for one of the administrative services.

(7) Officers now holding higher substantive or retired rank than that of lieutenant should be eligible for retention in their rank in the reserve; but, ordinarily, rank in the reserve should not be higher than that of captain, and this should be attained according to the time-scale in force for the Indian Army.

(8) Officers appointed to the reserve should receive the present outfit allowance, if not already received, and should, for each year in which training is undergone, receive either the pay and allowances of their rank or, preferably, a lump sum, which it has been suggested should be 750 rupees for a period of training, ordinarily of one month.

(9) Officers belonging to the cavalry, field artillery and infantry should be trained annually till 31, and thereafter, if retained, every other year; officers of the garrison artillery, ordnance, remount, veterinary and supply and transport services should receive training every second year; and officers of the engineer and medical reserves should be trained every third year.

SECTION II.

Conditions of Service of "Followers."

6. We had the advantage of seeing certain proposals on this subject, which were under the consideration of the military authorities and the Government of India. With these we were in general agreement. Our specific recommendations were that the term "follower" should disappear, and that the duties hitherto performed by them should be allotted as follows:—

(A.) *Regimental Followers.*

(1) Those individuals who have hitherto been termed "regimental followers" should become enlisted and attested men, who should be borne on the establishment of the unit, and should be trained to arms sufficiently to be able to defend themselves; should wear uniform, and should serve under the same conditions as regards pay and furlough as the fighting men of the unit. Men of this class should not, however, be entitled to pension after so short a term of service as fifteen years; the minimum should be twenty-one years, and in some cases might be twenty-five years. Provision should also be made for these classes to be passed into the reserve.

(2) The term "sweeper" should be abolished. The necessary personnel for sanitary duties should be enlisted from low caste men, and trained as soldiers. Under this scheme, each unit would be self-contained in respect of its sanitary personnel, who would form an integral part of the unit establishment, and might be called the "sanitary squad."

An alternative proposal has been put forward for the formation of divisional sanitary companies, each consisting of four sections (one for headquarters and three for brigades). The cantonment authorities, under this proposal, would be responsible for the general sanitation of the area, while the brigade sections, each under a brigade sanitary officer, would be attached for duty to units. On mobilisation, the brigade sanitary sections would accompany the units into the field, and all cantonment sanitary work would fall on the cantonment authorities..

We expressed no opinion on this scheme, but suggested that the Government of India might consider it as an alternative to the arrangement mentioned above.

(3) With the introduction of piped water supply in certain stations, the necessity for *bhistis* (water-carriers) has, to some extent, disappeared; and we recommended that the Indian soldier should be trained, in the course of time, to draw his own water from the pipes and to convey it in *pakhals* (buckets). It is believed that the soldiers of all other armies perform these duties, and when once the *mussack* (waterskin) has been got rid of, there appears to be no reason why Indian soldiers should not draw water for themselves.

In stations where there is no piped water supply, and in the field, the water arrangements should, we considered, be superintended by the medical authorities, who should arrange for chlorinating tanks, &c., and should have, under their control, enlisted drivers to drive the water carts, or to lead pack animals carrying water tanks. These drivers should be attached to units for duty.

(4) *Dhobis* (washermen) should be eliminated from unit establishments. If the men choose to employ them in peace time, it should be by private arrangement, and the *dhobi* should not be paid by the State. We considered, however, that it was necessary to retain barbers as part of the unit establishment.

(B.) *Departmental Followers.*

With reference to "departmental followers," we pointed out that the term "follower" is a misnomer, and that these men are, properly speaking, the subordinate Indian personnel of various departments and services. We were informed that various schemes were already under the consideration of Government in respect of the non-combatant personnel of the Ordnance, Remount, Veterinary and Mechanical Transport Departments and in Fort Armaments; also in respect of the tindals and lascars employed on coast defences, and the non-combatant personnel of artillery, British infantry and cavalry units. We recommended that the latter three classes should be treated, so far as possible, on the same lines as in Indian units. With regard to the remaining classes, the terms and conditions of service of the subordinate personnel of each department should be considered on their merits. All such personnel should be attested and paid at suitable rates, with reference to the nature of their duties. We expressed the opinion, however, that it is undesirable to increase the number of subordinate Indian ranks who receive free rations, and we suggested that the rates of pay of these classes should be consolidated, and that free rations should not be given, except to those classes which will be required on mobilisation to proceed on field service. For men of these classes, it is desirable to provide for the issue of free rations in peace time, since they must receive free rations on service. Suitable scales of clothing should be laid down where necessary, and clothing should be issued free, with reference to the nature of the duties to be performed. Finally, we advised that it is unnecessary to grant to the subordinate personnel of departments the same pensionary terms as are applicable to the combatant ranks in fighting units.

SECTION III.

Military Staff Clerks.

7. We found that a Committee had been appointed by the Commander-in-Chief to examine the existing clerical organizations and conditions of service, and various cognate matters, and had recently submitted its report. We found ourselves in general agreement with its recommendations, which we do not think it necessary to reproduce.

We laid emphasis on the desirability of ensuring that British soldier clerks should be most sparingly used for clerical duties in the various military offices, in excess of the authorized establishments proposed in the report. We observed that the existing practice of engaging soldier clerks for temporary duty in these offices, in practically unlimited numbers, constitutes a grave danger to the fighting efficiency of the British Army in India.

With regard to Army Headquarters, we observed that if the clerks in the principal branches, such as that of the C.G.S., A.G., and Q.M.G., are to be paid at the same rates and enjoy the same status and privileges as the assistants and clerks in the Government of India's civil secretariat offices, it should be possible to effect, by degrees, a very considerable reduction in the numbers employed. A relatively small establishment of well-trained clerks, serving under favourable conditions, should be able to deal with work more efficiently and expeditiously than a much larger establishment of clerks who are for the most part untrained. We expressed a doubt, however, whether so high a grading or scale of pay is necessary in the case of the departmental offices subordinate to the principal staff officers, *e.g.*, that of the Director of Supply and Transport, the Director of Ordnance Inspection, &c.

We recommended that the Clerks' School of Instruction, which was established at Kasauli during the war, should be developed into a central school of training for military staff clerks. For the present, a fair knowledge of shorthand and typewriting should be an essential qualification for admittance to the school, and ultimately a first-class school certificate. No soldier should receive any clerical employment, other than temporary, until he has qualified by passing through the training school.

SECTION IV.

Chaplains.

8. During our stay in India we were asked for an expression of our opinion on a scheme for the formation of a Corps of Army Chaplains in India, which had been prepared for the consideration of the Government of India. We heard a good deal of evidence on the subject from chaplains of various denominations and from others well qualified to offer advice.

9. It had been brought to our notice that the present arrangements for spiritual ministrations to British troops are in many cases defective, owing to the following facts: firstly, that the Anglican and Presbyterian chaplains ministering to troops are borne on the civil establishment and are but little amenable to military control; secondly, that chaplains who have to minister to the civil population as well as to the troops are apt in some cases to give insufficient attention to the latter; and thirdly, that the more favourable treatment in the matter of pay, pension, &c., extended to those two denominations, as representing the established churches, is a cause of some dissatisfaction to the chaplains of other denominations, whose pay is undoubtedly inadequate for whole-time servants of Government attached to troops and who enjoy no leave or pensionary rights.

10. We expressed the view that the spiritual interests of the British Army as a whole would benefit from the adoption of the principles underlying the scheme submitted for our criticism, namely—

(1) Equality of treatment for military chaplains of all denominations, as now accepted by the War Office.
(2) The provision of an adequate staff of army chaplains to meet the needs of the various denominations.
(3) The organization of an Army Chaplains Department in India to administer the service so created.

11. We considered a suggestion that this Chaplains Department should be placed under the Chaplain-General at the War Office, and also that the chaplains should be supplied, as required, from the home establishment. We formed the conclusion that the first suggestion was quite inapplicable to Indian conditions, since the instructions of the Chaplain-General might conflict with the control of the Government of India over its own officers, and would also probably lead to friction with the various ecclesiastical authorities in India.

On the other hand, we saw no reason why Government should not arrange with the War Office for the supply of a certain number of army chaplains of various denominations from the home establishment to fill up vacancies in the proposed Indian cadre. Indeed, we considered that in this way the Indian Government would be likely to secure for their enlarged cadre chaplains who are already in close touch with British troops and able to exercise a healthy influence over them, and that the chaplains of the Royal Army Chaplains Department, who now provide the personnel for all foreign military stations except India, would welcome the opportunity of extending their sphere of duty to India.

If this arrangement were approved, chaplains would be detailed for tours of service in India for periods of five years, as in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Engineers, &c., the extension of the term in individual cases being a matter for the home and Indian authorities. While serving in India, they would receive the same pay and allowances as members of the Indian Army Chaplains Department, and they would also be eligible for permanent appointment to that department

12. The Army Chaplains Department in India, constituted partly of men from the home establishment doing tours of duty in India, and partly of men already serving or to be selected by the Indian Government, might, we considered, be administered by Army Headquarters through a Principal Chaplain at headquarters, as proposed in the scheme. The Principal Chaplain should be selected from the 1st class chaplains, irrespective of denomination. Questions of ecclesiastical discipline would be referred to the ecclesiastical heads of the diocese or district, whose spiritual authority would thus be maintained.

13. We recommended that, wherever the number of troops is sufficient for the whole-time service of a chaplain of any denomination, a whole-time chaplain should be appointed for army work alone, and should be relieved of all duties to the civil population. In many of the smaller cantonments it would no doubt be possible, as at present, to combine both duties, and in that case the civil Governments might be required to pay a contribution.

14. The proposal to differentiate between the pay of married and unmarried chaplains appeared to us to be desirable. We laid stress upon the importance of securing chaplains of British nationality (including men from the Dominions) for British troops, especially for the Roman Catholics, who are now mainly served by priests of other nationalities. Priests of other nationalities, whose services may be necessary, should while employed be classified as temporary chaplains.

SECTION V.

Class Composition of Units.

15. On this subject we expressed the opinion that the class squadron or class company system is preferable to the class unit.

16. We recommended, however, that, so far as is consistent with the prospects of recruitment to meet the strain of a normal war, and with existing plans for the reorganization of the Indian Army, the cases of certain pre-war class regiments should be favourably considered.

17. We observed that, if recruitment of a particular class falls short of requirements, the best solution is to dilute existing class units, rather than to withdraw a class company or half company of the class in question from a class company regiment.

18. Finally, we expressed the hope that it might be found possible to arrange that some class unit or units should remain to each class which furnished class regiments before the war.

SECTION VI.

Silladar Cavalry.

19. While stating that we were in favour of the abolition of the silladar system in Indian cavalry, as proposed by the Government of India, we recommended that the change to "non-silladar" should not take place while the unit affected is absent from India; that *asamis* should be paid on conversion, unless the soldier concerned expresses a wish that his credit should be left with Government until his discharge, in which case he should receive a suitable rate of interest; and that the committees, which the Government of India proposed to set up to consider the details of the conversion scheme, should be thoroughly representative of the interests of all ranks concerned in the change.

SECTION VII.

The Burma and Assam Military Police.

20. A question on which we were asked for our advice related to the future of the Burma and Assam military police forces, with special reference to (1) the incidence of cost of their maintenance, and (2) their relation to the military authorities in connection with the defence of the north-east frontier.

We felt that it was outside our province to express an opinion on the incidence of cost as between the Government of India and the local Governments concerned. With regard to the second point, we expressed our concurrence with the views of the General Staff in India, namely:—

(*a*) That the transfer to the army of responsibility for policing the north-east frontier, involving a large increase of expenditure, could not be justified on grounds of military necessity.

(*b*) That the circumstances of the case necessitated the location of the military police in a number of small posts, scattered all over the frontier. This dispersion is opposed to military principles and incompatible with a sound system of military defence, though doubtless suited to the purpose for which the force is primarily employed, namely, the policing of the frontier. For such duties it is desirable to employ local forces, which can be split up into detachments and moved about by the local civil authority without the delay involved by references to superior military officers.

(c) If regular troops co-operate with the military police, it is essential that the operations should be conducted under military direction. But this affords no justification for the suggestion that the military police should be brought permanently under military control. On the contrary, the present system, under which the military police are controlled by the local Government, suffices to meet all normal requirements, and should not be changed.

PART IX.

Conclusion.

We have now completed the task assigned to us. We have examined the conditions obtaining in the army in India at the close of a war of unprecedented magnitude. Many changes are needed, and they should not be postponed. The army in India is not immune from the general unrest prevailing throughout the world. Liberal and sympathetic treatment at the present time, and the removal of such grievances as we have shown to exist, should go far to secure contentment for the future.

2. In our proposals relating to the higher command and to the organisation of Army Headquarters, our main endeavour has been to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of all work that can equally well be performed by his subordinates. We have followed in many respects the organisation of the Headquarter Staff of an army in the field, since we consider that the work of Army Headquarters in India approximates more nearly to field conditions than is the case at the War Office. We have limited, so far as is consistent with efficient working, the number of officers with direct access to the Commander-in-Chief.

3. We have laid special stress on the necessity for decentralisation in India, and for diminishing the detailed control exercised by the India Office. We hope that, if our proposals are agreed to, there will not only be a considerable decrease in correspondence, but that more rapid decisions will remove such discontent as is now caused by delay.

4. Our principal aim has been to promote the efficiency and contentment of the army in India, and to secure that the Government of India will have at its disposal a well-trained and loyal army, fit to take its share in the defence of the Empire.

5. In submitting our recommendations, we have borne in mind that many of them will entail increased expenditure. We are aware that the present cost of the army in India (1920–1921) is already double the pre-war cost. We have therefore been actuated throughout by due regard for economy, but we have not refrained from recommending relatively costly measures, where we are satisfied that these are essential to the contentment and better administration of the army.

6. Our proposals will further increase the annual cost of the army in India. But although the immediate effect of adopting them will be to set up a higher standard of normal expenditure, we do not contemplate the probability of this standard being increased, at least for some years to come, above what can be met from the normal growth of Indian revenues. It is admitted that the first concern of any Government should be defence from external aggression, and the maintenance of internal tranquillity. With the prospect of industrial and agricultural development in India, the revival of trade, and the disappearance of freight difficulties, it is hoped that the revenues of India may expand sufficiently to enable the needs of the army to be satisfied without detriment to other claims.

7. Fresh standards have been set up; existing services require reorganisation, and new services have to be developed and equipped. There is much lee-way, too, to be made up in improving accommodation in conformity with modern requirements. All these will involve heavy initial expenditure. We venture to suggest that it might be

advantageous, from the point of view both of finance and of military administration, to adopt a system somewhat on the following lines:—

(*a*) The military authorities should first prepare a programme, showing the capital expenditure entailed by measures such as those indicated above.

(*b*) The Government of India would thus be in a position to gauge their liabilities, and to decide to what extent they could be met, and over what period the programme should be spread; and could proceed to obtain the Secretary of State's sanction, where necessary, to the expenditure involved.

(*c*) The Government of India might then arrange to give a definite allotment (over and above the sum required for the ordinary yearly upkeep of the army) towards the carrying out of this programme of special expenditure. This allotment should be expressed in terms of a total sum, to be spread over a fixed number of years. Lapses in the yearly allotment should be carried forward into the following year's budget, and remain at the disposal of the military authorities for the carrying out of this programme. Within the amount of the special provision, the military authorities should have a free hand in deciding to which of the measures in the programme priority should be given. The accounts relating to the expenditure on these measures should *pro formâ* be maintained separately.

(*d*) Subject to these conditions, the military authorities should be required to work strictly to the annual budget provision for the upkeep of the army, except in so far as this may prove impossible owing to unforeseen causes, such as military operations, or increases in the cost of food-stuffs, &c., occurring in the course of the financial year.

8. The Indian army is the instrument of the Government of India, by whom it is paid and administered, subject to the general control of the Secretary of State for India. We consider therefore that, subject to such control, the Government of India should be the final authority in matters connected with the pay and allowances of officers and men of the Indian Army, wherever they may be serving. We find it necessary to state this view, as we have been informed that the more liberal terms recommended by the Government of India have been rejected in several cases on the ground that all charges on account of officers and men of the Indian Army, serving overseas, are borne by His Majesty's Treasury. This does not appear to us to be a valid reason why terms of service should be prescribed which are at variance with the express recommendations of the Government of India, and which result in the creation of numerous inequalities in the rates of pay of officers serving overseas with formations containing Indian troops, or performing duties analogous to those of corresponding appointments in India.

The Government of India have no voice in deciding the rates of pay of officers and other ranks of the British Army, though increases in these rates materially enhance the cost of the army in India, which is entirely borne by Indian revenues. Just as the security of India demands the presence of these British troops, so the fresh military obligations devolving on the Empire as a result of the war necessitate the employment overseas of considerable numbers of Indian troops. We consider that the Government of India have the right to claim, as an essential condition of lending their troops for such duties, that they should be the final authority in all questions of pay and allowances, subject always to the control of the Secretary of State for India. This right needs to be explicitly safeguarded.

ESHER.
M. F. O'DWYER.
H. V. COX, Lt.-Gen.
H. HUDSON, Lt.-Gen.
G. FELL.
WEBB GILLMAN, Maj.-Gen.
UMAR HAYAT.
K. G. GUPTA.

C. M. WAGSTAFF, Colonel,
Secretary.

22nd June, 1920.

ANNEXURE I.

Minute by Sir Krishna G. Gupta.

I have signed the Report, because I believe that the Civil Government of a country must have in the future, as it has had in the past, a potent and effective instrument in the army, for repelling external aggression and maintaining internal peace, and because I agree with my colleagues that our proposals, if adopted, will greatly increase the efficiency of the Army in India. I wish, however, to make a few observations, not by way of dissent, but rather as supplementing what has been said in the Report.

2. It seems to me that the great importance of the momentous declaration of policy made in the announcement of August 1917 has not been sufficiently realised. The British Government have, in clear and unmistakable terms, affirmed their future policy in the governance of India, viz., increased association of Indians in all branches of the administration, and the introduction of responsible government with a view to place India on the road to the attainment of Dominion status; and this policy has been reaffirmed in the preamble to the Reforms Statute which was passed last year.

3. From the battle of Plassy in 1757, when the East India Company acquired for England her first footing in India, till 1858, when the Crown assumed the direct government of India, the principle underlying all measures was the maintenance of British domination and supremacy. In accordance with that principle all power, authority and control, whether civil or military, was concentrated in the hands of the British bureaucracy, and Indians were relegated to very subordinate positions.

4. As a legacy of the unhappy events of 1857, a feeling of distrust now further supervened and permeated the whole policy of army administration. Indians had always been excluded from the King's commission. A new restriction establishing a ratio of two Indians to one European was introduced into the rank and file.

5. Ever since the assumption of the government by the Crown there has been a steadily widening difference in policy between the civil administration and the army organisation. During the last half-century measures have been taken to extend the Indian element in the higher branches of the civil administration, and, in later years, to introduce the principle of representation in the Legislative Councils which culminated in the Statute of last year. On the military side, however, the tendency has been to make the grip closer and tighter, so as not only to keep the Indians out of all superior positions, but also practically to exclude them from the artillery and various other services, which form essential branches of the army organisation.

6. But now that a solemn declaration of policy has been made, such a distinction must no longer be observed, if that declaration is not to remain a dead letter or a mere pious wish. Distrust must now give place to confidence. It is not enough that the civil administration should be democratised and placed on a representative basis, but Indians should also be eligible for positions of trust and responsibility in the army. The adoption of measures which shall make the Civil Government responsible to the people does not, in itself, make a country autonomous and self-governing, nor can it ever become so, as long as the administration of the army remains in other hands.

7. In the covering letter of 3rd November, 1919, submitting Part I of the Report, it has been observed (p. 4) that "we desire also to mention that we have been requested in considering our recommendations to avoid, if possible, framing them in such a manner as may hereafter prove inconsistent with the gradual approach of India towards a Dominion status." I was not a member of the Committee when that letter was written. If I had been, I should have urged that our recommendations should not only be not inconsistent with Indian autonomy, but that they should be so framed as to help India to attain the goal which had been set down for her. I should be failing in my duty to the British Government, and unfaithful to my country, if I did not take this opportunity to express my conviction that we can peacefully attain national unity and full responsible government only through the sympathetic help and guidance of Great Britain, and that it is therefore to our advantage to remain, so long as we can do so with due self-respect, a component part of the great British Empire. But if we are to achieve this goal of national unity and full responsible government, it is necessary that the British Government should completely change their angle of vision in regard to military administration in India, and that they should be prepared to share the control of the army with the people of the country.

8. To that end several measures are urgently called for, and I shall briefly touch on them :—

(a) The superior ranks of every branch of the army, including the Artillery, Air Force, Engineers, Transport and Supplies, &c., should be freely open to qualified Indians, and for this purpose the number of King's commissions to be given to Indians should be materially increased every year. A better method of selection than that which obtains at present should also be adopted, so that not merely the scions of wealthy families, but the best qualified candidates, irrespective of birth or creed, will have a chance of competing. As in every other country, so in India, it is the educated middle-classes which must furnish the largest contingent of officers.

(b) Enlistment for the regular army should not be restricted to what are called martial races. The result of the present policy has not been completely satisfactory. It has thrown an unusually heavy military burden upon one province—the Punjab, the evil effects of which are already becoming apparent. It has taken the field of recruitment outside the borders of British India—bringing into the Indian Army men who are not British Indian subjects, such as the Pathans from the N.W. Frontier and the Gurkhas from Nepal. The trans-frontier Pathans have been discredited, and no longer form any appreciable part of the Indian Army. The area of recruitment should, therefore, be extended to all parts of India and everything should be done to stimulate the martial and patriotic spirit, which decades of neglect and discouragement have depressed but never wholly extinguished.

(c) No effort should be spared to make the Territorial Force a success and a real adjunct to the regular army.

(d) The practice of officering the Indian Army by regular periodical drafts from Europe is not only very costly but it is harmful to the best interests of India in another way. The British officer leaves the country generally in the prime of life, so that all his ability, knowledge and ripe experience are lost to it.

(e) Steps should be taken in due course to establish in India training and educational institutions for all branches of the army. At present almost all the training of the superior officers is done in England. This is an inconvenient arrangement for India and will become impracticable when more Indians get King's commissions. The best Indians may be prevented by cost alone, among a variety of reasons, from coming to England for training. The admitted success of the Quetta Staff College, and also of the Officers' College at Indore, shows that it is not a difficult matter to arrange for training in India. To start local institutions may appear costly at first but will be cheaper in the end. Besides, India must gradually be made self-supporting in every respect. We have advocated the adoption of this policy (Part II, Section I) as regards supply and munitions. The same reason holds good even with greater force for the application of that principle to the personnel of the army.

(f) The imported article, whether personnel or material, must necessarily be more costly than that which can be obtained at home. The British soldier roughly costs three times as much as the sepoy. The proportion is not so high in the case of the officer, but the fact that the British officer has to be remunerated adequately tends to raise the scale of pay of the Indian officers and thus adds to the total cost of the army in India. Our proposals must add largely to the army expenditure, which is already high, and the only way of introducing economy without impairing efficiency is gradually to increase the Indian element in the ranks as well as in superior positions.

K. G. GUPTA.

22nd June, 1920.

ANNEXURE II.

Minute by Sir Umar Hayat Khan.

We have in Part III of our Report made certain recommendations on the subject of securing liaison between the civil and military authorities in obtaining information of attempts made by agitators to spread disaffection. I would go further and advocate drastic action against all such agitators, who should be rigorously excluded from all cantonments or districts where their activities may be a cause of possible contamination.

During the sessions of the Army in India Committee I was too busy to go to Sandhurst and make enquiries about the Indian cadets there. I have since learned that their progress, generally speaking, is far from satisfactory. It seems very doubtful whether all will qualify for commissions or will be suitable for commissions, and whether those who do qualify will be willing to serve for more than a short period in the army. The inference is that some at least of the cadets selected for Sandhurst were not of the right class, as I predicted in a note on the subject written in 1915 and placed before the military authorities.

If this mistake is not rectified in the future the number of commissions allotted every year to Indians will fall far short of what it was intended to be, and public money, as well as the time of the cadets and their instructors, will be wasted. I would suggest that the shortage, which occurs owing to the selection of candidates of the wrong type, should be made good in the following years, so as to secure the full sanctioned number of Indian officers with King's commissions.

I have already pointed out that the army should not be allowed to be tampered with, as it is the only instrument in the hands of the Government to maintain internal peace and to cope with external aggression. I desire to emphasise this further, in view of what I have since learnt of the recent happenings in India. They force me to suggest that the reforms in the army should be introduced on more cautious lines. In the last disturbances attempts were made to tamper with the army, as was done in the Mutiny of 1857, but the bulk of the army was away, and, as many of the units had just returned from the war and had seen the might of the British Government, they were not, with very few exceptions, carried away by the intrigues of the revolutionaries.

Just as it is necessary, in the interests of efficiency, to have old and seasoned soldiers amongst the ranks of the Indian Army, it is equally essential to stiffen it by the British element, *i.e.*, by British units, however expensive it may be. The necessity for this I have seen myself in various campaigns, especially in the last war. There have been occasions when it was only the presence of British units which kept the Indian troops staunch. It must not be forgotten that, while British troops are fighting for the integrity of the Empire, the Indian soldiers, gallant though they have often shown themselves, cannot have the same inducement to fight for a distant Raj, and therefore require the stiffening which British troops afford. I hope that reformers with Utopian ideas will not persuade the Government to depart from this sound and established policy. If the revolutionaries succeed in bringing about serious trouble, coupled with a mutiny and foreign aggression, before India is fit for self-government, it will cause a set-back to India which will be detrimental to all classes, particularly those who have any stake in the land.

To recruit from the classes which lack the martial spirit or military traditions would be a great mistake, as they would never stand the strain of war. If the line is broken on the weak spot where such troops are holding it, the other portions, even if held by the best troops, may have to be abandoned, and this may bring disaster in its train. This remark would equally apply to both officers and soldiers recruited from such material, and to enlist them would not only be a waste of time and public money, but would be inadvisable, as already illustrated by an experimental regiment of a certain class during the war.

I would strongly urge that any change in the composition or organisation of the army connected with the Reforms, or any other alteration in the angle of vision, should be only introduced when all these experiments have first been proved successful and have stood the test in every other department of Government.

UMAR HAYAT.

22nd June, 1920.

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EAST INDIA (MILITARY).

DESPATCHES REGARDING OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IN MESOPOTAMIA.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

No. 205.—The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the General Staff, dated the 2nd February, 1915, submitting despatches from Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., and Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., describing the operations of I.E.F. "D" at the head of the Persian Gulf up to the 28th November, 1914. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the manner in which the operations were conducted and the behaviour of the troops engaged. His Excellency in Council also shares the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the support rendered by the Royal Navy which conduced so materially to the success of the operations.

From the Chief of the General Staff to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, dated Delhi, the 2nd February, 1915.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the undermentioned reports on the operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D" up to the 28th November, 1914:—

(i) Report by Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., on the operations of I.E.F. "D" up to the 14th November, 1914; and

(ii) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding I.E.F. "D," on the operations of his force at the head of the Persian Gulf, from the 14th to the 28th November, 1914.

2. His Excellency considers that the operations were conducted with skill and energy and that the discipline and steadiness of the troops reflect the greatest credit on all ranks. He desires to commend to the favourable consideration of Government the officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are brought to notice in the reports, and wishes specially to invite attention to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett's remarks in regard to the very valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy which he cordially endorses.

3. His Excellency recommends that the reports be treated as despatches and published in the "Gazette of India."

From Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 16*th Brigade, I.E.F. "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, dated Camp Saniyeh,* 16*th November,* 1914.

On the arrival of Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett at this camp and on conclusion of my period of independent command I have the honour to report as follows:—

2. The force under my command, known as I.E.F. "D," left Bombay on the 16th October in four transports, part of a large convoy. On 19th October we parted company and steered for Bahrain Islands, under escort of H.M.S. "Ocean." No. 1 Brigade, Indian Mountain Artillery, joined the force off Jask on the 21st. We arrived on the 23rd and anchored off Manama. Here we remained until the 2nd November.

3. On that date the Force sailed for the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab in compliance with instructions contained in your radio-telegram No. 6571. Pilots were taken on board off Bushire, and the Force arrived at the outer bar of the river on the evening of the 3rd November.

4. The 4th and 5th November were occupied with naval preparations and the transports themselves were prepared with bullet-proof cover on the upper decks for the use of parties detailed for covering fire.

Major Radcliffe, 2nd Dorset Regiment, returned from Kuweit on 5th with information that the Fort was in ruins but that guns were in position. A landing force was detailed for the capture of Fao, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher, 2nd Dorset Regiment, and orders issued. On the 5th the transports crossed the outer bar of the Shatt-el-Arab and anchored just outside the inner bar.

5. At 6 a.m. on 6th November H.M.S. "Odin," preceded by launches sweeping for mines, stood in and bombarded the Turkish guns outside the Fort, 3 miles south-east of the telegraph station at Fao. The hostile guns were soon silenced; they were well served for a time and hit the "Odin" twice. On the signal being made that the guns were silenced the transports "Umaria" and "Varela" advanced in that order, each towing eight boats full of troops alongside; the "Mashona" (armed launch) towed seven boats full of troops and the Royal Navy steam launches towed the detachment of Marines from H.M.S. "Ocean." Off the telegraph station the boats were cast off and made for the shore. Some 600 Infantry landed with one section, Mountain Artillery, complete with mules and one squad, Sappers and Miners. There was no opposition. When the 1st and 2nd reinforcements had also landed, Colonel Rosher assembled his force and marched south-eastwards to occupy the Fort. This was accomplished during the night of the 6th-7th, the guns were dismounted and thrown into the river and Colonel Rosher's command returned to Fao.

6. While the troops who had landed were being re-embarked on the 7th November, the General Officer Commanding with remaining transports proceeded up the river till within sight of the Oil Refinery on Abadan Island. On the 8th November the river was reconnoitred for a suitable landing place. A firm high bank with deep water close up to it was found at Saniyeh; the transports were called up and troops began to disembark. The disembarkation continued during 9th and 10th November being practically complete by evening of latter date.

7. It was proposed to advance from this camp and attack the Turks at Shamshumiya by land, but the reported advance of Turkish troops from Basrah and the necessity of safeguarding the Oil Works, combined with the absence of news from India regarding the arrival of reinforcements, decided me to remain at Saniyeh. With the intention of an early forward movement, as little baggage and supplies as possible were landed at this camp. Reconnaissances both up and down stream on the 9th and 10th failed to discover any enemy.

8. On the evening of the 10th reliable news was received from the Sheikh of Mohammerah that Sami Bey with a strong combined force of Turks and Arabs had arrived from Basrah at a point opposite Mohammerah with the intention of attacking our camp. At 3 a.m. on the 11th the Sheikh reported that Sami Bey had started to make the attack. Troops were turned out and outposts strengthened. The Turkish force, of whom over 300 were actually seen, delivered a determined attack at 5.30 a.m. on an advanced post held by one double company 117th Mahrattas with 2 machine guns. They advanced to within 50 yards of the post but were driven off by a dashing counter-attack delivered by the 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, with the assistance of the 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery. The enemy lost heavily in their retirement across the desert, 19 dead were counted, 14 wounded were brought in by us and 6 prisoners were taken. Abandoned rifles and equipment were found. The Turks officially acknowledged a loss of 80 men.

9. The defences of the camp were further strengthened and daily reconnaissances made. On the 14th November, Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett with the 18th Brigade and Divisional Troops arrived at this camp.

10. I would invite attention to the difficulties of communication in the Persian Gulf during the period covered by this report. Constant thunderstorms interrupted the wireless system. The installation on R.I.M.S. "Dalhousie" is apparently of poor quality and the operators not very experienced. This ship had to be stationed at Bushire to connect with the cable there. The wireless station at Jask was frequently in communication with H.M.S. "Ocean" in the sense that the station would answer the call of the warship but it would not take in any message for transmission. No night watch is kept at Jask.

11. Several points to which I would earnestly invite attention are mentioned in the "Notes" made at intervals in the "War Diary" which is forwarded by the same mail as this report.

12. I would mention that the stay of the Force at Bahrain was of advantage as it enabled me to have British and Indian Corps instructed in rowing and handling of boats and to rehearse the operation of a landing in force.

13. All ranks have performed their duties in a most zealous and creditable manner.

14. I would bring to notice the great assistance given me by the following officers in planning and carrying out the operations for the occupation of Fao and the landing at this camp:—

Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., Senior Naval Officer, H.M.S. "Ocean."
Commander Hamilton, Royal Indian Marine, Principal Marine Transport Officer.

15. I would also report that the masters of the various transports* gave all the assistance in their power. I would specially bring to notice the name of Mr. T. L. Mills, R.N.R., Master of the S.S. "Varela," British India Steam Navigation Company, who displayed great zeal and willingness to perform operations beyond those usually required of a master of a merchant vessel. I trust that it will be found possible to recognise his services.

* "Varela" } British India Steam Navigation Company.
"Umaria"
"Umta"
"Berbera"
"Masunda."

16. In connection with the Turkish night attack on the 11th November I would report that the counter-attack I ordered on the attacking force was carried out in a most dashing and skilful manner by the 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry and the 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. Rattray, 20th Infantry.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D" FROM 14TH TO 28TH NOVEMBER, 1914.

From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi. No. 101-G, dated Basrah, the 7th December, 1914.

I have the honour to submit for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the following report of the operations of the troops under my command from the 14th to the 28th November, 1914.

2. On the morning of the 14th November, the S.S. "Elephanta," with my Headquarters, and four other transports anchored in the river opposite Saniyeh, where Brigadier-General Delamain's force was already bivouacked. The disembarkation of the troops was commenced at once. Infantry used the ships' boats and experienced no difficulty in getting ashore. The landing of the guns, wagons and horses of the field artillery and of the cavalry horses in lighters and dhows was greatly delayed by the strong tide and current, the want of proper landing places, and by the shortage of lighters and steam craft for towing purposes. Every possible use was made of all the craft available, and with the hearty co-operation of the officers and men of the Royal Navy, the Indian Marine and the transports, considerable progress was made. The hatch covers of the transports were utilised as ramps for horses and guns, while excellent work was done by the Sapper companies.

3. In the course of the day I learnt from General Delamain of the presence of a hostile force at Saihan, four miles distant, and I ordered him to attack it the following morning. A full account of the action which ensued will be found in the attached report from General Delamain. I have already mentioned, in my telegraphic report of this action, my appreciation of the skilful and spirited manner in which this attack was carried out, and of the credit due to all who were engaged The result was entirely satisfactory, as it enabled our advance on the 17th November to take place without our right flank being harassed.

4. Our information on the evening of the 16th was to the effect that a force of the enemy would probably be met with about Sahil and Zain, while his main body was believed to be in position at Balyaniyeh. At that time the whole of the cavalry, sappers, and the infantry of the 18th Brigade had been landed, but only one battery of the 10th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. I was informed that the Sheikh of Mohammerah was apprehensive of an attack on Failieh from the enemy's forces on the

left bank, and also that the attitude of the neighbouring Arabs would depend, to a great extent, upon our ability to make headway against the Turks without undue delay. I therefore decided that it would be in our best interests to advance at once, with the whole of the force then at my disposal, leaving the remaining field batteries to be disembarked as rapidly as possible and to follow us as soon as circumstances would permit.

5. A copy of operation orders issued for Tuesday the 17th November will be found attached.† My intention was to turn the enemy's right flank, and drive him through the palm groves on to the river, so that the two sloops, "Odin" and "Espiegle," which moved up the river on a level with our advance, might be able to co-operate.

† Appendix 2.

6. After leaving the bivouac we moved across the open desert, the surface of which, owing to recent rain, was still very muddy in places, though fortunately free from creeks or other obstructions.

At 8.50 a.m. a report was received from the advanced guard to the effect that the enemy's position extended from a ruined mud fort, which was plainly visible, somewhat to the right of our line of advance, north-westwards through Hassanain to Zain.‡ At 10 a.m. the enemy's guns opened fire. I then ordered the 110th Mahratta L.I. to reinforce the advanced guard and moved up the 16th Brigade on its right, leaving a space between the two brigades for the artillery to come into action, and retaining as reserves the 48th Pioneers and the 120th Infantry. Each of the two Brigade commanders had then at his disposal three battalions of infantry and a company of sappers, with the cavalry covering the left flank of the whole force, and the two sloops on the river to our right, though at some distance, with only the tops of their masts appearing above the belt of palm trees. The whole of the artillery, consisting of the 23rd and 30th Mountain Batteries, and the 63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, subsequently joined by three guns of the 76th Battery, which were hurried up during the action from the landing place, were placed under the Commander, Royal Artillery.

‡ This report proved substantially correct, except that their position extended about ¾ mile to the S. of Old Fort along the date-palm belt.

7. While these dispositions were being made, a heavy downpour lasting for half an hour came on. The front was entirely obscured, while the surface of the ground was converted into a quagmire ankle deep over which guns and horses could only move at a walk. The enemy's guns ceased firing, and I was in some doubt as to whether he intended to maintain his position. Our troops continued to advance steadily until 11.45 a.m., when the enemy simultaneously opened a heavy gun, rifle and machine gun fire along his whole front. Our artillery and infantry also came into action. After watching the course of the engagement for some time, I came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to abandon my original intention of turning the enemy's right, which extended some distance, and was echeloned back into broken ground and palm groves. The key of his position appeared to be the old mud fort. I, therefore, sent word to General Fry with the 18th Brigade to engage the enemy's right and centre with a frontal attack, while General Delamain with the 16th Brigade turned his left flank and captured the fort. At the same time I reinforced General Delamain with a battalion from the reserve. General Delamain had meanwhile anticipated my intentions and had already commenced the turning movement. It was at this stage that a large number of casualties occurred on our right, especially in the 2nd Dorset Regiment, which had been the first to come into action, and had met with heavy fire in an exposed position, not only from the mud fort and trenches in front of it, but also from a body of the enemy entrenched on the edge of the palm groves behind and to the south of it. These Turkish regulars were using smokeless powder and were invisible from the point where the guns were in action, the latter being fully engaged with the enemy's artillery and with the long line of entrenchments on the main front Hassanain-Zain. The sloops on the river managed to put a few shells into the mud fort, but were soon obliged to desist owing to their view being obstructed by the belt of palm trees. The turning movement was very skilfully carried out by portions of the 104th Infantry, the 117th Mahrattas and the 22nd Company, Sappers and Miners, and was directed by General Delamain himself. The 18th Brigade and the main body of the 16th Brigade also pressed on steadily, supported by very efficient fire from our artillery. At 1.15 p.m. the whole of the enemy's line quitted its entrenchments and fled rapidly to the right rear into the broken ground and palm trees,

his guns covering the retirement, and finally being skilfully withdrawn from successive positions in the same direction under cover of long earthen embankments, which concealed them from view. The whole of our force advanced firing heavily and doing considerable execution, but the enemy's losses would have been much greater if the state of the ground had not precluded rapid movement, more especially on the part of the cavalry and artillery.

Two abandoned mountain guns fell into the hands of the 7th Rajputs, who were on the left of the line, and numerous prisoners were captured.

At 2.50 p.m. I thought it advisable to issue orders for the pursuit to be stopped. The enemy were then retiring through the palm groves, with banks and mud walls affording facilities for defence, and their retirement was covered by distant fire from their guns. I had to form an entrenched camp before night-fall, and to bring in a large number of wounded, who were scattered over a considerable extent of country.

The enemy's losses have been variously estimated, and probably amounted to about 2,000. Two days after the action 69 dead bodies were found lying in one portion of the position. His total strength is estimated at 3,000 Turks and 1,500 Arabs, with 12 guns.

The troops bivouacked at Sahil on the banks of the river with outposts on the line Sahil—Old Fort—to river bank.

The conduct of the troops throughout this engagement excited my warmest admiration. A very large majority of the men had never been under fire before, yet they behaved as steadily as if at an ordinary field-day, all the details of their training, as inculcated in peace time, being carried out automatically. The behaviour of the Dorset Regiment, when exposed to both frontal and enfilade fire, is especially to be commended. General Delamain has also brought to notice the 22nd Company, Sappers and Miners, who were on the right of the Dorsets.

The enemy's guns were well served and cleverly handled, but fortunately the fusing of the shells was indifferent and the elevation generally too great. Their rifle fire was also too high, and not every effective at close quarters, otherwise our losses would have been much heavier. Our artillery suffered for want of observation posts, but in spite of this their fire was highly effective, and, as was afterwards ascertained, produced a demoralising effect on the enemy.

As may be gathered from the above report, the duties of the commanders of brigades and of other units, as also of the staff were carried out most efficiently. I propose to defer bringing the names of individual officers to notice until the operations of this Force as a whole are finally recorded. At this stage I need only mention those who were especially conspicuous during the actions of the 15th and 17th, as set forth in the brigade commanders' reports attached.

The work of bringing in the wounded continued far into the night, and one ambulance party actually remained out all night, in spite of the fact that the enemy were firing on our piquets at intervals. I desire to pay a very high tribute to the personnel of the medical services, both for efficiency of organization, and for devotion to duty. In addition to our own men, a large number of wounded Turks and Arabs had to be cared for and conveyed on board the transports, at a spot where shelving mud flats and a strong current made boating operations extremely troublesome and at times even hazardous.

On the afternoon of the 17th, it was blowing a hurricane for several hours, in the course of which three large dhows lying alongside the transports, laden with stores ready to disembark, were wrecked, and 10 sepoys and two lascars were drowned.

On the 18th, 19th and 20th we were employed in landing supplies and blankets for the troops, and in reconnoitring the enemy's position at Balyanieh, which was found to be at right angles to the river, with four guns in position on the bank, commanding the north end of Dabba Island, where the S.S. " Ekbatana " and two smaller craft had been sunk to block the ship channel. The naval sloops engaged these guns from below the obstruction, and, as was discovered afterwards, placed a shell inside the battery.

I formed a plan of attack to be carried out on the 22nd in which naval and military forces were to co-operate, but on the 21st I received trustworthy information, confirmed by our cavalry, that the enemy had vacated his position. The report stated that the Turks had quitted Basrah and retired northward in boats to Baghdad, that numbers of armed Arabs had deserted, and that the town of Basrah was in danger of being looted.

Accordingly, I ordered a forced march for 8 p.m. that evening, while the naval sloops were to proceed by river to Basrah, and two battalions were hastily got on board shallow draft steamers to follow them. We started across the desert at 8 o'clock, and at 12 noon the next day we reached the outskirts of Basrah, after a march that was extremely trying to the troops. Frequent delays were caused by the high banks of water channels, which had to be levelled, and in some cases bridged to admit the passage of field guns.

On arrival at Basrah, we learned that the two sloops had got in at 9 p.m. the previous evening, and had succeeded in protecting the buildings on the river bank, to which no damage had been done, except the partial burning of the Custom House and destruction of its contents.

The two battalions had arrived at 9 a.m. on the 22nd and were then patrolling the town, which was perfectly orderly.

I therefore decided to defer making a formal entry into the town until the next morning, as the troops were badly in need of food and rest, and it would have been difficult to arrange quarters for them until the place had been more fully examined.

On the 23rd the troops made a ceremonial march through the town to a selected spot near the mouth of the Ashar Creek, where the foreign Consuls and notables were assembled to meet us, and were presented to me by Mr. Bullard, our late Consul. A proclamation prepared by Sir Percy Cox was then read, the Union Jack was hoisted on a prominent building, a salute was fired from the sloops, the troops presented arms, and three cheers was given for His Majesty the King-Emperor. The German Consul and five other Germans were placed on board transports for conveyance to India.

We were cordially welcomed by the inhabitants, who appeared eager to transfer their allegiance to the British Government.

In concluding this report, I wish to lay stress upon the very great assistance that I have received throughout from Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, and the officers and men serving under him, without which it would have been quite impossible to bring these operations to a successful issue.

I am also much indebted to Sir Percy Cox for his advice and help on all occasions, and for the valuable and accurate information that he was able to procure for me, chiefly through the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who, at the risk of drawing upon himself the hostility of the Turks, has spared no pains to prove himself our true friend and ally.

I reserve for a future report an acknowledgment of the good services done by the officers of the Royal Indian Marine, whose duties in connection with naval transport work have been most onerous.

We have also received very ready help throughout from the officers and men of the transports belonging to the British India Steam Navigation and other companies.

The following is a list of documents that accompany the report:—

1. Extract from Brigadier-General Delamain's report.
2. Operation Order No. 1.
3. Details regarding enemy engaged 17th November, 1914.
4. Commendations for conspicuous conduct.
5. Map* 4 miles to 1 inch.
6. Sketch* map of action.

APPENDIX 1.

Extract from a Report by Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, D.S.O., on the Operations of the 14*th November*, 1914.

* * * * * * *

Information from various sources went to show that Turkish troops were concentrating near Saihan only four miles west of our camp at Saniyeh; and on the 14th November I received the Force Commander's instructions to reconnoitre and dislodge this hostile gathering without involving my own force too seriously. I thereupon issued Operation Order No. 7.

---

*Not reproduced.

The force under my command consisted of the 30th Mountain Battery, the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, and the 104th Rifles, with 23rd Mountain Battery and the 20th Infantry in camp held ready to reinforce if we became engaged.

The force marched at 6 a.m. from Camp Saniyeh and on reaching the southern edge of the date palms turned westwards, the Advanced Guard (Major Clarkson, 1 Section Mountain Battery, 4 Companies 2nd Dorsets) keeping 1,200 yards from the edge of the date groves and followed by the Main Body at approximately the same distance.

The march was continued in this order till the Advanced Guard was approximately south of Saihan village and creek at 7 a.m. At 7.10 a.m. the enemy opened fire on the Advanced Guard from two positions on the edge of the date groves with rifles and machine guns and on the main body with artillery. The 104th Rifles were sent immediately to turn and capture the enemy's first position and then to work through the date groves from the east. The Mountain Battery (2 Sections) assisted the 104th Rifles and 1 Section kept the hostile guns in the Turkish second position in check. The 104th took the first Turkish position in capital style about 8.30 a.m. At the same hour the reinforcements arrived from camp.

The Advanced Guard was then reinforced by the remaining half-battalion of the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, and extended to their left so as to outflank the second Turkish position from the desert side. The 30th Mountain Battery was put under the orders of the Officer Commanding, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, who now commanded the Advanced Guard. The 20th Infantry (less 4 Companies) filled the gap between the Advanced Guard and the 104th Rifles on our right, leaving the 4 Companies of the 20th Infantry and 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery in general reserve under my own hand. A general advance was then made on the second Turkish position, assisted by the admirably directed fire of both the Mountain Batteries, from which the enemy suffered severely. The position was entrenched and held by the Turks with determination. It was gallantly rushed by the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, about 9.30 a.m. The enemy made off northwards through the date palms.

In the meanwhile, the 104th Rifles on our right found the ground inside the wood very difficult owing to the numerous irrigation cuts. They pushed forward slowly till they reached the line held by the 2nd Dorsets and the 20th Infantry, meeting with strong opposition at a fortified village, where there were posted 1 gun and 1 machine gun.

The arrival of Turkish reinforcements from their force near Umm-ur-Rowais might now be expected at any minute.

In view, therefore, of my instructions not to get too seriously engaged, I ordered a withdrawal to camp, after doing considerable damage to the Turkish camp. The retirement was unmolested.

H.M.S. "Odin" co-operated in the action by steaming up the river parallel with the troops, but owing to the impossibility of observing fire through and over the belt of date palms, her fire was necessarily restricted to a minimum.

I estimated the enemy's strength at 1,200 with 4 mountain guns and 3 machine guns. From information given by prisoners the force appears to have been considerably stronger. I put their losses at 160 dead and wounded unable to move. We took prisoners 6 unwounded and 19 wounded, including a battalion commander.

Our casualties came to :—

Captain Maclean, 104th Rifles.
Lieutenant Yeatman, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment. } Severely wounded.

Rank and File.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment	5	38	*Nil.*
104th Rifles	3	14	"
20th Infantry	—	2	"
No. 1 Brigade, Indian Mountain Artillery	—	1	"

The behaviour of all the troops was admirable. The co-operation between artillery and infantry was good.

I would mention that the information regarding the enemy obtained by Major H. Smyth, Special Service Officer, proved to be absolutely correct.

I bring to notice the good work done by the following :—

(*a*) Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, who commanded the main attack on the enemy's position in an able manner.

(*b*) Major H. A. Holdich, Brigade Major, 16th Brigade. An able Staff Officer who gave me the greatest assistance during the engagement.

(*c*) Lieutenant E. B. Allnutt, R.A.M.C., in medical charge of the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, reported as having displayed great gallantry in attending the wounded on the open plain.

(*d*) Bugler Surain Singh, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, reported by the Officer Commanding, 104th Wellesley's Rifles, as having very bravely set fire to a village held by the enemy.

* * * * * * *

APPENDIX 2.

Operation Order No. 1 *by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding Force " D," dated Force Headquarters, Camp Saniyeh, the* 16*th November,* 1914.

Reference 4 *miles to* 1 *inch map.** [*Not reproduced.]

1. *Information.*—A considerable body of the enemy was driven out of their camp at Saihan yesterday with severe loss. Opposition may be expected from other bodies here and further north-west.

2. *Intention.*—To march as light as possible to new camp on Turkish bank of river, all baggage, &c., being carried on ships. The Naval forces will co-operate under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer.

3. *Ammunition.*—Infantry must carry 200 rounds per rifle on person and other arms as much as possible.

4. *Starting point.*—The starting points are the 3 bridges south-west of the 16th Brigade camp; they will be marked by red lamps and flags by the 16th Brigade.

Head of Main Body to pass at 6 a.m.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General will control traffic.

5. *Advanced guard.*—Officer Commanding—Major-General C. I. Fry.

Guide—Captain Cochran.

Troops.—1 Squadron, 33rd Light Cavalry.
1 Mountain Battery.
17th Company, Sappers and Miners.
2 Battalions 18th Brigade.

6. *Main body* in order of march—
Cavalry less 1 squadron.
Force Headquarters.
Headquarters and Divisional Signal Section, No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.
Divisional Engineers less 1 Company Sappers and Miners.
Remainder 18th Infantry Brigade.
48th Pioneers.
Divisional Artillery, less 1 Mountain Battery.
16th Infantry Brigade, less 1¼ Battalions.
Field Ambulances (Bearer Sub-Divisions only) less those allotted to Brigades.
2nd Line Transport.

7. *Flank Guards.*—Right Flank Guard, Officer Commanding—Lieutenant-Colonel McGeorge, 117th Mahrattas.

Troops.—¾ Battalion 16th Brigade.

Left Flank Guard, Officer Commanding—Major Scott.

Troops.—1 Double Company 16th Brigade.

The Right Flank Guard to march 1,000 yards west of date palms.

8. *Rear Guard.*—Officer Commanding, Major Robinson, 117th Mahrattas.

Troops.—1 Double Company 16th Brigade.

9. *Medical.*—Field Ambulances are allotted as follows :—

16th Brigade $\frac{17}{B}$ B. F. A. $\frac{125}{\text{A. B. C.}}$ $\frac{\text{Bearer Sub-Division only.}}{\text{I. F. A.}}$
18th Brigade $\frac{16}{C}$ B. F. A. $\frac{126}{\text{A. B. D.}}$ I. F. A.
Unallotted $\frac{16}{D}$ B. F. A. and $\frac{125}{D}$ and $\frac{26}{C}$ I. F. A.

Sick and wounded will be carried with the force by these medical units.

10. *Transport.*—Pack transport will be allotted as follows at 4 p.m. to-day.

British Infantry	50 pack mules per Battalion.
Indian Infantry	38 „ „ „ „
Mountain Artillery Brigade ...	18
Royal Field Artillery Brigade ...	*Nil.*
Divisional Engineers	70
Pioneer Regiment	53
Cavalry	50
Field Ambulances	48 pack and 80 riding mules.
Divisional Signal Company ... Headquarters and Divisional Section and each Brigade Section	23

Reports to Force Headquarters at head of main body.

R. N. GAMBLE, *Colonel,*
General Staff Force "D."

APPENDIX 3.

ENEMY ENGAGED IN THE BATTLE OF SAHIL, 17TH NOVEMBER, 1914.

Estimated strength.

4 Q. F. Field Guns (3·25 in.).
8 Mountain guns.
3 Machine guns.
3,500 Regular Infantry.
200 Gunners.
350 Gendarmes.
Probably another 1,000 armed Arabs in the palm belt.

They belonged to the following Regiments:—
- 1st Battalion, 113th Regiment.
- 2nd Battalion, 113th Regiment.
- 2nd Battalion, 112th Regiment.
- 160 men of 1st Battalion, 26th Regiment, European Turks.
- Gendarmes of Halim Bey.

Part of the 1st Battalion, 114th Regiment was probably present.
The enemy were commanded by Bimbashi Adie Bey.

Enemy taken prisoners.

Major Mahomed Ali Captain Raouf Lieutenant Mahhi	of 1st Battalion, 113th Regiment.

47 men (excluding those severely wounded).

Estimated enemy's casualties.

About 800 killed and severely wounded, and a considerable number of slightly wounded.

Captured.

Two Mountain guns and a large number of rifles.

APPENDIX 4.

Extract from the Report of the General Officer Commanding, 16th Infantry Brigade, on the operations of his Brigade up to the 20th November, 1914.

* * * * * *

I recommend for reward the following officers, non-commissioned officers and men from those favourably brought to notice by Commanding Officers :—

2nd Dorset Regiment.

Major H. St. J. Clarkson, for gallantry.

Lieutenant and Adjutant F. G. Powell, for general assistance and conveying messages under heavy fire.

2nd-Lieutenant E. L. Stephenson, for commanding his company with conspicuous coolness and dash after his Major and Captain had been killed.

Lieutenant E. B. Allnutt, R.A.M.C., in medical charge, for again displaying conspicuous bravery in attending the wounded under heavy fire in the open. Many men owe their lives to this officer.

No. 3865 Colour Serjeant and Acting Serjeant-Major Delara, for coolness and gallantry.

No. 8558 Private Moores, who showed great courage in bringing up ammunition under heavy fire.

No. 7712 Private Hughes, who when the machine gun officer was wounded, took command of the one uninjured gun and under heavy fire brought it to close range where it was of much use.

No. 6591 Serjeant Drew, who, though wounded, continued to lead his men with coolness and bravery.

3rd Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant Matthews, R.E., for gallantry in leading a mixed party of Sappers and 104th Rifles and establishing the flank attack on the edge of the date groves.

Jemadar Feroze Ali. After Captain Twiss and the Subadar were wounded, this Indian Officer was in command of about 100 men who did excellent work in spite of heavy casualties.

No. 2855 Naik Dalip Singh, No. 22 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, behaved with conspicuous gallantry in the action at Sahil on the 17th November, 1914, when with a party of Sappers under Lieutenant Matthews, R.E., he showed himself very forward in action and led his squad with great determination into Turkish trenches.

104th Wellesley's Rifles.

Captain Chadwick, for gallantry.

Subadar Sabal Singh (first in grove), } for gallantry with Lieutenant Matthew's
No. 2336 Lance Naik Net Singh, } party.

117th Mahrattas.

Captain and Adjutant E. G. Hall, for gallantry. This officer was severely wounded.

I regret that I omitted to bring to favourable notice the services of Mr. Bryant, the Marconi operator on board S.S. *Varela*, of the British India Steam Navigation Company. Mr. Bryant was untiring in his efforts to secure communication, and when the apparatus on the *Dalhousie* broke down, he volunteered instantly to go across from Bahrain to Bushire to set matters right. The force owed much to his skill and devotion to duty, and I trust that it may be found possible to recognise his services.

Extract from the Report of the General Officer Commanding, 18th Infantry Brigade, on the operations of his Brigade up to 20th November, 1914.

* * * * * *

When all did well and where there was no opportunity for conspicuous individual action, I have no special recommendations to make.

Extract from the Report of the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, I.E.F. "D" on the operations of the Artillery under his command up to the 20th November, 1914.

* * * * * *

All ranks behaved with exceptional coolness and steadiness, and I wish to bring to notice the good work done by Lieutenant-Colonel Greer and Major Broke Smith throughout the action.

Extract from Reports of the Assistant Director, Medical Services, Indian Expeditionary Force " D," in connection with the Service under his command up to the 20th November, 1914.

I wish to bring to notice the especially excellent work done by the following Medical Officers during the engagement of the 17th instant :—

Captain Wright, I.M.S., 126th Indian Field Ambulance.
„ Hislop, I.M.S., 126th Indian Field Ambulance.
„ Lambert, R.A.M.C., 17th British Field Ambulance.
Lieutenant Allnutt, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer, Dorset Regiment.

* * * * * *

The undermentioned Assistant Surgeons and Sub-assistant Surgeons did conspicuously good work in attending the wounded under heavy fire on the 17th November, 1914, and are recommended for promotion as stated opposite their names :—

3rd Class Assistant Surgeon J. H. S. Huffton, to 1st Class Assistant Surgeon.
4th Class Assistant Surgeon, J. H. T. Pacheco (wounded) to 3rd Class Assistant Surgeon of three years' standing.
No. 282 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon V. U. R. Pandit, 104th Rifles, to 2nd Class Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon.
No. 318 2nd Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Shaikh Azimud-din-Shaik Ismail to 2nd Class Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

No. 597.—The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the General Staff, dated the 8th June, 1915, submitting despatches from Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., describing certain operations of Indian Expeditionary Force " D " up to the 31st March, 1915. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the manner in which the operations were carried out and the conduct of the troops engaged. His Excellency in Council also shares the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Marine.

From the Chief of the General Staff to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, No. 11854-1, *dated Simla, the 8th June,* 1915.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the undermentioned reports on the operations of Indian Expeditionary Force " D," up to 31st March, 1915 :—

(i) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., on the operations resulting in the capture of Qurnah, 9th December, 1914;
(ii) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., on an engagement north of Qurnah on 20th January, 1915;
(iii) Officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers brought to notice by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., for good services rendered during the operations from November, 1914, to 31st March, 1915.

2. His Excellency considers that the operations in question were skilfully carried out and that the conduct of the troops reflects credit on all ranks. He desires to commend to the favourable consideration of Government the officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are brought to notice in the reports, and wishes to invite attention to the valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy and Royal Indian Marine.

3. His Excellency recommends that these reports be treated as despatches and published in the " Gazette of India."

From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi. Headquarters, Basrah, No. 174-G., dated 29th December, **1914.**

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the accompanying reports by Major-General C. I. Fry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Frazer and Commander W. Nunn, R.N., on the operations which resulted in the capture of Qurnah, and the surrender of the Turkish garrison with its commander, the late Vali of Basrah.

The force originally despatched from Basrah on the evening of the 3rd December for this purpose consisted of two guns of the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one company of Norfolks, half company 3rd Sappers and Miners, the 104th Rifles and the 110th Mahrattas under command of Colonel G. S. Frazer. Two of the transports containing these troops were armed with two field guns each, to be placed at the disposal of the Senior Naval Officer as soon as the landing of the troops had been completed.

Colonel Frazer's orders were to land at a spot, selected by Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., on the left bank of the river a few miles below Qurnah, and, acting in concert with the naval force, to clear the left bank of the enemy up to and beyond Qurnah, after which he had a free hand to decide whether to cross the river and attack the village of Qurnah, or to hold on and await reinforcements.

It will be seen from Colonel Frazer's report that the clearing of the left bank was carried out most successfully.

The enemy on this bank, after being driven from his entrenchments and from the village of Muzaira'ah, fell back to the north, while our leading troops got engaged with those holding the village of Qurnah on the right bank. Owing to the thick groves of palm trees at this spot, intersected as usual by numerous creeks, touch was lost with the retreating Turks, who were thus enabled to cross the river unmolested higher up stream; while Colonel Frazer, being unable to cross the river under a heavy fire, withdrew for the night. It will be seen from the report of Captain Nunn, R.N., that although the naval guns and the field guns on the transports were able to afford most efficient support during the first part of the action, the ships and armed launches, one of which was disabled, could not, owing to being exposed to heavy shell fire, go far enough up stream to bring an effective fire to bear upon the enemy holding this village.

I consider that Colonel Frazer accomplished all that could have been expected of him, having regard to the limited number of troops under his command. The Turks had been reinforced before the action commenced and were in greater strength than was expected.

As soon as the transports containing wounded and prisoners returned to Basrah, I ordered General Fry to take up reinforcements consisting of four more field guns, the remaining three companies of the Norfolk Regiment, the 7th Rajputs and a half battalion of the 120th Infantry.

His orders were to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly before renewing the engagement, and to let me know if he considered more troops would be required. He asked for a Mountain Battery and some transport mules, which were despatched as quickly as possible.

The further course of the action is fully described in General Fry's report, and it only remains for me to express my high appreciation of the skilful manner in which they were carried out and of the excellent behaviour of the troops engaged. I consider that the crossing of the river was a most creditable performance, and I trust that the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Campbell and the non-commissioned officers and men of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, who swam the river, will meet with due recognition.

I also wish to endorse General Fry's commendations of other officers and men who distinguished themselves during this engagement, although, as I have already mentioned in a previous report, I propose to defer bringing the names of individual officers to notice until the operations as a whole have been concluded. I much regret that the force has now lost the services of Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., and the officers and men of H.M.S. "Ocean," who have now rejoined their ship and quitted the Gulf.

List of accompaniments to despatch.

I.—Report on the operations of General Fry's column on 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th December, 1914.
  Appendix "A."—Report on transport arrangements.
  „ "B."—Order of battle for operations, 7th December.
  „ "C."—Detail of ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah on 9th December.
II.—Report on the operations of Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer's column on 4th December, 1914.
  Appendix "D."—Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Clery, 104th Rifles, on operations 4th December.
  „ "E."—List of casualties 4th December.
III.—Report by Commander W. Nunn, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, on the operations 4th-9th December, 1914.
Maps and Sketches—
  Sketch map of Camp Shaib.
  Sketch map of action of 7th December.
  Sketch map of Muzaira'ah.
  Sketch of crossing of River Tigris.
  Sketch showing operations of 4th December.
  Map of country round Qurnah, scale 4 inches to 1 inch.
  Sketches illustrating the Senior Naval Officer's Report (Part III.).

Not reproduced.

Enclosure No. I.

Report on the Operations of General Fry's Column on 6th, 7th, and 8th December, 1914, culminating in the Surrender of Qurnah.

The troops despatched from Basrah on the 5th December to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer's Column (104th Rifles, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, and section 82nd Battery) arrived at Camp Shaib at 5 a.m. on 6th December and disembarked, extending the existing perimeter camp to the north. Colonel Frazer had arranged for a reconnaissance of the enemy's position by three companies under Major Hill at 8 a.m., and during this, I and one of my staff went on board H.M.S. "Lawrence" to confer with Sir P. Cox and Captain Hayes-Sadler, Senior Naval Officer.

The enemy had re-occupied Muzaira'ah after Colonel Frazer's operation of the 4th December and appeared to be actively engaged in entrenching the position.

At 10.30 a.m. the enemy opened fire with two guns from the southern end of Muzaira'ah on Major Hill's reconnaissance, firing about six groups of two shots of well-timed shrapnel, and at 11 a.m. opened on the "Lawrence," firing six groups of two shots. They appeared to be ranging new guns.

The reconnaissance returned to camp, while the "Lawrence" withdrew a short distance down stream.

At 2.30 p.m. the Senior Naval Officer reported that about 500 enemy with two guns were advancing from Muzaira'ah across the plain. The 110th were sent forward to reinforce the outposts with two sections, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. After some brief long range fire the enemy retired, and beyond a small affair of outposts just before dusk, when the enemy advanced too close, necessitating the reinforcement of the outposts by one double company, there was no sniping or other disturbing element during the ensuing night.

From my intelligence it appeared that the enemy had been considerably reinforced since Colonel Frazer's action on 4th, and were now estimated at 1,200 to 1,500 about Muzaira'ah with six guns, and about 800 in Qurnah with four guns.

As any forward movement from Muzaira'ah would enable the enemy to shell the camp (though the danger was a night one only), and to prevent any further reinforcement to the enemy, I decided that an early attack on Muzaira'ah, with the clearing of the left bank of the Tigris River was essential to further operations. This, however, would have been ineffectual unless I was prepared to remain in possession of captured ground. The opening of a short line of communication to Shaib Camp would be essential, and consequently 320 mules were wired for, being the minimum estimated requirement. (For the working of this line *see* Appendix "A.")

On 7th December the force (Appendix "B"), less one half-double company per battalion and details of other units left in camp, assembled on the further side of the creek just north of the camp at 9 a.m. Considerable delay occurred owing to difficulties experienced by the field artillery in crossing this shallow creek, filled by an exceptionally high tide.

My plan of attack was for the 2nd Norfolk Regiment and the 120th Infantry to attack the village of Muzaira'ah and the trenches south of that place, while the 110th Light Infantry, echeloned back on the right of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was to carry out a turning movement against the north of the village, the 7th Rajputs and 104th Rifles being held in reserve. The section, 82nd Battery, was directed to support the left attack, the two sections, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, the right attack. The Mountain Battery and transport mules asked for had arrived at camp, and I must here express my thanks for the prompt despatch of these, the latter being specially necessary for my plans. The 30th Mountain Battery at once joined the force for the action, and was placed between the field batteries to support either flank as required.

Close co-operation had been arranged for with the Senior Naval Officer. For the distribution of troops and subsequent movements *see* Sketch Map of action of 7th December.*

The advance commenced at 11 a.m. over an absolutely level and bare open plain without a vestige of cover, and at 11.15 a.m. 82nd Battery opened fire on Muzaira'ah at a range of 2,750 yards.

Ten minutes later the enemy opened rifle fire from the village and trenches covering it, and at 11.45 a.m. the 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, came into action at 3,800 yards range. Two of the enemy's guns then opened fire on the 76th Battery from the north end of Muzaira'ah, the flashes being visible, but they were silenced in ten rounds and did not re-open fire, being subsequently captured intact.

The infantry were meanwhile steadily advancing and all artillery advanced to closer ranges. As the infantry came into action each line successively dropped their blankets to facilitate movement and these were collected after the action.

The 2nd Norfolk Regiment and 120th Infantry came under some enfilade fire from trenches on the enemy's right, but the prompt switching of fire on to that flank by the 82nd Battery and guns from the ships, combined with vigorous action on the part of the 120th Infantry, reinforced by a double company, 7th Rajputs, with Maxim guns effectually checked any danger from that direction.

Meanwhile the 110th Light Infantry executed their turning movement against trenches on the north of Muzaira'ah, till at 12.50 p.m. the whole of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment being now merged in the firing line, the village was stormed at the point of the bayonet, the enemy not waiting to receive the charge.

The pursuit through the palm groves was vigorously carried out by the 120th Infantry and 2nd Norfolk Regiment, while the 110th Light Infantry cleared the trenches immediately north of Muzaira'ah. The 104th Rifles followed closely after the 110th Light Infantry and, as the latter regiment swung towards the river, moved northwards, clearing further trenches occupied by the enemy in their retirement. All the artillery moved round the north of Muzaira'ah and shelled the enemy.

At 2 p.m. two hostile guns opened fire from the north-north-east, the flashes only being visible. These were silenced in seven minutes by searching fire from 76th Battery at 4,100 yards range, and teams were seen galloping away, leaving the guns. A squadron of cavalry or even a troop during this pursuit would have been invaluable, for the two guns could undoubtedly have been captured and probably a large body of the enemy (estimated from 1,000 to 1,500) could have been rounded up, with their line of retreat up the river bank cut.

Major Maule, 82nd Battery, had meanwhile placed one of his guns in position on the left bank of the Tigris at the northern edge of the palm groves and effectually raked the river front of Qurnah at a range of 2,300 yards.

The 7th Rajputs, except for one double company reinforcement to the 120th, were in reserve throughout the action.

Through the palm groves the fighting continued till nearly dusk, the enemy bringing a heavy fire to bear from Qurnah and along the river bank.

Camp was arranged for the force in some gardens between Muzaira'ah and the palm groves, where, though within shell fire from Qurnah, it was hidden from view and covered by the glare of the burning village. By 5 p.m. all units were settling into camp except the 110th Light Infantry, who were covering the operation from the north-west and who came in after dark. About this time two enemy's shell were burst outside the north-west corner of camp, and at 9.30 p.m. five shells were fired over the glowing village: no damage was done and the ensuing night was devoid of incident.

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* Not reproduced.

The captures this day included 3 field guns, about 130 prisoners and a large number of rifles which were destroyed.

The enemy are estimated to have had about 2,000 troops on the left bank, and subsequent information places their casualties at about 200 killed and 300 wounded; but the latter is probably under-estimated. Our casualties were British officers wounded 5; Indian officers wounded 3; rank and file killed 8; wounded 112, of whom 2 have since died.

I must acknowledge the admirable support extended by the Artillery and the Navy, which seems to have paralyzed all artillery resistance.

From my intelligence this evening it appeared that about 1,500 of the enemy escaped northwards up the left bank of the Tigris and that the majority had embarked and fled north, while in Qurnah itself were some 800 regulars with 4 guns.

I decided to attempt a crossing of the Tigris without delay.

Early on the morning of 8th December the half Company (No. 17) Sappers and Miners were despatched to the northern edge of the palm groves to get a line across the river. The 104th Rifles were to reconnoitre and cover the operations from the north; the 110th Light Infantry and 2nd Norfolk Regiment were moved to the edge of the palm groves, the former to cross and the latter to cover the crossing, while the artillery moved to positions in support, and the 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs were to distract attention opposite Qurnah itself in combination with the naval force.

The dispositions of the crossing are shown in sketch of crossing of River Tigris.*

At 11.30 a.m. Havildar Ghulam Nabi swam across the Tigris with a log line accompanied by Lance Naik Nur Dad and Sapper Ghulam Haidar, and in spite of a strong current and the possibility of a heavy fire being brought on them at any moment, they succeeded in swimming the 130 yards of river and landing on the right bank. Lieutenant Campbell, R.E., then went across and the 1½ inch wire cable, especially brought up for the purpose, was hauled over and made fast; a difficult feat in the strong current on an ebb tide.

A dhow was secured with the assistance of two or three friendly Arabs, and being brought across, the first party of some 70 men, 110th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer and Captain Cochran, General Staff Officer, 3rd grade, for Intelligence, successfully landed on the right bank at 1.20 p.m. under some rifle fire from dhows down stream. Though the operation was tedious, the rest of the Battalion was gradually pushed over.

Meanwhile the Navy and a Double Company of each of the 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs were distracting the enemy's attention in front of Qurnah successfully; for the crossing did not appear to have been realized by the enemy till too late, though some rifle and ineffectual shell fire was experienced.

The 104th Rifles had earlier reported that they could cross about 1½ miles up stream by 3 dhows, the crews of which were friendly. They were directed to cross and come up on the right of the 110th Light Infantry for the advance on Qurnah, while the 2nd Norfolk Regiment detached half a battalion to replace them.

The single gun, 82nd Battery, only returned the enemy's fire, and it was not found necessary for the other guns to disclose themselves. One Section, 30th Mountain Battery, without mules, followed the 110th Light Infantry across the river, but were not employed, as Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, meeting with some opposition north of Qurnah, decided it was too late in the day to storm the town with the probability of street fighting.

The 104th Rifles, 110th Light Infantry and Section 30th Mountain Battery accordingly went into camp on the right bank near the flying bridge. One Double Company, 110th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Britten, however, moving down the right bank, did not get the order to retire, and entering the enemy's position on their right, enfiladed their northern defence and occupied three towers in this part of their position. This Double Company, being isolated, later withdrew to camp without casualty for the night.

To support this force on the right bank, the 2nd Norfolk Regiment were left to camp at the end of the palm groves on the left bank, other units resuming their camp at Muzaira'ah.

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* Not reproduced.

The ensuing night was devoid of incident.

Our casualties this day were 23 rank and file wounded.

At 5 a.m. on 9th December, as I was about to resume operations, I received intimation from the Senior Naval Officer that a deputation of officers from Subhi Bey, the late Vali of Basrah and Turkish Commander, had boarded H.M.S. "Espiegle" about midnight, stating that the Vali was prepared to surrender unconditionally.

I met a deputation, consisting of the Chief Staff Officer and 2 Lieutenants on board at 8.30 a.m. when arrangements for surrender were made and all movements of troops stopped.

At 1.30 p.m., accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, Captain Hayes-Sadler (Senior Naval Officer) and Staffs, I landed at the Vali's house and received his surrender, returning to him his sword in recognition of his able defence.

Meanwhile the 104th Rifles and 110th Light Infantry had moved into Qurnah, and piquets were posted round the town, the remainder of the battalions being drawn up round the Turkish force which had fallen in with piled arms on the open square at the south corner of the town.

At 2.30 p.m., the Union Jack was formally hoisted and the transference of the prisoners to the paddle steamer "Blosse Lynch" was proceeded with. The detail of ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah are shown in Appendix "C."

General remarks and recommendations.—I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops throughout these operations and their steadiness under heavy fire. Their tactical formations were admirably adapted to the ground which afforded no cover, and the units were handled with marked ability.

My thanks are due to Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., for his very close co-operation with his naval force throughout these operations, which was of invaluable assistance.

The fact that there were so few casualties was due to the splendid co-operation of the field and mountain artillery. Their fire was rendered very difficult owing to mirage, but in spite of this they maintained an accurate fire on the enemy's trenches right up to the moment of assault. They also immediately silenced any of the enemy's guns which opened fire. *Major St. T. B. Nevinson*, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, acted as Commander, Royal Artillery and directed this co-operation with great skill and ability. *Major St. J. Maule*, 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, throughout showed great initiative, and his action in bringing a gun to bear on the river front of Qurnah on the 7th and 8th December had much to do with the decisive issue of the operations.

Major H. J. Cotter, 30th Mountain Battery, and *Captain E. V. Sarson*, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, gave valuable services.

No. 98166 *Battery Sergeant Major H. E. Haggett*, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, is noted for exceptionally able and energetic assistance.

No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners. I cannot speak too highly of the services rendered by this half Company throughout, under the command of *Lieutenant R. C. Lord, R.E.* They have had very hard work and their devotion to it has been of incalculable assistance.

Major H. E. Winsloe, R.E., acted as my A.C.R.E. and ably directed the operation of bridging the river Tigris.

Havildar Ghulam Nabi, No. 2632, swam across the Tigris with a log line accompanied by *Lance Naik Nur Dad, No. 3743, and No. 3898 Sapper Ghulam Haidar.* There was a strong current in the river which was about 130 yards wide, and the enemy were occupying the opposite bank only a short distance down stream. Although they were not fired on, there was every reason to expect they would be, as the ground on the opposite bank was densely wooded and favoured the approach of an enemy. It was owing to their gallant action that the steel cable was got across and the flying bridge constructed. I recommend *Havildar Ghulam Nabi* for the "Order of Merit" and *Lance-Naik Nur Dad and Sapper Ghulam Haider* for the "Distinguished Conduct Medal."

Lieutenant M. G. G. Campbell, R.E., deserves special recognition for his gallant crossing over the Tigris, holding on to the log line only, when a strong current was running, to superintend the hauling over of the steel hawser and fix the running tackle for the flying bridge—he was for some time under fire while performing this difficult operation.

2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.—This fine Regiment has throughout been an example to others, both in the field and in camp. Their cohesion and the precision in their movements showed that they have attained a very high standard of efficiency in their peace training, the credit for which is due to *Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Peebles, D.S.O.*, who has commanded the Regiment with marked ability and energy.

Captain W. J. O'B. Daunt (severely wounded) proved himself a gallant leader.

Captain and Adjutant G. de Grey was particularly conspicuous in taking messages to the firing line, and conveying ammunition to it when it was running short.

Lieutenant H. S. Farebrother for bold handling of his machine gun section over absolutely open ground.

No. 5008 Sergeant W. Bailey (twice wounded) for work with machine guns.

No. 5223	Lance-Sergeant L. Snell	for exceptionally gallant and useful work during the attack on Muzaira'ah.
„ 5973	Sergeant A. Cornwall	
„ 7226	Lance-Sergeant Leveridge	
„ 7345	Corporal W. Fristin	
„ 7521	Musician Mullinger	
„ 7784	„ Sharpe	
„ 8049	Private A. Dawson	
„ 8365	„ F. Pryor	did particularly well, attending to Captain Daunt when wounded.
„ 8632	„ A. George	

Captain D. Arthur, I.M.S., was particularly conspicuous in attending Captain Daunt and other wounded when exposed to heavy fire, and throughout the action.

7th Rajputs.—This Regiment was held in reserve throughout, but one Double Company under Lieutenant-Colonel Parr did well when it reinforced the 120th Infantry.

Lieutenant W. L. Harvey.—For the very efficient manner in which he brought up his machine gun section in support of the 120th Infantry; he was wounded just after adjusting a jam in one of his guns.

Subadar Brijmohan Singh handled his company in a very efficient manner when brought up in support of the 120th Infantry and acted throughout with conspicuous bravery and coolness.

104th Rifles.—This Regiment has been engaged in every action which has taken place during this campaign and has met with very heavy casualties. Their work under my command during these operations has throughout been excellent and quite up to the fine traditions of the Regiment. During the action of the 7th they were in reserve, but were thrown in towards the end of the action and carried out the pursuit well. On the 8th *Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Clery* showed great initiative in securing the 3 dhows up stream and his action greatly facilitated the rapidity of crossing.

Captain H. M. Butler (severely wounded) for exceptional skill and gallant leading of his Double Company in the attack on Muzaira'ah.

Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pundit, I.S.M.D.—During the attack on Muzaira'ah on the 7th December, 1914, Rifleman Ghos Mahammad was shot by an Arab, who was hiding in one of the huts. Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pundit called on a sepoy of another Regiment to enter the hut and clear it. The sepoy seemed reluctant to do so, and this Sub-Assistant Surgeon took his rifle and bayonet, entered the house and closed with the Arab. The sepoy followed and between them they killed him. He has also shown exceptional bravery in attending wounded under fire.

110th Mahratta Light Infantry.—This Regiment carried out the turning movement on the enemy's left flank on the 7th with great intelligence and dash and worked well on the 8th.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. X. Britten.—His action on 8th December, 1914, in capturing 3 towers on the right of the enemy's position at Qurnah shows him to be a resourceful and dashing leader.

Captain K. E. Cooper showed great dash and bravery attacking through the north end of Muzaira'ah. He approached one small house from which fire was being kept up, climbed a wall at the back and shot 4 Turks, who were occupying it, with his revolver.

Subadar Hari Savant and *Jemadar Vishun Ghone* for conspicuous coolness and ability in handling their Half Double Companies on 7th and 8th December, 1914.

No. 2089 Lance-Naik Bhan Sawant (since killed), a young soldier who showed much dash and spirit in command of the scouts of his company.

No. 1148 Lance-Naik Haider Beg, a signaller, who on two occasions signalled an important message from the firing line to the artillery, standing up fearlessly in the open under heavy fire, doing so, as he could not see properly in any other position.

120th Rajputana Infantry.—This Regiment, consisting of only Headquarters and 2 Double Companies, acted with great boldness and spirit on our left flank and ably supported the 2nd Norfolk Regiment when the latter came under enfilade fire from the enemy's right.

Lieutenant and Adjutant W. L. Miskin showed great dash and capacity. After Captain Macready was wounded he took command of that officer's Double Company and handled it well, having twice to change direction to meet enfilade fire, and on each occasion succeeded in turning out the enemy.

Subadar Dunga Rawat for conspicuous bravery and coolness in handling his Half Double Company.

No. 978 Havildar Gunesh for marked capacity as a leader.

Medical Services.—The Field Ambulances under *Major E. Bennett, R.A.M.C.*, worked with great devotion on the 7th and were under shell fire for a short time that night.

Transport.—I must recognise the good work done by the portion of the 10th Mule Corps under *Jemadar Allah Din* and endorse the recommendations to notice of individuals mentioned in paragraph 12 of Appendix "A."

Headquarters.—Finally I would bring forward the names of *Captain E. G. Dunn*, Royal Irish Rifles, my Brigade Major, who again gave most valuable and energetic assistance in the working out of the details of the operations. His clear conveyance of my orders materially assisted in the successful issue of the operations. Also *Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist*, 52nd Sikhs (F. F.), my Staff Captain, who again proved himself an able, energetic and resourceful Staff Officer; he, in the absence of either a Supply or Transport Officer, organized and maintained an unfailing supply to the troops from my original camp at Shaib.

Captain H. G. Morrell, 119th Infantry, in command of the 18th Brigade Section of the 34th Divisional Signal Company, carried out his duties under difficult circumstances very ably and with untiring energy.

Captain G. W. Cochran, 81st Pioneers, General Staff Officer, 3rd Grade for Intelligence, worked unsparingly and the information he collected turned out to be very accurate. He also gave me much assistance in other ways.

APPENDIX A.

Report on the working of the transport between Shaib Camp and Muzaira'ah.

1. On arrival at Shaib on the morning of the 5th December, 1914, General Fry decided to get up three hundred mules, his intention being, when the village of Muzaira'ah was captured and the troops reached the left bank of the Tigris, to maintain himself there and attempt to cross above Qurnah.

2. A demand for 320 mules was therefore sent to Basrah at 1 p.m. on December 5th.

3. These mules (320) arrived on the morning of the 7th at 7 a.m. They were disembarked by 9 a.m.

4. I ordered them to feed and saddle up at 12 noon. Captain Lanyon, of the Norfolk Regiment, was put in charge of the mules to distribute them. I gave him a distribution list showing how mules were to be allotted.

5. At 1 p.m. orders were telephoned to camp to load up the mules as it was seen that Muzaira'ah would soon be in our possession.

6. About 4.30 p.m. the mules began to arrive in Camp Muzaira'ah. As it was getting dark and spasmodic firing was going on the confusion was considerable.

All the mules were unloaded, however, and in the dark assembled by the duffadars and taken back to camp.

This evening the Regiments got each :—

16 loads rations,
8 „ ammunition,
8 „ tools,
8 „ cooking pots,
some kits,

and so were amply provided for.

7. The orders for the 8th, 9th and 10th were to send up one day's rations each day.

8. As it was feared that the horses might not be able to get full forage rations on 8th, 190 loads of forage were sent for and arrived after dark on 8th.

With them came 48 mules for duty in Muzaira'ah as 1st line mules in case of a further advance across the river. The mules this day therefore did a double trip.

9. There being ample forage in camp, the mules on 9th and 10th only brought up men's rations from Shaib, while 48 mules assisted in carrying up kits of units as they were sent across the Tigris.

10. Eventually all the mules were taken to the right bank of Tigris on the 12th, having been used to ration the troops left on the left bank and to bring up the remains of kits left in camp.

11. On the 8th, when two units were passed over to the right bank, all available mules and the 30th Mountain Battery baggage were used to send up their kits, so that by the evening the troops across the river were rationed and had their blankets that night.

12. Captain Lanyon speaks very highly of the work done by *Jemadar Allah Dih* who commanded the mules. His work was of the greatest help.

The Kote Duffadars :—

2193 Busaki Ram,
6417 Jamal Din,
205 Mir Dad,

were of the greatest help to me in collecting their mules in the dark and in constantly moving backwards and forwards.

The men, of whom I saw a certain amount, were cheery and worked well, and though they were under spasmodic shell fire on 7th and 8th and had to cross the plain where bullets, though spent, were falling, behaved very well indeed.

APPENDIX B.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Major-General C. I. Fry's Column on 7th December, 1914.

	Commanding ...	Major-General C. I. Fry, Indian Army.
Staff	Brigade Major ...	Captain E. G. Dunn, Royal Irish Rifles.
	Staff Captain ...	Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist, 52nd Sikhs.

Attached—

G.S.O., 3rd grade (Intelligence).	Captain G. W. Cochran, 81st Pioneers.
A. C. R. E.	Major H. E. Winsloe, R.E.
O. C. Brigade Section, 34th Divisional Signal Company.	Captain H. G. Morrell, 119th Infantry.

TROOPS.

Artillery :—

76th Battery, R.F.A. (less 1 Section).		Major St. T. B. Nevinson.
82nd Battery R.F.A.	one section on each of "Medijieh" and "Blosse Lynch."	Major H. St. J. Maule.
30th Indian Mountain Battery ...		Major H. J. Cotter.

Engineers :—

17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners (less 2 Sections).	Lieutenant R. C. Lord.

Infantry:—

18th Brigade	2nd Bn., Norfolk Regiment	Lt.-Col. E. C. Peebles, D.S.O.
	7th D.C.O. Rajputs (less 1 D.C.) ...	Lt.-Col. N. E. Robin.
	120th Rajputana Inf. (less 2 D.C.)	Lt.-Col. E. Codrington.
	110th Mahratta Light Infantry ...	Lt.-Col. G. S. Frazer.
	104th Rifles	Lt.-Col. C. B. Clery.

APPROXIMATE STRENGTH.

Unit.	B. O.	I. O.	Br. R. & F.	Ind. R. & F.	Guns.
76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery	4	—	60	—	4 18-pr.
82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery	5	—	62	—	6
30th Mountain Battery	5	3	—	277	6 10-pr.
17th Company, Sappers and Miners	3	1	—	75	—
2nd Norfolk Regiment	23	—	845	—	2 m. g.
7th Rajputs	10	13	—	479	2 m. g.
110th Mahratta Light Infantry ...	10	17	—	675	1 m. g.
120th Infantry	9	10	—	404	2 m. g.
104th Rifles	12	16	—	670	2 m. g.
Brigade Signal Section	1	—	11	18	—
Staff and Attached	5	—	3	—	—
Total	87	60	981	2,598	10 18-pr. 6 10-pr. 9 m. g.

NAVAL FORCE.

H.M. Ships.—"Espiegle," "Odin," "Lawrence."
H.M. Gunboats.—"Miner," "Lewis Pelly," "Shaitan."
S.S. "Medijieh," "Blosse Lynch."
2 guns on S.S. "Medijieh"
2 guns on S.S. "Blosse Lynch."

N.B.—One ½ D. C. each unit (120th details only) and details from other units were left in Camp Shaib as guard out of these numbers.

APPENDIX C.

Detail of Ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah on 9th December, 1914.

Ordnance.—2 Krupp Field guns.
2 Mountain guns.
1 ·303 Maxim-gun (recovered after its loss 4th December, 1914).
22 Officers' swords.
776 Rifles (of which some 250 were handed over to Navy at their request).

N.B.—Large quantities of ammunition were destroyed.

Prisoners of War.

Subhi Bey, late Vali of Basrah and Turkish Commander.

——	Officers.	Rank and file.
1st Battalion, 26th Regiment (Anatolia)	12	353
2nd Battalion, Murrattab Regiment (Bagdad) (Amara) ...	13	345
1st Company, 1st Battalion 28th Regiment Artillery ...	2	63
Turkish Navy	1	3
Basrah Battalion Gendarmerie	7	177
Medical	4	11
Supply, etc.	3	11
Vali's Staff —	1	5
Wounded in hospital	2	21
Total	45	989

Enclosure No. 2.

Copy of Report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Frazer, **110***th Mahratta Light Infantry, Commanding, Qurnah Column, on the operations of the* **4***th December,* **1914,** *dated Camp Um Rash,* 5*th December,* **1914.**

I have the honour to report as follows on the operations yesterday :—

2. My Staff Officer, Captain Branson, who was wounded, has already taken to you most of the details, and I sent you a wireless in code last night.

3. The disembarkation yesterday morning was carried out quickly and without confusion.

Two small creeks delayed the advance of the column till they could be rendered passable.

My Advanced Guard was, in the first instance, directed so as to pass well to the east of Muzaira'ah.

As all the scouting had to be done with Infantry, the advance was not very quick.

It was first reported that there was no enemy in Muzaira'ah and I then changed the direction of the Advanced Guard so that their right passed to the east of Muzaira'ah.

It was then discovered beyond a doubt that the enemy were in position along the edge of the date palms between Muzaira'ah and Qurnah.

I directed the Advanced Guard to clear the village and brought up the other ½ Battalion of the 110th on their left, and attacked the enemy on their left flank.

It then became known that Muzaira'ah was occupied by the enemy,

I sent the Norfolks, 1 D.C., to support the ½ Battalion 110th attacking the village.

Eventually the Sappers and Miners also joined the right attack.

The village was cleared and also the trenches in front of the date trees, where the 110th captured 69 prisoners and 2 abandoned field guns (9 prs.).

In the meantime, the ships had been shelling Qurnah and the date groves, and the Royal Field Artillery Muzaira'ah, and the practice of all guns seemed to be excellent.

The troops after this did not come under shell fire, but the rifle fire opposed to them was considerable.

When the troops entered the date grove I reinforced the left half of the 110th by ½ Battalion of 104th, and the enemy was driven back to the Tigris River, where they quickly effected a crossing by means of boats arranged as flying bridges.

At 2.10 p.m. I ordered a retirement to the place near where we disembarked and there formed camp.

After my Infantry entered the date grove my Field Artillery was unable to render any further assistance.

The Tigris east of Qurnah is from 200 to 300 yards wide and field guns cannot operate against Qurnah owing to the date trees.

My retirement to camp was well and steadily carried out.

I am of opinion that until guns can be brought up to demolish the houses of Qurnah, the only way to effect a landing would be to do so with country boats north of Qurnah.

All the troops under my command performed their duty most thoroughly.

Captain Branson, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, my Staff Officer, afforded me the greatest assistance and was wounded shortly after I had decided to retire, while I was issuing the orders.

I attach a report from the Officer Commanding 104th.

The Officer Commanding 110th reports as follows :—

> " Of the officers who came under my observation I should like to particularly mention Major Hill and Lieutenant Hind in the Company firing line, and Lieutenant Ball who handled the machine guns most efficiently."

No. 959 Lance-Naik Apa Bagive displayed great bravery during the attack on the enemy's position in the date groves, and in the subsequent advance towards Qurnah. He was carrying the flag on the left of the line in order to indicate the position of the line to the warships. The flag was a very conspicuous mark, and drew a heavy fire from the enemy. Lance-Naik Apa Bagive carried the flag absolutely in the open. Had he taken cover, the flag might not have been visible.

I am sending down all prisoners on "Blosse Lynch," "Malomir" and "Medijieh" under command of Captain Bayley, Royal Field Artillery.

APPENDIX D.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Clery, Commanding, 104 *Rifles, to the Staff Officer, Qurnah Column, dated* 5*th December,* 1914.

As requested, I have the honour to forward the names of the following officers and men of the regiment under my command, who were conspicuous for their gallant conduct during the action on the 4th instant opposite Qurnah:—

Captain E. G. J. Byrne.—This officer in the face of a heavy and accurate fire brought his machine guns right up to the firing line on the river bank opposite Qurnah. From here his fire was so galling to the Turks that they brought up a field gun and endeavoured to silence the machine guns. Several of the shells hit the parapet where the machine guns were; notwithstanding this, Captain Byrne kept his guns in action, and did not retire from his position until ordered to retire. This officer on two previous occasions on which the Regiment has been in action, has brought his detachment forward most intelligently and gallantly. On this occasion he received one bullet through his helmet and one cut his puttee.

2. Subadar Ghulam Rasul.—This Indian officer was conspicuous for the gallant manner in which he led his men forward in the face of a heavy accurate and short range fire from the Turks.

This officer was subsequently killed.

3. Jemadar Kishna Ram.—Conspicuous pluck under fire, and assisted a wounded man to rear under heavy fire during the retirement.

4. No. 2317 Lance-Naik Guman Singh.
5. „ 2866 Rm. Khota Ram.
6. „ 2578 Rm. Dhanna Ram.
7. „ 2090 Rm. Maula Dad.

8. When ordered to retire, the two machine guns had to be carried by hand some 250 yards back to the mules under heavy fire. Not having enough men to take away all the ammunition boxes as well as guns, the machine gun officer asked four men to return to the position and recover the ammunition boxes. They did so under a heavy gun and rifle fire and brought back all the boxes to the mules, although the troops had left the trench.

9. No. 2435 Havildar Mohru Ram, when left in command of a long mixed firing line, performed meritorious service in controlling this line and opening very heavy, accurate fire on the Qurnah position, thus keeping the enemy's fire down while other parts of the firing line retired.

10. No. 1615 Reservist Jhonta Singh, "B" Coy.—Meritorious conduct during the retirement from the river, in carrying Rm. Jai Singh, who was severely wounded through the chest, on his shoulders for 600 yards under heavy fire, over a number of water nullahs, finally handing him over to some dhoolie bearers.

Reservist Jhonta Singh was previously recommended by his Double Company Commander for good work during the action of November 15th, when he carried ammunition forward to the firing line from mules that had fallen into a canal.

11. No. 2263 Bugler Narsu Singh, "A" Coy.—For meritorious conduct in taking written orders regarding the retirement under a heavy fire along the firing line on two occasions—once to extreme right and again later on to the machine guns on the left.

12. No. 3241 Rm. Sobh Singh, "A" Coy., and No. 2981 Rm. Kan Singh, "A" Coy.—For meritorious conduct in carrying between them Rm. Jat Singh, "A," who was severely wounded in the head, under a heavy fire during the retirement for some 300 yards to the dhoolie.

14. No. 3195 Rm. Ratna Ram.
15. „ 2112 „ Dunga Ram.
16. „ 2670 „ Kheta Ram.
17. „ 3143 „ Kema Ram.
18. „ 2422 „ Jowana Ram.

The above men for meritorious conduct, who, in the absence of Indian Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, were conspicuous in taking the place of Non-Commissioned Officers in leading their commands forward under a heavy and accurate fire.

19. No. 2463 Bugler Kala Khan, for meritorious conduct. On November 15th this man with another during retirement from Saihan carried Captain Maclean out of action. On 17th November and 4th December he again performed meritorious work in carrying messages backwards and forwards from the Officer Commanding to the officers in the firing line.

APPENDIX E.

Casualties on December 4th.

Units.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
2nd Norfolks	—	3	—
3rd Sappers and Miners	—	2	2
110th Mahratta Light Infantry	5	16	3
104th Rifles	1 I. O. 13	28	2 W. & M. 8 M.
No casualties, Royal Fleld Artillery			
2 mules killed			
2 „ wounded...			
1 machine gun missing, 110th			

1 B. O. wounded; 1 I. O. killed.
Indians.—18 killed.
British.—3 wounded.
Indians.—46 wounded.
Indians.—15 missing.
Enemy reported in Qurnah, 600 and 4 guns; outside, 700 and 2 guns.

Captured { Gunner officer.
Infantry Captain, 2nd-in-command.
Another officer.
75 prisoners.
1 gun captured.
1 „ destroyed.

Enclosure No. III.

From Commander W. Nunn, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, to the General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade, dated H.M.S. "Espiegle," Qurnah, 15th December, 1914.

In the absence of Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., of H.M.S. "Ocean," who was Senior Naval Officer at the time, I beg to forward a short report from the naval point of view on the Qurnah operations from 3rd December to the 9th December, 1914.

The names of H.M. ships engaged were as follows:—

H.M.S. "Espiegle"	Commander W. Nunn, R.N.
„ "Odin"	Commander C. R. Wason, R.N.
„ "Lawrence"	Commander R. N. Suter, R.N.
H.M. Armed Launch "Lewis Pelly"	Lieutenant in Command, J. F. B. Carslake, R.N.
„ „ „ "Miner" ...	Lieutenant in Command, C. H. Heath-Caldwell, R.N.
„ „ „ "Shaitan" ...	Lieutenant Commander in Command, F. G. S. Elkes, R.N.R. (killed in action).

I have the honour to report as follows on the part taken in the operations for attack and occupation of Qurnah by H.M.S. "Espiegle" under my command.

On Thursday, 3rd December, H.M.S. "Espiegle" left Basrah at 3.50 p.m., and anchored to northward of Dair, about 10 miles south of Qurnah, at 7.45 p.m., and weighed, and proceeded at 5.5 a.m., on 4th December towards Qurnah, followed by H.M. Ships "Odin" and "Lawrence" and armed launches "Miner," "Lewis Pelly," and "Shaitan" and the four Lynch's steamers "Medijieh," "Blosse Lynch," "Malomir," and "Salami," carrying the troops.

"Medijieh" and "Blosse Lynch" each had two 18-pr. field artillery guns mounted in the forepart of the deck house.

On rounding the river bend near Um Rash, fire was opened on us by two Turkish guns mounted to the south-west of Muzaira'ah village, and we at once replied, opening fire at 6.45 a.m.

The transports went alongside the bank just south of Um Rash village and disembarked troops, and at 9.20 a.m., they had disembarked and were advancing towards enemy.

The "Blosse Lynch" and "Medijieh" came up and anchored off our port quarter at 9.55 a.m., and opened fire. At this point the enemy's fire was fairly accurate, and they were firing on us from the two Muzaira'ah guns and also from Qurnah.

At 10.5 a.m., "Espiegle" was hit on port bow but not damaged, and was also hit several times later, "Lawrence" also being hit several times.

"Odin" had been left in a position to guard the camp which was formed at the place of disembarkation.

At 1.0 p.m., the armed launches were ordered up to assist in the attack as our troops were seen to have practically reached the left bank of the Tigris opposite Qurnah. The launches opened a rapid, accurate fire and a hot fire was opened on them by the Turkish guns and riflemen.

At about 1.40 p.m., "Miner" was seen to be listing and she returned towards ship and grounded just ahead of "Espiegle" and reported that she had been hit and that a shell had penetrated starboard side into engine room.

Assistance was at once sent by "Espiegle" and leak stopper placed over hole and "Miner" was, later on, able to raise steam again and proceed down river where during the night she was patched by "Odin."

All this time "Espiegle" was in extremely shallow water and unable to move nearer Qurnah. The "Espiegle's" fire had been directed on the enemy's guns at Qurnah, which had been several times temporarily silenced, also those at Muzaira'ah.

During the advance of our troops "Espiegle" and "Lawrence" also shelled the enemy's trenches.

At 2.37 p.m., extremely heavy firing was heard near the bank of the Tigris opposite Qurnah and at 3.0 p.m., a signal was received from Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, Commanding Troops, that he had decided to retire to Shaib Camp south of Um-Rash.

"Espiegle" and "Lawrence" at once directed a heavy fire on the only Qurnah houses which could be seen plainly enough to be sure of not hitting our troops, and ordered the armed launches back at 4 p.m.

At 6.15 p.m., the retirement had been effected and "Blosse Lynch" and "Medijieh" and launches had gone down river, as "Espiegle" proceeded towards the camp and remained there for the night.

Reinforcements were asked for from Basrah and the river steamers sent down for them on 5th December, bringing up four more 18-pr. guns and two and a half battalions of troops, with General Fry in command, on Sunday morning 6th December, and disembarked on arrival.

On Sunday forenoon General Fry held a conference on board "Lawrence" during which the enemy opened fire, and in the afternoon at 2.10 p.m., "Lawrence" which was anchored just to north west of camp reported that the enemy were advancing with guns across the plain from Muzaira'ah.

"Espiegle" at once proceeded to a position north west of camp and opened fire with shrapnel on the enemy at 2 p.m., "Lawrence" also firing on them.

"Espiegle" was hit twice by enemy's shell, one piercing the side of port bow near 3-pr. gun port. This shell had been fired by enemy's guns near Muzaira'ah village. At 3.10 p.m., one of them was silenced and, it is thought put out of action by a shell by "Espiegle." "Lawrence" was also hit.

Our field artillery had also got into action and the enemy retired across the plain with considerable loss.

"Espiegle" ceased fire at 3.25 p.m., and returned to anchorage for protection of Shaib Camp. More reinforcements arrived in the river steamers about 6.30 p.m., on 7th December, and the troops left the camp at 9 a.m. to advance for attack on Turks' position in accordance with scheme arranged, so that Navy and Army could co-operate as much as possible.

"Espiegle" weighed at 9.45 a.m., and proceeded up river and anchored at 10.10 a.m., to north-west of Um-Rash with "Lawrence" astern and launches and "Odin" to south-east.

The enemy at once opened fire from the guns at Qurnah and Muzaira'ah, and we at once replied attacking the guns with lyddite and co-operating with the field guns in the river steamers "Blosse Lynch" and "Medijieh" in shelling enemy's trenches during the advance of our troops, Lieutenant A. G. Seymour, R.N., of H.M.S. "Espiegle," directing the gun fire from the mast-head.

At 11.30 a.m., a very heavy musketry fire was opened on our troops from Muzaira'ah village, and "Espiegle" moved further up the river at 11.50 a.m., and again at 2.10 p.m., although in very shallow water, in order to support the troops.

The armed launches were sent forward at 2 p.m., and at this time Lieutenant G. E. Harden, R.N., of H.M.S. "Espiegle" went in the steam-cutter to locate and sound round the dredger which the Turks had sunk in the river between us and Qurnah.

A heavy fire was being kept up by the Turkish guns and at 3.30 p.m., the "Shaitan" returned with her Captain, Lieutenant Commander F. O. S. Elkes, R.N.R., killed and several wounded, and steaming gear disabled. Her wounded were taken and treated on board "Espiegle."

The launches were recalled at 2.45 p.m., and "Espiegle" remained in the same position for the night, the enemy firing a few shells when the moon rose.

The enemy's fire had been very heavy and fairly accurate during the day and "Espiegle" was hit several times, two men being wounded by a segment of shell which hit spreader of main topmast rigging and burst over afterpart of the ship. Another shell pierced foremast cowl and lodged in netting.

Great difficulty was experienced in keeping signal communication with the Army, but we ascertained during the night that they had camped near Muzaira'ah and would advance on Qurnah in the morning.

At 8.30 a.m. on 8th December, the armed launch "Lewis Pelly" was ordered to reconnoitre towards Qurnah and was heavily fired on by Turkish guns and riflemen at 9 a.m.

"Espiegle" therefore opened fire and ordered "Lewis Pelly" back. Heavy firing in the woods indicated that our troops were engaged and we received information from General Fry that he intended to attempt to cross the Tigris above Qurnah and advance on the town.

"Espiegle" proceeded further up the river and Lieutenant G. E. Harden, of "Espiegle," placed a buoy on the outer side of the sunken lighter, and, with "Lewis Pelly" sounding ahead, "Espiegle" passed it about 11 a.m. and anchored to northward of it, opening fire on the guns at Qurnah and firing lyddite at the houses. "Blosse Lynch" and "Medijieh" also moved up and assisted, and "Lawrence" anchored some cables astern. Firing continued intermittently until sunset, and heavy rifle fire and the burning buildings indicated that the troops were progressing. The guns did not fire till after sunset and early in the middle watch a small steamer with all lights burning was observed to be coming down the river from the direction of the town blowing her siren to attract attention.

"Espiegle's" siren pipe had been cut by shell so "Blosse Lynch" was directed to sound her siren in reply, and I sent an armed boat away under Lieutenant G. H. Harden, R.N., to board her as she approached. She was found to have on board a deputation of three Turkish Officers to discuss terms of surrender of Qurnah.

They came on board at 12.35 a.m., and were interviewed by Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., of H.M.S. "Ocean," who is directing Naval operations from "Espiegle," and agreed to an unconditional surrender and to meet General Fry on board "Espiegle" at 8.30 a.m.

At 8.30 a.m. on 9th December the three Turkish Officers, viz., Major Hussain, Lieutenant Kornal, and Lieutenant Ismail Haki, returned on board and met General Fry and Staff and arranged details as to surrender.

"Espiegle" went further up the river at high water with "Lewis Pelly" again sounding ahead, and although very shallow was able to reach the deeper water near Qurnah and entered the Tigris, anchoring off Qurnah at 10.50 a.m.

In the afternoon, General Fry landed from H.M.S. " Espiegle " and received the sword of the Turkish Vali and Officers, the Turkish troops were disarmed and sent down the river as prisoners of war, and the Union Jack was hoisted over Qurnah.

From the General Officer Commanding, 18*th Brigade, to the General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force " D," dated Qurnah,* 15*th December,* 1914.

Forwarded. In my report on these operations I have already mentioned the great assistance and co-operation extended by the Naval Force under Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N. I much admired the intrepidity shown by the Commanders of the armed launches in ascending the Shatt-al-Arab River under shell fire each day, and sincerely regret the death of one of these, Lieutenant Elkes, R.N.

From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force " D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, No. 204 *(G.), dated Basrah,* 3*rd February,* 1915.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the following report on an engagement with the Turks north of Qurnah on the 20th January.

Reports from naval and cavalry reconnaissances were to the effect that Turkish outposts had occupied some sand-hills about six miles north of Muzaira'ah on the left bank of the Tigris. I thought it advisable to drive them back, and to impress upon our troops, as well as upon our adversaries, that it was not our intention merely to maintain a passive defence of our prepared position at Qurnah—Muzaira'ah.

A copy of the operation order issued is attached.*

The cavalry of the advanced guard, after drawing the enemy's fire from his trenches on the sand-hills, moved eastward to cover our right flank, sending a patrol to the west to watch the villages near the river bank. The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry then advanced direct on the sand-hills, which were speedily cleared of the enemy. The 103rd Light Infantry prolonged the line to the left, with the 22nd Punjabis and 119th Infantry in second line, and the Norfolk Regiment and half a battalion of the 7th Rajputs in reserve. The Turkish guns, six in number, opened fire from a position near the village of Rotah and were heavily shelled by the " Espiegle " and by our batteries. As our infantry advanced they came under fire from the Turkish main trenches.

These were at the time believed to be north of the Rotah creek, but a comparison of reports received since the action leads to the conclusion that some of them must have been on the south bank. A large extent of ground in front of the creek was marshy, so that the men of our leading battalions were over their knees in water.

The cavalry were also in wet ground. Our artillery were in action at a range of 3,500 yards, engaging the enemy's guns and shelling his trenches and camps, which were plainly visible beyond the creek. The 4-inch guns of the " Espiegle," firing lyddite, were also within effective range, with two guns of the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, mounted on the deck of the S.S. " Medjidieh." The enemy's guns were temporarily silenced, and some of his troops were seen to be retiring to the north-east.

At this stage I was inclined to order a general advance on Rotah village, with a view to destroying the Turkish camp, and possibly capturing his guns. But I had warned the troops beforehand that I had no intention of crossing the creek, and an advance through marshy ground without cover would probably have entailed considerable loss. I also had to consider that our force was hardly strong enough to hold a position at Rotah as well as at Qurnah in the event of more troops being brought down from Baghdad.

I therefore issued orders to stand fast and prepare to withdraw to camp. Our second line took up a position on the sand-hills and our first line withdrew almost unmolested, except for an occasional shell from the enemy's guns, their infantry fire being well kept down by our artillery and the guns of the " Espiegle." Shortly after noon the engagement ceased, and by 2 o'clock the last of our troops were back in camp at Muzair'ah.

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* Page 29.

Arab reports gave the strength of the enemy at about 5,000, and variously estimated his losses at from 200 to 300 killed, besides many wounded. These numbers may be exaggerated, but it is evident that his troops were much demoralised by our fire. Askari Bey, who had recently arrived from Constantinople to take command, was wounded, and is said to have returned to Baghdad.

I was much pleased with the behaviour of the troops on this occasion. General Dobbie handled his brigade skilfully, and the rapid and spirited advance of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the 103rd Mahrattas is worthy of special mention.

I am greatly indebted to Captain Nunn, R.N., for the valuable assistance afforded by H.M.S. "Espiegle" and the armed launch "Miner."

Enclosures:—

1. Casualty return.
2. Operation Order No. 17.
3. Captain Nunn's R.N. report.
4. Rough sketch of ground. } Not reproduced.
5. Map of Qurnah and district. }

INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D."

CASUALTIES.

Units.	British.						Indian.						Remarks.
	Officers.			Rank and File.			Officers.			Rank and File.			
	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	
Force Headquarters ...	—	1*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	*Captain Cochran.
XVIITH BRIGADE.													
1st Bn., Oxford and Bucks L. I.	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
22nd Infantry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	—	—	3	—	†Subadar Rajpal Singh.
103rd Mahratta L. I. ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1‡	—	6	20	1	‡Subadar Krishna Rao Gadgi.
119th Infantry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	—	
XVIIITH BRIGADE.													
7th Rajputs	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
10TH BRIGADE R.F.A.													
63rd Battery	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
76th "	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
33rd Cavalry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Total	—	1	—	—	18	—	—	2	—	7	29	1	58

OPERATION ORDER No. 17 BY GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, "D" FORCE.

Dated Qurnah, 19th January, 1915.

Reference 1 *mile to* 1-*inch map issued to-day.*

1. The enemy is believed to be receiving reinforcements by river at Sakhricha and north of Mazeeblah, and he occupies an advanced position on the sand-hills, one mile south of the Rotah canal.
2. The Force Commander intends to attack this advanced position to-morrow.
3. The Senior Naval Officer will co-operate from the Tigris. The "Medjidieh," with two 18-pr. guns of 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, and half a double company 120th Infantry on board, is placed at his disposal. The Navy will also guard the mouth of the Shatt-al-Shaib and the Euphrates.

4. *Advanced guard.*—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Wogan Brown.
Troops.—33rd Cavalry, less 2 squadrons.
Half battalion, 17th Brigade.
1 section, No. 17 Company, Sappers and miners.

5. *Rendezvous.*—Just north of the central redoubt at Muzaira'ah at 5.30 a.m.
Troops.—17th Infantry Brigade (less 1 battalion) in two lines of Company Columns.
Xth Brigade Royal Field Artillery (less 82nd Battery and 1 section 76th Battery).
No. 30 Battery Mountain Artillery.
No. 17 Company, Sappers and Miners, less 1 section.
2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment (in reserve).

Distances 100 paces between lines, intervals 50 paces between units.

The left hand man of the right battalion of the front line will direct.

6. One double company, 17th Brigade, on each flank.

7. The improvised Divisional Ammunition Column—

Two British and three Indian Bearer Sub-Divisions, Field Ambulances and 50 riding mules escorted by two double companies of the 7th Rajputs—Officer Commanding, Captain Ogg—will follow the main body starting at 6 a.m.

Clearing Hospital.—1 section British and 1 section Indian Field Ambulance on the "Medjidieh."

8. Captains Cochran and Taylor will guide the Column.

9. One hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition and a havresack ration to be carried on person.

Signalling, entrenching tools and section reserve ammunition to be carried on mules with units.

10. Reports to Force Headquarters during operations with the Royal Field Artillery.

11. The remainder of the force in garrison as follows:—

Tigris Redoubt.—Officer Commanding, Major Pocock.
Troops.—120th Infantry, less half a double company.
1 section, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.

Qurnah Fort—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer.
Troops.—110th Mahratta Light Infantry.
7th Rajputs, less 2 double companies and details.

Muzaira'ah—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Harward.
Troops—48th Pioneers, less 2 double companies.
Sirmur Sappers and details.

R. N. GAMBLE, *Colonel,*
General Staff.

Issued at 1.30 p.m.

	Copy No.		Copy No.
General Officer Commanding, 17th Infantry Brigade	1	Senior Naval Officer	2
Commanding Royal Artillery ...	4	General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade	3
Officer Commanding, 33rd Cavalry...	5	Officer Commanding, Qurnah ...	6
Officer Commanding, Muzaira'ah ...	7	Record	8

General Officers Commanding Brigades to pass copy to Sappers and Medical Units.

Copy of a report from Captain W. Nunn, Royal Navy, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, to the General Officer Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," dated Qurnah, 21st January, 1915.

I have the honour to forward the following report on the Naval operations in the Shatt-al-Arab on the 20th January.

At 6.50 a.m. H.M.S. "Espiegle" (Captain W. Nunn, R.N., Senior Naval Officer) followed by H.M. Armed Launch "Miner" (Lieutenant in Command, S. N. Heath-Caldwell) and "Medjidieh," having on board two 18-p. Royal Field Artillery guns, proceeded up the river from anchorage off Tigris Camp.

At 7.30, the ships came under fire of the enemy's guns posted on south side of Rotah village, and at 7.58 a.m. "Espiegle" anchored in reach of Tigris beyond

Bahran village heading E.N.E. in a position in which her whole broadside bore on enemy's position, and opened fire on enemy's guns.

At 8.15 a.m. "Medjidieh" anchored as previously arranged about a quarter of a mile to southward of "Espiegle" and warped her stern round to bring her guns to bear and then opened fire.

At 8.20 a.m. "Miner" anchored off Bahran village and was attacked by twenty armed Arabs who ran out from the village. "Miner" drove them away with a well directed fire and then continued to engage parties of armed Arabs and cavalry on the right bank of Tigris.

"Espiegle's" fire was at first directed entirely on enemy's guns, of which five were plainly visible from the ship in pits south of Rotah village (just north of Rotah Creek), "Medjidieh" assisting.

Later on "Espiegle" and "Medjidieh" also shelled enemy's trenches and parties of Turks, who came forward close along left bank of river under cover of the raised bank and sniped at the ship.

After 10.45 a.m. the enemy's guns seldom fired. Their fire had been fairly good for direction, but badly laid for elevation, and shots and fragments of shell often fell near the ship but did no damage.

About 10.45 a.m. the signal arrived that our forces were retiring to camp, so "Espiegle" shelled the trenches vigorously and ordered "Miner" and "Medjidieh" to drop down river firing as they went.

A large body of the enemy's infantry were observed about 10.0 a.m. to be leaving the camp near Sakhricha marching in column and numbering between one and two thousand. They marched to south-eastward round Pear Drop bend and reinforced the trenches and position near Rotah about noon. "Espiegle" was able to put a few shells amongst them and they scattered and took cover.

On their left was a large scattered body of enemy, presumably Arabs, numbering several thousand. On our departure they appeared to march into Rotah with red and green flags flying.

At noon the "Miner" was ordered to set Bahran village on fire, which she did and took two Arabs in Turkish uniform prisoners who were fighting for the Turks; at the same time the Royal Engineers were destroying Halla village.

At 12.10 p.m. "Espiegle" weighed and followed the others down river, the enemy keeping up gun and rifle fire as we left.

From the General Officer Commanding, I.E.F. "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India, Simla. No. 860-*A., dated Basrah,* 31*st March,* 1915.

As I am about to relinquish the command of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," I have the honour to submit, for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the names of those officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, whose good services during the operations from November, 1914, to 31st March, 1915, I desire to bring to notice, in addition to those who have already been mentioned in my reports No. 101-G., dated 7th December, 1914,* and 174-G., dated 29th December, 1914* :—

Commanders, Headquarter Staff, etc.

Major-General C. I. Fry	Has done excellent service throughout. He commanded during the highly successful engagements which led to the surrender of Subhi Bey at Qurnah in December, 1914.
Brigadier-General W. H. Dobbie, C.B.	A keen and capable Brigade Commander, and a good leader of troops in the field.
Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.	Commanded the Force before my arrival and showed great skill and resource in his arrangements for overcoming the resistance of the Turks, and landing his troops in face of considerable difficulties. Has shown much dash and gallantry when leading his Brigade in action.

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* Published in the *Gazette of India,* dated 26th February, 1915.

Brigadier - General C. T. Robinson.	A very capable Artillery Commander. When in command of a mixed force at Ahwaz he was greatly outnumbered by the enemy, and succeeded in extricating his troops from a very difficult situation with much coolness and decision.
Colonel R. N. Gamble, D.S.O. ...	His services as senior General Staff Officer have been carried out to my entire satisfaction, and have contributed greatly to the success of the operations. He is full of tact and resource, and possesses all the qualities that go to make a good staff officer.
Colonel L. W. Shakespear ...	His duties as Assistant Quartermaster-General to the Force in connection with the landing, movement and location of troops have been of a most onerous and responsible nature, and he has spared no pains to carry them out successfully in face of many difficulties.
Colonel P. Hehir, M.D. ...	As senior medical officer he has done much to promote the general efficiency of the Force by his unceasing care for the physical welfare of the troops and followers, and for the treatment of the sick and wounded. He possesses great administrative ability and is an extremely valuable officer.
Colonel U. W. Evans	A thoroughly capable and energetic Engineer Commander with high abilities and full of resource. Owing to the difficult nature of the country the work of the technical troops has been throughout of a most arduous nature, and has been carried out with thorough success.
Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. D. Fordyce.	Has performed his important duties as Assistant Director of Supplies in a highly satisfactory manner. He has good administrative ability.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. R. Annesley.	A very competent and energetic transport officer, with a thorough knowledge of the duties connected with his Branch. Under his able direction the transport has been kept in a highly efficient state, and its organisation and work in the field has left nothing to be desired.
Major J. H. M. Davie	An officer of great administrative ability, whose most arduous and responsible duties as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General to the Force have been carried out to my entire satisfaction.
Major G. A. F. Sanders ...	An officer of great talent and resource, whose general professional ability and knowledge of staff duties in the field are much above the average. I cannot speak too highly of the quality of his work.
Major C. C. R. Murphy ...	Has done valuable work as head of the Intelligence Branch. He has been successful in obtaining accurate information of the enemy's strength and movements, and his local knowledge of the country and people has been of great assistance.
Major J. F. Tyrrell	His most responsible duties as head of the Ordnance Branch have been performed to my entire satisfaction.

Major d'A. C. Brownlow ...	In addition to his work as Deputy Judge Advocate-General to the Force, he has filled the important appointment of Military Governor of Basrah with marked success.
Captain H. S. Cardew ...	His work as Assistant Director of Army Signals has been thoroughly satisfactory. He has good abilities and considerable powers of organisation.
Lieutenant C. K. Greenway ...	As Aide-de-Camp this Officer has proved himself to be a most energetic and capable young officer.

2. The following staff and regimental officers are also worthy of special commendation:—

Adamson, Lieutenant-Colonel H. M., M.B.
Ali, Risalder Mahomed
Anthony, Major W. S.
Arthur, Captain D., M.B.
Barber, Captain C. H., M.B.
Browne, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Wogan.
Browne-Mason, Major H. O. B.
Booth, Captain F.
Collins, Major D. J., M.B.
Cook, Captain W. K.
Dallas, Major A. E.
Dent, Captain W.
Donegan, Lieutenant-Colonel J. F.
Farmar, Major W. C. R.
Gillies, Captain F. G.
Goldsmith, Captain H. A.
Grey, Captain A. J. H.
Gribbon, Captain W. H.
Harward, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N.
Hewett, Captain G.
Horton, Major J. H., D.S.O.
Irvine, Lieutenant-Colonel G. B.
Khan, Lieutenant Abdul Majid (Nawab of Savanur)
Khan, Lieutenant Murtaza
Landale, Lieutenant C. H.
Lyttle, Lieutenant W. J.
Lloyd, Major J. H.
McCreery, Captain A. T. J., M.B.
Messenger, Captain H. T. K.
Ogg, Captain A. C.
O'Keefe, Major D. S. A., M.B.
Parr, Lieutenant-Colonel H. O.
Peel, Captain B. G.
Pirrie, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W.
Pocock, Major P. F.
Pogson, Lieutenant C. A.
Radcliffe, Major F. W.
Riddell, Major H. J.
Roe, Captain J. W.
Shah, 2nd Lieutenant Abdul Samad.
Shairp, Major H. F.
Shuttleworth, Major A. R. B.
Singh, Lieutenant Jiwan.
Singh, Risaldar Hukum.
Stace, Captain R. E.
Sykes, Lieutenant-Colonel C. A.
Thornton, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E.
Whiteley, Captain E. C.
Wright, Lieutenant R.

The following departmental warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men have rendered valuable service, for which I recommend suitable departmental promotion in each case in the order named:—

Medical Services.

No. 854 1st Class S. A. S. Mohun Lal.
3rd Class Assistant Surgeon E. A. Cotton.
1st Class S. A. S. Ganga Ram Hariba.
3rd Class Assistant Surgeon S. C. Raphael.
3rd Class Assistant Surgeon H. Vincent.
1st Class S. A. S. V. Sambasiva Nayakar.

Ordnance Department.

Sub-Conductor A. T. Bardens.
Conductor W. J. Chambers.
Arm. Staff Sergeant L. R. Anderson.

Supply and Transport Corps.

Conductor S. Fowles.
Sub-Conductor F. Carey.
Sub-Conductor J. A. P. Day.

India Miscellaneous List.

Conductor H. Joyner.
Sub-Conductor J. Bryce.

No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.

No. 1. Sergeant-Major J. McConville.
No. 40 2nd Corporal W. Fletcher.
No. 45 Private H. J. Newstead.
Jemadar Murugesan.
No. 78 Sapper Adimulam.
No. 48 Lance Naick Joshua.

Searchlight Section.

Staff Sergeant J. Houghton.
Sergeant F. N. Booth.*
Sapper T. G. Pendrigh.*
Sapper J. Mulhern.*
Sapper W. J. Mooney.*

3. The following officers are specially brought to notice for gallantry in the field:—

Major M. H. Anderson, 33rd Cavalry.	In the operations from Mezera on the left bank of the Tigris on 30th January, 1915, he led a successful charge against the enemy with conspicuous gallantry and resolution—he had two horses shot under him.
Captain W. M. Hunt, 23rd Mountain Battery.	At Ahwaz, on the 3rd March, 1915, this officer displayed conspicuous coolness and bravery in repeatedly checking the enemy with his own rifle, although severely wounded, and thus enabling his section of the 23rd Mountain Battery to withdraw at a most critical stage of the fight.
2nd-Lieutenant H. J. Baillie, 2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment.	Near Ahwaz, on the 3rd March, 1915, displayed conspicuous courage. With a handful of men he gallantly checked the advance of overwhelming numbers of the enemy and was thus instrumental in saving many of our wounded from falling into their hands.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Stack, 33rd Cavalry.	Severely wounded near Shaiba on 3rd March, 1915, whilst displaying great personal gallantry and handling his regiment in a most skilful manner. This officer did extremely good work whilst commanding the Shaiba Post for over two months.
Captain H. E. Shortt, I.M.S. ...	In the operations from Mezera on the left bank of the Tigris on 30th January, 1915, this Medical Officer displayed great devotion and courage in attending wounded in the open, in face of rifle fire at comparatively close quarters.
Captain A. R. Thomson, 7th Rajputs.	Near Ahwaz, on the 3rd March, 1915, was acting as Signalling Officer on the Staff of the Column Commander. At a critical moment he displayed great initiative in collecting as many men as he could and holding a position to cover the retirement. He next gallantly led a bayonet charge against a party of the enemy who were blocking the road to camp and succeeded in clearing them out.
Captain H. C. West, "S" Battery, R.H.A.	Near Shaiba, on the 3rd March, 1915, at a critical moment of the operations, when the teams of a gun and a waggon were down, displayed conspicuous coolness and courage in keeping the enemy at bay with his revolver, whilst he enabled his defenceless drivers to escape on foot.
Lieutenant R. H. Sheepshanks, 12th Cavalry (attached 33rd Cavalry).	Was conspicuous for his gallantry and skilful handling of a small body of cavalry near Ahwaz on the 3rd March, 1915. Re-forming his troop he repeatedly charged the foremost lines of the enemy and inflicted heavy loss on them.

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* Volunteers.

4. In a previous report, I mentioned the good services of the officers and men of the Royal Navy. Since the departure of Captain Hayes-Sadler, the duties of Senior Naval Officer have been most ably performed by Captain Nunn, R.N., of H.M.S. "Espiegle," whose valuable advice and ready co-operation in all our undertakings has contributed so greatly to the success of the operations.

5. I am also much indebted to the officers of the Royal Indian Marine, who have shown zeal and energy in organising a most efficient river transport service, and in making all arrangements for the berthing and unloading of the large fleet of vessels that has been employed on transport duties. The whole has been under the able direction of Captain Hamilton, R.I.M., and among those serving under him I would specially mention Captains Goldsmith and Marsh.

6. I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to the officers and crews of the steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company which conveyed the troops from India at the outset of the operations, while the Turks were still in occupation of the country. At this time there was much risk owing to the difficult navigation of the river, and to the fact that the banks were often held by the enemy. The one desire of the captains of these vessels was to push forward as rapidly as possible, and to afford us all the help that was in their power. The same remark applies to the captains of Lynch Bros. steamers and of the other river craft which have been in constant employment on transport duties, and have many times been in situations of considerable danger.

The following are those who are worthy of special commendation :—

Captain R. W. Coope	H.T. "Elephanta."
Captain G. R. Elton	H.T. "Umaria."
Captain J. S. Kilner	H.T. "Ekma."
Lieutenant S. L. Mills, R.N.R. ...	H.T. "Varela."
Captain J. S. Reddock	H.T. "Erinpura."
Captain C. J. Swanson	H.T. "Torilla."
Captain C. H. Cowley	"Mejidieh."
Captain E. C. P. D'Eye	"Blosse Lynch."
Captain F. W. Lyte	"Shushan."
Captain O. Sczulczewski	"Malamir."
Captain Hassan bin Ghulami ...	"Salimi."
Captain Tahir bin Bangool ...	"Mozaffari."

7. In a previous report I expressed my great indebtedness to Sir Percy Cox for his valuable advice and assistance. His intimate knowledge of local politics, and his remarkable personal influence over the surrounding tribesmen, have smoothed over many difficulties, and greatly assisted the military operations.

I also wish to mention the good services of Mr. E. G. Gregson, of the Indian Police, Mr. D. Gumley of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, Mr. E. Clerici, of the Postal Department, and Mr. Thomas Dexter, Personal Assistant and interpreter to the Military Governor of Basrah.

Doctor Arthur Bennett, of the American Mission Hospital, has helped us greatly by undertaking the treatment of wounded Turkish and Arab officers and men.

8. Several recommendations of Indian ranks for the Indian Order of Merit and Indian Distinguished Service Medal on account of recent acts of gallantry, which are now being recorded, will be submitted in due course.

Field Operations.

No. 757.—The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the General Staff, dated the 29th July, 1915, submitting a despatch from General Sir J. E. Nixon, K.C.B., Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," describing the operations in the vicinity of Shaiba—12th to 14th April, 1915. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, regarding the conduct of the troops engaged in the operations and the manner in which the latter were carried out. His Excellency in Council also shares the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief that the manner in which the attack on the 14th April, 1915, was executed, reflects the greatest credit on Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., C.B., and on the troops engaged.

From Lieutenant-General P. Lake, Chief of the General Staff, to the Secretary to the Government of India, No. 11741-1, *dated Simla, the* 29*th July,* 1915.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the following report:—

Report by General Sir J. E. Nixon, K.C.B., Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," on the Operations in the vicinity of Shaiba, 12th-14th April, 1915.

2. His Excellency considers that the conduct of the troops in these operations was exemplary throughout, that the operations were skilfully carried out and that in particular, the manner in which the attack on the 14th April was executed, reflects the greatest credit both on Major-General Melliss and on the troops engaged.

3. His Excellency recommends that this report be treated as a despatch and published in the *Gazette of India.*

General Headquarters.

INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D."

From General Sir John Eccles Nixon, K.C.B., Commanding Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, No. 168-40, *dated Basrah,* 6*th May,* 1915.

I have the honour to forward for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying despatches from Major-General C. I. Fry, regarding the fighting at Shaiba on the 12th April, and from Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., C.B., regarding the action at Shaiba on the 13th, followed by the defeat of the Turkish forces on the 14th at the battle of Barjisiyah.

2. The Shaiba garrison on the 11th April, 1915, consisted of the troops named in the margin, the whole under the command of Major-General Fry.

The defensive perimeter, in which this force was camped, extended over 3½ miles.

During the flood season from February to June, water, varying in depth from one to four feet, lies between Basrah and the further shore, and two methods of approach are in use across this lagoon, one by wading across 6 miles and landing near Old Basrah, whence troops and convoys have to march another 4 miles to reach Shaiba; the other by using the native boat, known as "bellum," which is punted by two men and carries 8 to 10 armed men or their equivalent in stores or ammunition. This latter line of approach passes through nearly 8 miles of water, and is traversed transversely by a creek too deep to wade.

6th Division. *16th Brigade.*

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—
2nd Dorset Regiment.
104th Wellesley's Rifles.
117th Mahrattas.

18th Brigade.

Major-General C. I. Fry.—
2nd Norfolk Regiment.
110th Mahratta Light Infantry.
120th Rajputana Infantry.
48th Pioneers.
63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery (less 1 gun). } 10th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. }
23rd Mountain Battery.
17th Company, Sappers and Miners.
22nd Company, Sappers and Miners.
No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.

Cavalry Brigade.

Brigadier-General H. Kennedy.—
"S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
7th Lancers.
16th Cavalry.
33rd Cavalry.

3. I took over command of this Force on the 9th April at Basrah from Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., who was granted leave on the 10th by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief owing to ill health.

The same morning, about daybreak, a party of the horsemen reconnoitred close to Shaiba, but retired before our cavalry.

On the 11th it was reported that the enemy's cavalry had occupied Barjisiyah wood, and that some 4,000 infantry were moving into Shwebda; later in the day

Major-General Fry, who had succeeded to the command of the 6th Division, reported that he considered them to be the advanced guard of the enemy's main forces, and that a serious engagement was probable within the next day or two.

I ordered the 30th Brigade, reinforced by the 30th Mountain Battery, under the command of Major-General Melliss, V.C., C.B., to move to Shaiba the following morning, and since he, as senior officer, would command all the forces there, I placed at his disposal the staff of the 6th Division and ordered them to proceed to Shaiba with him.

4. At about 7.30 a.m. on the 12th, General Fry reported that he was attacked from the south in force, and at 11.20 a.m. that he was confident of being able to resist all attacks but was unable to prevent the occupation of Old Basrah by the enemy.

Meanwhile, General Melliss' Brigade, having marched from Makina Masus, commenced its crossing about 9 a.m.

The water was high and the enemy disclosed guns and infantry near Old Basrah; at about 10 a.m. General Fry sent word to say that the enemy were in force between Shaiba and Old Basrah, and that he could not spare more than two battalions to co-operate with General Melliss' Brigade.

As, owing to the distance, I was unable to cover with guns the crossing of General Melliss' Brigade, and, moreover, as he could make no use in the water of the Mountain Battery which accompanied him, I ordered him to return after he had accomplished about one-third of the journey, and to cross by "bellum" by the second route.

The boatmen refused to assist and only about 80 "bellums" were available; I therefore ordered men of the 20th Punjabis, who readily came forward, to punt them. By about 4 p.m. General Melliss, accompanied by the Staff of the 6th Division and most of the 24th Punjabis, started and got successfully across to Shaiba that evening by about 10.30 p.m. During the return journey these "bellums" were attacked by the enemy in some force.

These were the only reinforcements which I found it possible to send by the evening of the 14th. The enemy in "bellums" were in considerable force in the lagoon on the route taken on the 13th, and it was therefore necessary to organise better protection for the next day in the shape of a special guard with mountain guns placed on "bellum" rafts. This convoy got across on the 14th with gun ammunition and the remainder of the 24th Punjabis and the arrangements made would have allowed this convoy to be continued daily.

5. The actions themselves are described by the Commanders, and I will now pass on to the part played by the Euphrates Blockade Flotilla, consisting of armed launches, small steamers and gun barges on which were mounted two 4·7 in., one 12-pr., and three 3-pr. Naval guns, one 5 in. B.L. and one 18-pr. gun. This flotilla, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Molesworth, R.G.A., was enabled to do good service, aided as it was by the valuable assistance of Lieutenant A. G. Seymour, R.N., H.M.S. "Espiegle," officers and men of the Royal Navy on this station.

When the fighting commenced round Shaiba on the 12th, this flotilla was operating off Nakhailah intercepting supplies, which were coming to the enemy across the water in "mahailas" (country boats of from 30 to 80 tons burthen).

The Officer Commanding the Blockade, having observed the action of Barjisiyah on the 14th, approached Nakhailah early on the morning of the 15th and finding that many of the enemy were escaping in native craft, at once gave chase and pursued them to Ratawi, destroying 8 and capturing 4 large "mahailas"; a heavy gale on the following day forced him to lie to.

On the 17th he reached Chubashiah but found it entirely deserted. The enemy were seen retiring in scattered groups across the desert, and though he fired a few rounds at them, they offered no target. It would appear, from subsequent information, that, during their retreat, the enemy were harassed and robbed by their former allies, the Arabs, and that they fled across the desert in wild confusion, scarcely halting until they reached Kamsieh, a distance of close on 90 miles from the scene of their defeat, so thoroughly disorganised were they.

It is now known that Suleiman Askeri, the Turkish Commander, shot himself at Nakhailah after assembling his officers and denouncing the faithlessness of the Arabs.

A large quantity of ammunition, both gun and rifle, was captured upon the battlefield at Barjisiyah and subsequently at Nakhailah; this was either brought in or destroyed on the spot. The total in round numbers amounts to some—

1,500 shell—4·5″, 15-pr., and Mountain gun.
400—500,000 rounds S. A. A.
3,000 hand-grenades, some boxes of lyddite and a number of bombs, fuzes and primers.

6. I cannot speak too highly of the steadiness, spirit and pluck shown by the troops in these actions, nor of the able manner in which they were handled by their Commanders.

In the battle of Barjisiyah our troops had to attack over open ground a superior force of the enemy, skilfully entrenched and concealed, on a front of over 3 miles.

The Turkish troops showed themselves well trained and exhibited tenacity and courage; while their musketry and machine gun fire were remarkably effective.

In driving such an enemy from his position by a bayonet charge, after a steady advance in the face of a hot fire, the British force performed a feat of which any troops might be proud.

7. The races, from which the portion of the Southern Army engaged here are drawn, have shown, in the stiffest fight which has fallen to their lot for years, a steadfastness and gallantry worthy of all praise.

Mahrattas, Dekhani Mahomedans, men from Rajputana, Gujars and Mers have earned for themselves in these operations a proud reputation. They vied with their British comrades in this field, the Royal Artillery—the Norfolks—the Dorsets, in spirit and resolution, and have added lustre to their former traditions.

8. Major-General Fry, under whose orders the defences of Shaiba had been organised, made a very successful defence against the enemy's constant attacks for the first 24 hours, during which the enemy suffered heavy losses and were everywhere repulsed.

9. I would specially bring to notice the services of Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., C.B., who at once seized the opportunity of taking the offensive, and, after driving the enemy from the vicinity of Shaiba on the 13th April, followed up this success the next day by attacking the Turkish forces in the strong position to which they had retired.

The determination and skill with which he handled his troops on the 14th April resulted in the complete defeat of the enemy after a very hard-fought action, and I fully endorse his recommendation that Barjisiyah be commemorated as a battle honour for the corps engaged.

10. I entirely agree with the recommendations made by Major-Generals Fry and Melliss in the despatches I am now forwarding, and I will only add remarks with regard to the following officers :—

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—This officer has consistently distinguished himself in command of his brigade throughout the campaign, and has shown marked ability as a Commander.

Colonel R. N. Gamble, D.S.O., General Staff Officer, 6th Division, was Senior Officer to Major-General Melliss, who speaks most warmly of the services he rendered throughout the hard-fought and successful operations of the 13th and 14th April. I would also add that his thorough knowledge of the locality, of the troops, and of earlier operations has been of the greatest assistance to me.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. Cleeve, Royal Field Artillery.—This officer has shown himself an exceptionally able Artillery Commander, who, until disabled by a wound on the 14th April, handled his guns, not only to the admiration of his own side, but also to that of the Officer Commanding the opposing artillery. That Turkish officer, when taken prisoner, particularly requested that he might be presented to the officer who had directed the fire of the British guns, as our artillery fire, he said, had silenced the Turkish batteries in rapid succession in a way that he would not have considered possible.

11. In addition I wish to mention the following who prominently came to my notice, and who were not under the orders of either Major-General Fry or Major-General Melliss.

Major-General G. F. Gorringe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.—In addition to the command of his own Division, he ably commanded the local defence troops and also undertook the temporary organization of the communications and base. His experience of river expeditions rendered him most valuable in arranging the despatch of troops and supplies across the lagoon between Basrah and Shaiba.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Molesworth, R.A., for some weeks commanded the Euphrates Blockade Flotilla, which, with the aid of the Royal Navy, often under extremely arduous and hazardous conditions, did excellent service in stopping the enemy's supplies and harassing his retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Molesworth has shown much enterprise and energy in these duties, and also in reconnaissance work which has been most valuable.

Captain C. A. Pogson, 117th Mahrattas, has done very valuable intelligence work in connection with the Euphrates Blockade and showed much enterprise and daring. He has probably undergone more continuous hardships than any other individual in the force.

Lieutenant R. H. Dewing, Royal Engineers.—On April 15th, the Euphrates Blockade guns drove two " mahailas " (large country cargo boats) into the reeds. Lieutenant Dewing went in after them and destroyed them with explosives.

Lieutenant Commander A. G. Seymour, R.N. (H.M.S. Espiegle).—The guns and gun crews of the Royal Navy under this officer have contributed largely to the success of the Euphrates Blockade, while his advice on naval matters and constant support were most valuable to the Officer Commanding.

Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) L. H. Queripel, R.A., Deputy Director of Army Signals, Headquarters, has shown energy and capability in meeting the sudden strain thrown on the signal service by the operations round Shaiba.

Captain F. Booth, The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment), No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company.—His zeal and unremitting supervision successfully disposed of the heavy traffic that was unceasing between 12th and 16th April.

2nd-Lieutenant F. McConville, The King's (Liverpool Regiment) No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company, from 12th to 16th April never left his station day or night, doing very valuable work.

No. 46, Sergeant A. Butcher, No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company, between 12th and 16th constantly helped the signallers in their work besides directing traffic and supervising the repair of lines. His services were of the greatest use.

Jemadar Marugesan, No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company, made two brave attempts on 12th April to repair the Shaiba line, but on both occasions was recalled by the General Officer Commanding, 30th Brigade. Between that date and the 16th supervised his station with unremitting zeal.

No. 370, Naik Sher Ali, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis) behaved with initiative and gallantry during the attack on a " bellum " convoy on night of the 12th-13th April.

Colonel P. Hehir, Indian Medical Service, Acting Deputy Director of Medical Services, materially assisted the operations by the ability and untiring energy which he displayed in the working of the important department over which he at the time was presiding.

Major H. A. Bransbury, Royal Army Medical Corps, commanded the sections of No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital that carried out the evacuation of the wounded after Shaiba—attended himself to all cases (over 1,100 wounded, including those of the enemy) as they arrived, displaying much initiative and resource.

4th Class Assistant Surgeon H. N. Murphy, Indian Subordinate Medical Department, was attached to No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital during the evacuation of wounded from Shaiba—worked with untiring energy and marked intelligence, proving himself to be very capable and reliable.

12. Others of the Medical Service I consider worthy of commendation are :—

Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Adamson, Royal Army Medical Corps.—(Commanding No. 3 A., British General Hospital up to 21st April.)

Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. Irvine, Indian Medical Service.—(Commanding No. 9, Indian General Hospital.)

Lieutenant-Colonel D. J. Collins, Royal Army Medical Corps.—(Commanding No. 3 A., British General Hospital after 21st April.)

Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. Palmer, Royal Army Medical Corps.—(Surgical Specialist, No. 3 A., British General Hospital.)

Major H. R. Brown, Indian Medical Service.—(Commanding No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital.)

Captain C. C. C. Shaw, Indian Medical Service.—(No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital.)

Captain G. F. Graham, Indian Medical Service.—(Medical Officer, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, Brownlow's Punjabis.)

1st Class Assistant Surgeon W. H. Brown, Indian Subordinate Medical Department.—(In charge of Depôt of Medical Stores.)

13. In conclusion, I cannot fail to mention the great assistance I received from Major-General G. V. Kemball, C.B., D.S.O., Major-General, General Staff, and Brigadier-General W. G. Hamilton, D.S.O., Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, to whom I am much indebted for their able support; also to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Z. Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., the Chief Political Officer.

REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS AT SHAIBA ON 11TH AND 12TH APRIL, 1915, BY MAJOR-GENERAL C. I. FRY, INDIAN ARMY, COMMANDING AT SHAIBA.

From Major-General C. I. Fry, Commanding at Shaiba, to Major-General, General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force "D." No. 1815 *(Confidential), dated Dirhamiyah,* 21*st April,* 1915.

I have the honour to submit this report which deals with the first portion of the operations at Shaiba and covers the period during which I was in command of the garrison.

2. The first indication of the advance of the Turkish forces from Nakhailah was a message received from my normal protective cavalry reconnaissance at 7 a.m., to the effect that Barjisiyah Wood and Shwebda were occupied by hostile cavalry and that further troops were advancing on the latter place from the north-west.

The protective cavalry were reinforced by the 33rd Cavalry and at 9 a.m. information was received that a large body of the enemy's cavalry had been located in Barjisiyah Wood, another body behind it, a large body of Arabs to the north-west of Shwebda and a large column of regular infantry estimated at 4,000 men was advancing on Shwebda from the direction of Nakhailah. No guns could be distinguished and there were no signs of enemy in other directions.

Except for the approach of the columns on Shwebda, the situation remained unchanged till about 3.30 p.m., when our advanced patrols were driven back by hostile cavalry.

At 4 p.m., the 6th Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier-General H. Kennedy moved out, supported by a small mixed column always held in readiness for the occasion. The enemy, however, retired into Barjisiyah Wood and by 7 p.m. all was quiet.

3. My intelligence this evening pointed to an attack during the later portion of the night by a force of some

12,000 Regulars (mostly Kurds).
12 field guns.
10,000 tribesmen.

The plan of attack was said to be—

(*a*) An attack by the Turkish Regulars direct on the Fort.
(*b*) Saiyid Yezdi and his following were to attack, from Ana's Tomb, the north of our position.
(*c*) Ajaimi's Tribesmen on the south of Shaiba from Zubair.
(*d*) Yusuf, with the "beni malick," from Old Basrah.

All tents were struck and troops occupied their alarm posts.

The distribution of the garrison, which varied only slightly during the ensuing day, is given in the sketch map of Shaiba defences.*

4. The expected attack was actually made at 5 a.m., on 12th April, 1915, and turned out to be very much on the above plan. Heavy fire was opened on the Fort Section of the defences from the west and south-west just as it was becoming light, our two piquets in this direction making the enemy disclose themselves and retiring without loss.

The enemy's advanced line reached to about 900 yards of the position and were then checked.

At 5.45 a.m. enemy's gun fire was opened on the Fort from 2 guns to the westward and these were engaged by our Field Artillery.

A determined advance of the Turkish infantry was made at 6.10 a.m., supported by heavy rifle fire mainly against south salient, but their attacking line was extended round the west of the Fort up to Kiln Post.

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* Not reproduced.

Large bodies of enemy's infantry were seen advancing over the horizon to the westward and masses were also seen occupying the ridge of hills immediately north of Old Basrah.

By 7 a.m. the enemy were definitely repulsed and retired leaving small parties in observation, who entrenched themselves about 1,700 yards from the west and south-west of our position. The attack against Cairn post was not very determined and broke up about 8 a.m., considerable numbers, however, collecting in the tamarisk wood to the south of that post.

5. Hitherto on the northern face of the position all had been quiet and the defences at Kiln Post and West Work had not been seriously engaged, but at 9 a.m. a large force of irregulars, with 6 standards, occupied North Mound and houses in the vicinity. Here they remained all day, and the subsequent night, making various attempts to advance on our position, but they were easily checked by rifle and machine gun fire.

6. Meanwhile further enemy's guns had opened on the position till it was estimated that they had two heavy 4·5", six field and four mountain guns dispersed mostly in pairs in an arc extending from west to the south.

Their heavy guns kept up a good and accurate fire but never exactly located our batteries, which were under cover, while their other guns did little harm, their shells in most cases bursting too high. Our artillery observing officers on Kiln Post located the flashes of the enemy's artillery and in most cases their detachments were driven off, and 6 guns were completely silenced—these guns were withdrawn in the middle of the day while the mirage rendered their position invisible. Two guns of 23rd Mountain Battery, which had been placed for the night immediately south of the Fort, were withdrawn about 11 a.m. without difficulty.

7. Preparations had been made for the despatch of a column of all arms towards Old Basrah to cover the landing of the 30th Brigade and a Mountain Battery, which were known to have left Basrah. This, however, was not put into effect as that force was recalled to Basrah.

8. The enemy resumed their attack at 2.15 p.m., mainly directed as before on the south salient, and to prevent them establishing themselves on the western portion of the Dorset position, I sent ½ Battalion 2nd Norfolk Regiment from the reserve to occupy this place, replacing them in my general reserve by ½ Battalion 2nd Dorset Regiment from 16th Brigade.

9. Up to this time nothing of note had occurred on the Eastern Defence work beyond some sniping, but at 2.30 p.m., as the snipers had become troublesome to the artillery observation post, Major Wheeler, 7th Lancers, volunteered to take his squadron and clear them. The movement was made at the gallop, but the original objective was covered by enemy's irregulars in a hidden position—these were ridden over and many lanced, while "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, and machine guns repelled an attempted counter-attack by hostile horsemen. The manœuvre was very effective and the squadron was admirably led with great dash by Major Wheeler, who lost only one man and three horses wounded.

10. At 3 p.m. the attack died away and sniping tactics were resorted to—and soon afterwards, about 3.25 p.m., further enemy's guns opened fire from a southerly direction, and at 4 p.m. the enemy's artillery appeared to be registering ranges on various portions of the positions with percussion fuze without doing much damage.

11. For the ensuing night I reinforced Cairn Post with a Double Company 120th Infantry from the southern portion of East Work, their place being taken by a Double Company 110th Light Infantry. The ½ Battalion, 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was withdrawn from Dorset position to their original position and the ½ Battalion, 2nd Dorset Regiment, rejoined the 16th Brigade. To increase my reserve, however, I asked General Delamain for ½ Battalion from 16th Brigade, and this, furnished by the 117th Infantry, was placed centrally between the two portions of Piquet Hill Works. During the earlier part of the night the 24th Punjabis arrived in "bellums" from Basrah and bivouacked near the Cavalry Camp.

12. About 5 p.m. a distinct rearward movement was noticed in front of our north defensive line and fourteen big "bellums" were seen going off in a northerly direction filled with Arabs from North Mound vicinity.

13. At dusk a furious attack was made from the western extremity of Dorset position, supported by fire from south-west and west, heavy rifle and machine gun

fire being brought to bear on the south salient and ground immediately east and west of the fort, but they made no progress and the attack died away to intermittent firing. The machine gun in south salient was out of action from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m., but was replaced by one from the 48th Pioneers during this time, and the searchlight here too was put out of action by rifle fire 15 minutes after it had opened up.

14. Throughout the night intermittent firing, with occasional heavy bursts with machine gun fire, took place to cover bold attempts to cut our wire entanglements, especially on south salient, where the enemy's main efforts were concentrated, though these attacks extended to the north end of the fort on our right and to Cairn Post on the left. The brunt of these attacks fell on the 48th Pioneers and 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, which units with ceaseless vigilance repelled every effort of the enemy. During the heavier periods of the attacks the star shell fired by Field and Mountain Artillery greatly assisted in the defence. The machine gun of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment at the southern extremity of south salient did most excellent service throughout the day and night in a very exposed position. The 120th Infantry and portion of the 110th Light Infantry in East Work and Cairn post were less heavily engaged, but frequently repelled the efforts of wire cutters and were throughout alert for developments.

15. At 11 p.m. the enemy were heard digging off south salient and a half-double company 48th Pioneers was held in readiness to meet any penetration by the enemy, while I held one double company 2nd Norfolk Regiment ready for particular support in this direction.

16. The night thus passed with occasional lulls till 3.30 a.m., when the final attempt was made and small parties were seen close up to the entanglements (one party was heard to call out in Hindustani "Do not fire"). After this no further attacks were made and all became quiet.

17. From 4.30 a.m. Major-General Melliss, V.C., C.B., who had arrived late the previous evening with the 6th Divisional Staff, took over command of the garrison, but not being "au fait" with the defence arrangements, had left the conduct of the operations for the night to me, and my report on subsequent operations has been submitted to him.

18. The casualties during this action were comparatively slight, and were, approximately, British officers wounded, 4; rank and file killed, 5; wounded, 62.

19. The artillery expended some 1,495 shrapnel and 15 star shell during the above period of action.

20. The 6th Cavalry Brigade were not employed during the day except one squadron 7th Lancers and "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Sykes, Royal Horse Artillery, which did good work in co-operation with the infantry and other artillery; they however came in for many casualties among their horses as, unfortunately, their camp was situated directly behind the fort section of the defence and in line with the main hostile attacks. I wish to mention:—

Major G. G. M. Wheeler, 7th Lancers.—For a gallant and admirable leading of his squadron in the charge against a body of the enemy south of Piquet Works, who had been causing much annoyance to our artillery observation post, with a most successful and effective result.

21. The artillery afforded, as had been my experience throughout the campaign, a magnificent support and their rapid location of the enemy's guns was followed by a slackening and in many cases a cessation of their fire. *Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. Cleeve, R.F.A.*, most efficiently directed the artillery during the defence, as my C.R.A., and I would also mention—

Major E. V. Sarson, R.F.A. Major H. Broke Smith, R.F.A. Major E. E. Edlmann, D.S.O., R.G.A.	For their clever handling of their batteries and accuracy of fire in silencing the enemy's guns and repelling his attack.

22. The 16th Infantry Brigade were not seriously engaged during the day or night, and the General Officer Commanding has no recommendations to make. I would like, however, to pay tribute to Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., and his Brigade, who originally constructed the defences which the 18th Infantry Brigade were occupying.

23. I wish to bring forward to special notice the very gallant defence made by the 48th Pioneers and 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, who bore the brunt of the enemy's attacks. All ranks behaved with great steadiness and their

vigilance and good shooting repelled all attempts of the Turkish forces to break through the defences. This section of the defence was admirably commanded by *Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N. Harward, 48th Pioneers.*

The following further names are brought forward for recognition:—

No. 365 Naik Hukmi, 48th Pioneers, when at dawn No. 7 Piquet retired, refused to leave the piquet until the last man had got away safely under heavy fire.

No. 345 Havildar Harchand, 48th Pioneers, commanded No. 7 Piquet, and withdrew his men with skill and coolness so well that the enemy continued to fire into the piquet position after its evacuation.

No. 1686 Sepoy Chanda Singh,
No. 1406 Sepoy Narain Singh,
48th Pioneers, stretcher bearers, brought in a dangerously wounded man to the aid post for 100 yards under very heavy enfilade fire.

24. The 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners (with 48th Pioneers), withstood all the shocks of the Turkish attacks, being in occupation of the south salient, with utmost coolness and steadiness and were ably commanded by *Captain E. J. Loring, R.E.*, I would mention—

No. 31125 Sapper C. A. Wells, R.E., Searchlight Section, who did excellent work under heavy fire till his light was put out of action.

Jemadar Mohammed Din, No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.—For his coolness under heavy fire, and the able way in which he directed the fire of his men under trying circumstances in a particularly exposed part of the defences.

25. The 120th Rajputana Infantry, under Major P. F. Pocock, though not very seriously attacked during the day, were frequently assailed at night in attempts of the enemy to cut their wire entanglement. They occupied a somewhat exposed position at Cairn Post and behaved very steadily and with great coolness.

26. The 2nd Norfolk Regiment and 110th Light Infantry, excepting one double company of the latter under Lieutenant-Colonel Britten, who were engaged during the night in repelling attempts on their obstacles, were not seriously engaged, though kept continually on the alert, especially at night, to meet developments. I mention—

Lieutenant H. S. Farebrother, 2nd Norfolk Regiment, for his skilful handling of the machine gun at south salient until seriously wounded.

No. 6592 Lance-Corporal R. Waller, 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was in charge of the machine gun at South Salient after Lieutenant Farebrother was wounded, and handled his gun exceedingly well and assisted largely in keeping off the attack when it was heaviest. Though wounded, he still continued to direct the work of the gun throughout the night 12th-13th.

The action of Lieutenant Farebrother and Lance-Corporal Waller has also been brought to my notice by Lieutenant-Colonel Harward, Commanding the Fort Section, in which this machine gun was employed in a very important and exposed position. He reports that the accuracy and intensity of the fire was remarkably good.

27. *Medical.*—I cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of the Medical Department in all its ranks. There was no flinching during the bombardment and perfect steadiness, and their work was done in a most efficient manner under the able direction of *Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hennessey, R.A.M.C.* As I have already noted during this campaign, the Army Bearer Corps and Hospital Corps behaved excellently. I would particularly bring to notice the good work done by—

Major T. G. Foster, R.A.M.C., and *Captain R. E. Wright, I.M.S.,* No. 3 Field Ambulance, who were working in the Fort Section of the defence and most exposed to fire.

28. *34th Divisional Signal Company.*—I wish to specially notice the excellent work done by the 18th Brigade Section of this company. Throughout the operations under report they were constantly engaged in the dual capacity of Brigade Signal Section and Divisional Signal Section, being the link between me and my whole force. They were consequently exceedingly hardworked and got no rest. I cannot speak too highly of their work and they were ably commanded by *Captain H. G. Morrell,* who was untiring in his exertions.

I would also bring to favourable notice—

No. 41 *Serjeant F. Murphy* for continuous hard work supervising both telephone and visual signalling.

No. 16 *Corporal J. Sleven* for unremitting assistance in looking after and keeping telephones in working order. He also laid a fresh line to Cairn Piquet under heavy fire when the line was broken.

No. 47 Pte. A. Cloud
No. 44 Pte. A. Barker.
No. 53 Pte. A. Palmer.
No. 8597 Lance-Corporal J. Anderson, Cameron Highlanders (attached).
} For continuous hard and willing work requiring care and great coolness.

29. Finally I wish to bring to special notice the good work done by my Staff Officers, Captain E. G. Dunn, Royal Irish Rifles, Brigade Major, and Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist, 52nd Sikhs (F.F.), Staff Captain. They have had on their shoulders the Staff work of the Shaiba Force and of the 18th Infantry Brigade up to the time of the arrival of the Divisional Headquarters on the night of 12th, and have carried out their duties with untiring zeal and efficiency, especially during the enemy's attack on the 12th, when their forethought and general good staff work were of the greatest assistance to me.

I would also mention Major H. Smyth, Cheshire Regiment, Intelligence Officer, attached to my Staff. The information collected by this officer was wonderfully accurate and was of the greatest assistance to me.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS ON 13TH AND 14TH APRIL NEAR SHAIBA.

From Major-General C. J. Mellis, the General Officer Commanding, Shaiba Force, to the Major-General, General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," No. 250-G, dated Headquarters 6th Division, Shaiba, 24th April, 1915.

I have the honour to submit reports on the operations of the Shaiba Force on 13th and 14th April, 1915.

I arrived at Shaiba by " bellum " convoy at 8.30 p.m. on the 12th April with the 24th Punjabis (less 1 Double Company) and 6th Divisional Staff, placed at my disposal by the Army Commander. A general all-round night attack on the landward sides of the defensive perimeter was in progress at the time of my arrival. This attack was nowhere pressed home, but continued with varying intensity throughout the night of 12-13th, the enemy endeavouring without success to cut the barbed wire entanglement at variour points.

As senior, I assumed command from Major-General C. I. Fry that night, after making myself acquainted with the distribution and disposition of the troops.

The night attack died away at 4 a.m.

The Cavalry Brigade,* in pursuance of orders issued by Major-General Fry on the afternoon of the 12th instant and approved by me that night, moved out at 7 a.m. towards North Mound in order to clear our right flank and ascertain the enemy's strength and dispositions to the north-west. The 104th Rifles (Lieutenant-Colonel Clery) followed as a support and were placed under the orders of the Cavalry Brigadier.

The Cavalry, 7th Lancers leading, remainder following in support, on nearing North Mound came under a very heavy rifle fire from superior forces advancing from North Mound, the broken ground near House A, and from House B.

The 7th Lancers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cook, made a gallant charge on North Mound and vicinity and a large number of hostile Arabs were put to flight. Trenches, however, immediately behind North Mound and House A were strongly held, and a hot fire was poured into the Cavalry ranks. A squadron of the 7th Lancers, most gallantly led by Major Wheeler, actually charged the mound itself. Major Wheeler, closely supported by Jemadar Sudhan Singh, 7th Lancers, rode at the enemy's standard planted on the mound and both were shot dead in their gallant attempt. The remaining squadrons of the 7th Lancers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cook's command, made a gallant attempt to clear the enemy from the palm groves, but from good cover the enemy's fire at short range proved so effective that the 7th Lancers had to retire, and Brigadier-General Kennedy, realizing that the enemy in force were firmly established and that his main body (16th and 33rd Cavalry) were exposed to a severe flanking fire from entrenched infantry, decided not to press the attack and to withdraw his Brigade. I had previously instructed him verbally not to commit his Brigade at this phase of the action if serious opposition were encountered. This took place at 7.45 a.m.

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* 13th April.—"S" Royal Horse Artillery, 7th Lancers, 16th Cavalry, 23rd Cavalry, 3 squadrons each unit.

The actions of the Cavalry Brigade were well supported by " S " Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sykes, while the 104th Rifles, posted just north of House C,* covered the retirement by a well sustained and accurate fire. I ordered the withdrawal to camp of this battalion on the retirement of the Cavalry.

From Kiln Post, where I established my Headquarters, an excellent view of the whole of the terrain to the north of Shaiba is obtainable and large bodies of the enemy were visible advancing near North Mound and to the east of it. At 8.30 a.m. I ordered Brigadier-General Delamain, Commanding 16th Brigade, to move out from the defensive perimeter with 3 battalions (2nd Dorsets, 104th Rifles and 24th Punjabis) with North Mound as his first objective, covering his advance with the concentrated fire of the 63rd and 76th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, and 23rd Mountain Battery, whilst " S " Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, also co-operated. The concentrated fire of the guns and the engaging of successive enemy's targets was most skilfully controlled and directed by the Divisional Artillery Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Cleeve, whose valuable assistance throughout the operations of the 13th I particularly desire to bring to notice.

The co-operation between infantry and artillery in the attack and indeed throughout the action of the 13th was most marked, and very largely contributed to the success of the operations. By 11 a.m. Brigadier-General Delamain was in occupation of North Mound and the enemy, many of whom had clung to their trenches with great tenacity, were in full retreat to the northward. Over 90 of his dead were found on North Mound itself. Meanwhile consistent sniping and desultory attacks were in progress to the west-south-west, and south of my perimeter, and troops, computed at 3 battalions, were visible to the south-west of the Brick Kiln and a considerable force to the westward. I now decided to continue the clearing movement against this unbroken enemy, and incidentally to capture two of their guns, which their teams, owing to our accurate shell fire, had been unable to remove.

With this object I ordered the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, to make a partial left wheel pivotting on North Mound, which was to be held to protect his right flank. I pushed a half Battalion 119th Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Chitty) to reinforce Brigadier-General Delamain's left and ordered 1½ Battalions of the 18th Brigade (2nd Norfolks, 2 Double Companies 48th Pioneers) under Lieutenant-Colonel Peebles to prolong the line of the 16th Brigade to the left, co-operating with their advance. The Cavalry Brigade were again moved forward and placed under Brigadier-General Delamain's orders, to protect his right flank. Supported by a sustained and accurate shrapnel fire from our batteries, the enemy, though in considerable force in well constructed trenches, were unable to withstand the *élan* of our Infantry. Many surrendered and the two abandoned mountain guns were secured. The Cavalry Brigade on the right flank succeeded in getting home into the now broken enemy and accounting for more than 100 of them.

By 2.30 p.m. the whole vicinity of the camp was clear of the enemy, but large numbers could still be seen to the southward in direction of South Mound, where two Turkish guns had been located. The General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, reported at 2.35 p.m. that he was advancing on South Mound, some three miles distant, and hoped to capture these guns.

I decided that at this late hour it was not desirable to undertake a general engagement with the enemy's main forces with my troops, who had been under arms continuously throughout the previous night, and were in need of a rest.

I therefore issued orders to break off the engagement for the day and ordered a general retirement to the Fort at 3 p.m.

The enemy's casualties were estimated at 1,000, many of their dead being left on the field, while over 400 prisoners, 2 guns and a standard fell into our hands.

The night of the 13th-14th, in marked contrast to the previous night, was entirely undisturbed by hostile sniping or shell fire.

From personal observation shortly after dawn on 14th April, 1915, from the Kiln Post, considerable bodies of the enemy were seen in the direction of South

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* *Vide* large map No. IV. in pocket (not reproduced).

Mound some 2½ miles south-west of Shaiba Fort, while the immediate vicinity of the Fort was practically clear of the enemy.

The exact whereabouts of the enemy's main force was uncertain. On the 12th April a large force had been reported to be at Old Basrah, while all reports pointed to the Barjisiyah Woods being strongly held, but it was evident that the enemy had been severely shaken by the action of the 13th April. I decided, therefore, to continue the offensive without awaiting the arrival of the remainder of the 30th Brigade (two battalions). These reinforcements would, I was aware, be necessarily delayed by the difficulty of transport through the area which is inundated to a depth of from two to four feet and which extends for some 8 miles between Shaiba and Basrah. Moreover, the necessary line of advance to Shaiba from Old Basrah had been, as I was aware, hitherto closed by the enemy, while reports of withdrawal from Barjisiyah Wood in a north-west direction rendered it desirable to advance without further delay.

I therefore ordered the whole force (less 104th Rifles, 48th Pioneers and three field guns as camp garrison) to start at 9 a.m. to engage the enemy wherever found.*

Operation orders were issued accordingly. Three hundred rounds rifle ammunition and water pakhals were taken by the troops, who carried a haversack ration.

The troops moved off at 9.30 a.m. in preparatory formation for artillery fire, the 16th Brigade, with the 23rd Mountain Battery, 22nd Company Sappers and Miners, and 24th Punjabis attached, moving with their left directed on a point 300 yards to the west of South Mound, while the three battalions of the 18th Brigade, with 17th Company Sappers and Miners, moved off on the left of the 16th Brigade, echeloned back, left refused. The Cavalry Brigade was moved wide on the right flank of the 16th Brigade, detaching half squadron to protect our extreme left flank, guns in rear of centre and Divisional Headquarters with the guns.

The 16th Brigade were directed on South Mound, with 18th Brigade refused on my left, as I apprehended a possible attack from the direction of Old Basrah or Zubair. The advance on South Mound took place under ineffective long range rifle fire from the enemy's advanced troops—mostly mounted men who soon gave way before our advance, South Mound being occupied and Divisional Headquarters established there by 10.30 a.m.

It now became apparent that the enemy's main force was in position in the vicinity of Barjisiyah Wood, and that Old Basrah and Zubair were not strongly held. I accordingly ordered the left of the 16th Brigade to be directed somewhat north of the Watch Tower, while I ordered two battalions of the 18th Brigade (2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment, and 120th Rajputana Infantry) to pass from left to the right rear of the 16th Brigade and the remaining battalion of the 18th Brigade (110th Mahratta Light Infantry) to remain echeloned on left of 16th Brigade. Whilst these movements were in progress I rode forward to where the Cavalry Brigade were in position on my right flank, engaged in dismounted fire action. From this point I endeavoured to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, but owing to the mirage this proved extremely difficult. It was not possible to locate any of the enemy's trenches, but I was able to determine that his right extended as far south as the high Watch Tower, but where his left rested I could not ascertain. On returning to Divisional Headquarters I therefore ordered General Delamain to direct the left of his advance on the Watch Tower and requested General Fry, Commanding 18th Brigade, to pass over his remaining battalion (110th Mahratta Light Infantry) to the right rear of his own brigade. My plan of operations was to engage the enemy along his front extending from a point to the west of the Watch Tower, while I drove back his left with the 18th Brigade, and thereby threatened his line of retirement towards Nakhailah. I ordered my Cavalry Brigade to co-operate with this object, while giving the Brigadier a free hand to seize any opportunity for vigorous action which might offer.

It soon became evident that the enemy occupied a very extensive front of some 3½ miles and considerably overlapped our line. The 18th Brigade had to come up into line with and on the right of the 16th Brigade in order to engage the enemy along his front—the 110th Infantry being my sole reserve. By 11.15 a.m. I discovered definitely that the enemy's line covered over 3 miles, extending from west of Watch Tower to the north end of Barjisiyah Wood.

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* *Note.*—63rd Battery had only 5 guns.

The 18th Brigade having come into line with the 16th Brigade a general advance from South Mound was continued for a mile without incident. By 11.30 a.m. the two battalions in the front line of the 16th Brigade (2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment and 24th Punjabis) became suddenly heavily engaged with the enemy in position at 900 yards distance from the Dorsets and 600 from the Punjabis, while on the right the 18th Brigade were also fully engaged, the Norfolks and 120th Infantry coming under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from trenches some 400 yards to their front.

The enemy's trenches were well sited and practically invisible from the front, while the glacis-like slope of the ground trending towards the Barjisiyah Woods afforded them an ideal position for defence, and a large proportion of our casualties occurred at this stage.

At 1 p.m. I ordered the 18th Brigade to advance direct on the gap in the trees near the north end of Barjisiyah Wood and the 16th Brigade to close the gap between the 2 Brigades—both to co-operate in the attack. Heavy firing now became general all along the line, the whole of our Artillery being engaged in close support of the Infantry attack. At 11.30 p.m. three casualties occurred in the Divisional Staff, my C.R.A., Lieutenant-Colonel Cleeve, being wounded and his successor Major Edlmann being hit before he could take over his duties, while Captain Cardew, Assistant Director, Army Signals, was also wounded. At this period the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, ordered the 22nd Company Sappers and Miners to prolong the right of the 24th Punjabis, and half battalion, 117th Mahrattas, to reinforce on the right of the Sappers and Miners, and with these reinforcements a further advance was effected in this part of the field. The General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade, now pushed forward half battalion of 110th Mahratta Light Infantry on the right of the 120th Infantry, holding the remaining wing of the 110th and No. 17 Company, Sappers and Miners, in reserve, but owing to an enfilading fire from the right flank the advance of the 18th Brigade was checked.

At 2.30 p.m. I called on the Cavalry Brigade for vigorous action to assist the forward movement of the 110th on the extreme right flank. The Cavalry assisted by dismounted rifle fire, while " S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, also co-operated.

At 3 p.m. the fight was practically stationary, the enemy clinging to his trenches with desperate tenacity—while the Cavalry reported their inability to press forward on the enemy's left flank owing to severe shell fire and the mud line. The Artillery were supporting our Infantry attack to the utmost, but such support was extremely difficult to render owing to the mirage and the invisibility of the enemy's trenches. Our gunners did splendid work and I must mention one of many instances of it. The Norfolks were losing heavily and asked for further Artillery support. Lieutenant Gilpin, 63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, went forward into the Norfolk firing line for observation of fire, and communication with his Battery Commander was maintained by Captain De Grey, Adjutant of the Norfolks, who from the firing line flag signalled back to the Battery the result of Lieutenant Gilpin's observations. Many were the gallant deeds of resolute courage by all ranks on this day, but this appears a striking example of the right kind of Infantry and Artillery co-operation.

The day was now waning and I told both Infantry Brigadiers that the enemy's position in advance of Barjisiyah Woods must be taken and that a general advance with the whole of the Artillery in close support must now be made. The troops responded most gallantly to this fresh call, the 76th Battery in action close to the Watch Tower supporting the 16th Brigade, the 63rd Battery and 23rd Mountain Battery, the 18th Brigade.

At 4.15 p.m. the 2nd Battalion, Norfolks, and 120th Infantry under Colonel Peebles and Major Pocock respectively, dashed at the enemy's trenches with the bayonet, while the 110th, also under heavy fire, pressed unflinchingly forward on the right supported by " S " Battery and dismounted Cavalry fire. Almost simultaneously part of the 16th Brigade consisting of the 2nd Battalion, Dorsets, 24th Punjabis, 119th Infantry (less 1 Double Company in reserve) and 1 Double Company, 117th Mahrattas, withdrawn from the left flank guard, made a general advance and by 5 p.m. the enemy abandoned the front trenches all along the line and fled, many surrendering.

In the meantime at 4 p.m., in view of the necessary withdrawal before nightfall, the 48th Pioneers with all available Jaipur carts were ordered out from Shaiba. The Pioneers were directed to take up a rear guard position about South Mound to cover the retirement of the main body and the carts were also directed there to be ready to assist in the collection and evacuation of the wounded. The arrangements for the collection and disposal of the large numbers of wounded were ably arranged for by Lieutenant-Colonel H. O. B. Browne-Mason, Royal Army Medical Corps, Officiating Assistant Director of Medical Services.

The retirement timed for 5.30 actually commenced at 6 p.m. owing to the difficulty of collection and removal of the wounded scattered over a wide area. Our withdrawal was entirely unmolested and the troops reached Shaiba with all wounded by 8.30 p.m.

It is impossible to conceive a more exposed tract of ground than the plain devoid of cover over which our Infantry had to attack the Turkish trenches, cleverly concealed and sited. Our advance in the last 400 yards was down a glacis-like slope. It was on the crest of this slope that so many of our losses occurred. Splendid dash, combined with resolute courage, alone carried our men across that bullet-swept glacis. It was a sheer dogged soldiers' fight and no words of mine can adequately express my admiration of the conduct of those gallant regiments who won through, *viz.*, 2nd Battalion, Norfolks, 2nd Battalion, Dorsets, 24th Punjabis, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, 119th Infantry, 117th Mahrattas, 120th Infantry, 17th and 22nd Companies of the 3rd Sappers and Miners.

It is gratifying to record the fact that all the Indian troops engaged (24th Punjabis excepted) are old Bombay Presidency Regiments. They have proved on this occasion that they are worthy to stand shoulder to shoulder with the best troops that the Empire can produce and I trust that these Corps may be permitted to inscribe the battle honour of " Barjisiyah " on their colours as a fitting tribute to their gallant conduct on this hard-fought field.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

I desire to bring to notice the specially good services of the following :—

Commanders, Staff, etc.

Major-General C. I. Fry.—Commanded his Brigade to my entire satisfaction during the battle of Barjisiyah on the 14th; his Brigade behaved admirably under his direction.

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—A very able Brigade Commander: handled his troops during the action of 13th and the battle of 14th with marked success.

Colonel R. N. Gamble, D.S.O.—I am much indebted to this officer for the invaluable assistance he afforded during the operations of the 13th and the battle of the 14th April. He is a Staff Officer of marked ability and character, very cool and collected. He should be in command of troops, and I strongly recommend him for promotion.

Major G. A. F. Sanders, R.E.—An excellent Staff Officer of great ability, very cool and collected. His services on my Staff during the operations of 13th and battle of 14th were most valuable to me.

Captain B. G. Peel, 81st Pioneers.—A very useful Staff Officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. Cleeve, R.A.—A very capable Artillery Commander. As my Divisional Artillery Commander his services during the operations of 13th were of great value, the handling of the Artillery on that day being a decisive factor in the success of the operations. I greatly felt the loss of his services on the 14th after he was wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel U. W. Evans, R.E.—A very able Engineer Commander of great energy and resource. He gave me great assistance during the operations of 13th and 14th April.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. O. B. Browne-Mason, R.A.M.C.—Acted as my Assistant Director of Medical Services during the operations of 13th and at the battle of the 14th. His arrangements for evacuating the large number of our wounded during the battle of Barjisiyah showed marked ability and organising power. I feel greatly indebted to him.

Major H. A. Holdich, Brigade Major, 16th Brigade.—A cool and able Staff officer.

Captain J. H. Carruthers, Staff Captain, 16th Brigade.

Shaikh Ibrahim El Abdullah El Ibrahim of Zubair.—Regularly furnished information of the enemy's movements. The information was almost always correct, and the Shaikh must have incurred great trouble and expense in procuring it.

Major H. Smyth.—Intelligence Officer at Shaiba.

Interpreter Mirza Ali.—Headquarters, 16th Infantry Brigade.

I also desire to bring to notice the names of the following officers who throughout the day conveyed my orders to various parts of the battlefield with promptitude and despatch at considerable personal risk:—

Major A. T. S. Dickinson, Brigade Major, 30th Infantry Brigade.
Captain A. J. Shakeshaft, 2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.
Lieutenant H. D. Hickley, 2nd Battalion, 7th Gurkhas.
Lieutenant H. H. Rich, 120th Infantry.
2nd Lieutenant Lemon, attached 104th Rifles.

ARTILLERY.

Major O. S. Lloyd, Adjutant, 10th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.

63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery—
Major H. Broke-Smith.
Lieutenant R. Gilpin.
No. 52668 Gr. J. Stanley.

76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery—
Major E. V. Sarson.
No. 55119 Gr. E. Kirk.

23rd Mountain Battery—
Major E. E. Edlmann, D.S.O., R.G.A. (Since died of wounds.)
Captain A. V. Jarrett ... ... Although twice slightly wounded and on the second occasion partially stunned, continued to command his Section with great ability and energy.
No. 535 Gunner Harnam Singh.
No. 30 Cr.-Havildar Latif.
No. 226 Dr. Naik Sher Khan.

CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Sykes ... "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. Ably commanded his battery throughout the operations.

7th Lancers—
Lieutenant-Colonel C. Chesney Cook.
Major G. G. M. Wheeler (killed in action). The initiative, dash and gallantry of this officer marked him out for special recognition had he survived. I now recommend him for the posthumous grant of the V.C. which forms the subject of a separate application.
Lieutenant and Adjutant G. L. B. Stones.
Jemadar Sudhan Singh (killed in action). Recommended for posthumous grant of Indian Order of Merit.
No. 3574 L.-Dafadar Ram Singh.
No. 1103 Kot-Dafadar Kala Singh.
No. 3548 Sowar Bakhtawar Singh.
No. 2108 Sowar Amrik Singh.

ENGINEERS.

Searchlight Section—
No. 31125 Sapper C. A. Wells, R.E., Searchlight Section.

17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners—
Captain E. J. Loring, R.E.
Lieutenant R. C. Lord, R.E.
Jemadar Mohammad Din.

22nd Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners—

Captain E. C. Whiteley, R.E. (killed in action).	Quite an exceptionally promising officer, killed whilst gallantly leading his men.
Lieutenant K. B. S. Crawford, R.E.	Jemadar Ramswami Naidu.
No. 1930 Havildar Gangaji Rao Khanvalkar.	No. 2899 Naik Narayan Halatkar.

No. 3955 L.-Naik Said Hussain.

INFANTRY.

2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment—

Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher (killed in action).	An able and most gallant Commanding Officer whose death is a great loss to the Service.
Captain H. K. Utterson.	No. 8328 Private Burt.
Captain G. M. Herbert.	No. 8483 Private Joliffe.
Lieutenant H. H. Dean.	No. 8662 Private Lloyd.
No. 5349 C.-S.-M. W. Warren.	No. 8406 Private Scudden (killed in action).
No. 6701 C.-S.-M. W. Daniel.	No. 9059 Private Scovell.
No. 8744 Corporal H. Scott.	No. 7909 Private Sedgbeer.

2nd Norfolk Regiment—

Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Peebles, D.S.O.	Ably commanded his regiment, which under his direction attacked with great dash and spirit in spite of heavy losses.
Major F. De B. Bell (since died of wounds).	Captain R. D. Marshall.
Captain and Adjutant C. De Grey.	Captain A. B. Floyd.

Lieutenant R. T. Frere.

Lieutenant M. Burnett, R.A.M.C....	For conspicuous courage attending to the wounded in the open in the firing line under very heavy fire where his work necessitated his being very exposed. He lost his life in the firing line doing so, and his work was beyond praise.
3rd Class Assistant Surgeon J. V. Fernandez, I.S.M.D.	No. 7040 Drummer A. Barker.
No. 7014 L.-Corporal C. Woodward.	No. 7879 Private T. Bindley.
No. 7609 L.-Corporal J. H. Preston.	No. 7925 Private H. Farmes.
No. 5359 Sergeant C. Aldridge.	No. 8390 Private C. Smith (wounded).
No. 6331 Sergeant J. Airey.	No. 7840 Private S. Chapman.
No. 6161 Sergeant H. Solomon.	No. 8200 Private J. Chard.
No. 5676 Sergeant J. Savage.	No. 7359 Private J. Murphy.
No. 6789 Sergeant F. Bolingbroke.	No. 8416 Private E. Harper.

24th Punjabis—

Lieutenant-Colonel S. H. Climo (wounded).	A proved soldier, who commanded his regiment with coolness and courage.
Captain W. F. B. Edwards (killed in action).	I recommend him for a posthumous honour in recognition of conspicuously gallant leading of his men.
Lieutenant M. Birkbeck.	Sub.-Major Sakt Chand Bahadur (wounded).
Lieutenant D. Hobart (dangerously wounded).	Subadar Gul Akhbar.
Jemadar Sohan Singh.	No. 4943 L.-Naik Lal Singh (wounded severely).
No. 137 Naik Dula Singh, 19th Punjabis (killed in action).	No. 405 Sepoy Vir Singh (wounded severely).
No. 514 Sepoy Pal Singh.	No. 4909 Sepoy Labh Singh.
No. 318 Sepoy Yarak.	No. 4847 L.-Naik Bela Singh.
No. 4886 Naik Sardar Khan.	No. 141 L.-Naik Lal Khan.

48th Pioneers—

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N. Harward	Ably commanded the Fort Section of the Defences throughout the night 12th-13th.

Major H. J. Riddell.

Sub.-Major Dula Singh.

Subadar Ganga Singh.

104th Rifles—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. L. Clery ...	An exceptionally good Commanding Officer and in the field a cool and reliable commander.

Captain A. M. Cheeke.

No. 2898 L.-Naik Teja Ram.

Jemadar Chothu Singh.

110th Mahratta Light Infantry—

Lieutenant-Colonel T. X. Britten (died of wounds).

Major H. C. Hill.

Captain R. Knowles, I.M.S.

Captain and Adjutant A. C. S. Hind (killed in action).

Sub-Assistant Surgeon Keshanrao Kuperkar.

Subadar Shaikh Yasin.

Jemadar Dattaji Rao Kauvilkar.

Jemadar Ranchander Hase.

No. 1498 L.-Naik Sakaram More.

No. 2050 Sepoy Hari Sawant.

117th Mahrattas—

Lieutenant-Colonel H. K. MacGeorge	Commanded his regiment with skill and determination.
Captain A. W. White	For conspicuous gallantry when in command of his double company. This double company reinforced the Dorset left and joined in the successful assault, capturing 73 prisoners. The Officer Commanding Dorset Regiment specially remarks on the dash shown by this double company.
Captain W. B. Benton ... .. (105th Mahratta Light Infantry)	For conspicuous gallantry and coolness when working the machine gun section on April 12th, 13th and 14th. He is quite an exceptionally good officer. His name came up for gallantry at the action of Sahil.
Lieutenant N. K. Bal, I.M.S. ...	For conspicuous bravery in attending wounded men under a heavy fire in the open. He attended the wounded of the 22nd Coy., 3rd Sappers and Miners as well as those of his own regiment.

Subadar-Major Balwantrao Savant.

Subadar Sakharam Rao Jagtap Bahadur.

Jemadar Sita Ram Sellar.

No. 1883 Havildar Vishnu Aire.

No. 2742 Havildar Dadu Aggave.

No. 2437 Sepoy Jairam Dalbi.

No. 2474 Sepoy Ithu Kadam.

No. 2915 Sepoy Abdul Gaffur.

th Infantry—

Lieut.-Colonel W. W. Chitty ...	An able and efficient commander whose regiment behaved admirably under his direction.

Captain J. J. Harper Nelson, I.M.S.

Captain T. De B. Carey.

Lieutenant A. De St. Croix.

Lieutenant M. Eccles	Successfully carried messages under fire from the Brigade Commander to his unit. Subsequently displayed great gallantry in bringing ammunition mules close up to the firing line although nine of the mules were killed on the way, and finally led a double company in the assault on the trenches.

Subadar-Major Bhairo Singh Bahadur I.O.M.
Subadar Uma Rawat.

No. 3639 Havildar Uma Rawat.
No. 4339 L.-Naik Mukna Rawat.
No. 4025 L.-Naik Dewa Rawat.
No. 3887 Naik Nathu Singh.
S. A. S. Munishwamy Ramaswamy. I.S.M.D.
No. 3846 Sepoy Ramlal Singh.
No. 4112 Sepoy Dhanna Rawat.
No. 4166 Sepoy Gokal.

No. 2940 Ward Orderly Sirpulrao Bhosle.

120th Infantry—

Major P. F. Pocock	An able leader who has rendered valuable services which are deserving of recognition.
Captain W. Andrews (95th Russell's Infantry), (died of wounds).	For conspicuous gallantry on 14th in leading a charge across the open against the enemy position with machine guns.

Captain W. L. Miskin.

Subadar-Major Khitab Gul Bahadur.
Subadar Sri Bahadur Singh.
No. 873 Cr.-Hav. Gunesh Ram.
No. 1089 L.-Naik Bhima Rawat
No. 1243 L.-Naik Suja Rawat.
No. 840 L.-Naik Panne Khan.
No. 1662 Naik Seolal.
No. 1474 Naik Allah Baksh.
No. 1712 Sepoy Lachman Singh.
No. 1531 Sepoy Koom Singh.
No. 1511 Sepoy Gangadhar.
No. 1202 Sepoy Rawat Singh.
No. 1800 Sepoy Padna Rawut.
No. 1549 Sepoy Channan Singh.
No. 1111 Sepoy Sujan Singh.
No. 1742 Sepoy Jagdeo (killed).

34th Divisional Signal Company, 18th Brigade Section—

No. 16 Corporal J. Sleven.

No. 28 Sapper Abdul Jabbar.
No. 45 Sapper Rangasami.

16th Brigade Section, attached as Despatch Riders—

No. 966 Sowar Phuman Singh (16th Cavalry).
No. 1289 Sowar Nikka Singh (16th Cavalry).

21st Mule Corps—

No. 190 L.-Naik Aladad (killed).
No. 176 L.-Naik Sherbaz.
No. 722 Dr. Rhoda (wounded).
No. 796 Dr. Suchet „
No. 632 Dr. Khwaja „

The Dorset Regiment being in want of ammunition the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, sent up 16 mules with ammunition boxes. The behaviour of the drivers of these mules has been brought to notice by the Officer Commanding, Dorset Regiment, and the Officer Commanding, 24th Punjabis, the latter describing them as heroes. Nine mules were killed. One Driver was killed, and three wounded, one escaping unhurt. The greater part of the ammunition reached the firing line, the drivers showing the greatest courage. One driver was seen holding on to his mules, some of whom wounded, although wounded himself and under very heavy fire.

MEDICAL SERVICES.

Captain R. E. Wright, I.M.S. ...	Displayed exceptional ability in handling his sub-division of No. 3 Field Ambulance throughout the day. He displayed particular initiative in proceeding to the firing line of the 18th Brigade under a heavy fire and, by ascertaining personally the position of the groups of wounded, was able to conduct a detachment of Jaipur Transport Carts direct to the place where they were most required when speedy evacuation was most essential. He afterwards superintended the main advanced dressing station at South Mound in a most efficient manner.
Captain F. C. Fraser, I.M.S. ...	Displayed great coolness in bringing his sub-division forward under heavy shell and rifle fire and was in close touch with the 16th Brigade throughout the day. I was particularly struck by the steadfast behaviour of the A.B.C. men of this sub-division and attribute it in great part to his excellent example and leading.

Royal Army Medical Corps—

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hennessey.
Major F. G. Foster.
Major F. C. Lambert.

Indian Medical Service—

Major L. Cook.
Captain H. E. Stanger Leathes.
Lieutenant L. A. P. Anderson.

Indian Subordinate Medical Department—

4th Class Assistant Surgeon A. E. Phaure.
No. 972, 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Sundar Singh.
No. 402, 3rd class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Shaikh Mahomed Dada Sahib.

Pack Store Sergeants—

No. 5887 Sergeant F. Hayter, 2nd Battalion, Hampshire Regiment.

Nursing Orderlies—

No. 9166 Lance-Corporal Parkes, 1st Oxford and Bucks. Light Infantry.
No. 8601 Private E. Lock, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment.

Pack Store Havildars—

No. 911 Havildar Ram Lal Singh, 2nd Rajputs.
No. 2154 Havildar Mahomed, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.

Ward Orderlies—

No. 2399 Sepoy Nabi Bux, 119th Infantry.

Hospital Store-keepers—

Sergeant J. A. Bloomfield, Great Indian Peninsula Railway Volunteers.
Private Moos, Poona Volunteer Rifles.
2nd Class Hospital Store-keeper B. F. Ghyara, Supply and Transport Corps.

Army Bearer Corps—

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No. 1196 Bearer Ram Charan.
No. 7485 Bearer Rafawa.

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2. I desire to record the valuable services of the Jaipur Transport Corps in the collection and removal of wounded from the battlefield. The transport drivers worked backwards and forwards to the firing line with great dash and devotion to duty.

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	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.		s. d.
Territorial Infantry Private.	7 0	1 2	12 3 [Ration allowance is given in exceptional circumstances only. The general rule is for Field Service Rations to be issued in kind.]	(1) The cost of any barrack damages or losses caused. (2) For National Insurance, 1½d. a week.	7 0

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	Kit Allowance.†	Messing Allowance.¶§									
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)						(5)	(6)	(7)
			Messing.	Cooking.	Washing.	Hair Cutting.	Library.	Barrack Damages.			
s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	d.	d.	d.	d.	d.	s. d.	d.	s. d.
7 0	1 2	1 3¾	1 3¾	3	3	½	½	½	1 11¼	6½	7 0

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† In return for this allowance the Territorial Force soldier has to keep up his kit of necessaries and to pay for hair-cutting, washing, library, and general incidental expenses.

‡ Subject to the deductions detailed in column 4.

§ The difference between the peace messing allowance at home of 1s. 9d. a week and 1s. 3¾d. in India is made up for in India by the issue in kind of certain articles which lessens by a corresponding amount messing deduction.

‖ Subject as at home to deduction of 1½d. a week for National Insurance.

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WITH

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EAST INDIA (AFGHANISTAN)

PAPERS

REGARDING

HOSTILITIES WITH AFGHANISTAN,

1919.

No. 1.

Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, to His Excellency the Viceroy, No. 1, *dated* 29*th Jamadi-ul-Awal* 1337 *Hijra, corresponding to* 3*rd March*, 1919.

(Translation.)

After compliments.—I am desirous of informing my friend, His Excellency the Viceroy of the great and mighty British Government in the Indian Empire, with much despair and regret, of the particulars of a crime full of poignant grief, namely, the crime of the unjust and unlawful assassination of my late father, His Majesty Siraj-ul-Millat-wad-din Amir Habibulla Khan, King of the Government of Afghanistan, who was killed by a pistol shot at 3 A.M. in his royal bed on Thursday, the 18th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1337 Hijra, corresponding to the 20th February 1919, during his stay at a place called Kalla Gosh in his royal dominions by the hand of a treacherous perfidious traitor. I have no doubt that Your Excellency, my friend, will be much touched by the news of this painful event, for the observance of all the conditions of neutrality and the upright conduct and friendly relations displayed during the past and present by His Majesty my late father, the martyr, towards my esteemed friend's mighty Government were clearly proved and require no mention. I, Your Excellency's friend, had been appointed by order and command of His late Majesty, my assassinated pious father, as his plenipotentiary in the capital of Kabul, and consider myself in every way his heir and successor as Amir and the rightful caller to account and avenger at this time of my father's blood. The people and populace of the capital of Kabul and its surroundings, Saiyads, Ulemas, military and civil classes, traders, artisans, Muhammadan and Hindu subjects of Afghanistan itself, as well as all foreign subjects who were in the capital, unanimously and unitedly, with great enthusiasm and of their own free will and consent, swore allegiance to me, your friend; and putting my trust in God I placed on my head the crown of the Amirship of my Government of Afghanistan in the capital of Kabul amid the loud acclamations of the people and troops. And this by the grace of God. Later on our Government Armies in camp at Jalalabad also took their stand on the path of Right, which was wholly on our side, and proved their fidelity and loyalty by deposing and divesting of office my uncle Sardar Nasrulla Khan, who had as usurper declared himself Amir without any right at Jalalabad, and by submitting to me their oaths of allegiance. Thereupon my uncle Sardar Nasrulla Khan abdicated the throne of the kingdom, and my brothers Sardars Inayatulla Khan and Hayatulla Khan and other members of the Royal family, who had sworn allegiance to him, considered that allegiance illegal and submitted their oaths of allegiance to me at Kabul and acknowledged and recognised my succession as Amir and King. Therefore relying upon the friendship and sympathy that exist and will continue to exist between us, I have considered it necessary to do myself the great honour of informing my friend.

Nor let this remain unknown to that friend that our independent and free Government of Afghanistan considers itself ready and prepared at every time and season to conclude, with due regard to every consideration for the requirements of friendship and the like, such agreements and treaties with the mighty Government of England as may be useful and serviceable in the way of commercial gains and advantages to our Government and yours.

For the rest kindly accept considerations of my friendly esteem.

Usual conclusion.

No. 2.

Proclamation by Amir Amanulla Khan.

(Undated.)

(Translation.)

In the name of God, most merciful and compassionate.

O high-minded nation!

O courageous army!

This weak creature of the Creator of the Universe, *viz.*, your Amir, Amir Amanulla, gives you joyful tidings that thank God—again thank God—the Government of this great nation of ours and the sacred soil of our beloved country have in a very admirable way remained peaceful and safe from the horrors of such a disturbance as was calculated to make our enemies—near and far—happy and joyful and our friends much concerned. And this by the grace of God.

Listen, the facts are as follows:—

You have already been informed by proclamations, *firmans* and notices of the details of what has happened.

The happy news now is this. The bold and courageous army of our Government at Jalalabad displayed the greatest sense of honour and courage in the discharge of all their obligations. On Thursday the 25th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1337 Hijra (27th February 1919), all the officers and soldiers who had accompanied His late Majesty, my father, the martyr, assembled on the parade ground of the cantonment at Jalalabad, swore allegiance to me with the band playing, a salute of guns and great rejoicings. Thereafter they arrested and imprisoned all persons who were entrusted with the safeguarding of His late Majesty and who were on special duty in the Royal bedroom at the time of the assassination and demanded their being called to account and punished by my uncle, who, without any religious or worldly right, had acted as usurper and declared himself as Amir. Since no false claimant can establish his illegal claim, my uncle, who had no right, voluntarily abdicated the Amirship and recognised me as Amir. The deeds of his allegiance and those of my brothers, Sardars Inayatulla Khan and Hayatulla Khan and other members of the Royal family have been received by me. Copies of these are herewith sent for your perusal and information.

O high-minded nation of Afghanistan! Let us offer thousands of thanks and praises most humbly to the imperishable God of the Earth and Heavens with our burning hearts and bleeding eyes that He has saved our sublime Government from the horrors of commotion and confusion and has inspired our Islamic Government with more strength, power and freedom. Please do not for a moment think that this King of yours expresses his thankfulness for his success in securing the throne. No, I express my thankfulness to God for safeguarding peace and prosperity of yourselves, my beloved nation, for saving the Muslims of the great nation of my beloved country Afghanistan at these perilous and hazardous times from various troubles and misfortunes and their painful consequences and for giving us a new lease of life.

O courageous army of the Government of Afghanistan! I offer thousands of thanks and endless praise to God, the Most Holy—Glory be to Him—that your soul-consuming bullets and your heart-piercing steel spearheads which were kept ready for the protection of the honour of the faith and nation of our country have by the grace of God been prevented from being used for our self-destruction and against each other. Understand it well and carefully realise that this is due to the special favour and mercy of God Almighty and the spiritual blessings of the Prophet which have been showered on our Government and nation. It is the eternal will of the unchangeable Creator—Exalted be His Glory—that all hardship and oppression may be removed from the heads of your nation; and that Afghanistan may be protected from the mischief of enemies of the faith and the country.

O nation with a nice sense of honour.

O brave army.

While my great nation were putting the Crown of the Kingdom on my head, I declared to you with a loud voice that I would accept the Crown and throne only on the condition that you should all co-operate with me in my thoughts and ideas. These I explained to you at the time and I repeat here a summary thereof:—

(1) *Firstly* that the Government of Afghanistan should be internally and externally independent and free, that is to say, that all rights of Government that are possessed by other independent Powers of the world should be possessed in their entirety by Afghanistan.

(2) *Secondly* that you should unite with me with all your force in avenging the unlawful assassination of my late father, the martyr, who was spiritually a father to all of you.

(3) *Thirdly* that the nation should be free, that is to say, that no individual should be oppressed and subjected to any highhandedness or tyranny by any other individual. Of course obedience to the sacred law of Muhammad and Civil and Military laws is looked upon as a glorious honour for which we, the great nation of Afghanistan, are by disposition and nature well-known.

I would not accept your Crown except on these conditions. All of you, members of the high-minded strong nation, accepted these conditions with enthusiasm and acclamation, and I also put that great supreme Crown on my head with extreme honour and with determined resolution and purpose thus putting my head under the heavy weight of "*imamat* and *amarat*" (religious leadership and rulership). I hope that you, my faithful prudent and high-minded nation, will pray to the Creator of the Earth and the Heavens to favour me with strength to be successful in my undertaking and in doing all that may be necessary for your welfare and prosperity; and that you will co-operate with me manfully in the execution of my thoughts and ideas. O nation! at present I abolish at the outset the system of "begar" (impressed labour) in the country. Henceforward no labour will be impressed and not a single individual will be employed by force from among you on making roads, working on public works, tree cutting, etc., and by the grace of God our sublime Government will adopt such measures of reform as may prove serviceable and useful to the country and nation so that the Government and nation of Afghanistan may make a name and gain great renown in the civilized world and take its proper place among the civilized Powers of the world.

For the rest I pray to God for His favours and mercy and seek His help for the welfare and prosperity of you Muslims and all mankind. From God I seek guidance and the completion of my wishes.

[Seal of Amir Amanulla.]

No. 3.

Letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to Amir Amanulla Khan, dated **15th** *April,* **1919.**

After compliments.—I have received from you with deepest regret the lamentable news of the untimely death of your revered father His Majesty the late Amir Habibulla Khan Siraj-ul-Millat-Wad-din. United from of old by ties of friendship, the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan are now united in a common sorrow. For while Afghanistan mourns the loss of a great ruler who ever sought the welfare of his countrymen and by his wise statesmanship preserved it from the horrors which the war, just ended, has brought upon so many nations, the British Government mourns the loss of a staunch friend who throughout his reign maintained firm the alliance between the two Governments.

I thank you for informing me that you have been unanimously acknowledged as Amir by the populace of Kabul and its surroundings, Saiyads, Ulemas, Military and Civil classes, that your uncle Sardar Nasrulla Khan has abdicated, and that your brothers Sardars Inayatulla Khan and Hayatulla Khan and other members of the Royal family, together with the troops at Jalalabad, have sworn allegiance to you.

I note with pleasure that you say that you have sent me this information relying upon the friendship and sympathy which exist and will continue to exist between the two Governments. That friendship is based on the treaties and engagements concluded with the British Government by the late Zia-ul-Millat-Wad-din and confirmed by the late Siraj-ul-Millat-Wad-din, and I understand from what you say that the Government of Afghanistan intends to act upon them as in the past.

You say moreover that the Government of Afghanistan considers itself ready at every time and season to conclude with due regard to the requirements of friendship such agreements and treaties with the British Government as may be to the commercial advantage of the two Governments. From this it seems possible that the commercial requirements of Afghanistan are thought to call for some agreement with the British Government subsidiary to the treaties and engagements above-mentioned. At this period of mourning I refrain from pursuing the matter further. But the Government of Afghanistan may rest assured that I shall be prepared at all times to invite His Majesty's Government to give careful consideration to anything it may wish to put forward and that it will be my constant endeavour in the future as in the past to foster friendly relations between the two Governments. *Usual conclusion.*

No. 4.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated **23rd** *April,* **1919.**
(Received **25th** *April.)*

(Telegraphic.)

British Agent at Kabul reports: "In Durbar held 13th April Amir made speech in which he declared Afghanistan independent internally and externally, and he personally made this fact known to me particularly. He has appointed a certain Muhammad Wali Khan as Afghan Safir to Bokhara; latter is about to leave. Am informed by reliable sources that question of appointing Safir to Persia is under consideration."

No. 5.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated **27th** *April,* **1919.**
(Received **29th** *April.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Following from Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province:—*Firman* quoted below has been sent under seal of Abdul Qudus Khan to the Governors of Jalalabad, Laghman, etc., by Amir whom the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar has sedulously primed with sensational accounts of disturbances in India:—"The people in India, in the Punjab and in Peshawar have risen in rebellion against the British Government on account of certain new laws passed by the Government. I therefore direct you to warn the officers under you to be on the alert against the commission of some foolish act in British Territory by any Afghan subject. Saiyid Mir Jan Badshah also should give the necessary instructions to his Mullahs, and you are therefore to communicate this order to him." Amir's agents in Peshawar have received *firmans* forbidding them to issue passports to Kabul to any British subject, whether Mohammedan or Hindu, who has participated in riots in India, except with Amir's prior sanction. Application had already been made for passports which they could use in event of trouble, by some of the Peshawar Union Committee.

No. 6.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd May, 1919.
(Received 7th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Speculation in regard to Amanulla's intentions has been aroused on frontier by arrival at Dakka of Afghan Commander-in-Chief, Saleh Muhammad Khan, with 2 companies of infantry and 2 guns, and by exaggerated accounts of troubles in Punjab. Officer of Khyber Rifles was told by Saleh Muhammad himself that his intention was to inspect whole frontier of Afghanistan. Letter of 26th April from British Agent, Kabul, contains mention of similar speculation there in regard to this tour by Commander-in-Chief, and the fact that late Commander-in-Chief has been sent to Khost with a force; by some these movements are put down to natural precautions in view of dissatisfaction at findings in regard to murder of late Amir, and by others they are ascribed to anti-British intentions. Former view, which is inherently the probable one, is held by Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province.

No. 7.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 4th May, 1919.
(Received 5th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, sends following two messages, dated 3rd May:—

No. 1.

Saleh Muhammad Khan, Afghan Commander-in-Chief, has left Dakka, where his escort, however, remains, for Jalalabad.

Party of Khyber Rifles escorting caravan to Landi Khana was met this morning in disputed area between Tor Kham and Landi Khana by armed Afghan pickets, who threatened to fire if party advanced; latter were firm and proceeded to usual point without any incident arising. So far as can be ascertained there were no Afghan troops or military force among Afghan pickets, who were apparently acting in concert with tribesmen under notorious Zar Shah. Ningrahar is much out of hand, and it is possible this incident is only a piece of impudence by Zar Shah; against this view it is possible Zar Shah's action was taken under instructions, this incident being first step to revive old dispute about boundary. If present attitude is persisted in by Afghans, is it Government's wish that escort should continue to be sent as far as Tor Kham, which is extreme limit to which we lay claim, force being employed if necessary, or is it preferred that we should not go beyond Landi Khana, thus avoiding trouble? The stretch of nullah bed, which is in dispute, is less than a mile long and has no value in itself, but is important in that Afghans might be given a claim to Bagh villages by its possession. Dispute ought to be settled by a Boundary Commission, but when settlement has been attempted by us in past Amir has made excuses and failed to send commissioners. In Peshawar there are rumours that Nasrulla Khan has died of poison in jail. Kurram reports rumours of trouble in Afghanistan are very rife and that apprehension of attack exists among Turis, who are always very nervous. Political Agent, Tochi, telegraphs that movements of troops are rumoured. Reaction against Amanulla is undoubtedly increasing in districts of Afghanistan and in Kabul considerable amount of apprehension without doubt exists.

No. 2.

Political Agent, Khyber, has received letter from Sarhaddar, Dakka, warning him of passage of *lashkar* under Zar Shar. Warning sent too late on purpose. Sarhang's intention is to cover himself. It is now quite obvious that Zar Shah is acting under orders. We have got in touch with him and he says Sipah Salar sent him on to commence hostilities, but that pending arrival of Afghan troops he will do as little as possible. Last night his gang killed five coolies on the waterworks. He has given us a lithographed copy of a *firman*, apparently undoubtedly genuine, bearing Amir's seal, text of which will be telegraphed as soon as possible. It begins by referring to Indian unrest, and to faithful loyalty of Indians to British Government throughout the war being now rewarded by cruelty and injustice; repetition of usual denouncement of Rowlatt Bills follows, and exhortation to Afghans to follow orders of the new Commander-in-Chief, Saleh Muhammad Khan, who will give full explanation of Amir's orders and intentions (Commander-in-Chief has been talking quite openly of Holy War); conclusion is exhortation to all to win favour of God and obey will of the Prophet which, although actual word is not used, is clearly an incitement to *Jehad*. 245 copies are said to have been sent to Peshawar, and letters of very inflammatory tone to the tribes. Abdur Rahman, the new Afghan envoy, and the Afghan

Postmaster have done all they can to influence Amir by their reports to take this course. Latter, who has had many interviews with Union Committee in Peshawar, is now at Jalalabad in conference with Sipah Salar (Afghan Commander-in-Chief). Probably we should find many compromising documents if we were to arrest him at Landi Kotal on his return journey and were to search Afghan post office in Peshawar, but reprisals on British Agent would presumably be made by Afghans. Shinwaris and Mohmands are flocking into Jalalabad, where distribution of rifles and ammunition is said to be taking place. Tone of Khyber Rifles, Shinwaris and Afridis is good. From Kurram there are reports of activity by Afghans on Peiwar Kotal and some panic among Turis. I do not propose to send Expeditionary Force to Landi Kotal until situation is much worse, as movement would have disturbing influence in Peshawar, but I have asked G.O.C. to evacuate German and Austrian prisoners as soon as possible and to have Khyber column ready.

No. 8.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1919. (*Received 5th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Following is translation of Amir's *firman*, wording of which is about as bad as possible, though loophole is still left for hope that he has not definitely committed himself:—

"I send this order to all my subjects of the Eastern circles, Saiyids, Sheikhs, Khans and "Motabars. This is to tell you that there is great unrest in India. Practically all, Muham-"madan or Hindu, have remained sincere and faithful to Government, and proved themselves to "be loyal subjects; but they have been rewarded by all kinds of cruelty and injustice, affecting "their religion, honour, and modesty. This is a pity. The latest news received by Amir "Amanulla, your King, is very distressing, and there is nobody but must lament and hate "such deeds of injustice. To be brief, the account received of these injustices shows that "nobody, whether Hindu or Muhammadan, will have any right to own his land or his property "or power to speak; nor may more than three men stand together in one place; nor may they "go to their mosques nor Hindus to their temples; if they do go there and assemble together "they will be punished at the mere word of the Criminal Investigation Department and with-"out any investigation of the matter. There are other examples of orders and rules of the "same kind, contrary to the rights of humanity. Of all these things I inform you. I am "prevented by international law from interfering with the internal policy of the British "Government, and I have nothing to do with it; but from the point of view of Islam and man-"kind, I dislike unfair laws and, in my view, Indians, in rising and creating disturbances, "are right. But these risings and disturbances are not confined to India; in Afghanistan also "their bad effects are seen. It is, therefore, your King's duty to warn his faithful subjects "to remain united and ardent. Do not scatter but catch fast the rope of God. Act upon the "order of God and do not become disunited. For God the Creator has laid this order upon us "that casting aside all pride, distinctions and differences in such time of disorder we help "one the other. Sympathy and kindness to the poor are virtues of the children of Adam "and Eve. All are God's children, Jews and Christians, Hindus and Muhammadans. It is "a pity that, excepting themselves, no one is considered a human being by the British. What "will be the result of these things we do not know, nor are they any concern of ours. But in "pursuance of one of my duties as King of Afghanistan, I appoint to be Commander of the "Eastern Circle, with military and civil powers, Saleh Muhammad Khan, our Commander-in-"Chief, in whom are all soldierly and righteous virtues: I give him full powers to protect "and benefit the Eastern Circle, and honestly, prudently and courageously to preserve its unity "and community. I lay upon him the duty of watching carefully the frontiers and of keeping "my subjects informed of all intentions, thoughts and orders of me, your King, which shall "be for the benefit of our country and for its religion, and which shall make us united to "achieve this sacred end. So you may win the favour of God, and obey the will of the "Prophet and remain sincerely obedient to your King to the end. For upon these things "depends the good of this world and the next. God be with you." *Firman* bears the seal of Amanulla.

We are preparing a message from the Viceroy to the Amir, and meanwhile impressing on Chief Commissioner that it is of vital importance to avoid any frontier incident at Tor Kham or anywhere else, and are inviting him to consider whether it would not be advisable for Abdul Qayum to try and arrange a meeting on the frontier with Afghan Commander-in-Chief.

No. 9.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 6th May. (*Received 7th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, has sent four telegraphic reports, first three dated 4th May, last dated 5th May.

I. Following information has been received from Kabul by Afghan Post Office in Peshawar:—The Amir called a special Durbar, at which, weeping bitterly, he read letters received from India, and said: "See the tyranny exercised upon our brethren in India; and, more, tyranny has seized Baghdad and the Holy Places. I ask you: Are you prepared for

Holy War? If so, gird up your loins, the time has come." All replied that they were prepared, whereupon Amir Amanulla said that he would collect no more revenue, but all present should collect grain for the holy war, and the rich should purchase rifles and ammunition from the arsenal, which would issue them on security to the poor. Orders were given to Ghilzais to collect the Shinwari camels to take supplies to the Khyber and Kurram frontiers. Amanulla paid a visit to Nasrulla and Inayatulla to ask them to join, but, on the ground of their respect for the late Amir Habibullah's judgment, they declined. Last Friday a proclamation was read in the Hadda Mulla Mosque describing the cruelty exercised by British authorities at Delhi, Lahore and Amritsar, and describing the Rowlatt Bill. The Mullas all voted for *Jehad*. Kazi Abdul Jalil has been sent with three Turks to Tirah to raise the Afridis, Mir Jan Badshah to the Mohmands, to whom also Chaknawur Mullah has been sent by Sipah Salar. I have asked G.O.C., Kohat, to be ready to support Kurram if necessary, as situation there is more threatening, and Turis are leaving their villages near the border.

II. During night of 3rd May party of Afghan soldiers or *khassadars* in uniform, 150 strong, occupied Bagh and Kafirkot. Their C.O. sent an oral message that his action was precautionary measure against raids by Zar Shah. Afghan camp has been pitched at Bagh, and all inhabitants of village have fled to the hills or to Landi Kotal. This act is a clear challenge to us, and the tribes so regard it. It is impossible for us to send caravan escort while Afghans hold hills above Landi Khana ravine without it being practically certain to be ambushed. I have, therefore, instructed Political Agent in Khyber to send Sarhaddar, Dakka, a letter in reply to his,* thanking him for the information given and pointing out that in precautionary measures he has taken he has, possibly by error, encroached on British territory, and requesting that, if it is an error, his men be withdrawn from limits of Bagh, but that if it is intentional act, responsibility for any trouble arising will rest on Sarhaddar; and adding, that so long as the situation remains disturbed the Khyber will be closed to caravans. Orders of Government are requested as to ejecting Afghans by force from Bagh. Conflict would be precipitated thereby, but this appears inevitable any way, and worst effect on tribes will result from irresolution and inaction. Afridis have received letters from Amir, and Zakka Khel were shown one by Yar Muhammad Khan, who tried to get them to accompany him to Dakka; they refused, saying their action would depend on decision of tribe as a whole. Great quantities of supplies are being sent to Dakka and open declaration of *Jehad* in a week is rumoured locally.

III. Force at Bagh consists of 100 Afghan regulars, 200 *Khassadars* and some Shinwari tribesmen. They are commanded by a colonel who is very nervous and has been appealing for more troops: these have been promised him. G.O.C. will send emergency column to-morrow to Landi Kotal to strengthen Khyber Rifles at my request. Copies of Amir's *firman*† have reached Afghan post office in Peshawar, and large numbers have been distributed through Peshawar; many copies also are said to have been sent to India in various directions. This puts its authenticity beyond question. Afghan Postmaster returned to-day to Peshawar from his conferences with Sipah Salar at Jalalabad. Main to Tangi water supply has been plugged by Afghans at Bagh, and short supply of water at Landi Kotal is serious.

IV. Afghan Post Office has distributed in Peshawar large number of copies of Amir's *firman* previously mentioned. Pretence that it is a forgery is no longer possible. Revised version containing additional information that Abdul Qudus is in command of Western Afghanistan at Kandahar has also been received. Mohammed Tarzi must be in power at Kabul if Qudus can be spared from capital in present crisis. Afghan Postmaster has returned from Jalalabad yesterday bringing with him a motor-car load of leaflets which had been printed at his Kabul press, and which are extremely violent in tone, alleging that India and Egypt have risen in successful rebellion and that war has been resumed by Germany. They end with "cursed be the English tyrants."

Pending receipt of replies to Khyber Political Agent's message to Sarhaddar, Dakka, and Viceroy's letter to Amir, Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, has been instructed to avoid any steps tending to precipitate matters.

No. 10.

From the Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 6th May. (Received 7th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Authenticity of Amir's *firman* is reported by Roos-Keppel to be beyond doubt. On 5th May Afghan Postmaster in Peshawar, accompanied by a motor-car load of printed leaflets of most inflammatory nature, ending with curses on British, arrived back from Jalalabad. On same day there arrived at Bagh three Afghan regiments with two guns; reinforcements are said to be on their way: and accordingly despatch of troops from Peshawar to eject them from their position has been authorised. Kurram reports panic among Turis following on arrival in Khost of late Commander-in-Chief Nadir Khan, with additional regular troops and *lashkars* of tribesmen, including several thousand Ghilzais, three Afghan regiments, with two guns, and large Kunar *lashkars*, led by Mullahs, have left Jalalabad for Mohmand country. It is clear from reports from our Agent in Kabul that Amir's enquiry into circumstances of murder of late Amir has caused deep dissatisfaction among populace. Finding his position impossible to maintain and under encouragement derived from accounts of Indian disturbances, grossly exaggerated, he has been led to proclaim a Holy War, coupled with promises of easy conquest of India, in order to avert a rebellion against himself. The tribes' attitude will constitute a most important factor in situation, and Chief Commissioner has been instructed to endeavour to secure their adhesion and authorised to spend money without stint to achieve this. Already he has been approached by Mohmands, who have promised to stick to us, provided military support is given them, and have given hostages for their good faith. We have instructed Roos-Keppel to give the assurances they require. On Baluchistan frontier there is no anti-British feeling, and absence of any information that Amir's *firman* has been sent to Kandahar.

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* See No. 7. † No. 8.

No. 11.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 6th May. (Received 7th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Letter of which text is given below was despatched to Amir on 4th May by special messenger. Agent in Kabul has been instructed by wire to obtain audience of Amir at once and explain situation in Punjab to him fully and frankly. Letter is as follows:—

"I am informed that one Zar Shar, a Shinwari, of Ningrahar, who has previously been concerned in raids in the Peshawar district, is stirring up trouble on Khyber border. He has interfered with Khyber Rifles in British territory, and impudently states that Sipah Salar has sent him ahead to commence hostilities. Nor is this all. He is parading a *firman*, declaring that there is great unrest in India, that loyalty of our subjects has been rewarded by my Government by cruelty and injustice in connection with their religion, honour, and modesty, and that they are right in rising and creating disturbances.

"Though I am informed *firman* bears your seal, I cannot but believe it is a forgery, set in circulation by some enemy of Afghanistan and of yourself. For it contained misrepresentations of the state of India so gross that no statesman could have believed them. Its object is so palpably to incite the hot-headed frontier tribes against the British Government (whose power has now been demonstrated by the crushing of the strongest power in the world) that no friendly Afghan could have penned it. In short, it is so grave a menace to the secure position you are now consolidating for yourself after the troubled history of the last few months, that it can only be the work of some enemy of yourself who seeks your overthrow. In your letter to me,* No. 1, dated 29th Jamadi-ul-awal, 1337, Hijra, you wrote of the friendship that exists between the two Governments, and in the letter just received† inform me that you have sent Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan to be your envoy. You wrote of the necessity for friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between nations. Relying, therefore, on the sincerity of your words, I request you to issue stringent and immediate orders for the arrest of the said Zar Shah and to make it known along our common frontier that the *firman* which he has distributed broadcast is an outrageous forgery, based on lying rumours. Of the true state of the Punjab, which is rapidly subsiding to normal conditions, I am directing the British Agent, Kabul, to inform you. Your envoys, incoming and outgoing, will be able to corroborate his reassuring accounts from their own experience.

"I trust you will agree with me that the matter is of too serious character to permit of action being delayed, and that you will lose no time in informing me that you have taken such action as it requires. *Usual ending.* (Signed) CHELMSFORD."

No. 12.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 7th May. (Received 7th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Roos Keppel reports that feeling in Peshawar City is bad and at present is getting worse; city is full of wild rumours. From Afghan Postmaster information has been obtained that Afghan plan of campaign is, in outline, establishment of three fronts, Dakka, Khost and Quetta, under command respectively of Saleh Mohammed, Nadir Khan and Abdul Qudus Khan. Simultaneous attack on all three fronts will be launched on a date which will be announced within 10 days, by hordes of Ghazis, with regular troops in support. At same moment riots immobilizing troops will break out all over India.

No. 13.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 8th May. (Received 8th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Report received from one of the escort attached to British Agent, Kabul, that troops left Kabul on 26th April for Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar. Informant, who left Kabul (which is covered with inflammatory posters) on 30th April and Jalalabad on 4th May, states that between Jalalabad and Dakka country is full of parties of Ghazi tribesmen. He was told at Dakka that strict injunctions had been issued by Amir that till he gave the word no advance should be made. Consul-General, Meshed, reports that on 25th April Commander-in-Chief and Governor at Herat were suddenly arrested by a senior military officer on authority of Kabul *firman*, which presumably was sent off from Kabul before Durbar held there on 13th April at which Musahiban were acquitted. From Kurram arrival of troops is reported to have led to great improvement in feeling. Tochi report: Khost elders not inclined for war though younger men are enthusiastically for it.

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* No. 1.

† Not printed: letter of credentials to Envoy.

No. 14.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 9th May. (*Received 9th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Report dated 8th May, from Chief Commissioner, Peshawar, states: Large enemy reinforcements arriving; enemy positions advanced to Ash Khel heights, from which Landi Kotal is commanded. This advance is deliberate invasion of British territory. Behaviour of Afridis good; they are sitting on fence with slight inclination towards us. Report from Baluchistan states that Abdul Qudus Khan, who seems to have gone on ahead of his troops in order to raise the tribes, reached Kalat-i-Ghilzai on 5th May. In Kandahar *Jehad* is now generally reported. On 8th May Peshawar city was surrounded by cordon of troops and martial law proclaimed. Effect on city reported to be excellent. Afghan postmaster, who has engaged himself actively in Afghan propaganda, gave himself up, together with three notorious Indian agitators and post office staff. Crowd in city was menacing and police were roughly handled; one Indian official was dangerously wounded by stabbing, but there were no fatal casualties. McLoughlin, the last European employé in Afghanistan, reached Landi Kotal 5th May.

No. 15.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 10th May, 1919. (*Received 10th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Yesterday morning our advanced forces drove Afghans from their positions in neighbourhood of Landi Khana, with co-operation of aëroplanes, who bombed Dakka with good effect. Our casualties slight. Enemy still hold positions near Khar Ghali to westward. General disposition of our forces yesterday was; 1st Division between Landi Kotal and Kach Garhi, 2nd Division moving into Peshawar area.

No. 16.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 12th May, 1919. (*Received 12th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Report from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, indicates that up to 10th tribes all along border were remarkably quiet, but that yesterday they showed signs of wavering. We need to have success at early date to keep them steady. A *lashkar* is at Chura, on the Afghan side of the border, 300 or 400 strong, under a malcontent Malik, who has sent Political Agent in Khyber a letter threatening to cut our line of communication. Situation through Peshawar district has been much improved by arrest of all principal Afghans in Peshawar City and leading agitators; bad spirit still shown by some villages in district. A great deal of inflammatory literature and about a lakh of rupees, presumably for purposes of propaganda, have been found in Afghan Postmaster's house. Yesterday, a declaration of war by Amir was posted up in Peshawar City, but we could not obtain a copy as it was torn down at once. From Baluchistan reports received of several officers having passed through Kandahar from Herat for Kabul; they are believed to be Bolshevik emissaries. We are sending Afghan envoys in India back to Afghanistan.

No. 17.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 16th May. (*Received 16th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Announcement is being spread through tribes by Afghans that negotiations for armistice are pretence and device to gain time. Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, regards situation generally as very favourable, though some of the young men of Afridis are getting out of hand. There have been frequent desertions from Khyber Rifles at isolated outposts and concentration of corps at Landi Kotal is in hand. There has not been a single desertion from Frontier Constabulary or Police, both of whom have done magnificently.

No. 18.

From the Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 16*th May,* 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to your telegram of to-day,* which contains the only information I have received as to Afghan request for cessation of hostilities, and telegraph without delay circumstances in which request was made. Has Amir Amanulla yet replied to your letter to him of 4th inst.† or is any further evidence of his complicity available?

No. 19.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 18*th May,* 1919. *(Received* 21*st May.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Following received by wire from G.O.C., Peshawar:—"Report dated 17th May, 7 p.m., "on situation at Loe Dakka. Attacks delivered on 16th from west and south-west by Kabulis; "they were driven off, and except for some sniping night was quiet. Our casualties were 130. "Morning of 17th May: enemy on ridge west of Dakka were attacked by 1st Brigade. At "7 a.m. 1st Division sent to Dakka H.Q., 3rd Brigade, with one M.G. Company and two "battalions, one section 4·5 howitzers and one section 3·7 howitzers. By 3.50 p.m. General "Skeen had captured hills; no report yet received of our casualties, but it is believed 35th "Sikhs had considerable losses. Enemy force, eight battalions, with guns, according to indica-"tions of Political Officer's report. Night of 16–17th May: some sniping at Fort Maude. "17th May: 4th Brigade moved with guns and machine guns to Ali Masjid, without meeting "opposition, for purpose of clearing hills to south of that point. All quiet at Bannu and "Kohat. Nearly 12 cwt. of explosives were dropped on Basawal, on ridge to west of Dakka, "and on Jalalabad." There has been increase in number of desertions from Khyber Rifles, and probably we shall have to give orders for greater part of the force to be disbanded. Baluchistan reports situation unaltered. Some unrest amongst Achakzais near Chaman, in British territory. Five hundred Afghan troops reported by Jaji Maidan Maliks in their country; reinforcements expected. Mohmands, Waziris, Zaimukhts, Orakzais and Afridis maintain good attitude in general. Information received points to intention of Afghans to move some troops, as nucleus for Afridi *lashkars*, into Bazar. Barker and Hoare are names of two lieutenants of R.A.F. taken prisoners in Bazar; tribesmen are treating them well. Swatis and Dirwalis are still fighting each other. No operations reported in Bajaur and Mohmand country up to 15th May, but Mullahs and agents still show activity.

No. 20.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 18*th May. (Received* 18*th May.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Swatis are being kept fully occupied by Nawab of Dir. Situation in Wano reported normal by Political Agent, and distribution of allowances taking place. Zhob Militia: desertion reported of 15 cavalry near Akhtarzai, mostly Ghilzais. In view of alarming increase in number of desertions from Khyber Rifles, Roos-Keppel reports that yesterday he instructed Commanding Officer to have corps concentrated at Jamrud and Landi Kotal and ask each man whether he wished to be discharged or to remain with corps. 600 out of 700 at Landi Kotal asked to be given discharge; men at Jamrud are expected to act similarly. This practically amounts to disbanding the force. It will have an adverse effect on Afridi tribe as a whole, but there is a considerable difference between calling on young men of Afridi in Khyber Rifles to fight for us and leaving the tribe to sit on the fence with steadying influence of elder men. To-day Afridi *jirga* is reported to have decided to take no steps till Amir supplies them with food and arms and ammunition, and the Chief Commissioner expects that the result of the operations round Dakka, which are being watched with close attention, will be decisive factor in their behaviour. Much the same may be said of the Orakzais, and the attitude seems to be common to all the tribes. The Mohmands are quiet and have informed Haji Turangzai that if he tries to come through their country he will be opposed; they are said to have thoroughly looted rifles, etc., in Afghans' camp after Dakka was bombed.

No. 21.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 18*th May. (Received* 19*th May.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Following is text of letter from Afghan Commander-in-Chief to Political Agent, Khyber, asking for armistice:—"Sir,—As regards outbreak of war between Afghanistan and Britain, I have the honour to inform you that British officers commenced an unlawful war without any declaration of war on any side and by this aggressive step inflicted heavy losses on civil population and Army of Afghanistan by throwing bombs from aeroplanes. I am informed by His Majesty (the King of the Independent Kingdom of Afghanistan) that His Majesty has received a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy of India and in consequence of that I am ordered to suspend war (thus unlawfully begun by your side) until further orders. You are accordingly informed that war has been suspended until final decision has been reached by correspondence between His Afghan Majesty and His Excellency the Viceroy." Reuter has already telegraphed above. Message is insolent and so obviously a device to gain time, as reported by us on 16th May,* that orders were given to Political Agent to send reply that he had no authority to answer it, and that Amir should address himself to the Viceroy through channel of G.O.C. in charge of operations, if he wanted peace. Roos-Keppel has telegraphed rough translation of Amir's letter of 10th May† which reached Peshawar on 17th. General tenour, revealing Amir's complicity beyond doubt, is clear from following salient passages, though message is very obscure and in parts corrupt:—"At a time when all India and all Mohammedans are united against the Government of India's tyrannical enactments and Afghans are in sympathy with them especially on the frontier, it would be unreasonable and inadvisable to arrest Zar Shah. It is possible that he may have had papers printed somewhere and possibly they do bear my seal. You accuse me of stirring up the Afghans. Their combination is spontaneous. Your great delay in answering my first letter to you surprises me and I am surprised that your reply should be such as to give my heart no joy. There is much danger in the present state of affairs and your duty is to remove tyrannical laws, to remove tyrannical treaties and not to forget that Afghanistan is independent."

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* No. 17.   † No. 11.

No. 22.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 18*th May.* (*Received* 19*th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Roos-Keppel reports under date 16th May that he has intercepted four letters from Amanulla dated 10th May. (*a*) An invitation to Kazi Abdul Wali, a Peshawar agitator who was till recently member of the Bolshevist Committee there and escaped to independent territory before city was surrounded, to come to Kabul: (*b*) Letter to Afghan Postmaster instructing him to use means employed by Afghan Envoy to deliver to Haji Turangzai letter (*c*) which is promise to Haji to help with troops and ammunition: (*d*) copy of letter to Abdur Rahman, the Afghan Envoy, commending his services in Peshawar and stating Amir has received from him two letters from Haji Turangzai. Originals are being posted to Delhi 16th May. As has been reported already Abdur Rahman during short time he was in Peshawar had intimate dealings with Bolshevist Committee there. Envoy's post bag has been intercepted: it contains number of copies for distribution of inflammatory leaflets and also a letter of 28th April from Commissary for Foreign Affairs instructing Envoy to obtain from Hindus and Mussulmans deeds of allegiance to Amir and instructing him to put exciting announcements in the Press as good opportunity will soon arrive.

No. 23.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 19*th May.* (*Received* 20*th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Strong influence on Afridi opinion in favour of British is reported by Roos Keppel as result of our success at Dakka on 17th. Afridis had previously been influenced by Afghans' apparent success, and on 16th were gradually inclining towards Jehad. City of Peshawar is quiet and every Agency and district in North-West Frontier Province reports all well. Mohmands are ostentatiously friendly. As further result of our success of 17th Chief Commissioner reports good effect on Khyber Rifles, of whom more wished to remain with us; but after consulting fully with Political Agent, Khyber, and officers of Corps, he feels that in present strained state of religious feeling reliance can no longer be placed on it, and its disbandment is therefore being proceeded with. 200-300 men are being retained as messengers for political work. Agent in Baluchistan forwards report of 12th May received from Kamar-ud-din-Karez that orders had reached Governor of Wazikhwah in Sulemankhel country to issue rifles and ammunition to all who had none, that every one must prepare for Ghaza and that every second man is to be taken forcibly if the people do not volunteer. Copy of manifesto found at Thal has reached us to-day. It is most violently written and is issued by the "Provisional Government of India," bearing seal of Faqir Hassan§, Secretary, and signature of Obaidulla§, Wazir. Following extract is typical:—"A compact "has been entered into with the forces of invasion by the Provisional Government. Your real "interests would be destroyed by fighting against invaders; you should, therefore, not do this, "but rather use every possible means to kill British, continue to tear up railways and cut "down the telegraphs and refuse to help the British with men and money. Supply the "armies of the invaders with provisions; thus shall you earn peace at their hands and obtain "*sanads* of honour."

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* See No. 17.

† See No. 31.

§ See Report of the Hon. Mr. Justice Rowlatt's Sedition Committee, 1918, para. 164.

No. 24.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 20th May. (Received 21st May.)

Following is an extract from letter of 10th May from Amanulla to Haji Turangzai mentioned in our message of 18th*:—" We pray God you may remain firm on the path of Holy " war. You will know our ideas from proclamations printed and circulated. We have " appointed Commander-in-Chief, who will advise you and supply you with ammunition." On 7th May the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar wrote letter to Amanulla, of which following is an extract:—" Hearing Post Office was to be searched I ordered armed resistance as whole of my " correspondence went against British Government. If necessary I would begin holy war in " haven of city. Hearing of this, about 8,000 Peshawaris, both Hindus and Moslems, came to " help to sack. That night 2,000 villagers from outside offered their assistance. I said I would " invite them when the time came. Sikh regiments have assured Hindus that they look on " Moslems as brethren and will not fire upon them. Government has not sufficient troops in " India and often moves about one regiment consisting of two or three companies to make " display. In spite of many telegrams sent by Chief Commissioner no regiments have arrived " by train. British subjects will not supply recruits. There are disturbances throughout India " and troops if sent for from England will not arrive in time. It has been given out in public " meeting that Amir and Ghazis are ready to help Indians, and if war is delayed people will " be displeased with Amir. They cried with one voice they could not forget oppressions and " tyranny of British Government. If after sealed leaflets have been circulated Sipah Salar " especially refrains from invading India, Hindus and Moslems will be much displeased. It is " not expedient to delay and give time to the English to collect troops."

No. 25.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 20th May. (Received 21st May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Consul-General, Meshed, reports that up to 10th May Herat was quiet, and without news from any quarter, even including Kabul, in regard to war; rumour was prevalent that Amir did not any longer desire friendship with us and people were pleased at reports of Indian riots. As regards Meshed, Grey states Governor-General is at our disposal with his resources, that expressions of sympathy with British are common and outspoken, and that there is no pro-Afghan feeling worth speaking of. Kurram is much disturbed by expectation of approach of Nadir Khan with *lashkars*, reported 12,000 strong, in addition to four regular battalions and guns; large numbers of Ghilzais are reported to be collected at Ali Khel and Gardez and Jaji Maidan tribesmen are having arms distributed to them. Enemy are using propaganda to endeavour to shake Turis from their loyalty. All other districts and Agencies of North-West Frontier send satisfactory reports. From Roos Keppel report received yesterday that a big Afridi *jirga* was held on 18th, at which it was decided to send to Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Jalalabad a small deputation (which, incidentally, would look out the Afghans' weak spots in case of decision to loot their camps) to take message similar to that sent by Orakzai, that the Afridis have no quarrel with British Government and would certainly refuse to rise against them unless given a large amount of food, arms and ammunition. Afridi feeling is liable to daily changes, but they do not seem at all likely to rise at present. Mohmands have sent message that they and many Ningrahar tribes would join Yakub Khan if he has any chance of the Amir's throne. Roos Keppel's messengers are all being killed one by one, and he finds it increasingly difficult to get news from enemy's country.

No. 26.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 21st May. (Received 22nd May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegraphic message, dated 20th May at Sarwekai, received from Political Agent, Wano, by Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, who repeated it to us to-day: " Yesterday information reached me from Russell at Wano that reports " of arrival of Afghan troops at Urghun from Gardez had been received from " Urghun. I got no reply to my wire to Garratt asking him to confirm. Later " report from Russell indicates it is correct that 2,000 infantry, with seven batteries " and 60 cavalry have arrived, object presumably being attack on Wano. Political Assistant is " going to try and get news from Durand Line. G.O.C. Waziristan force has been informed, " and told that he should at once make any preparations that he needed to make. He was " instructed by me to represent matter to you if there was any probability at all of attack being " made, as Norfront† cannot spare any considerable force and is not disposed for reinforce" ment of troops up Gomal. Your instructions as to measures to be taken are therefore " solicited." Roos-Keppel continues:—Information in my opinion indicates probability of attack on Tochi rather than Wano, but whichever is correct, it is necessary clearly to define our policy. Following instructions sent to G.O.C. Waziristan and Wano after conference between self and G.O.C., indicate latter's views: "If Afghan forces enter Wano district and are joined by tribes evacuation of Sarwekai, Gomal posts and Wano will be necessary, as it is not possible to hold line of communication to Wano through Gomal. Evacuation should be effected in time to let any of garrisons who remain loyal have chance of getting away safely to Murtaza or Zhob. Everything of value in posts should be destroyed before evacuation. Political Agent, Wano, is being informed of these instructions by Chief Commissioner. As regards Tochi, in respect of all posts above Miranshah these orders apply. Decision as to moment for evacuation will rest with Senior Officers, Tochi and Wano Agencies." In conformity with above, following message of instructions as to action to be taken on development of emergency contemplated has been sent by me to Political Agents in Wano and Tochi:—*Wano.* You are to hold on to Sarwekai and Gomal posts for so long as seems reasonably safe to you and Commandant, South Waziristan Militia, with whom you should consult. In preparing to withdraw give yourself time to destroy everything useful to enemy. If there are any friendly Mahsuds and Waziris left, hand over posts to them; you can promise them ample reward for looking after them. Question of withdrawing men from various posts to Wano or Murtaza, latter if possible, left to your discretion. Act similarly in regard to Wano, whence you should retire to Zhob if circumstances demand. It is out of question to relieve Wano, so there is no use holding on there to the end. Our operations on Dakka and Jalalabad front have had so much success that Afghans' whole plan of campaign may be upset; you should, therefore, hang on so long as there is fair chance of safety, but if you and Senior Military Officer think position so bad that you may be besieged, you should quit, destroying all you can before departure; take all men who remain loyal, and with rations sufficient for journey to Zhob, make your way there. *Tochi.* If position becomes critical all posts above Miranshah should be evacuated and men withdrawn, as G.O.C. directs, posts being either abandoned or given over to any friendly Waziris that may remain: you may promise generous rewards for safe custody of posts. Everything useful to enemy to be destroyed, whether posts are given over or abandoned. I cannot avoid putting on you and Crosthwaite a heavy responsibility in giving these orders, but I realise its weight: your accurate sizing up of position is main factor in situation. It is possible that attack on Tochi or Wano may not come off, as Afghans' schemes have been quite upset by our military successes near Dakka; but, on other hand, there is no possibility of relieving garrison if besieged and you must, therefore, not hang on too long, thereby, perhaps, giving enemy success in capture of garrison. Political Officer, Wano, has authority to tell all men of South Waziristan Militia who remain loyal, if retreat becomes necessary, that their loyalty will be handsomely rewarded and that they will find lucrative work here. Keep me fully informed by wire of developments."

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* No. 22.

† G.O.C. Northern Front.

No. 27.

From the Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd May. (Received 23rd May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Two messages, dated 20th May, received from Chief Commissioner North-West Frontier Province:—"Afridi deputation under Mullah Said Akbar met Kahi Commandant on their way to Jalalabad, and in reply to demand for money, food, arms and ammunition were told that Afghans could put no trust in Afridis after their treachery in last war against Afghanistan, and would only give them ammunition now, keeping back other things demanded till after they had definitely risen. Afridis replied by accusing Afghans of having betrayed them in 1908, and earlier in 1897. Enormous quantities of ammunition are being distributed in Kahi and Afridis are flocking there: it is said that Afghans are giving away all their ammunition, of which they probably have unlimited supply, because they are sick of fighting and want by this means to get tribes to do the fighting for them. On Kurram frontier Afghans still making warlike preparations, but made no move yet. Elsewhere all quiet. Information received that factions engaged in internal warfare in Bajaur have been reconciled by Mullahs, who are getting *lashkars* together for an attack next Friday on Mohmand border. Possibly information is premature, as the Hindu women and children in Shabkadr, whose invariable custom is to leave when trouble threatens, have not done so, and the lower Mohmands are full of confidence, though they are prone to alarm." Later report from Roos-Keppel:—"Latest information from Mohmand country indicates large *lashkar* of Afghans from Kunar at Ghalanai under leadership of Mir Sahib Jan Badshah, supported by 3 Afghan regiments and 6 guns, and large number of Ambahar Utman Khels, Mohmands, Salarzais and Bajauris. Upper Mohmands have not joined, and Haji Turangzai has stayed behind to raise them. Force is considered by locals at Shabkadr to consist of unreliable troops, who may perhaps disperse on arrival of guns and aeroplanes. Four regiments are reported by Political, Zhob, to be at Wazikhwah, about 60 miles north of Kamaruddin Karz, occupation of which, as he points out, could be effected without difficulty and with very disturbing effect on Zhob Valley. Afridis of Kohat Pass are quiet and came in as usual for their allowances. Mahsuds remain quiet."

No. 28

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd May.
(Received 23rd May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following dated 21st received from Roos-Keppel:—"Letter has been received by Amir of Hindustani Fanatics from Black Mountain tribes, asking for instructions, as they had heard *Jehad* had been commenced. He replied that he did not want to have anything to do with them, as they had failed to help him on previous occasions when he needed help, and that he has no intention of rising, as he has been well treated by Government and is on amicable terms with Government at present. Deputation sent by Afridis failed to reach Jalalabad and have returned deeply annoyed at manner in which Afghans received them, and dispersed to their homes in Tirah. All very quiet in Bazar and Chura; no gatherings. *Jehad* is being preached among Orakzai by Mullah Mahmud Akhunzada, but in half-hearted way, as he is telling them not to rise openly for present, but only damage railways and telegraphs in their neighbourhood. Political, Kurram, reports good sign in whole Zaimukht *jirga*, coming in in response to summons to see him: situation unchanged. Arrival reported by Tochi of Nadir Khan at Almerai with 3 regiments of infantry, one of cavalry and 16 guns (estimated number), one of which is heavy and has elephant transport. No more information as to advance on Wano. All quiet reported from Dera Ismail Khan, Hazara, Kohat, Bannu. These four districts, reporting independently, are unanimous that though Mullahs are no doubt stirred by Amir's proclamations which have reached all points of country, feeling for *Jehad* is practically non-existent now that Afghans are up against the real thing. Public opinion has been affected very favourably by our Dakka success and Commander-in-Chief's request for cessation of hostilities. People may not be loyal, but at any rate hope is general that invasion of Afghans may be prevented by crushing defeat of Amir."

No. 29.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd May.
(Received 23rd May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Roos-Keppel telegraphs 21st May as follows:—"Letter received 10 a.m. to-day in Dakka camp from Sardar Abdur Rahman, Afghan Envoy, addressed to G.O.C. British Forces. Letter is dated Shaban 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 20th May, 1919, and translation runs:—'I was deputed by Foreign Secretary to Government of India, while I was at Simla, to journey to Afghanistan, the God-granted Kingdom, in order to remove the misunderstandings existing between the military officers of Afghanistan and Great Britain. I therefore hastened to Afghanistan, and with all speed paid my respects to H.M. the King of Islam, to whom I represented matters, explaining that there were certain responsibilities by which both sides were bound. I am now, accordingly, in Jalalabad, whither I have been sent deputed to commence this important affair, and request that you will advise the Foreign Secretary of this as soon as possible by telegraph, and ask that a delegate may be appointed and a place fixed for a meeting and discussion of the matter by both parties. If God so pleases, this great question shall be settled, and a great name gained by you and me for ourselves thereby. I should be grateful, with your permission, to meet you for a friendly interview, and for this purpose can come to any place you may select. Till a settlement of the matter is concluded, both parties must cease from the commission of unfriendly acts. Will you please send me an acknowledgment that this letter has been received.' A letter, of which the text will be telegraphed as soon as possible,* has been received from the British Agent in Kabul, that he is at Jalalabad on his way to Simla bearing indisputable information of the readiness of the Government of Afghanistan to come to terms. He asks that bombardment of Jalalabad should be discontinued, but relaxation of our pressure is not, I consider, advisable."

No. 30.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 22nd May.
(Received 23rd May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following from Roos-Keppel dated 21st May:—"I consider that another proof is afforded by overtures from Abdur Rahman† of Afghans' bad faith; and I think it my ~~duty to point~~ this out to Government. We know from his intercepted correspondence and from his intrigues in Peshawar too much of his conduct in India to have great confidence in his sincerity. As regards Amir, he would have sent a letter signed by himself if he were in really repentant mood. Afghans have harmed us all they can and are pouring inflammatory messages and letters, money, arms and ammunition into tribes in our territory. Failure of tribes to rise has clearly been a disappointment to them. Abdur Rahman has no credentials, and so can always be repudiated by Amir; this leads me to conclusion that this half-hearted overture for peace is a device to gain time in hopes that tribes may still rise, which they certainly will do if we cannot display some definite success. I suggest that, without our ceasing to harry Afghans in Ningrahar, and while we use greater speed than ever in preparing advance, Abdur Rahman should be met at Dakka or Peshawar by Political Agent, Khyber, with brief reply in sense that, as he has no letter from Amir Amanulla, no recognition as accredited envoy can be accorded." Situation all along frontier is so critical and time is such vitally important consideration, that we are instructing G.O.C. to give Abdur Rahman following intimation, at same time inviting him to meet him:—'Amir Amanulla Khan has wantonly, deliberately and without provocation violated British territory; he has incited the tribes to take up *Jehad*; he has made nefarious attempts, of which we possess documentary proof, to tamper with the allegiance of the loyal subjects in India of His Majesty the King, Emperor of India. In view of these facts, the British Government must secure guarantees that the wicked folly of a handful of evil counsellors shall not again jeopardise the peace of the frontier and the welfare of Afghanistan, before they can cease from hostilities. Till then Amir can best prove his sincerity by at once ordering his troops on all fronts to return to their peace stations, sending to the G.O.C., under his own signature, a signed copy of orders to that effect. His Excellency the Viceroy is unable to instruct the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in India to order the officers in command of operations to refrain from further action till the return movements of Afghan troops are made.' "

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* See No. 32.

† No. 29.

No. 31.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May.

(*Telegraphic.*)

We have now received in Simla and carefully translated the letter from Amanulla referred to in our telegram of 18th May.* The translation received from Peshawar did not clearly bring out Amanulla's admission that the *firman* inciting the tribes was authentic. We do not understand Amanulla's reference to letter No. 3, which we have not received, though present letter is numbered No. 4.

Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan to H.E. the Viceroy, dated 10*th May,* 1919. (*Telegraphic version received in London 23rd May,* 1919.)

(*Translation.*)

It is made known to the mind of His Illustrious Excellency my friend His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India of the Great Government of Britannia:—

Your Excellency's letter, dated 4th Shaban 1337 Hijra, corresponding to the 5th May, 1919, has been received.

With regard to what you have written about Zar Shah, that he should be arrested, I regret to say that at such a time when all the people—Hindus and Muslims—of India have combined against the tyrannical law which the Government have considered it advisable to enforce on them and the Muhammadan and Hindu subjects of the sublime Government of Afghanistan, especially the people of the frontier, owing to sympathy and racial nearness have displayed a desire to participate in this union, Zar Shah's arrest at this time is for that reason inadvisable and difficult. As regards the statement that Zar Shah Afghan has exhibited certain leaflets, he might have obtained from somewhere the printed manifesto bearing this friend's Royal seal and expressing my Islamic sympathy and human feeling towards mankind, and the abhorrence of my Royal mind of things affecting the faith and religion, and freedom and liberty of human beings. In the same manifesto has been mentioned my unwillingness to interfere with the internal affairs of the dominions of that friend or to have any concern with them. By rousing the Afghan tribes my object is not such as has been apprehended by Your Illustrious Excellency. Nay, the object is to make them unite and co-operate with each other in safeguarding the rights of the independence and rule of their country, nation and the Government of Afghanistan, in maintaining peace on the frontier and in guarding and protecting it from the effect of the quickly approaching revolutions.

Your Illustrious Excellency has written to inform me of the receipt of my first and last Royal letters and of your becoming acquainted with the appointment of the Exalted Abdur Rahman Khan as the Envoy of my sublime Government at the court of that friend's Government, &c. It is a matter for great surprise that His Illustrious Excellency the Viceroy wrote a reply to our first letter after great delay and that reply was not such as might have made our heart happy. As regards our second communication, which contained the credentials of our Envoy, it was essential for the Envoy himself to present it personally to His Excellency the Viceroy; but you had demanded that also before the Envoy's arrival at Simla. The Envoy had, however, left for Simla before the receipt of your telegram demanding the said credentials. Without talking to our trusted Envoy Abdur Rahman Khan, you have made reference in this last letter of yours to our third Royal letter and have done so in terms of intimidation conditional on certain things the accomplishment of which was difficult, as mentioned above.

We have fully explained our objects in those letters, and if you ask our Envoy for explanations he will furnish them clearly in detail. While Your Excellency should have recognised our Government as one of the absolutely independent Governments with all honour and dignity, in view of its important geographical and political situation, it is to be regretted a thousand times that it appears from Your Illustrious Excellency's letter and intentions as if those hopes of ours which we had in the friendship and unity of the Government of Your Illustrious Excellency were considered to have been dispersed. Our sublime Government of Afghanistan, in view of the acquaintance and neighbourliness which it has had from long times past with the Exalted Government of Britannia by way of India, has already expressed and now expresses its willingness to conclude treaties and have friendly relations with Your Exalted Government. Relying on the great respect and consideration which have for long times past existed between both parties, I hope that that friend will use his best and well-meaning endeavours and efforts to avert this very grave and dangerous state of affairs, with great prudence, by abolishing tyrannical laws and recognizing the absolute independence, equal rights and freedom in all respects of the Government of Afghanistan, which is ready to conclude treaties and engagements in every way beneficial to each other, so that doors of calamity may not be opened upon the world, for it is right to demand right and it is not right to shed blood without right in the path of right. The truth is that no delay is admissible. I hope confidently that Your Illustrious Excellency will inform this friend without delay that that kind friend will take the necessary measures in this matter.

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* No. 21.

For the rest may the days of friendship endure for ever.

No. 4. Dated 9th Shaban, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 10th May, 1919.

(Seal of Amir Amanulla)
Your friend,
AMIR AMANULLA.

No. 32.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May.
(Received 24th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following is text of British Agent's letter* to Officer Commanding at Dakka, dated 20th May, in camp at Jalalabad, transmitted by Roos Keppel by wire on 21st May.—"Sir, Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan, lately Envoy for Afghanistan in India, has addressed to you a letter in Persian which you will receive and in which I entirely agree. I am staying at the Ark (*i.e.*, Government House) in Jalalabad on my way to India, and from here I have since morning watched your airships continuously bombard the city and the Ark. I had a narrow escape from them, for a few bombs exploded not many yards from the room where I am. I have received reliable and authentic information that the Afghan Government is ready to come to an understanding with the British Government and I ask you, Sir, kindly to take immediate steps to lay before the Foreign Secretary this letter and the Persian letter from Envoy Sardar Abdur Rahman who is here with me in Jalalabad also, and meanwhile until you receive the Government of India's orders on the matter, and let us know the result, please stop utterly the bombardment of the city of Jalalabad and the Ark in it; for we are both using our best endeavours to repair as soon as possible the position and have taken measures through the authorities of the district and by other methods to prevent and cool the excitement and fanatic spirit of *Ghaza*, unwelcome word, and to prevent the foolishness of Ghazis near your camp and at other places on the British border from being hostilely active till both parties come to an understanding." Roos Keppel points out that as Agent does not mention present whereabouts of Amanulla, who is said in reports repeatedly received by military intelligence officers to be in Jalalabad, it is clear that the letter was written under compulsion.

No. 33.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May.
(Received 24th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following received from Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, dated 21st:—Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphs that the late Envoy, Sardar Abdur Rahman, who has brought a letter from our agent, written at Jagdalak, stating that Amir has recalled him to Kabul, has arrived at our camp at Dakka to obtain answer to his letter.† He is accompanied by Col. Ahmed Ali Sarhaddar and Nazir Habibulla Khan, and whole party is being kept, pending further instructions, at Dakka camp by orders of G.O.C. there. None of these men have any credentials and G.O.C. objects to the visit as probably being for espionage purposes, and to their return to enemy's country after our arrangements have been exposed to their observation. With this view I entirely agree, and suggest that they should be brought in to Peshawar Fort as they have transgressed the customs of war: they can be honourably treated there and at same time, if they have gained any information, prevented from using it. There does not seem to be any reason why we should not keep them as hostages, which is apparently Amanulla's intention in regard to British Agent." We have given instructions to keep Abdur Rahman's two companions for the present, but to let him himself deliver his message and after giving him the G.O.C.'s reply* to put him across the frontier, with an oral message that before any further representations can be entertained, the British Agent must be released.

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* *See* No. 29. † *See* No. 29.

No. 34.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May. (Received 24th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Following report, dated 21st May, has been received:—" W/T station at Tashkend last night sent to Lenin and Foreign Minister at Moscow message that two sealed letters, both dated 7th April, addressed to the President of the Russian Republic, had been received from Kabul, one from Amanulla, Amir of Afghanistan, the other signed by Mahmud, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Latter expresses hope that friendly relations with Bolshevism will be established on permanent basis. Amanulla, in his letter, says that hitherto Afghanistan has stood apart from all other nations, but now that Russia has raised the standard of Bolshevism he hastens to declare that she has earned the gratitude of the whole world, and that he seizes the occasion of his accession to throne of Afghanistan to announce to Republic of Russia that he strongly adheres to the principle of equality among all men and peaceful union of all peoples: he expresses hope that the honoured President of Russian Republic will not refuse his friendly greeting. Tone of letter, which is signed " Your friend Amanulla," is subservient and not of kind to which we are used. Tashkend asks what replies should be made and says originals will be kept there till direct communication with Moscow is established. In telegram to Eastern Propaganda Department Bravin asks that reminder be sent to Barkatullah of his promise to write a pamphlet on Bolshevism in the Koran, and that the work be hastened on, and 100,000 copies in Persian and Hindustani printed and sent by special courier with all speed." Yesterday morning, in response to challenge, Afghan envoy showed letters, dated 7th April, which Amanulla had had addressed, but not actually sent, to Japan, Turkey, Persia, France and U.S.A., in which he announces his accession, requests that Government addressed in each case should accept his respects, and explains that owing to certain causes, as he says, Afghanistan had not previously been able to have relations with Governments of other great States.

No. 35.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 23rd May. (Received 24th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reports on 22nd May as follows:— " Political Officer, Wano, telegraphs that there is no foundation for rumour that enemy are at Musa Nika. He says Mullah Fazl Din, who has arrived from Kabul disappointed, has quarrelled with and is working against Mullah Hamzulla, who is trying to induce Mahsuds to rise. Large numbers of Mahsuds are coming in to Sarwekai to get their allowances; they do not seem disposed for war and temper seems excellent. Telegraphic report from Tochi states that force under Shar Wali Khan has now reached Urghun, consisting of 400 infantry, 100 cavalry, one gun, 2 machine guns, with 3,000 Ghilzai reinforcements expected, as against previous garrison of Urghun reported as 3,000 men and 12 guns; Shah Wali Khan expected to reach Lawara to-morrow. Nadir Khan in Khost is still delaying and has announced that he will fix date for advance after spending some days in interviewing *jirgas* at Nariza, in Turi country. Kohat reports all quiet in district and on border, except for despatch of deputation from Biland Khel Wazirs to Khost *jirga*. Kurram reports that Nadir Khan in Khost has just sent orders to Muhammad Alam, commanding Kharlachi front, to withdraw his tribesmen, as former is not yet ready to fight. About a thousand have been withdrawn, and force now left in front of Kharlachi consists of 2 guns, 300 regulars, 300 local tribesmen, 400 Ghilzais; total, about 1,000. Situation unchanged in Peiwar. Mullah Mahmud Akhunzada is said to have visited Para Chamakannis urging them to be ready, but they urged they were so insignificant they would be glad to be excused. No gatherings reported from Orakzai and Tirah Afridis; all quiet. Black Mountain, Swat and Dir show no signs of trouble. Peshawar district report: large gatherings of Mohmands, with Mir Sahib Jan Badshah, reported in Gundab Valley. Babra Mullah, in Pindiali, had not succeeded in getting any followers up to last night. In Buner *jirgas* are being held, Mullahs said to be very active, but tribesmen are still disinclined for *Jehad*. Enemy may attack to-night or to-morrow morning, unless orders received from Jalalabad countermanding advance. On whole, I consider situation is improved."

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* No. 30.

No. 36.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 24th May.

(*Telegraphic.*)

Please take steps to translate and circulate on frontier following message from Aga Khan who is also telegraphing a message for circulation among his followers in India direct to President of Ismailia Council in Bombay:—"Without a shadow of excuse, and at a time of profound peace, forgetting the wise statesmanship of the great Abdurrahman and the loyal and honourable example of King Habibullah, breaking sacred treaties, some misguided people have attacked wantonly and foolishly British India. Of course the great King-Emperor who overthrew German militarism can break these people, but for us our sacred duty is to help His Majesty the King-Emperor, because his cause is just, because his treaties are sacred, because it is only by every one of us, whether great or small, loyally doing his duty, that the cause of peace and prosperity and religious and civil freedom's triumph in Mid-Asia can be assured. I wish and pray that all my dear children should, like myself, not only remain staunchly loyal, but do their utmost to open the eyes of others to their and mankind's interests.—Aga Khan."

No. 37.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May. (Received 25th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

On 22nd Jutogh W/T Station intercepted following message sent out apparently from Kushk to all Eastern Stations:—

> "Pursuant to telegram from Moscow, No. 1473, according to official advice from Kabul, the new Government of Afghanistan is endeavouring to rally mountain tribes of the frontier with a view to securing an exit to sea and to gain possession of port of Karachi."

No. 38.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May. (Received 25th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Roos Keppel's report of 23rd May:—Wano agency; no news. Tochi telegraphs that Nadir Khan is still at Matun and taking no action. Tirah: all quiet. Villagers are making their way back to Lalpura, 400 families have already returned and more are *en route.* Usman Khan, eldest son of refugee Khan of Lalpura, Extra Assistant Commissioner posted at Dakka, is in communication with village and states inhabitants will gladly send in supplies. Small numbers of Afridis are going to fetch ammunition from Kahi and Jalalabad. Reports have been received that Mohmands have been sent messages by Amir instructing them to start fighting without delay so as to draw our troops away from Dakka front; many men are reported going to Mohmand border from Kunar. Bajaur reports that on morning of 22nd May Salarzai *lashkar* started for Shabkadr. Enemy force on Mohmand border, of which bulk is at Gandab, and outposts at Hafiz Nor and Dand, remains curiously inactive. Our Lower Mohmands and people of the district show no signs of enthusiasm for *Jehad.* Malakand reports Swatis driven out of Shamozai by Nawab of Dir's *lashkar.* Swatis will have no thoughts for *Jehad* so long as pressure from Nawab is maintained. Political Agent, Kurram, telegraphs estimate of enemy at Peiwar Kotal as 1,500 or 2,000 regular troops and *lashkars* of strength unknown. All districts reported quiet. Position generally shows no change. Lieuts. Hoare and Barker, R.A.F., prisoners of war, have been brought in by Zakka Khel Maliks, who have made no demand for ransom. Recent reports from Jalalabad show that air raid of 21st May caused great confusion and town is practically deserted. Several Government buildings were set on fire and citizens, Afghan officers and majority of Afghan troops fled in panic. Afridis and other tribesmen who had gone to the town to get ammunition, looted town and Army stores freely, in spite of Mullahs' attempts to prevent them.

No. 39.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May. (Received 26th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Report received from Chaman that on 21st there was great activity in Kandahar in military preparations and great excitement. Abdul Qudus Khan had not arrived. Roos Keppel reports, 24th May:—Abdul Majid, Sarhaddar of Dakka, is now in Dakka Fort and Political Agent, Khyber, has got possession of his official diary, which is being examined, and which contains an entry of his organising raids into British territory in accordance with orders received. Diary is very voluminous.

No. 40.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May. (Received 26th May.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Following report, dated 23rd May, received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—"Reply of Government of India* was communicated to Afghan envoy last night and Abdur Rahman left for Dakka, a.m., 23rd. Two of his colleagues, all three of whom are detained in fort here, asked to have interview with me. Their names are Sardar Habibulla Khan, nephew of Muhammad Zi, and grandson of Gul Muhammad Khan Zi, and he is, according to his own account, Master-General of Telegraphs in Afghanistan; Col. Ahmad Ali, brother of Col. Ali Ahmad, and grandson of Sardar Mahomed Rafiq Khan Lodi; and Abdul Majid Sarhaddar of Dakka. I did not see the last-named, but had long conversation with other two this morning. I saw them separately and they had no communication between themselves between their interviews with me. They both said that Nasrulla Khan is in strict confinement but well, and that Inayatulla Khan, who is also well, is under surveillance. Habibulla Khan is about 50 years old, with far greater intelligence and more polished manners than the average of Afghan Sardars; he lived in Turkey for many years; he is pleasant to deal with and we had a long conversation full of interest. He produced a *firman* signed and dated 'Amir Amanulla, Sihshamba, 19th Shaban, 1337'—and reading as follows:—'To Habibulla Khan, Superintendent of Post Offices, and to Col. Ahmad Ali Khan, Supervisor. As I have been informed by Abdur Rahman Khan, who was appointed to be Envoy to the Government of India, and has returned from that post, and who informed me at the time of his departure, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India discussed with him the question of ceasing from hostilities and of opening the way for peace. You are therefore deputed and authorised to proceed to the British camp on the field of battle and discuss the terms (*Mugarrarat*) of peace, and to inform me if you find the terms of peace favourable. It is necessary, and I authorise you to take these steps.' I told Habibulla at the outset that I had no authority to negotiate and could only discuss things in a friendly manner with him and, if he had anything he wished to say, represent it to Government. He started by taking the line that the commencement of hostilities was due to a misunderstanding, the responsibility for which must rest with the British; but finding this line impracticable, he had resource to the argument that faults had been committed on both sides. He said that Saleh Muhammad Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, had been arrested and sent back to Kabul; but I believe that, as a matter of fact, his reason for returning to Kabul was simply that he was too severely wounded to carry on on duty. Habibulla says he and Col. Ahmad Ali are authorised to negotiate, and that Abdur Rahman came intending to go on to Simla; he argues that Abdur Rahman has never given up his appointment there, and that he went back to Kabul at the request of the Foreign Secretary to give private assurances to the Amir. This is an ingenious argument, affording explanation why Hafiz Saifulla Khan, British Agent, is kept at Kabul on grounds that a state of war cannot exist between British and Afghan Governments till written declarations of war have been exchanged, that the events on various sections of the frontier are no more than local incidents, and that the two envoys should stay at their posts, as we are still technically at peace with Afghanistan. I told him the Government of India did not share his view, and he undertook at once to write and ask Amir to send British Agent down from Kabul at once, as his remaining there was misunderstood. I strongly advised him to do this, and he said he must first consult his colleague, but would do as I advised. I pointed out that, although Amir had not sent us formal declaration of war, his troops had encroached on our boundaries, and had fought inside them at Landi Kotal, and at this very moment were on the Kurram and Mohmand borders, inside our tribal territory; that at three different points armies had come down to the frontier and were making lavish distribution to our tribes of arms and ammunition, obvious purpose of which was use against us; and that Afghan officials in India had engaged in violent propaganda against British for some time before hostilities actually broke out, and that we had been waiting for written evidence of their complicity in this direction. Habibulla said he knew nothing of the propaganda in India, which was not his department, and that some of the military movements in Afghanistan were merely defensive measures due to our bombing Jalalabad and Dakka, and others were due to misunderstandings easily corrected. He explained that his mission was the suggestion of an armistice, while enquiry into reasons for the outbreak of war and arrangement of terms of peace would be for a mixed commission to accomplish. He admitted quite openly that bombing of Jalalabad had had very great effect and practically whole place was in ruins. Col. Ahmad Ali, the other envoy, is a younger man, and inclined to be aggressively argumentative; he is a rather typical Afghan official. He stuck to the point that hostilities had been wantonly begun by us, and I did not consider this a point worth arguing with him. Habibulla and he request to be sent to Simla. Military authorities want to get them out of the fort and be rid of them, but no opportunity of communicating with Peshawar City can be admitted and they cannot be allowed to be at large here." Both these men are now being told that there is no additional message for them beyond that already given in writing to Abdur Rahman, and they are being conducted across the border.

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* No. 30.

No. 41.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May. (*Received 26th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Yesterday's report from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—No report received to-day from Bannu; all other districts report all quiet. Amanulla's *firmans* preaching *Jehad* reached Hindustani Fanatics at Samasata about 14th May and were distributed among tribes of neighbourhood. Amir of Fanatics preached a sermon two days later strongly opposing *Jehad* and telling his adherents that he would wait about two weeks, giving time for the crops to be cut and for Swat and Buner to show their hands, and then consider questions afresh. Presumably he is waiting for reply (which is being sent) to his message* to Abdul Qaiyum. The Hasanzai held a full *jirga* on 19th and decided to take no hostile action at all. They sent Amanulla a message that they had received good treatment from Government of India, with whom they were on good terms, and they would not only decline to take part in *Jehad*, but would oppose any Ghazi force crossing their limits of territory in attack on Government. They added with some humour that when Attock fell to the Amir they would give question of joining his forces fresh consideration. *Jirga* was held by tribes of Black Mountain, who decided to wait lead from Buner and Swat. Swatis have their hands full with harvest and fighting with Nawab of Dir. Buners are reported to be holding tribal *jirga*, but quiet. Mohmand border: no enemy movements. Attack has been expected for yesterday or to-day from direction of Hafizkor, but last night information reached Khyber Agent that enemy in Mohmand country were in retreat. This morning's air reconnaissance reports confirm this, indicating that enemy on that front is in full retreat in north-west direction in two columns, first of which has already passed Nahakki. Mohmand militia, 1,500 strong, have had less than 30 cases of desertion; they have stood the strain well and shown themselves keen. Tirah: Abdul Qaiyum reports all quiet. We seem definitely to have got past danger of rising among Afridis, all sections of whom are sending deputations to Political Agent; this is rather embarrassing, as Khyber villages get filled with armed men and misunderstandings might arise. Political Agent has told them that if they want to send a whole *jirga*, it will be seen at Peshawar, but must not come into Khyber, and that they had better go back and only come in small numbers to see him. More details have been received of looting of Jalalabad on 21st by Afridis, Mohmands and Shinwaris. Afridis returning to Tirah are bringing very large amount of loot. Attempt was made by some Afghan regulars to protect Government property; they fired on tribesmen, who replied, and after casualties on both sides drove the regulars off. Mullah Saiyid Akbar, then at Hadda, was summoned to persuade tribesmen not to loot; he did all he could, but had to retire, as they fired on him too. Afridis of Kohat Pass obtained a big quantity of ammunition at Kahi and Jalalabad, pretending they were going on *Jehad*, and are now selling it at great profit; they are quite quiet, and this is largely due to Commander-in-Chief's action in releasing men of 130th Baluchi Regiment. I have been lent by Government of Punjab services of Mr. Douglas Donald, C.I.E., I.C.S., who knows well Orakzai and other tribes of Kohat border, and am giving him charge of that section. Biland Khel Wazirs are leaving for Khost; it may be they are going to fetch ammunition, but if they join enemy's *lashkar* I shall have their village burned. Distribution is being made from Khost of leaflets of the "Provisional Government of India," of which copies sent you already.† Mullah of Karbogha has refused to have any share in agitation for *Jehad* or allow his sons to. Following received by wire from Mehtar of Chitral:—"Am glad to inform you we have defeated Afghans in Bashgul; we crossed Bashgul River, taking Istorgats and bridge there. We are rebuilding bridge at Istorgats, which enemy had burnt. Casualties: ours, one killed, two slightly wounded; enemy, 20 or 30 killed and wounded." Extra-Assistant Commissioner Usman Khan crossed Kabul River on 23rd to Lalpura; where he had very good reception; supplies at moderate prices brought in from Kam Dakka and Lalpura in considerable quantities. Kurram report: no change. Tochi report: Nadir Khan has sent six guns to Bari, with stores and ammunition; Bari is three miles from Charkhai, on Durand Line. Large *lashkar* being sent to Kaitu and other *lashkars* to other points; he is issuing tribesmen with ammunition. Information received gives impression that attack is not to be expected immediately. Wano report: *jirga* of Mahsuds to be held on 26th at Kaniguram to discuss letters inciting to *Jehad*; meanwhile payment of allowances at Sarwekai going on satisfactorily. No further reports of enemy advance in direction of Wano. Confirmation now to hand from several sources that Mullah Fazl Din will preach neutrality and keep Mahsud boundary neutral against us and Afghanistan. Political situation of whole North-West Frontier shows daily improvement.

No. 42.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 26th May. (*Received 26th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Report for 25th May from Roos-Keppel:—Military authorities are deporting‡ Sardar Habibulla Khan, Col. Ahmad Ali and Sardar Abdul Majid to-morrow from Peshawar. A certain Sultan Muhammad Khan arrived at Dakka with letters for Abdur Rahman, ex-Envoy, whom he seems to have missed on the road, and the Afghan delegates. He is being detained at Dakka and will be put across frontier with the others. Situation favourable. Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, is to see Mohmand *jirgas* to-morrow at Shabkadr, and if he confirms reports I have already received of their conduct, allowances forfeited since 1915 will be restored. Our Mohmands, Burhan Khel, Isa Khel, Tarakzai and Halimzai have behaved very well and enemy's decision to withdraw was largely contributed to by their hostile attitude to enemy and *lashkar* from Upper Mohmand country. Peshawar district: a certain amount of unrest in Charsadda sub-division; am dealing with this. All other districts quiet. Bajaur *lashkars* have gone home, as they were too late to reach Afghan force in Mohmand country. Tirah reported quiet. Afridis are now friendly, but a serious danger for future is constituted by their possession of large number of rifles and ammunition brought in from looting of Jalalabad; meanwhile they are submissively bringing in to Abdul Qaiyum arms taken away by deserters from Khyber Rifles. Afridis of Kohat Pass, Orakzais and Zaimukht quiet. Wano report, dated from Sarwekai: Abdur Rahman Khel Mahsuds inclined to cause trouble over old claim for special allowances, but I have arranged matter. Mahsuds' *jirgas* are believed to be sending reply to Afghans not to come into their country, but adding that if Afghans take Khyber, Kurram and Tochi, they themselves will take Jandola and Sarwekai without help from anybody else. Tochi report: no fresh news. Kurram report: minor incident reported, Afghan picket firing on party of militia, who replied, killing three Afghans. Desultory firing from enemy. Turis in confident mood.

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* No. 28.

† No. 23.

‡ See No. 40.

No. 43.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 27th May. (Received 28th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Meshed reports, 26th May, all quiet in Herat up to 21st May. Baluchistan report, 26th May: Zhob; Fateh Khan and other Saraz headmen have sent Jacob a letter in which they express their loyalty and say they do not intend to give any trouble, but are too afraid of Afghan authorities to come in. All quiet in all country round Zarmelan. North-West Frontier Province report for 26th May: (First Message.) All well to-day in northern half of frontier, and situation through whole Province was all one could wish up to yesterday, when Afghan forces on all fronts seemed to be stationary if not retiring, and there seemed to be no sign of trouble and tribes were in good mood. But news has just reached me of withdrawal by G.O.C., Tochi, of garrisons of all posts on Thal-Idak line and in Upper Tochi. Afghans seized Spinwam, and Mahsuds and Waziris at once occupied and burned upper posts. At 6.45 p.m. on 25th, Political, Wano, telegraphed that all was well, that Mahsuds' and Waziris' attitude was good, and that Mullah Hamzulla, disappointed with former's attitude, had gone home and troops also rapidly leaving. Second wire, timed 1.15 a.m., 26th, received from him stating that he had heard Tochi posts had been evacuated and that news was bound to affect Mahsuds, though they showed no signs yet of change and were quite quiet. Third message, timed 10.25 a.m. to-day, received, in which he says that with concurrence of Commandant, South Waziristan Militia, and Assistant Political Agent, he had decided it was necessary to evacuate posts at once, as they all consider Mahsuds and Waziris will rise as soon as they hear Tochi news. Political Agent, Kurram, telegraphs that Kabul Khel Wazirs have patched up their private feuds and promised Afghans to join them if they enter Waziri country. Political situation in southern half of Province, which was "set-fair," has thus shifted in a single night to "stormy," and we must be ready for probable general rising of Mahsuds and Waziris, spreading possibly to Sheranni, Bhitanni and even Zhob; we may assume General Nadir Khan will move now, for up to present the great mistake in the enemy's plan of campaign has been their inability, up to now, to raise the tribes. (Second Message.) I have already reported Tochi and Wano situation, but later information received of Afghan advance from Spinwam to point less than seven miles from Idak, on the Tochi road, and that *lashkars* of Waziris from Khaisora direction are assembling for attack on Miranshah. Political, Kurram, reports Gabar Mangals' *lashkar* has started to join Nadir Khan in Khost. Bajaur Khans, with their own and Salarzai *lashkar* started from Mohmand country, but returned on meeting messengers who told them Amir had asked for peace. All quiet elsewhere. Abdul Qaiyum has given handsome rewards to Zakka Khels of Bazar Valley, who brought in the two captured officers of R.A.F. without asking ransom. Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, saw *jirgas* of Burhan Khel, Halimzai, Isakkel and Tarakzai Mohmands, and tells me their behaviour throughout recent disturbances has been excellent. *Lashkar* in Gandab would certainly have attacked if they had joined it or Afghan troops, but latter's nervousness about their line of retreat, combined with steadiness of our Lower Mohmands, and effect of messages describing destruction of Jalalabad, induced enemy force to forego attack and retire. On 28th I intend to see full *jirga* of our Mohmands in Khyber Agency at Shabkadr. Afridis have taken on task of guarding as far as possible road from Ali Masjid to Jamrud and have placed pickets of tribesmen 1,000 yards in advance of our pickets to prevent passage of enemy snipers.

No. 44.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 28th May. (Received 29th May.)

(Telegraphic.)

Roos Keppel reports, 10 a.m. 27th May:—Inevitable effect on North Waziristan Militia, who had till now remained keen and staunch, of abandonment of Tochi posts is now visible.

They and tribes disbelieve stories of our successes on Mohmand and Khyber fronts, and regard our sudden withdrawal as great victory for Afghans. Reports show militia at Miranshah to be excited and restless, and at many posts garrisons are deserting. Report, giving no details, received that Miranshah Serai has been burned. Commandant, Waziristan Force, wires that he received following from Sarwekai by W./T.:—"27th, 7.34 p.m. Everything being destroyed; no messages can be got through after this. Nili Kach ordered to evacuate, after destroying all stores and ammunition, and join party at Spinwam. Sarwekai party retiring to Murtaza; Wano party to Zhob." Bannu road is seriously threatened, and above shows we have lost all Waziristan and Miranshah beyond it. Commandant, Frontier Constabulary, has been told by Deputy Commissioner Dera Ismail Khan to hold Sheranni posts up to last possible safe moment. General quietness of tribes had led me to believe that danger of attempts at concerted risings in Agency and district rumoured in contemplation for third night of Ramzan was past, but it will probably be revived by Tochi affair, which is looked on as Afghan victory. We may presume that Amir will put up stiff resistance. G.O.C., Frontier Force, is taking steps to reinforce Tank and Bannu. It is possible Mahsuds and Waziris will be contented with their success in freeing Waziristan of British, but they may take offensive; in that case will probably first attack Jandola, Tank and Murtaza, cutting either railway. Baluchistan wires to ask whether force at Tank is enough to keep Mahsuds and Waziris busy, or whether it is likely they will have time to make attack in force on Fort Sandeman. Even if they turn their attention to Zhob, they will probably not do so for some time, and it is hardly likely they will make an expedition to Fort Sandeman unless Zhob rises and asks their help. Even in that case, I am not sure they would leave limits of Waziristan. Bhittanis will have to join Mahsuds if they overrun their country, though they do not like them. Sherannis are likely to rise.

Khyber Agency: Political Agent reports all well, tribes assisting to guard road and offering to do any sort of service. Political Agent gave liberal reward to Zakka Khels who brought in airmen prisoners; they went away very pleased at treatment received, and ask as a favour that if it can be avoided aeroplanes should not fly over Bazar Valley.

Shinwaris from Sangar Khel attacked party of 200 Afridis, mostly Kuki Khels, who were returning with loot from Jalalabad, and killed or wounded 20, including six Kuki Khel elders; their own losses were about 20 also. Abdul Qaiyum thinks this will lead to bitter feud between Afridis and Shinwaris of Ningrahar, separating Afridis from Afghanistan.

Kurram reports slow fire all day by mountain guns at Utsar, on Peliher mountain, at targets not ascertained. Militia at Chapri had rush attack made on them by tribesmen led by a Mullah. Militia, under Capt. Wilson, killed Mullah and three others and repulsed attack. Kurram militia and Turis showing excellent spirit generally. I shall see Mohmand *jirga* to-morrow: they have sent in long letter (of which translation is being forwarded to you) setting forth their services. Lower Kurram and border tribes between Sadda and Hangu, Masozai, Alisherzai and Zaimukht, Kabul Khel and Tori Khel Wazirs, are bound to be affected by events in Tochi; most of Lower Kurram is Sunni, but Upper Kurram is Shiah and solid for us, only Sunnis being Peiwar Mangals resident in Kurram, and they are fighting on our side. It is likely that communication between Thal and Sadda will be temporarily interrupted, but Turis will fight so long as there is force remaining in Upper Kurram, and as there are plenty of supplies there, I have no great anxiety on that score. Orakzai and Afridis are quiet and intend to remain quiet, but effect of Tochi events will spread from Lower Kurram tribes to them and excitement will inevitably revive under latest news from South. Donald's appointment* to Kohat border, where he has gone to-day, will, I hope and expect, have great effect on Orakzai, with whom he has much influence. He went through Kohat Pass to Kohat this morning, and reports traffic conditions normal, roads undamaged, and villagers most friendly. All other districts quiet and report no news.

No. 45.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 28th May. (Received 29th May.)

Following from Roos Keppel:—See my message of 25th.† Following are translations of letters delivered by Sultan Ahmad at Dakka for Abdur Rahman Khan and Habibulla Khan:—(*First letter.*) "Be it known to the respected Abdur Rahman Khan, Envoy of the God-granted Kingdom of Afghanistan, Col. Ahmad Ali Khan, Col. Abdul Majid Khan, and Habibulla Khan, that Abdul Aziz Khan, the late Envoy, had the honour of an interview yesterday, Friday 22nd May, and delivered to me your message in regard to the cessation of hostilities, and we, therefore, at once issued orders urgently to the various regions and frontiers of Afghanistan to break off fighting. But it is strange that while the British Government ask the Government of Afghanistan to cease from fighting, they on the other hand themselves sent their aeroplanes to-day, Saturday, at 6 a.m., which bombed Kabul, our capital, and then returned. It is regrettable that what they do should be contrary to what they say: and this should not be the case. Great excitement has been caused in the city and suburbs of Kabul by the bombardment, and the Afghan nation will not readily be subdued by fighting if this line of action is persisted in. We, therefore, request that you will clearly inform the British of this. For the rest, by the grace of God all is well and you may rest assured. *P.S.*—The message which Abdul Aziz Khan delivered that hostilities should cease was only verbal, but it was from you and, as stated above, we accordingly issued orders to stop hostilities. But now that Kabul has been bombed, I write to instruct you that if the British really want no truce, you should obtain from them and send on to me a formal letter to that effect, and if they decline to give you a formal letter, you should inform me of the fact so that I may take action accordingly."

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* No. 41.

† No. 42.

(*Second letter, which is of earlier date.*) "Be it known to the faithful and respected Abdur Rahman Khan, envoy of the God-granted Kingdom of Afghanistan, and to Col. Ahmad Ali Khan, Habibulla Khan, and Abdul Majid Khan. We received and understood your message sent through Abdul Aziz Khan, lately Afghan Envoy, that the British Government had intimated to you that they had stopped hostilities and that Afghanistan should do likewise. As the British Government have done so, we also have issued orders to our forces on various frontiers that hostilities should cease pending the conclusion of a final settlement. We have dispatched urgent letters to this end, and we inform you also of our orders; but as there is no communication by telegraph in Afghanistan our information cannot reach over the whole country and to its frontiers in a single day. You are to continue the duties with which you have been entrusted. We pray to God for the well-being of Afghanistan and all its nations, and fervently beseech Him that success may crown our efforts. The rest remains with Him."

No. 46.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 29th May. (*Received* 30*th May.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

North West Frontier Province report for 28th May: Political Agent, Malakand, reports by wire receipt of news from Jandol that Chitralis' force drove Afghans down the Kunar River as far as Narai, 10 miles above Asmar, which latter evacuated and Chitralis now threaten, though Salarzai *lashkar* is collecting in effort to anticipate them if possible in its capture. Ex-Nawab of Nawagai's eldest son has made written offer of his services. No reliance can be put in him, but his action is favourable symptom. Aka Khel and other Afridi elders have been visiting Abdul Qaiyum to make excuses for members of their tribes taking part in sniping at Ali Masjid. They blame Yar Muhammed Khan entirely; and have undertaken to recover rifles which deserters from Khyber Rifles took away. Political Agent, Khyber, also reports that Upper Mohmands have threatened to attack Afghans if they retire through their country, and that some fighting is rumoured to have taken place, during the retirement, between Afghans and Mohmands. At Shabkadr this morning I saw full *jirga* of Isa Khel, Halimzai, Tarakzai, and Burhan Khel Mohmands, who are very proud of their services in keeping their tribesmen from joining with Afghans and claim that they have now definitely proved efficacy of last year's settlement. There is no doubt they have done very well. I restored their allowances, forfeited since 1915. They show much delight and reliance can, I think, now be placed on them. Conduct of Mohmand Militia has also been very good. The new telephone line from Peshawar through Mullagori country and Shilman to Dakka is erected as far as Shilman Ghakhai, and tribal guard has been arranged. For rest of its length to Dakka, Kam Dakka villagers will afford protection. Guarding of Mullagori road for transport by tribes has also been arranged. Baluchistan wires that it is considered that very great effect in Kandahar and whole of Afghan-Baluchistan frontier will result from fall of Fort Baldak, which had reputation of being practically impregnable and certainly strongest fort in Afghanistan. Mutilated message, dated 27th, from Political Agent, Kurram, states that Nadir Khan has written urgently to Mulla Mahmud Akhunzada to summon Orakzai *jirga*; that troops under Kazi Shah Buzurg on Lakatiga Border have moved south to Thal and that reports are confirmed of large increase in numbers of Afghan regulars on Kurram flank. Remainder of message could not be translated. Following two reports from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat:—(1) Dated 27th, at Hangu. Afghans have occupied and looted Thal town. Police safely evacuated Thana. Constabulary have orders to hold post. On his own initiative Jamadar Khaibat Shah removed to post two lakhs of treasure. (2) Dated Hangu 28th. Enemy occupied Thal town, mission hospital and police station. During night 27th/28th Thal Fort was attacked several times by Nadir Khan, but without success. Efforts will be made to-day to relieve constabulary who held out against several attacks during night. Necessary to evacuate constabulary and police posts at Torawari, Manzalli, Gurguri and Karbogha. Wire received dated Moghal Kot, 27th May, reporting arrival there in evening of about 450 other ranks and followers from Upper Gomal and Wano posts; these will be all the men remaining loyal to Political Agent, Wano, who retired to Murtaza from Sarwekai and Lower Gomal posts; he reported 61 desertions during evacuation, but total numbers brought in not yet reported. There is no more news available.

47.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 31st May. (Received 1st June.)

(Telegraphic.)

Roos Keppel's report for 29th May:—Assistant Political Officer at Dakka has met *jirga* from Basawal, Kam Dakka and Loe Dakka, who are showing friendly attitude and bringing in supplies. Shinwaris are returning to Khar Gali and Bagh, and will bring in to Landi Khana Brigade *bhoosa* and other supplies available when they have reaped their crops. Political Agent, Khyber, reports that full *jirga* of Afridis is being hastily called for meeting at Maidan on 30th, presumably to consider developments in Khost. Khoda Khel Mohmands (on Afghan side) are furious at failure of Afghans' expedition in Mohmand country and are threatening to attack Mohmands of Lalpura, who have entered into relations with us. There is very active enemy propaganda among tribes and in districts. Line taken is that Powers of Europe are determined to crush all Islamic kingdoms and that Government of India, taking advantage of recent incidents due to Amanulla's youth and lack of experience and turning deaf ear to his request for peace, is attempting to annex Afghanistan and tribal territory. Propaganda is having considerable effect. Donald reports from Hangu that Mullah Mahmud Akhunzada, who has recently come back from Kabul, promised Amri that Orakzai and Afridis would join his forces if General Nadir Khan attacked and captured Thal. Other sources confirm this report. Thal town has been gutted and alarm has been spread by Hindu merchants fleeing into Kohat district. On other hand it was believed that Hindus would have received special protection in view of union of Hindus and Mussulmans, and therefore news has done much to deprive Afghans of sympathy locally. Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, reports excitement in district and town since news of Tochi events received. Zhob reports safe arrival of 500 South Waziristan Militia and followers under eight British officers. Both mountain guns at Sarwekai were made useless before place was evacuated, and all ammunition, powder, bombs, shell, etc., soaked in petroleum and set on fire. Explosions went on all night and place must have been quite gutted. At all lower posts ammunition was destroyed prior to evacuation. Crosthwaite brought into Murtaza 450 rank and file, with 45 followers, loyal remainder of militia, with 11 Pathan officers and two British officers. Political Agent, Kurram, reports that Turis, Upper Kurram, show excellent spirit and Lower Kurram full of panic; Zaimukht up to present show good attitude. Telegrams for Parachinar have to go through Thal, where wireless telegraph installation damaged; there is great congestion of messages and communication very irregular.

No. 48.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 1st June. (Received 1st June.)

(Telegraphic.)

Chief Political Officer with General Barrett wires from Peshawar, 31st May, that he has just received a letter from Amanulla, dated 28th May, addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy, of which rough summary of first translation is given below; full translation to follow by wire. Tone is satisfactory, indicating sufficient "climb down." "We were led, by our alarm at disorders in India, to take steps to protect our eastern frontier, and this led to misunderstandings on our side and the British Government's. They invaded our country and war was forced on us, though our envoy at Simla understood that war was not wanted by the British Government. On this we suspended proclamation of *Jehad*, and National Council of Afghanistan decided to send our envoy back to Simla to prevent bloodshed and explain the matter. But, in spite of this, you sent your aeroplanes, by which Jalalabad and the Royal Palace at Kabul and the tomb of my forefathers were bombed. It causes us regret to see the example of Germany followed by the British. Yet, in spite of all, we do not wish to break our long-standing friendship or see enmity grow from bloodshed, and in proof of our good intentions we send this friendly letter, enclosing certified copies of orders sent to our commanders to stop movements of troops and cease from hostilities. I assure Your Excellency, with the utmost sincerity, that it was never the intention of my Government that our friendship should be severed; what we desire is an honourable peace beneficial to both parties. Let matters be settled thus: let each side select some person to meet at Peshawar or Landi Kotal, the earlier the better for both sides, to discuss and settle matters."

No. 49.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 1st June. (Received 2nd June.)

(Telegraphic.)

Full translation,* received from Peshawar by wire, of letter from Amir Amanulla reads as follows:—

"May it be known to friendly mind of his illustrious Excellency, my friend His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, of the Government of Great Britain. While friendly communications were passing between our two exalted Governments and our trusted envoy, the exalted Sardar, Abdur Rahman, was deputed to your Court for strengthening relations and raising high the connections, certain unpleasant events happened owing to some misunderstanding. These led to strain of relations and resulted in bloodshed between us. Consequently I was obliged by considerations of humanity and obligation of rights of civilisation to use my endeavours as far as possible to prevent bloodshed amongst mankind, which is a sign of barbarity, and to pay no heed to personal slight which has been caused from your side. Firstly, it is necessary to offer certain explanations of misunderstanding which has occurred. At the time our envoy arrived at Peshawar he could only be summoned to Simla after much delay owing to disturbances and disorders which had occurred in that country. These disturbances and disorders had created such a panic that railways and telegraph lines between Simla and Peshawar were cut, though only temporarily, and much bloodshed and disorder occurred so that delay occurred to departure of our envoy, perhaps due to these causes, while at Peshawar itself Muhammadans and Hindus who have intercourse with Muhammadans and Hindus of our country held meetings and made demonstrations to such an extent that news of such an event compelled us to despatch number of troops to mark and control frontiers of our own country under the orders and commands of certain trusted officers of ours, so that they might inspect and protect line of frontiers. Sipah Salar Saleh Mohamed Khan, who was deputed to Eastern frontier of our country, started to make certain defensive preparations as precautionary measures. Since the feelings of our frontier and trans-frontier hillmen had been excited, these preparations appeared to be necessary. The other cause of these preparations was that on the 8th Shaban 1337 Hijra (9th May, 1919), your aeroplanes made a flight into the air of our country with certain threats, and the reply to our letter was also delayed. I am very sorry that certain undesirable events also occurred on both sides in the meantime which very nearly caused a breach of old friendship of long years past between you and us. As we had given orders to our Commandant to inspect and protect the frontier he considered certain points as included in his own territory according to the map and plan which he had in his possession and proceeded to carry on some digging as a precautionary measure. Without the exchange of any written communication on the face of the earth between terrestrials on subject, matters came to such a pass that aerial operations resulted in bomb throwing, which wounded our Commander-in-Chief. Your troops, moreover, violated our territory. We were therefore obliged to issue general order declaring war. In Kabul and surroundings of Kabul the Ulemas Saiyads and Sheikhs, every one of whom commanded influence amongst thousands of Afghan Mussulmans, assembled and created excitement. In the meantime our Envoy Abdur Rahman, who was permitted by you to come away, reached Kabul, and it became quite clear from his statements and explanations that the Foreign Secretary of high dignity discussed with him with great emphasis the necessity of desisting from war, which was injurious, and had clearly asked that hostilities should be stopped. It became apparent that events and movements which had taken place were accidental and undesirable. Consequently the duties of humanity made it necessary before anything that an attempt should be made to put matters right. Accordingly we put off the publications of the proclamations of holy war by the Islamic Sheikhs of Afghanistan, and referred matter to the Exalted National Council who decided that our envoy should be sent again to your Exalted Side to offer explanations and to stop fighting and bloodshed. A day had hardly elapsed after the departure of our envoy from your camp when one of your aeroplanes flew over Kabul and bombed our Royal Palace, thereby causing great excitement and panic among our loyal people. The machines bombed the sacred mausoleum of my great grandfather His Majesty Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, may he rest in peace, and certain other quarters were bombed. Similarly at Jalalabad also the sacred grave of my revered father, His Majesty Siraj-Ul-Millat-Waddin, on whom be peace, who discharged the obligations of friendship toward you to the extreme during his lifetime, and many other favourite buildings in our official quarter and in unprotected town were bombed. It is a matter for great regret that the throwing of bombs by Zeppelins on London was denounced as a most savage act and the bombardment of places of worship and sacred spots was considered a most abominable operation, while now we see with our eyes that such operations were a habit which is prevalent amongst all civilised people of the West. Notwithstanding this, it is not our desire that the century-old friendship between you and us should be broken and that bloodshed should occur between us which would again lead to perpetual enmity, hatred and malice between these two nations in such a way that it would be impossible to extinguish these feelings, because once a nation prepares for death and thirsts for revenge, it becomes impossible to restrain it. In this respect, singular proof of our Royal good intentions is the despatch of this friendly letter to Your Excellency. At the same time we have sent our Royal commands to our Commandant to suspend movements of troops in different directions and to stop hostilities and a certified copy of said *firmans* is forwarded herewith for Your Excellency's perusal. Relying on this, I state to Your Excellency with great sincerity intention that our sublime Government has never had any idea of severing friendly relations with illustrious Government of Great Britain, is in no case whatever desirous of upsetting old obligations and old relations. On the contrary it is desirous of honourable and dignified peace that may be advantageous to both parties at present and in the future enable Afghanistan to acquire honourable and dignified existence. And it is possible to settle the question in this manner that some personage on behalf of your Illustrious Government and some on behalf of our Sublime Government may be selected and nominated to assemble at Landi Kotal or Peshawar to discuss the matter and to conclude an honourable and dignified peace for both parties. The earlier action is taken in this affair the better it will be for both parties. For the rest may the days of friendship endure for ever. Dated 28th May, 1919.—Amir Amanulla."

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* See No. 48.

Enclosure: "May it be known to our Exalted and Dignified brother Dost Muhammad Khan, Naib Salar, Eastern Side. According to information received by us in these days from the Exalted Government of India it appears that fighting has taken place between the troops of the two sides owing to some misunderstanding. You should suspend hostilities until the door of discussion and communication is opened. As we had no intention of fighting with this old friend and were obliged to take defensive measures, now that he is also desirous of peace we order and command you to keep back your regular troops, tribes, Mujahidin and Ghazis, for whom we are liable to be responsible, with your masterly effort and wait for further orders. You should, however, keep in view defensive and offensive preparations. If the result of discussion between Your Sublime Government and the Illustrious British Government is the conclusion of peace or otherwise I shall inform you. That is to say you should suspend action until further orders. Dated 27th May, 1919.—Amir Amanulla."

No. 50.

From the Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd June. (Received 3rd June.)

(Telegraphic.)

At the beginning of the Afghan trouble I wrote personally explaining the situation to all ruling princes and chiefs. All important rulers have in their replies offered their resources to Government and have expressed unswerving loyalty to the Throne and detestation of the Amir's action. Necessary measures have been taken by the Nizam, the Begum of Bhopal and other rulers to ensure that the real circumstances of the Afghan attack are fully understood by their Mohammedan subjects and that latter realise that no question of religion is involved. In placing his Imperial Service Troops and resources at the Government of India's disposal, the Nizam of Hyderabad has specially asked me to convey to His Majesty the King his humble and respectful offer. The rulers of Baria, Ratlam, Patiala and Dholpur are among those who have offered personal service. Staff appointments in the field have been given to the Nawab of Loharu's two sons, including the heir apparent. We are considering other offers. Sir Partap Singh was eager to go, but, in view of the importance of his duties as Regent of Jodhpur, I discouraged him.

Units have been offered by all ruling princes and chiefs who maintain Imperial Service Troops. These units have in some cases only just returned from the front. We have selected for active service or garrison duty in India contingents of infantry, cavalry, artillery, sappers, etc., from Gwalior, Faridkot, Jaipur, Indore, Khairpur, Kashmir, Patiala, Maler Kotla, Sirmur, Tehri and Rampur. We are considering employment of Imperial Service Troops of Bikaner, Nabha and Kapurthala. We are receiving and accepting offers of camels, motor-cars, and money for providing comforts for the troops engaged in the campaign.

Assistance was offered by the Nepalese Government in February last on the death of the late Amir. I asked the Prime Minister for a Nepalese contingent at the outbreak of hostilities, and, in spite of the great difficulties of moving troops through Terai in the hot weather, he promptly agreed. Arrangements for their reception in India are being made.

Chiefs and governors of the Gilgit Agency, Khan of Kelat and tribes in Baluchistan have also sent offers of assistance and loyal messages. Active assistance in repelling raiding parties has been given by the Mehtar of Chitral. The Nawab of Dir has expelled all Afghan agents who were in his country and has offered his son's services.

No. 51.

Letter from H.E. the Viceroy to Amir Amanulla Khan (dated Simla, 3rd June, 1919, despatched from British Lines 6th June, 1919: telegraphic version received in London 3rd June, 1919.)

After Compliments.

I have received your letter dated 28th May* and learn with pleasure that you are now sincerely anxious for a cessation of hostilities and the renewal of the friendship between our Governments. For, as your envoy was told in Simla, nothing could be more entirely opposed to traditional policy and sentiment of the Government of India than war with Afghanistan. I cannot, however, pass by in silence your allegation that what has happened is due to an unfortunate misunderstanding. There has been no misunderstanding on my part. If there has been any misunderstanding on yours, it was a misunderstanding of the political situation in India of which you were completely misinformed, and a misunderstanding of the temper and power of the British Government. Let me state the facts clearly in order that there may be no doubt as to the responsibility for this war. On the 3rd May, Zar Shah, a notorious frontier marauder, brought a tribal gathering to the frontier near Landi Kotal and killed five coolies on our waterworks. He gave out openly that your Sipah Salar had sent him ahead to commence hostilities and produced a *firman* under your seal in support of his assertion. On the 4th May a party of 100 Afghan regulars, 200 Khassadars and some Shinwari tribesmen occupied Bagh and Kafir Kot and cut off one of the water supplies of our frontier post at Landi Kotal. On 5th May two guns and three regiments arrived at Bagh and 300 to 400 regulars occupied Tor Sappar and Spina Suka. By 8th May about 4,000 men and 8 guns were holding positions stretching from Tor

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* No. 49.

Sappar to Bagh, further invading unquestionable British territory, while large reinforcements were held in readiness at Dakka. On 11th May my troops ejected your army by force of arms from British territory. The causes of the war are revealed in your own admissions. You admit in your present letter that you sent troops to the frontiers. You admit in your letter of 10th May that you roused the Afghan tribes. In the same letter you admit the authenticity of the inflammatory *firman* circulated by your commandants among the tribes to the effect that the loyalty of our Indian subjects had been rewarded by cruelty and injustice in connection with religion, honour and modesty; and winding up with an incitement to *Jehad.* And finally in your present letter you admit that a proclamation of *Jehad* was actually on the eve of publication. Even at the eleventh hour, after British territory had been wantonly and deliberately violated, I sought, as the friend of your late lamented father, to furnish his son, who had only just come to the throne, with an honourable retreat from the inevitable consequences of these foolish actions. I invited you to arrest Zar Shah, who in violating British territory had announced that your Sipah Salar had sent him ahead to British territory to commence hostilities. And I invited you to repudiate as a forgery the inflammatory *firman* which had been distributed broadcast along our common frontier. To my sorrow you refused the hand of forgiveness and friendship thus extended to you. In your letter of 10th May you said that Zar Shah's arrest would be inadvisable; and so far from repudiating the *firman* you affirmed its authenticity and even sought to justify it. The fact is that days before the first shot was fired, plans were laid in Kabul for a deliberate attack upon the British Government. Of the many proofs in my hands I will refer you to one document only—letter dated 27th Rajab 1337 Hijra (corresponding to 29th April, 1919)—from your Commissary for Foreign Affairs to your Envoy at Simla, ordering him to obtain deeds of allegiance from the Hindus and Muhammadans of India, to put excitement into the Indian newspapers because a good opportunity was drawing near, and to keep in touch with the Commander-in-Chief and the War Minister and Sardar Muhammad Nadir Khan. In spite, however, of ample justification for carrying this war to its logical conclusion, I am anxious to meet your overtures in a friendly spirit. In this I am actuated partly by a knowledge of your youth and inexperience, partly by a knowledge that you have been misinformed and led astray, and because I share your desire to avoid further useless bloodshed. Moreover, I am not unmindful of our obligations to your father, the late Siraj ul Millat Wa-ud-Din (on whom be peace), who was not only a faithful friend and ally to the British but also a great patriot. Intense love of his country, coupled with wise statesmanship, led him, in the face of much opposition, to restrain his country from plunging into a great war to her certain ruin. Respect for his memory prompts me to deal as leniently as possible with the country and the people he so loved. To this end my Government are prepared at once to agree to an armistice on the following terms:—

1. That you should at once withdraw all your troops from the frontier. No Afghan troops are to be located within 20 miles of the nearest British force.
2. That the British troops should remain where they now are in Afghan territory with freedom to continue such military preparations and precautions as may be deemed necessary. The troops will, however, take no offensive action whatever, so long as the terms of this armistice are observed by your side.
3. British aircraft will not bomb or machine-gun Afghan localities or forces so long as the armistice is observed, but they will have freedom of movement in the air to reconnoitre and observe positions of Afghan forces in order to ensure against any concentration or collection of Afghan troops or tribesmen in contravention of the armistice; further, that you undertake that your people will not fire upon or molest British air craft and will return without delay, unhurt, British aircraft and airmen who may have been forced to land in Afghan limits, and to use your utmost endeavour to ensure the safety of any British airmen who may be forced to land in tribal territory.
4. That you should at once send urgent messages to the tribes both on your own side and on our side of the Durand frontier into whose limits your troops have advanced, or who have been excited by your agents and proclamations, stating that you have asked the Government of India for a cessation of hostilities, and that you will not countenance further aggressive action on their part against the British Government; if they take such action it will be at their own risk, and they will receive no support from you, and find no asylum in Afghanistan, from which they will be ejected if they come.

Now, my friend, I would ask you to consider these terms carefully, and you will realise how very lenient they are. I avoid all humiliating conditions. If you are wise, you will accept them in the friendly spirit in which they are offered. If you do not accept them the consequences must rest with you. And in all friendliness, let me point out to you that, with the unlimited resources of the British Empire, which has just issued triumphantly from a struggle with the greatest military power the world has ever seen, those consequences can only mean one thing. If you accept terms offered, orders will at once be issued accordingly to the British General Officers Commanding operations, who will be authorised to arrange meetings with the Officers Commanding your troops and to sign armistice agreements to the above effect. Thereafter I shall gladly appoint selected officers to meet officers selected by you to discuss and arrange final terms of peace and once more to establish and strengthen friendly relations between our two Governments. As regards a place of meeting, I do not consider that either Landi Kotal or Peshawar are suitable places for negotiations of this kind. I have fixed upon Rawal Pindi, which, though not on the frontier, is sufficiently near to be convenient. In the meantime I should be glad to know the names and designations of the delegates whom you propose to send and the earliest date on which they can reach the frontier. I agree with you that the earlier action is taken in this matter the better it will be for both parties. You may rely on there being no delay on my side. I earnestly hope that I shall very shortly receive such a reply from you as will pave the way to a renewal of old friendship between our Governments.—*Usual ending.*

"(Signed) CHELMSFORD."

No. 52.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd June. (*Received 4th June.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Officers Commanding Forces have been instructed that to avoid prejudicing armistice negotiations bombing operations by air against Afghan towns are to be suspended. Continuation of operations against the tribes will not be affected by armistice negotiations. Applications has been made by Nadir Khan, under instructions from Amir, to G.O.C., Thal, for hostilities to be suspended. Reply was to give him 24 hours to commence withdrawing his forces inside Afghan frontier, operation to be completed within 96 hours. Yesterday we attacked and captured enemy position on low hills two miles north-west of Thal.

No. 53.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 5th June. (*Received 5th June.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

In event of Amir accepting our proposals for negotiations at Rawal Pindi,* British representative selected is my Foreign Secretary, Sir Hamilton Grant, who will have as his Political Adviser, Mr. J. L. Maffey.

No. 54.

From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 10th June, 1919.

(*Telegraphic.*)

I approve proposals contained in your telegram† of 5th inst. for British representatives at discussion of terms of peace. I presume military adviser, in addition to political adviser, will be attached to Sir H. Grant.

No. 55.

Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy, No. 6, dated 12 Ramzan 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 11th June, 1919. (*Telegraphic version received in London 15th* June.)

(*Translation.*)

May it be known to his illustrious Excellency my friend the Governor-General of India, of the great Government of Great Britain. I have received the friendly letter of my gracious and kind friend dated 4th Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 3rd June, 1919, regarding the discussion of peace, and containing lenient terms of the cessation of hostilities, sincere well-meaning sentiments on your part, desire to avoid further useless bloodshed, and appreciation of him who reposes in the tomb of martyrdom, His Majesty Siraj-ul-Millat-wa-ud-din, my illustrious father, whom God has taken into His mercy and who was in friendly alliance with the British Government for many years. We are impressed by the natural peace-loving inclinations of Great British nation, whose high functionaries have honourably made this the principle of their diplomacy in other places of the world. And we are grateful for the expression of sincere friendly regard and esteem towards the sublime Afghan Government.

You have, by alluding to events mentioned in previous letters, pointed out our misunderstanding of the temper and power of the exalted British Government. My kind friend, I consider a repetition of matters previously discussed is only to prolong uselessly a subject which is far from the object in view. I refer to your expressions of certainty and to your eulogy of the unlimited resources of British Government, and to our hinting at the internal power of the sublime Government of Afghanistan, which, notwithstanding its defects of organisation, has repeatedly been a cause of destruction and ruin to foreign power on its sacred soil, and to our alluding to the fact that, firstly, the Islamic Afghan nation really looks upon fighting with non-Muslim nations as a cause of revival of its existence and as a means of its awakening notwithstanding its terrible damages and the probability of numerous losses and injuries; secondly, that it is in the Muslim nature of Afghans to prefer visible death to subordination to a Foreign Power and to consider it as its perpetual life; and, thirdly, that the spirit of freedom and of natural individuality and national liberty, with its wonderful and surprising world-wide electric and magnetic power of inspiring peace, has caused the withered hearts of the depressed classes of humanity to expand and blossom in every part of the world, and has by an extraordinary force brought into being conferences loving peace and equality, and has nearly brought to its death-agony oppression and domination among different nations.

We shall, therefore, leave these matters and turn to the real object in view, which is the conclusion of peace and cessation of hostilities between the Exalted Governments of Afghanistan and Great Britain. Regarding this you have made certain impossible demands such as the removal of the Afghan troops to a distance of 20 miles from British troops and the free movement in the air of British aeroplanes over Afghan territory without any hindrance by the people, as well as an undertaking by the Afghan Government for the protection of aeroplanes and aircraft in their country. Your overlooking of points so manifest and apparent is a matter for surprise, for the only definition of the military forces of the sublime Afghan Government is that the military and civil forces of Afghanistan are identical. How, then, is it possible to move thousands and thousands of individuals and tribal people from their villages and winter-camping grounds in places opposite British lines? I overlook those matters also which are impossible to accomplish and devote attention to the possible and correct terms of armistice worthy of the dignity of honoured and exalted governments. The essential object of the armistice is the suspension of hostilities by both sides for the discussion and settlement of peace. Nothing more than the cessation of hostilities and peace of mind which is its inevitable result are required. That has already taken place as communicated in my letter dated 27th Shaban, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 28th May, 1919, to my honourable friend. The best way to secure a discussion of peace with due consideration to the honour of both parties is that the troops of both Governments should remain in their present positions and enjoy mutual respect until the settlement of terms of peace. With regard to aeroplanes it is evident that their movement in the air in our exalted dominions is an illegal violation and interference, for the feelings of our nation who do not have aeroplanes are bitterly excited by seeing your aeroplanes. In every house and with every man are arms, rifles and ammunition, and it is impossible to restrain people even if we wish to do so. Moreover, it is possible owing to a change in the attitude of friendship between the two Governments an ignorant, mischievous or designing person may fire at them, thus leading to a rupture in the friendship and the postponement of peace between the two exalted Governments, the consequences of which will not be advantageous but injurious to both Governments. In my former letter I mentioned Landi Kotal or Peshawar as the meeting-place of officers of both exalted Governments appointed for the conclusion of peace. Now you have in your present letter, for certain reasons, perhaps, fixed on Rawal Pindi as a suitable place of meeting. We also, in order to secure your pleasure and to safeguard the dignity and honour of Illustrious British Government, agree with it. We have selected and appointed the following officers for the discussion and argument of the terms of peace and the establishment of friendship between the two exalted Governments. They will, please God, be ready to start for Rawal Pindi on the 28 Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 27th June, 1919. I do not hesitate to mention here that we must not fail to keep in view the advantage of friendship and avoidance of hostilities between the exalted Governments of Afghanistan and Great Britain, particularly at a time when such critical circumstances have arisen in Asia and Europe for our old friend the British Government. Your Excellency will see a signal proof of my good intentions in my receiving your terms of armistice in a reasonable manner. If Your Excellency will overlook the past you will see a bright future for both parties in the establishment of friendly relations between the two exalted Governments. Its advantageous results will be mentioned by our selected representatives in course of discussion and communication:—(1) Our exalted and honoured brother, Ali Ahmad Khan, Commissary for Home Affairs, President of Peace Delegates. (2) Civil General Sardar Muhammad Yunus Khan. (3) Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Commissary for Commerce. (4) Civil Colonel Abdul Aziz Khan, former Envoy of the Sublime Afghan Government at the Court of the Government of India. (5) Muhammad Rafiq Khan, Amir's Ulmu Abilah, Superintendent of Correspondence. (6) Doctor Abdul Ghani Khan, Rais-idar-ul-Muwallafin, Chief of the Compilation Department. (7) Civil Colonel Diwan Niranjan Das, Sardaftar-i-wajuhat, Head of Tax Department. (8) Abdul Hadi Khan, Chief Clerk. (9) Civil Colonel Mirza Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Mir Munshi, Foreign Department. I hope Your Excellency will appoint the representatives of your Government for the management and settlement of the question by the time of the arrival of the said officers at Rawal Pindi. For the rest, may the days of your honour and prosperity endure for ever. Dated 12 Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 11th June, 1919. Signed, Amir Amanulla.

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* No 51. † No. 53.

No. 56.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India; dated 22nd June, 1919. (Received 22nd June.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Following letter to Amir Amanulla Khan issued yesterday, 21st June:—

"I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your friendly letter,* No. 6, dated 11th June, 1919, corresponding to 12th Ramzan, 1337 Hijra. You say 'Your Excellency will see the signal proof of my good intentions in my acceptance in a reasonable manner of your terms for armistice.' At the same time you point out your difficulties in carrying out literally the first and third terms. My friend, I appreciate those difficulties. But you have misunderstood what was meant by first term. All I demanded was that your regular troops be removed from frontier to a distance of 20 miles from nearest British force. I understand you have given practical effect to this provision except in vicinity of New Chaman, where I must ask you to do so at once. Further, I am informed there are still some Afghan troops on our side of frontier, notably in vicinity of Peiwar Kotal. These must be immediately withdrawn. So long as a single Afghan regular soldier remains on our side, peace negotiations are out of the question and there can be no alternative but a resumption of hostilities. I said nothing in the first term of armistice regarding removal of villagers and tribesmen from their homes. But I must ask you to issue orders against any gatherings of such tribesmen in vicinity of our military forces. Should such gatherings occur and threaten our forces, I have authorised my Generals to take the necessary steps to disperse them.

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* No. 55.

"2. As regards third term, what you say regarding your difficulties has been understood by me. Nevertheless my aeroplanes must continue to reconnoitre in order to secure my troops against such hostile gatherings of tribesmen. I look to you to issue strict warning to your people against molesting them, and I have every confidence that your orders will be effective. If our aeroplanes are molested they will retaliate.

"3. You do not mention fourth term. I assume from this that you have done what is necessary. If not I must ask you to so without delay. For at a time when peace negotiations between us are pending it is impossible to leave tribes in a state of doubt and excitement, and it lies with you, whose actions have excited them, to warn them on the lines laid down.

"4. Finally, I must make it plain to you that His Majesty's Government will not allow any further modification of armistice terms. I sincerely hope, therefore, that you will now accept what I have written, and carry out what I have asked, in a spirit of genuine friendliness, for on this must depend initiation of peace negotiations between us. On this understanding I shall be glad to issue orders for reception of delegates you name at Rawal Pindi.

"5. I have appointed Sir Hamilton Grant, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to be chief of British delegation, and, assuming that you accept my conditions, I shall be glad if you will kindly inform him of the full numbers of party you are sending, and the date on which they will reach British lines. Arrangements will then be made for their conveyance to Rawal Pindi. The names of other members of the British delegation will be intimated to you in due course.

"6. I also on my part look forward, please God, to a bright future in the re-establishment of friendly relations between two Governments.

"(Signed) CHELMSFORD."

No. 57.

Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 19th June, 1919. (Telegraphic version received in London 27th June, 1919.)

(*Translation.*)

No. 7, dated 20th Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 19th June, 1919. *After compliments.* In these days reports have reached me that persons from Independent Territory are committing raids in the Eastern districts in your camp in the limits of Dakka. It is probable that these persons from Independent Territory may gradually induce some persons in our territory to join them and take part in raids, and it will be very difficult to restrain them, since the presence of your troops and camps in Afghan Territory is causing extraordinary agitation and excitement among the people on this side, which is leading to difficulties. As negotiations for an armistice and peace are at present going on between the two exalted Governments, I think it necessary to offer Your Excellency friendly advice as a wellwisher and say that it will be advisable during this period of armistice for your troops to return to their former limits, pending settlement of the peace terms, as it will also remove the cause of my anxiety.

As the peace meeting will shortly take place, I have considered it necessary and essential to write to Your Excellency on the subject in a friendly manner. For the rest Your Excellency will take such steps in the matter as you may deem fit in your own interests.—*Usual conclusion.*

No. 58.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 2nd July. (Received 2nd July.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Please refer to my telegram of 1st June* containing Amir's allegations that the tomb of Amir Abdur Rahman and Royal Palace at Kabul, and the grave of Amir Habibulla at Jalalabad, and open quarters of town of Jalalabad had been bombed. Facts are as follows. Kabul: bombing was limited to the arsenal workshops and the Ark or citadel, which is used, not for residential purposes, but as subterranean magazine. The tomb of Abdur Rahman is in grounds outside the Ark, and it is possible that area of burst of bombs might include it. Jalalabad: our information shows that Amir Habibulla has been temporarily interred in a grave on the golf course; no bombs have been dropped on any grave that could be recognised from the air as such. The Palace was bombed; it was being used as military headquarters. Damage was undoubtedly done by bombing to the town about which troops were billeted.

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* No. 49.

No. 59.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 4th July, 1919.
(Received 5th July.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following letter from Amir Amanulla Khan has been received and transmitted on 3rd inst. by G.O.C. North-West Frontier:—

"*After compliments.* Your Excellency's friendly letter dated 22nd Ramzan, 1337 Hijra, corresponding to 21st June, 1919, was received by me on the 26th Ramzan, corresponding to 25th June, and was source of augmentation of friendship and concord. I invite Your Excellency's attention to my friendly and well-meaning ideas. The sole object of the two exalted Governments is to re-establish relations of friendship and concord between the two parties. Thus, when it is the intention of both parties in their mutual interest to try and establish peace honourable to both Governments, it is necessary that both should devote attention to healing up of former wounds and to make an attempt to bring about a state of affairs that may help to remove former misunderstanding and to re-establish firmly new friendship and unity, so that both parties may benefit by it. Your Excellency's last letter, however, which has been quoted above, has not tended to confirm the above views, and, as it does not correspond with the exigencies of the times, it has caused me some perturbation of mind and disturbed me. I have, therefore, considered it necessary to invite Your Excellency's attention to my wishes as to the armistice and to acquaint Your Excellency with what I, as a wellwisher, consider desirable and advisable.

"As regards the first term that Afghan troops be removed to a distance of 20 miles from the nearest British force, I write to say that as I considered Your Excellency's ideas and first statements as expressing a desire for peace and showing it was your Excellency's object to avoid bloodshed between the two exalted Governments, I believed and was convinced that Your Excellency's intentions were good and rightly reasonable. I therefore became desirous of peace and asked for an armistice. At the same time, as I saw that Your Excellency was determined that Afghan regular troops should be removed to a distance of 20 miles from the nearest British force, I gave practical effect to this provision in most parts of my territory, notwithstanding the fact that I had made no such promise in my letter to Your Excellency. I also gave orders to the troops on Chaman and Peiwar Kotal frontiers to take up their positions at a distance of about ten miles from your forces until the settlement of peace terms. Thus, in this manner, this request of Your Excellency was practically complied with in full. But, in response to my action in ordering my troops to be removed to a distance of ten miles in the limits of Peiwar Kotal and Chaman and to a distance of 20 miles on my other frontiers, I consider it is necessary and advisable that the regular troops of the illustrious British Government should also be removed by Your Excellency from the new fort in the direction of Chaman to Chaman and from limits of Dakka to Landi Kotal and stationed at the former limit until the settlement of peace terms in order to avoid trouble of frontier raids, to allay extraordinary excitement prevailing amongst Afghan subjects and to prevent them from fighting. It is the rule of the world that when armistice and peace are arranged between two Governments the interests of both parties are kept in view, so it is not incumbent on one party to agree entirely to what the other party says. This is far from justice nor is it the law of the world. It is necessary for Your Excellency to consider this matter carefully. What need is there for Your Excellency to insist on this? Prolongation of correspondence and distortion of the subjects in such trifling matters will only lead to disturbance of feeling of both parties and have an effect, result of which would be that affairs will assume a different course and lead to misunderstanding and mischief. With due consideration to the good intentions of and friendship between the two Governments, I do not consider that it is proper that such matters should be delayed.

"As regards movements of aeroplanes of Your Excellency's Government in Afghan territory, this is not at all necessary, as there seems to be no advantage in it to the illustrious British Government. As requested by Your Excellency, stringent orders to the frontier tribes of Afghan Government have been issued, strongly warning them that during the period of armistice no aggression or attack should be made by people within our country upon your troops. Your Excellency may entirely rest assured. The advent of your aeroplanes is certain to cause extraordinary excitement amongst our people, who will fire at them in spite of our strict orders not to. The aeroplanes will then bomb them, as mentioned by Your Excellency. This will result in loss of life and property, the consequences of which would be very bad. Thus there will be no armistice or peaceful settlement. Since both Governments consider the conclusion of peace desirable and necessary in the interests of both parties, what need is there for bringing about such a state of affairs, and why does Your Excellency insist on this matter so much, as it does not appear to be of any importance? As the sole reason for the British Government sending aeroplanes is to reconnoitre and acquire information regarding the state of affairs in different directions round their camp and nothing else, this can be fully attained by flying areoplanes above your own camp. If this is done, all agitation and excitement amongst our people and exchange of shot and bomb between our people and your aeroplanes will be avoided, and both parties will remain in peace and safety.

"In view of the safety of both parties, I do not consider movement of your aeroplanes over parts of Afghan territory is advisable in any case whatever.

"As regards frontier tribes being inflamed and excited, and the demand that if they seek an asylum in Afghan territory they should not be allowed to remain there and should be ejected, I have understood this. I now write to Your Excellency that I was not particularly the cause of their being inflamed and excited. It is possible in some cases some of frontier officials of our Government did some things in opposition to certain actions of Your Excellency's frontier officials, but in compliance with Your Excellency's earnest desire they have been warned to abstain from these ideas, and to take no such action in future.

"As regards frontier tribes and others taking refuge in Afghan territory, it has been always the prevailing practice of the world that the extradition of persons taking refuge from territory of one Government into that of another is not allowed and an asylum is given to them. I would strongly urge Your Excellency to consider carefully how it is possible for me to expel and surrender such persons when this action is opposed to law of nations and of humanity. Moreover, according to law of Islam it is quite unlawful to refuse asylum to, and expel from country of Islam, people of any religion whatever who take refuge in it. These are matters for discussion in the peace meeting, which is to be convened between the two Governments, and it will be better to settle them there.

"I may point out to Your Excellency that it is no advantage and only a waste of time to get involved in such matters at such critical juncture. If it is intention of British Government to conclude peace what necessity is there then for worrying about such trifles? If there is no intention of making peace I request that I may be so informed so that we may understand each other. It has caused me much surprise that on one hand Your Excellency has indicated delight in agreement and unanimity, expressed a desire for the strengthening of relations, stated that you are looking forward to a bright future, and given me glad news of re-establishment of friendly relations between two exalted Governments; while on the other hand you insist so strictly on unimportant matters referring to terms of temporary armistice which have no apparent advantage to Your Excellency's Government as compared with friendship of Government of Afghanistan. This has made me somewhat uneasy at unexpected turn that affairs have taken. I write to Your Excellency with regret to say result of this state of affairs will be the avoidance of peace on my part also, otherwise I am not at all willing that the relations of unity and friendship which the sublime, independent Government of Afghanistan has for many years maintained with the illustrious British Government should be severed and converted into conflict and hostility. It is my earnest endeavour that relations of friendship and unity between the exalted Governments should be established more strongly than ever with honour to both parties.

"I am glad to hear of appointment of Sir Hamilton Grant, Foreign Secretary, as chief of delegates of illustrious British Government, and trust that Your Excellency will communicate names of other delegates also for my information. The delegates of the sublime Government of Afghanistan whose names have already been communicated to Your Excellency are ready to start so that they may discuss matters with delegates of the illustrious British Government with a view to removal of the confusion and misunderstanding which has arisen between the two parties, the establishment of a clear understanding advantageous to both and the settlement of affairs in a manner honourable to the two exalted Governments. The numbers of persons who will arrive in India with my exalted honourable and dear brother Ali Ahmad Khan Sahib, Commissary for Home affairs of the sublime Government, will be 150, including attendants and military escort as follows: military, 30 cavalry, 50 infantry; attendants, 70.

"I hope Your Excellency will fix the date of their arrival so that they may arrive on frontier of illustrious British Government on that date. *Usual conclusion.*"

No. 60.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 4th July. (*Received 5th July.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

We propose to address following reply to Amir in reply to his letter transmitted to you in my preceding telegram of to-day*:—

"I am glad to learn how sincerely anxious you are for the restoration of peace. But my friend, both the whole tone of your letter and your advice that the British troops should now be withdrawn from Afghan territory on the Dakka and Chaman fronts force me to the conclusion that you fail to appreciate your true position. You appear to forget that it was the Afghan Government that started this war and that it is the Afghan Government who are now suing for peace; and that it was for these reasons that armistice terms were laid down by my Government. You do not seem to realise His Majesty's Government have been very gravely affronted by what has occurred; and that British people are indignant that a great Power should thus have been attacked. When I wrote to you of my desire for the renewal of the long-standing friendship between our Governments I did so on the assumption that having asked for peace you sincerely regretted what had happened and accepted your proper position in the matter. I agree with you, however, that there is no advantage in prolonging this correspondence and that best course will be for our respective delegates to meet as soon as possible. Will you therefore please direct your delegates and their party to present themselves at the British lines before 10 a.m. on 22nd July. They will thence be honourably conducted by my officers to Rawal Pindi where arrangements for their entertainment will be ready. I shall be obliged if you will let me know as soon as possible that you have issued the necessary orders in order that necessary arrangements may be made on this side. In this connection you appear to suggest that your delegates will be accompanied in India by an escort of cavalry and infantry. This, however, is contrary to practice and is not permissible. Every precaution for the safeguarding of your delegates will be taken by my officers. In these circumstances number of attendants can doubtless be reduced, and I trust that you will limit their number to 50 persons.

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* No. 59.

"In addition to Sir H. Grant, Chief of British Delegation, I have appointed following to be my delegates:—Mr. Maffey, my Private Secretary, Brig.-Gen. Moberley, General Staff, Nawab Sir Mir Shams Shah and Sir Gurbaksh Singh, Bedi."

No. 61.

From the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, dated 7th July.

(*Telegraphic.*)

The terms of reply to Amir proposed in your telegram of 4th inst.* are approved, subject to insertion of following sentence after sentence about indignation of British people " Moreover, it is for this reason that, as I have already informed you, His Majesty's Government will not allow any modification of armistice terms."

No. 62.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 21st July, 1919. (*Received 21st July.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

The following is complete translation of a letter from Amir Amanulla Khan which we have received by telegram to-day from the Chief Political Officer, North West Frontier:—

" No. 9 dated 19th Shawal 1337 Hijra. *After compliments.* May it be known to my illustrious friend His Excellency the Viceroy of the mighty Government of India in the British Empire that Your Excellency's friendly letter† of 9th Shawal 1337 Hijra corresponding to 8th July 1919 has reached me, and I have been made acquainted with its contents which are full of friendship and which refer to past hostilities and in which it is stated there is nothing to be gained by further lengthy correspondence, and you should therefore think it advisable that all past misunderstanding should be removed by meeting of Peace delegates. You also wish for their presence at the place appointed on 23rd Shawal 1337 Hijra corresponding to 22nd July 1919. You also express your unwillingness to the attendance of military escort in India by assuring us of safety of our delegates, and you have also informed me of the delegates which Your Excellency has been pleased to approve the appointment of for this settlement. The friendly sentiments expressed by Your Excellency gave us great pleasure, but to reply to each point separately in detail appears unnecessary and would simply lengthen letter unduly. We will therefore be brief.

" 'With reference to arrival of peace delegation on the 23rd Shawal at the appointed place, as proposed by Your Excellency, we desire to say that deputation under our noble and dear brother Ali Ahmad Khan, Minister of Home Affairs, will arrive at selected place on the 25th of the month above mentioned, and they trust that Your Excellency will accordingly expect their arrival on that date. As Your Excellency expresses certain apprehensions in connection with military escort, which we proposed to send with our deputation, we accept your views. Our military escort will only escort deputation as far as we consider it advisable for their safety.

" 'We have made ourselves acquainted with rank and names of those delegates now appointed by Your Excellency; and we agree to them; Your Excellency is the person who knows best who should be appointed.

" 'On our part we have appointed Abdul Rahman Khan, our newly appointed envoy to India, as an additional member of our peace deputation.

" 'We trust now that, God willing, peace with honour to both the friendly Powers will be established in near future, and the honourable object of both parties will be attained.' "

No. 63.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 25th July, 1919. (*Received 25th July.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Afghan delegates arrived Rawal Pindi this morning.

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* No. 60. † No. 60.

No. 64.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 29th July, 1919. (*Received 31st July.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Please refer to my telegrams of 27th* and 28th May†: evacuation of Upper Tochi posts, Shawa and Spinwam. As regards Upper Tochi posts, desertions and signs of uneasiness among their militia garrisons led Area Commander to despatch a small column of all arms on 24th May from Daidoni to Mahomet Khel in order to restore the garrisons' confidence or, if necessary, to support their withdrawal. G.O.C. in C., however, was not aware of G.O.C., Bannu's intention to move to Mahomet Khel as he omitted to report this and it was not till after column had marched from Daidoni that Gen. Barrett heard of it. Latter also was led by information before him to believe that General Nádir Khan was expected to commence operations before 27th May, and on these grounds decided that mobile column from Daidoni should be ordered to return there; following instructions were therefore sent by General Barrett to G.O.C., Bannu, on 25th May, and repeated to G.O.C. Waziristan Force: "Information from reliable source points to likelihood at any moment of simultaneous attacks on Miranshah and Kurram: mobile column should return to Daidoni immediately." G.O.C., Bannu was of opinion that crisis would inevitably be precipitated by withdrawal of mobile column and that wholesale desertions of militia would result; with the object, therefore, of concentrating his force and saving the loyal elements in the militia with their arms, ammunition and other Government property, he ordered that the posts should be evacuated at once. We consider that he was justified in this action as G.O.C. in C.'s instructions left him no discretion in regard to mobile column's withdrawal.

As regards evacuation of Shawa and Spinwam, a consultation was held on 24th May between G.O.C., Bannu Area and Political Agent, Tochi, at which it was decided that as the situation contemplated in instructions from G.O.C. in C. might develop before information could reach O.C. at Daidoni, the decision whether or not to evacuate these posts must be taken, in accordance with circumstances, by officers on the spot. On 24th May, therefore, G.O.C., Bannu sent out orders that garrison at Shawa was to retire to Spinwam in event of gathering of enemy on Kaitu, and that Shawa and Spinwam garrisons should fall back together to Sheratalla in event of enemy making actual advance. During night of 24th-25th May information was received that General Nadir Khan's force was advancing on Spinwam and both garrisons accordingly were promptly withdrawn. The Afghans occupied Spinwam on following day, 25th May. In view of the isolation of these posts, it was unavoidable, in our opinion, that they should be evacuated.

Adverse criticism of these withdrawals is easy after the event; but it is an open question whether we should not have found ourselves more seriously embarrassed had these isolated posts been invested by the enemy. The situation facing the officers responsible was critical and fraught with many difficulties; we are confident they took a deliberate review of the position before exercising their judgment as they did.

No. 65.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 8th August, 1919. (*Received 8th August.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Peace with Afghanistan was signed 11 this morning.

No. 66.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 9th August, 1919. (*Received 9th August.*)

(*Telegraphic.*)

Following from Grant, dated 8th August:--*Begins.* Peace Treaty was signed to-day at 11 o'clock. Full text is as follows. *Begins.* Following is text of peace treaty signed this morning. Treaty of peace between the illustrious British Government and the independent Afghan Government concluded at Rawal Pindi on the 8th August 1919 corresponding to the 11th ZIQAD 1337 Hijra.

The following articles for the restoration of peace have been agreed upon by the British Government and the Afghan Government:—*Article* 1. From date of signing of this treaty there shall be peace between the British Government on the one part and the Government of Afghanistan on the other. *Article* 2. In view of the circumstances which have brought about the present war between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan the British Government to mark their displeasure withdraw the privilege enjoyed by former Amirs of importing arms, ammunition, or warlike munitions through India to Afghanistan. *Article* 3. The arrears of the late Amir's subsidy are furthermore confiscated and no subsidy is granted to the present Amir. *Article* 4. At the same time the British Government is desirous of the re-establishment of the old friendship that has so long existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain provided they have guarantees that the Afghan Government are on their part sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The British Government are prepared therefore, provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts and conduct, to receive another Afghan mission after 6 months for the discussion and amicable settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis. *Article* 5. The Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation by a British commission of the undermarcated portion of the line to the west of the Khyber where the recent Afghan aggression took place and to accept such boundary as the British commission may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their present positions until such demarcation has been effected. *Ends.*

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* No. 43. † No. 44.

Afghan delegation leave Rawal Pindi on Monday night.

No. 67.

From the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated 9th August. (Received 10th August.)

(*Telegraphic.*)

My telegram of to-day. Sir H. Grant reports that after signature of Peace Treaty he handed Afghan delegate following letter: "You asked me for some further assurance that the "Treaty of Peace now offered by the British Government contains nothing that interferes with "the complete liberty of Afghanistan in external or internal matters. My friend, if you will "read the Treaty of Peace with care you will see that there is in it no such interference with "the liberty of Afghanistan. You have informed me that the Government of Afghanistan "is unwilling to renew the arrangement under which the late Amir, Habibulla Khan, agreed "to follow the advice of the Government of Great Britain in matters affecting the external "relations of Afghanistan, without reserve. I have therefore refrained from pressing this "matter of which the Treaty of Peace contains no mention. By the said Treaty and this letter, "therefore, Afghanistan is left officially free and independent in its affairs, both internal and "external. Furthermore, all previous treaties have been cancelled by this war."

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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER CAMPAIGN, 1919).

No. 2.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND COMFORTS FOR THE TROOPS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER (IN CONTINUATION OF CMD. 310).

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER CAMPAIGN, 1919).

Further Correspondence regarding the Medical Arrangements and Comforts for the Troops on the North-West Frontier (in continuation of Cmd. 310).

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

1. The telegraphic correspondence published herein is in continuation of that already published and presented to Parliament (Cmd. 310).

The recent operations on the North-West Frontier of India commenced early in May 1919, and complaints regarding the medical arrangements and comforts for the troops began to be made in Parliament and in the Press at the end of July 1919. Telegraphic enquiries were addressed to India regarding each allegation, and the correspondence contained in this paper and that referred to above shows the enquiries made and the explanations received from the Government of India. It appears from the correspondence that at the outset there was a shortage in some respects, but that this was rapidly overcome, and that the arrangements have since been adequate and satisfactory. The initial shortage appears to have been due to several causes—the rapid advance to Dakka coupled with the fact that the political and tribal situation did not admit of the prior installation of a piped water supply through the Khyber, the sudden defection of the Frontier Militia, which necessitated troops being rushed up to threatened points to meet the advance of Afghan forces into tribal country. As explained in the correspondence* the field army normally mobilises behind a screen composed of the Frontier Militia and the frontier outposts. Circumstances necessitated a departure from this plan, and for a short time there was a deficiency in stores and equipment of the troops, which had to be moved hurriedly to places on the frontier. The outbreak of cholera among the civil population at several points along the frontier added greatly to the gravity of the situation.

2. It has been stated in criticism of the medical administration in these operations that the lessons of the Mesopotamian operations have been neglected by the Government of India. The following summary of the action taken on the recommendations of the Mesopotamian Commission, so far as they are relevant to a campaign on the N.W. Frontier, shows that the criticism is not well founded.

Some of the points to which the Commission called attention involved a fundamental reconsideration of the whole military and medical organisation. Other recommendations were of a less fundamental nature and were capable of adoption while operations of war were still proceeding. This distinction should be borne in mind in comparing what has been done with what would have been done if a longer period had elapsed since the signing of the Armistice. During the war it was only possible to proceed with such measures as furthered the war effort, and to leave the larger questions of reorganisation for the ensuing period.

In the following summary a statement of the Commission's recommendations precedes the description of the position.

(a) *The Director of Medical Services in India should have far greater powers to authorise expenditure and make purchases, and to delegate such power to his subordinates.*—In cases of urgency, the sanction of Government to expenditure can be obtained within a few hours. General officers commanding divisions, divisional areas, and independent brigades were, before the Commission reported, given power to sanction expenditure up to a limit of Rs. 25,000 in each case on hospital and convalescent accommodation, furniture, clothing, medical and other stores, required in connection with sick and wounded men returning from field service to India.

(b) *Improvement in standard of comfort and accommodation in the Hospitals for British troops in India.*—Improvements have been made by electrical installations, and by the extended provision of operating rooms, recreation rooms, of facilities for X-ray work and laboratory work, and of superior hospital equipment generally. The ground has been explored, since the Mesopotamian Commission reported, by a

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* *See* No. 9 in Cmd. 310.

Committee under the presidency of Sir G. Makins. The Committee has made recommendations with a view to station hospitals being brought up to the level of the war hospitals (which were acknowledged by the Commission to be good) and of the civil hospitals in India. The principles advocated by this Committee have been accepted generally by the Government of India, and are being given effect to so far as funds and other circumstances permit.

(c) *The substitution of Station Hospitals for Indian troops for the regimental system.*—The principle of substitution has been adopted. Station hospitals have been instituted on a provisional basis, the most suitable of the regimental hospitals being adapted for the purpose, while the remainder of the regimental hospitals are being used as ancillary section hospitals. Improved scales of accommodation and diet, the latter being now free both for troops and followers, when in hospital, have recently been issued. The new scales of accommodation are designed to bring the Indian hospitals as nearly as possible up to the same standard as the hospitals for British troops. A scheme for the formation of an Indian Hospital Corps, which will be an essential feature of the Indian station hospital scheme in its complete form, is now under consideration in the India Office.

Following upon the report mentioned above on the hospitals for British troops, the Government of India appointed a travelling Committee to inspect some of the station hospitals, both British and Indian, and to prepare plans for extensive structural improvements. For the time being action is suspended on these plans, as other measures of importance to the health and welfare of troops are held to have the first claim on such funds as are at present available. But the subject will not be allowed to drop.

(d) *Mobilisation Equipment of General Hospitals should be stored, kept in readiness, and inspected.*—The Government of India report that the equipment of general hospitals despatched from India to expeditionary forces was replaced in India and maintained according to the authorised scale, a general reserve being kept to meet demands from overseas and to provide for the operations on the N.W. frontier. Twenty-one general hospitals were available on mobilisation for the frontier operations in May, and 15 of these were mobilised and opened in time to meet the requirements of troops as they were evacuated from the front. Since then improvements have been made in the scale of equipment with a view to providing a higher standard of comfort. Inspecting officers report that every requirement has been satisfied.

(e) *Re-introduction of Base Depôts of Medical Stores.*—A scheme having this object has been sanctioned. One base depôt of medical stores was mobilised at Lahore in connection with N.W. frontier operations. Two other base depôts have been adequately provided for the present operations, and more could be formed if necessary. Nine advanced depôts of medical stores are maintained in addition. A revised scale of equipment for these was sanctioned in 1918. Several of these improved and expanded advanced depôts were in use with the Force. These changes were of the utmost service during the campaign.

(f) *A separate superior sanitary organisation and staff to safeguard the health of fighting troops, responsible to Principal Medical Officer of the Force, but otherwise independent of organisation for care of sick and wounded.*—The Government of India report that the divisional headquarters of all forces include sanitary officers. They form the staff responsible to the Director or Assistant Director of Medical Services for safeguarding the health of troops. During the recent operations additional sanitary officers were appointed to the lines of communication and areas. There are included in the field army special sanitary sections which are independent of units and under the orders of the sanitary officers. There are also the sanitary squads of the fighting units. A sanitary Inspection Committee was appointed on the outbreak of the Afghan War, as laid down in Field Service Regulations.

The introduction of motor ambulance convoys and considerable expansion of the hospital train service have been amongst the more important achievements during the war.

(g) *The Field Service Ration should receive very careful consideration.*—In October 1916 a revised scale of rations had been introduced, and during the following 10 months certain additions were made to the revised scale. The rations issued in the summer of 1917 had the complete approval of the General Officer Commanding in Chief in Mesopotamia, Sir Stanley Maude, whose opinion was fully concurred in by his medical adviser. This approval was based not merely on reports from subordinate commanders, but on personal investigations.

Within a few days of the opening of the North-West Frontier campaign the full scale adopted in Mesopotamia was available.

The Commander-in-Chief in India has made a close personal study of the rations supplied to British troops in India. He is of opinion that while the quality, especially in regard to meat, is not up to the home standard, which it would be useless to look for in India, yet it compares favourably with the average standard procurable in India. In regard to quantity the peace ration of British troops in India is larger and more varied than the scale sanctioned at home. It may be added that at the request of the Government of India two expert officers are being selected and sent out by the War Office with a view to improving the methods of preparing the ration.

3. Medical arrangements for the Indian Army (as distinguished from British troops on the Indian Establishment) are in the hands of the Indian Medical Service. Representations were made to the Mesopotamian Commission and elsewhere before and during the war that grave discontent existed throughout the service as to the conditions and prospects. It will not be out of place to enumerate the steps taken to meet grievances and to improve conditions.

(1) The rates of staff pay in the field were improved. A scheme of accelerated and acting promotion was introduced on the lines of that in force for the R.A.M.C., and promotions were made in the place of officers who had to be retained beyond the normal limit. Two temporary Surgeons-General were appointed to meet the special needs of the war, and eight additional military administrative appointments were created for the period of the war, carrying the rank of Colonel.

(2) The adoption of the system of station hospitals for Indian troops is of considerable advantage from the professional point of view to officers of the Indian Medical Service, as it involves a more satisfactory employment of specialist officers and enables an individual officer by his attachment to a hospital, where patients from several, and in some cases many, units are concentrated, to do his work under more satisfactory conditions and provides him with facilities for studying subjects in which he is specially interested.

(3) An increased scale of pay has been approved for the whole service, both on its military and civil sides. The principle of the increase is 33⅓ per cent. on the old rates of military pay of grade. The rates of pay for home leave have also been improved.

(4) Reversion from military to civil employment was proceeding as rapidly as possible before it was interrupted by the Afghan War.

(5) Another subject of discontent has been the restriction on leave to the United Kingdom, whether for health, for study, or for ordinary purposes. This cannot be fully remedied while the need for medical officers on the military side continues as urgent as it is at present, or until the cadre of the service can be replenished. Steps are being taken in two directions :—

(1) Temporary officers already in the service are being retained and more temporary officers are being appointed. The supply of temporary officers has always been restricted by the requirements of the R.A.M.C. throughout the war and by the comparative smallness of the medical profession in India.

(2) The recruitment of permanent officers for the I.M.S. on a large scale was not possible during the war. But the Government of India have recently completed their estimate of their requirements, and steps have been taken to announce the conditions of appointment and arrange for selecting candidates. A special inducement is offered in the shape of a retiring gratuity of 1,200*l.* after eight years' service.

(6) The right of the administrative heads of the Service to direct official access to the Viceroy and to the heads of provincial governments has been conceded, and arrangements are being made to give effect to this.

(7) The whole field of medical administration in India, both civil and military, and including under the latter heading the medical arrangements for British troops in India, has been explored during last winter by a Committee appointed by the Government of India. This Committee has presented a report which makes recommendations of a far-reaching nature. The consideration of this report by the Government of

India was unavoidably delayed by their pre-occupation with the Afghan War, but the Government of India are now engaged in considering the matter.

4. Major General Sir R. Havelock Charles, G.C.V.O., Medical Adviser to the Secretary of State, will visit India this autumn and inform himself through the medical authorities there as to various matters which have formed the subject of correspondence between the India Office and the Government of India, more particularly as to matters, such as the recruitment for the I.M.S., the provision made for medical and sanitary training and research, the women's medical services, and the like, that specially fall within the executive sphere of the India Office. The whole subject of the army medical services in India will fall within the scope of the comprehensive inquiry which a strong Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Esher is making into the administration and organisation of the Army in India, including its relations with the War Office and the India Office, and the relations of the two Offices with one another.

(Signed) EDWIN S. MONTAGU.

India Office,
30th October 1919.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND COMFORTS FOR THE TROOPS ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

No. 1.

From the VICEROY, FOREIGN and POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, to the SECRETARY OF STATE for INDIA, dated 14th August 1919. (Received 15th August 1919.)

(Telegraphic).

With reference to your telegram of 7th August* regarding water supply at Ali Masjid, the allegation you mention is not in accordance with the facts. The water supply at Ali Masjid consists of one stream, the source of the Khyber river. It is the property of the Afridis, the Kuki Khel interests predominating, as their villages about Lala China are entirely dependent on it and their villages below Kadam largely dependent on it. In times of drought the Khyber Zakka Khel are also entirely dependent on it. The utilisation of this supply was strongly urged in 1916 and 1917 by the General Staff at Army Headquarters, India, for Landi Kotal as well as up and down the Khyber, which would include Ali Masjid Camp. Their recommendations after the fullest consideration were overruled on political grounds. The Kuki Khel would not for any payment give up their rights to the water on which their existence depended and any attempt at forcible acquisition would have brought the whole Afridi tribe in against us. There would have been grave chances of a conflagration spreading all along the Frontier and involving Afghanistan, and thus precipitating the war against which we were preparing. It was of vital importance to preserve peace on the Frontier and with Afghanistan during the war in Europe, and we accordingly decided that no work should be commenced on this water supply unless hostilities became unavoidable, but that all necessary stores should be collected. In 1918 the proposal was twice pressed by the military authorities, but the political objection still held good as the risk of hostilities with the tribes at a critical time was too great. It will be seen that the military authorities have been fully alive to the importance of improving the water supply in the Khyber, and have more than once pressed schemes on us. These we have been compelled to hold over for political reasons, the validity of which His Majesty's Government will doubtless recognise. Shortly, an Afghan war in 1917 or 1918 brought on by water arrangements, however perfect, would have been an infinitely greater evil than an Afghan war in 1919 without adequate water arrangements.

No. 2.

From the VICEROY, ARMY DEPARTMENT, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, dated 19th August 1919.
(Received 20th.)

(Telegraphic.)

In reply to your telegram of the 13th August,† we have received the following information from the General Officer Commanding, Kohat Kurram Force, regarding the further inquiries as to the conditions in Kohat Hospital.

Feeding of Officers.—Enamelled ware was used until glass was obtained from Rawal Pindi and crockery locally, and consequently service of food was unappetising. Service was carried on by ward orderlies. Owing to lack of accommodation in bungalow, patients had to be served at own bedside and not on properly appointed tables. This was remedied as evacuation made more room available. Statement that there were no feeding arrangements at Cholera Hospital is incorrect. Cook of the British Officers' Hospital was utilised from June 23rd, not June 20th, as cooks originally employed could not prepare appetising food for British convalescents.

Sheets.—From June 7th patients as they arrived were supplied with sheets from British General Hospital and from stock at Officers' Hospital; 132 sheets were supplied by British General Hospital, and, after June 12th, 72 good quality sheets were supplied by the Red Cross. The greatest number of patients was 22.

Furniture.—Bedsteads, mattresses, bedding, bedpans, towels, and chairs were sent as required from Officers' Hospital and supplemented from the British General Hospital.

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* Printed as No. 11 in Cmd. 310.
† Printed as No. 16 in Cmd. 310.

Basins.—There were two basins from Officers' Hospital until June 11th, and these were used for washing purposes for 14 patients. From the evening of June 11th until the bulk of patients were evacuated there were never less than eight basins, hospital equipment, for washing purposes. There were also sufficient glazed earthenware vessels and pots supplied from the Red Cross for use of patients. The equipment of the British Section No. 60 Combined Field Ambulance was in use from the 12th June to 3rd July and was then withdrawn to concentrate for operations fixed for 8th July. Prior to its withdrawal additional equipment was drawn and the amount required for the few patients due to remain on 4th July was available. It would help to trace incident of seizure of officer's basin if date could be given, but it is thought to be 4th July, when Captain Cameron, in charge of the hospital, lent his basin to convalescent officers who were awaiting removal. These officers were not patients, but convalescents. Major Halton, R.A.M.C., T.F., who was in charge of the British Section No. 60 Combined Field Ambulance and of the Cholera Hospital from 12th June to 1st July, is now at home and would, no doubt, be able to clear up many points if desired by the Secretary of State.

No. 3.

From the VICEROY, ARMY DEPARTMENT, to the SECRETARY of STATE for INDIA, dated 20th August 1919.

(Telegraphic.) (Received 21st August.)

In continuation of our telegram of the 7th August* we now send you details received from the General Officer Commanding, North-West Frontier Force, regarding cholera cases in the 6th Brigade at Ali Masjid. The total number of cases at Ali Masjid between 7th June and 30th June was 400 with 148 deaths. These were made up as follows:—

6th Brigade.—36 cases, 12 deaths, made up of 7 British with 2 deaths, and 29 Indian with 10 deaths.

Combatant Units attached 6th Brigade.—140 cases, 61 deaths, made up of 12 British with 6 deaths, and 128 Indian with 55 deaths.

Transport and Labour Units.—224 cases, 75 deaths, all Indian. The transport units were moving up and down the Khyber, but on the recommendation of the medical authorities such moves were stopped on 7th June. Cholera was first reported at Ali Masjid on 7th June, but the severe epidemic did not develop until 11th June. There were 99 cases at its height on 13th June. The epidemic was over on the 20th June. No. 13 Combined Field Ambulance was the only medical unit stationed at Ali Masjid prior to the outbreak. On the 11th, 12th, and 13th, 205 cholera cases were admitted. On the 11th June three sections of No. 8 Combined Casualty Clearing Station and the personnel of one section of No. 41 Combined Field Ambulance arrived at Ali Masjid from Landi Kotal. From this it will be seen that there was never any shortage of medical personnel, though the large number of cases on the 12th and 13th caused some overcrowding in hospital tents. By 2 p.m. on the 14th June a new cholera hospital in large double fly tents was ready, and patients were lying on charpoys and beds. They had every convenience and comfort, and the best treatment available outside a large General Hospital. On the 14th June, four additional sections of No. 8 Combined Casualty Clearing Station arrived at Ali Masjid, together with one section of No. 8 Combined Field Ambulance. It is to be noted that arrangements had already been made to deal with cholera epidemics at Jamrud, Kohat, Hangu, Doaba, and Thal. In addition to the medical units mentioned above a number of medical officers, assistant surgeons, and sub-assistant surgeons were sent with medical personnel from Peshawar to Ali Masjid as soon as it was known that their services were required. There was no shortage of saline solution for the treatment of cholera patients. Large quantities of saloids were sent and there was always plenty of salt for making saline solution. Some medical officers reported better results from the salt. The greater majority of units about Ali Masjid had been inoculated against cholera prior to the outbreak of that disease and the inoculation of the transport and labour personnel was in process of being carried out when the outbreak occurred. The inoculation of those not already protected was taken in hand, for which the necessary vaccine was available in medical mobilisation stores at Peshawar. Slight delay in certain cases was caused by indents being sent to wrong places. On the 13th and 14th June Ali Masjid was visited by the Deputy Director of Medical Services and Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services (Sanitary) who had just returned from the Thal and Kohat line. Every day one senior administrative medical officer at least took notes on the spot of any requirements, which were despatched at once from Peshawar or Landi Kotal. The figures for cholera cases at Ali Masjid given in this telegram differ from those given in our telegram of the 7th August.* The discrepancy is due to the fact that the former figures were taken from the daily telegrams from Ali Masjid at a time when it was difficult to distinguish between personnel belonging to transport units at Ali Masjid and those belonging to transport units passing along the Khyber.

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* Printed as No. 12 in Cmd. 310.

No. 4.

From the VICEROY to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, dated 20th August 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

I have had the allegations in connection with the North-West Frontier operations examined and send you the following observations :—

Medical Arrangements.—The standard of preparation for the Indian Frontier was that set by the Secretary of State in 1916, viz., passive defence of frontiers. Transport and medical arrangements have met that standard satisfactorily, and Commander-in-Chief does not admit that there has been anything of the nature of a breakdown. In his opinion those in charge have met a difficult situation with resource and promptitude, and have utilised to the best advantage the means available during all the vicissitudes and constant changes and tortuous dispositions of troops which are consequent on operations conducted over vast distances with sparse communications such as exist on frontier. There have, of course, been mistakes and minor discomforts which are unavoidable in any military operation of a mobile nature over a large area. Such as did occur, were rectified with utmost promptitude. To appreciate the situation it is necessary to remember that Army in India is maintaining in the field forces in Egypt and Mesopotamia, a contingency quite outside any pre-war preparations. During the war India's resources have been tapped, as you are aware, in every possible manner, and devoted without stint to meeting the needs of the Imperial troops overseas. The result of these conditions is :—

(*a*) Many of the best qualified generals and staff officers of the Indian Army are away with overseas forces.
(*b*) There is a deficiency in medical officers and subordinate staffs.
(*c*) There is also a deficiency in Royal Engineer and technical officers.
(*d*) Shortage and deterioration of railway rolling stock and personnel have militated against the development of the utmost efficiency in railway service.

Taking these results seriatim :—

(*a*) Needs no amplification.
(*b*) Has caused Commander-in-Chief infinite anxiety since he took up his duties. The needs of India have been represented to the authorities at home repeatedly [*vide* the request in May 1917 for 366 medical officers†]. We recognise that general Imperial situation precluded compliance with our demands, and we were compelled to draw personnel from medical sources locally available. Numbers thus obtained were 865 Indians, 116 Europeans, for whose instruction two schools existed during the war with Germany. When the armistice was concluded it was held that retaining these was not justifiable. It is not clear to us how this could have been rectified.

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* Printed as No. 12 in Cmd. 310.

† These were not required for immediate purposes, but the Government of India wished to know whether in the event of general mobilisation in India at any time they could rely on such a number being despatched so as to reach India within six weeks of the demand, this period representing the time to be reasonably expected for preparation. The War Office stated that with the resources then at their disposal they would not be able to meet such a demand, but would of course do their utmost to assist in doing so. The Government of India were accordingly informed.

Dealing with the theatres in turn :—

(*a*) As regards the Khyber you will have learned from my Foreign and Political Department telegram, dated 14th August 1919,* the reasons why the military were unable to improve the water supply. In absence of a permanent piped supply you will appreciate how difficult sanitary precautions for troops are against an outbreak of cholera due to followers drinking from irrigation streams.

(*b*) As regards Kohat the sudden attack on Sir A. Barrett's left flank at Thal threatened to cause an Orakzai rising which was only just stopped by immediate reinforcement of Kohat by two brigades. The emergency was so urgent that troops had to precede their full complement of hospitals. Had any delay occurred the grave situation consequent on an Orakzai rising would have produced much more suffering and hardship than actually occurred. As you know, Kohat has always sufficient hospital establishments to deal with its peace garrison.

(*c*) In Tochi and Derajat poor communications delay the arrival of amenities and personnel at frontier outposts such as Tank and Banu, which in peace time are equipped for their peace garrisons. Notwithstanding this difficulty no serious complaints have reached us from that theatre.

(*d*) In Baluchistan, Quetta is well equipped, and no difficulties have been reported.

Throughout the operations we have felt the need of more motor ambulance convoys, which should be maintained in peace if they are to be available at the outbreak of hostilities. On outbreak of hostilities we had three, one of which was immediately ready. On 24th May 1919 War Office was asked for one motor ambulance convoy and later for four in the event of an advance on Kabul. One and a half have been received from Mesopotamia, two more improvised in India. Expenditure on medical preparation has to be considered on its merits with other proposals and *pari passu* with capacity of our frontier roads to take motor transport. Until we can arrange for employment in peace of sufficient motor ambulances to meet our needs in war, and our frontier communications have attained requisite mechanical transport standard, wheeled ambulances must continue to make up the deficiency with unavoidable delay in evacuating sick. Great assistance has been rendered by British Royal Army Medical Corps other ranks now in India, thus emphasising the need for their permanent inclusion in establishment of the Army in India, whose fighting ranks would then be relieved of the strain of detailing hospital orderlies. With regard to (*c*) of paragraph 1, the shortage in Royal Engineer and technical officers involved delays in installation of ice and soda-water machines, water supply and electrical fittings, &c., and it should be remembered that installation of ice machines means buildings, carriage of machinery and plants not easily procurable. With regard to (*d*), paragraph 1, limitations of railways were well known to you, and of course retarded transport of machinery, pumps, and other stores. Concerning "Times" statement of total cases of sickness, though figures quoted may have been correct they are misleading read as a statement. The loss from sickness in forces both temporary and permanent was unusually low considering the climatic conditions to which troops were exposed. The daily shade temperatures during the months of May, June, and July were the highest recorded for many years and averaged some 5° to 7° Fahr. above the daily average of 20 years. At Peshawar, maximum temperatures were 114° on 31st May, 119·4° on 10th June, and on 5th July 119·6°. For period 5th May to 9th August the total admissions to hospital were 10,882 British and 45,700 Indian troops and followers, giving a daily admission rate per 1,000 of strength of 4·98 British and 2·97 Indians. The deaths from disease were 12 officers and 77 other ranks, British, total 89 ; and 9 officers and 1,260 other ranks and followers Indian troops, total of 1,269 Indians. Total deaths, British and Indian, 1,358. The deaths per 1,000 admissions to hospital (excluding wounded) were : British, 0·82, and Indian, 27·74. Ratios may be compared with similar ratios for other forces engaged in active operations during the same period of the year in India or the East on former occasions as follows:—

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* *See* No. 1.

—	Daily admission Rate per 1,000 of Strength.		Mortality per 1,000 of Admissions.	
	British.	Indian.	British.	Indian.
Indian Frontier :—				
5th May 1919 to 9th August 1919	4·98	2·97	0·82	27·74
Mesopotamia :—				
5th May 1917 to 9th August 1917	5·04	2·11	19·30	15·96
5th May 1918 to 9th August 1918	3·45	2·27	7·41	20·51
East Africa :—				
5th May 1918 to 9th August 1918	Nil	3·58	Nil	14·13
South Persia :—				
5th May 1918 to 9th August 1918	7·55	4·88	8·55	11·37
Waziristan :—				
1st June 1917 to 15th July 1917	8·68	3·77	7·11	16·66
Tirah Campaign :—				
October to April 1897–98	4·25	2·80	19·03	63·87

The relatively high rate of mortality among Indians is due to relatively high incidence of cholera, especially amongst Indian followers. If the cholera cases and deaths, Indian, are excluded, cases of mortality from all other causes is 14·9 per 1,000, a figure which is, with one exception, lower than that recorded for any of the operations included in above table. Another comparative estimate of the sick rate of the force may be obtained from daily numbers of hospital evacuations from front to base. The normal loss by evacuation on account of sickness from a force engaged in active operations in a temperate climate in Europe is accepted by all military authorities as averaging 3 per 1,000 of strength per day. This figure in the case of troops operating on frontier under the most adverse climatic conditions, as mentioned above, and including gun-shot wounds, was 2·8 for British and 1·3 for Indian troops and followers. As regards cholera it must be remembered that a severe and widespread epidemic far in excess of the mean per 10 years occurred among civil population of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province during period of the operations. The disease appeared amongst troops and followers at no less than 50 different and far distant posts or stations. The number of cases that occurred at any one post, and time taken at any one place to stamp out the disease, mainly depended on number of Indian followers present. The difficulties of bringing these totally undisciplined men—camel, mule, and other transport drivers—under control were almost unsurmountable. When their number was large and they were under conditions of intense heat and thirst practically no methods proved successful in restraining them from drinking polluted water and in their turn perhaps polluting water channels not previously contaminated. In this way the disease was propagated and kept alive among that class of follower, while regular units accustomed to disciplinary control escaped, but even in face of obstacles of this kind the comparatively short time taken in stamping out disease at every post where it occurred and complete immunity of certain corps in which sanitary discipline was good is an indication of the zeal and energy with which protective measures were enforced by all concerned. Moreover, the remarkably low rate of mortality of 30·5 per cent. (all cases of cholera) exemplified the efficiency of the treatment adopted. Again the deaths from heat stroke per thousand do not compare unfavourably with deaths from that cause during same period in 1918 in Mesopotamia when a heat wave of similar intensity prevailed in that country.

Deaths from heat stroke per thousand of strength.—Indian Frontier, 5th May 1919 to 5th August 1919: British, 1·16; Indians, 0·89. *Mesopotamia*, May to August 1918: British, 6·04; Indians, 0·30. The actual deaths from heat stroke were—British, 26; Indians, 140; total, 166. The battle casualties from May to 9th August, were as follows:—

—	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
British officers	19	46	65
British other ranks	32	153	185
British total	51	199	250
Indian officers	11	16	27
Indian other ranks	210	634	844
Indian total	221	650	871
Total British and Indian	272	849	1,121

Five officers and 13 other ranks, total 18, and 44 other ranks, Indian, died of wounds. Total British and Indian, 62. The only occasion on which a relatively high number of wounded, 322, had to be dealt with within a few days was as already reported in my telegram of 5th August,* between 15th May and 17th May in Khyber line. As intimated in previous communications,† all authorities on the spot, including General Sir Arthur Barrett, commanding the North-West Frontier Force, reported wounded were efficiently and expeditiously handled and that majority were in base hospitals at Peshawar or Rawalpindi within a few hours after being hit.

Concerning Transport.—There has been no shortage, much less a breakdown; but, on the contrary, expansion has been effected, particularly by means of Ford vans, which, as will be remembered, were ordered by us on 24th July 1918, and sanctioned by Secretary of State on 8th August 1918. It would appear that some three months' delay then occurred in placing the order,‡ and first consignment of 281 chassis did not reach India until 11th March 1919, namely, seven weeks before outbreak of hostilities.

As to Munitions.—If this means lethal munitions, no difficulty has occurred. If it refers to such stores as pumps, machinery, &c., any delays which have occurred are due to unavoidable congestion on the railway such as will happen even in peace time in any country.

Aircraft.—As Secretary of State is aware, the recent arrival of the squadrons Royal Air Force without machines§ has nothing to do with Indian arrangements, nor the Secretary of State. It is for Air Ministry to fix the responsibility. As regards the obsolete machines of the squadrons in India on the outbreak of war, General Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, cabled to the Air Ministry on 23rd January 1919, and 25th February 1919, for their replacement by "Bristol" fighters.

The statement that mess was made of opening stages of the campaign is best refuted by a comparison with the last Afghan war and Tirah campaign. In both these campaigns the Government of India took the initiative, made its plans and moved at its own time in cool weather, India being quiet. On this occasion Amanullah's aggression was an attack made in hot weather and to be supported by a rising in Peshawar. During the time of external peace internal India had recently been disturbed, railways and telegraphs interfered with and military forces dispersed in support of the civil power. In 1878 eight weeks elapsed between commencement of the precautionary movement and movement up the Khyber. In 1897 eight weeks elapsed between the first order to assemble and the advance into Tirah. In 1919 the first intelligence of Amanullah's intentions reached Simla on 3rd May. By 13th May Dakka had been occupied and Peshawar was quiet. By 17th May, namely, 14 days after first intelligence, the Afghan forces in Ningrahar plain dispersed in disorder after their defeat at Dakka. The promptitude of the advance through the Khyber and consequent threat to Jalalabad prevented the Afghan tribal combination. Delay meant loss of the Khyber, and consequent operations would have involved much more sickness and discomfort than any which may have arisen through transport not being immediately up with troops. As regards the "Triple censorship." It is true that articles were censored at front from military point of view by field censor there, and again from political point of view by political officer in Peshawar. Re-censorship in Simla was considered necessary, particularly from political point of view. It was several times found necessary to make excisions at Simla from matter passed by censorship at the front; notably term "Jihad" or "Holy war." It may be added that arrangement by which all publication matter was issued from Simla was accepted by the Associated Press of India as the most suitable arrangement possible, since it allowed the Association, which served practically all newspapers of importance in India, to regulate the distribution of news.

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* *See* Cmd. 310, No. 8.

† *See* Cmd. 310, Nos. 8 and 9.

‡ This was due to difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the United States Government to the placing of the order.

§ Arrangements were made with the War Office for the despatch of R.A.F. units from France to India, but they were unable to ship the *machines* for some time owing to the lack of vessels capable of carrying aeroplanes.

No. 5.

From the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to the VICEROY, ARMY DEPARTMENT. Despatched 11th September 1919.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 19th August.* Halton has been interviewed, but his evidence does not tend to disprove allegations regarding Kohat cholera hospital between 5th and 10th June. He states, cooking bad but improved later. Until 10th June no pyjamas or towels, and no soda water until about 19th June. Ice deficient until 14th June. Until his field ambulance unpacked its stores on 10th June only provision made for washing was two tin baths. Sick and convalescent were mixed up together and beds touching when hospital fullest.

No. 6.

From the VICEROY, ARMY DEPARTMENT, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, dated 25th September 1919.

(Received 28th September 1919.)

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 11th September.† General Officer Commanding Kohat Kurram Force reports as follows:—Cooking. Nothing to add to previous statement contained in telegram of 19th August.* Pyjamas not issued to patients in active stage of disease, hence not required until 12th June. Towels; as already explained in the telegram quoted above, towels were sent as needed. Soda water was not issued, as medical authorities considered only source of supply unsafe. No Government factory at Kohat and the local private factory proscribed for every one till removed to a controllable site. Issues from a Government machine sent to Kohat commenced 9th July. Ice. No deficiency except on one day as stated in my telegram dated 6th August.‡ The officer in charge of officers' hospital next to cholera hospital through whom ice for both hospitals was supplied does not remember having been asked by Major Halton or anyone else for more ice and not being able to supply. Washing arrangements. Further inquiry has elicited nothing further than that reported in our telegram of 19th August.* Mixing up of sick and convalescent and beds touching. We cannot confirm statement that sick and convalescent were mixed up together. It will be further investigated by Committee mentioned in this telegram. True that beds touched each other to the extent that in one room later on in the epidemic all the worst cases were kept together for convenience of treatment. Six beds were placed in this room and they were arranged head to head in three rows. They were close together in order to keep them all under the punkhas, the heads of beds touching, but no other part, as it was necessary to keep them separated to get between beds for treating the cases. This was only the case for possibly three days. Under orders of His Excellency's Commander-in-Chief in India, the Travelling Liaison Committee, consisting of General Ridgeway, Colonel Heard, and Lieut.-Colonel Frank Johnson, now in Waziristan, have been directed to assemble Bannu on 25th September and make full investigations into the alleged occurrence at

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* No. 2.   † No. 5.   ‡ No. 10 of Cmd. 310.

Kohat Cholera Hospital from date of opening to date of closing. Their report will be submitted on receipt.

No. 7.

From the VICEROY, ARMY DEPARTMENT, dated 26th September 1919.
(Received 1st October 1919.)

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to letter in "Times" of 1st August, signed ex M. W. S., stating breakdown of transport was due to collapse of Frontier road and to allegation made in "New Statesman," dated 16th August, that new macadam roads were unfit to carry weight of military traffic. There has been no breakdown of transport due to condition of roads. Khyber, Kurram, and Tochi roads have been used continuously since commencement of operations by heavy motor and other traffic, but, so far from deteriorating, their condition is very good and will compare favourably with any hill roads elsewhere; secondly, there is absolutely no foundation for statement in "Truth," dated 9th August, that all or any Government offices in Rawal Pindi were stripped of electric fans to equip hospitals. We would suggest these statements be authoritatively denied.

No. 8.

From the VICEROY, ARMY DEPARTMENT, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, dated 4th October 1919.

(Received 5th October 1919.)

(Telegraphic.)

We have observed two letters by Sir Henry Burdett which appeared in the "Times" on 12th and 26th August respectively. Sir Henry Burdett points out in the first letter that Indian gentlemen holding temporary commissions in the Indian Medical Service were, in the majority of cases, unqualified to practise in England. With few exceptions officers granted temporary commissions in the Indian Medical Service during the recent war were graduates of Indian universities, and as such are qualified for registration as medical practitioners in the United Kingdom. In his letter dated 26th August Sir Henry Burdett complains that many British medical officers with temporary commissions were retained in India owing to emergency on the frontier. We would remark that the release of temporary officers has always been dependent on military situation. The further retention of British medical officers with temporary commissions was unavoidable when hostilities with Afghanistan broke out in order to provide sufficient medical officers to meet any possible eventualities without having recourse to the employment of Indians without registerable qualifications. Sir Henry Burdett is therefore illogical in arguing that Indians holding temporary commissions in the Indian Medical Service with the medical qualifications granted by the Indian universities and licensing bodies, should not have been employed in military medical service, while at the same time protesting against the retention of temporary officers holding British medical qualifications. The interests of officers whose transfer to the United Kingdom was temporarily suspended, were carefully considered, and every endeavour was made to release those officers whose claims on compassionate grounds and length of service abroad entitled them to special consideration directly the military situation allowed. The Royal Army Medical Corps officers *ex* Mesopotamia, detained in India, were special reserve, 29; territorial force, 8; and temporarily commissioned, 70. Of these, five were granted regular commissions, and five were sent to the United Kingdom, six more before the end of July and 11 more during August—thus on 1st September, 80 remained for disposal, of whom 31 were transferred to the United Kingdom during that month, leaving 49 remaining in India on 1st October. Of these, 38 were ordered home early in October and two have applied for regular commissions and one has extended his service for one year on revised rate of pay, leaving only eight to be disposed of, for whom embarkation orders are about to be issued. The order of despatch has been determined by marks given on various grounds, special consideration being paid to claims of a compassionate nature coupled with age, length of service and time spent abroad. The case of special hardship mentioned in Sir Henry Burdett's letter cannot be identified. The pay of temporary commissioned officers was fixed by the War Office and amounted to 24*s.* a day, plus ration allowance and Army of Occupation bonus. As the result of strong representations made by us regarding the loss incurred by officers on sterling rates of pay, owing to the rise in value of the rupee, and the desirability of substituting a remuneration of a fixed monthly salary in rupees, the issue of pay at the rate of rupees 750 per month inclusive was sanctioned from 1st July,[*] and of rupees 800 per month to officers who were willing to re-engage for one year from 1st July. Revised rates of pay for territorial force and special reserve are under consideration by the War Office. The statement therefore contained in letter, in so far as it refers to us, is incorrect. A War Brigade on the Indian Establishment is composed of one British and three Indian Battalions and for that reason the Field Ambulances allotted to divisions are composed of British and Indian sections instead of being purely British or Indian formations. The unit is commanded by an officer of the Royal Army Medical Corps or Indian Medical Service with an officer in charge of each section. Two Assistant Surgeons or two Sub-Assistant Surgeons of the Indian Medical Department are allotted to each British and Indian sections respectively. In addition four British Nursing Orderlies or four Indian Ward Orderlies work in each section of Field Ambulance. The description of Dakka, as quoted by Sir Henry Burdett, is a fair representation of the conditions which prevailed there. The climatic disadvantages and absence of comfort incidental to the unavoidable military situation were, of course, common to all troops of the force, but every endeavour was made, and in many ways with marked success, to mitigate the exceedingly trying life which dust, heat, and lack of shade and other concomitants of active service during the hot weather months, imposed on both British and Indian soldiers on the North-West Frontier. For instance, in addition to their field service rations, the troops were provided with ice, soda water, fresh milk, fruit, and vegetables.

No. 9.

From the VICEROY, ARMY DEPARTMENT, to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, dated the 11th October 1919.

(Received 15th October.)

(Telegraphic.)

Extracts from the letter to the "Times" of 5th September 1919, which are referred to in the telegram from the Government of India.

The defective water supply was a fact at four important stations or outposts, including the base at Kohat. The records of the Staff Office there could show that this has often been represented in former years, and that the risk of a mobilization there was foreshadowed, but that the necessary improvements were ruled out by a highly-placed Political Officer at Peshawar. At Chaman, in Baluchistan, under a local government with different ideas, a piped water supply for large formations has been available for many years to meet the needs of a general mobilization. In Kohat, however, units were detrained on to the so-called mobilization camp. Only two tanks, with a total of four small taps, existed. These were insufficient for the many units

Please refer to letter published in the Times of 5th September under heading "The North-West Frontier." References are to paragraphs of letter.[*]

Para. 3.—The situation regarding the water supply to troops has already been reported to you, *vide* telegram of 5th August.[†] The expansion of the water supply at Kohat involved the question of water rights with the tribes, and on political grounds its consideration was postponed till the termination of the war. It was sufficient for the garrison which was considered necessary to meet the probable military operations. The incursion of Nadir Khan compelled an increase to the force in the Kuram with a view of not only dealing with Nadir Khan but to steady the tribes. Even so there was no shortage of drinking water, though during the earlier stages piped supply was not laid on to the camps. This therefore was undertaken when additional

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[*] This new rate was not applicable to officers whose contract was up and who insisted on their claim to be sent home at once, even though services might have been rendered by such officers for short periods after 1st July.

[†] Printed as No. 8 of Cmd. 310.

herded there together. The place was surrounded, however, by small irrigation channels (which are practically open drains), and from these the troops, as well as the followers, had to drink, or else die of thirst. This foul spot is where, late in May, the Kohat cholera epidemic started.	troops were despatched to the area, and the yield amounted to 60,000 gallons daily. The incidence of cholera fell chiefly on ill-disciplined transport followers. It is untrue that either troops or followers had to resort to irrigation channels owing to lack of drinking water.
At the same time, and on into June, there was a shortage of rations all along the Frontier, and especially of British rations. Possibly the pre-war, obsolete scale of Indian rations was attained, but nothing approaching modern ideas on the subject. Even in the hospitals officer patients depended largely on their messes for sufficient food, whilst "Tommies" sent native menials of the hospital staffs to purchase food for them in the bazaars. There were then—*i.e.*, in May–June—no field force canteens either. In future, of course, a reserve of British and Indian rations should be maintained at the five bases from which war against Afghans and the tribal hinterland can alone be waged—*i.e.*, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Quetta. An interesting reason for some of the deficiencies in British rations is to be found in the rationing of the Simla "war-zone." During the Punjab disturbances in April, Army Headquarters ordered up a prodigious quantity of the best kinds of British rations (at the expense of the military stations in the plains), with which to feed Simla in case of supplies being cut off. Having got the rations up, some one suggested that it would be better for them to be used by the officers and clerks at A.H.Q. than to have the trouble of returning them. This was sanctioned, and A.H.Q. were getting free rations weeks before these were sanctioned for officers at the front. Even when a free issue for officers was sanctioned in June, there were none for officers to draw for some time. Incidentally, A.H.Q. about this time obtained sanction for a daily allowance for all officers at Simla of Rs. 2 to meet the increased cost of living!	Para. 4.—For months prior to outbreak of hostilities, there were 30 days' reserve of rations on Indian Field Service scale stocked for both British and Indian troops at Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Quetta, and also at such forward points as Thal, Parachinar, Miranshah, and Landi Kotal. An increased scale of rations was determined on the first day of mobilisation, and issues were despatched at once from reserve stocks held in India. Report was received by us to the effect that food given patients in hospital was insufficient. No restrictions were placed upon Medical Officers regarding diets. As to Field Force canteens, we were unable to procure help from the organisation existing in Mesopotamia, and we therefore arranged with a Calcutta firm to provide stores for messes and refreshments at all suitable military localities. The allegation that the best kinds of British rations were sent to Simla is entirely without foundation. It is equally false that Army Headquarters were ever granted free rations or that a daily allowance was given to meet increased cost of living.
There was no popular demand for demobilisation. Most of the Indians wanted to serve on so as to get good pay and free rations, thus escaping the rise in prices. For example, a battalion of 1,470 was ordered to reduce to 850. Only 90 men desired to go. About 90 more were discharged as suitable, whilst over 400 were sent away against their own wishes. The real reason for the hasty and "panicky" demobilisation was the desire for immediate economy.	Para. 5.—It is quite correct that the process of demobilisation was being actively proceeded with prior to Afghan aggression. It is equally correct that it was influenced by a desire for economy.

Cholera hospitals (for British) and a cholera camp (for Indians) were certainly not "working satisfactorily on 12th June" in Kohat, nor for weeks later, if ever they have been. The statements in your leading article of 29th July ("A Minor Mesopotamia") did less than cover the facts so far as Kohat was concerned. Some of the facts could not very well be printed.	Para. 8.—It was definitely reported to Army Headquarters by the General Officer Commanding, Kohat-Kurram Force, that the cholera hospitals working satisfactorily 12th June, but this statement was slightly modified by a later telegram to the effect that cooking in British General Hospital was not up to that of other British hospitals. In this connection please see our telegram of 12th August.* The reasons for any delay in completing the arrangements were mentioned in our telegram of 5th August.†
The real facts about Kohat during May are as follows:—The brigade was commanded by an officer of tried experience and proved reliability, and who, moreover, then, as always, spoke his mind. The files in the staff office could prove the nature of his criticisms of the administrative muddles to which he was subjected from above, and his suggested remedies. He was given command of the division, but this put him more directly into touch with Simla. To them, apparently, Kohat was by this time becoming a nuisance. A pretext was found, and by the middle of June he was on the pension list. He knows nothing of this letter in any sense whatever. Nor have I any interest in his career. Probably no more will be heard of him, he not being of that type, but no inquiry into the local conditions of Kohat at that time can be complete without the evidence of his letters and telegrams to his superiors.	Para. 9.—The Kohat-Kurram Force formed part of the command controlled by General Barrett, and did not, as is alleged, come directly into touch with Simla.

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† Printed as No. 9 of Cmd. 310.

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EAST INDIA (MEDICAL SERVICES COMMITTEE)

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF THE RE-ORGANIZATION

OF THE

MEDICAL SERVICES IN INDIA

(President: Sir Verney Lovett, K.C.S.I., I.C.S.)

April 1919

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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MEDICAL SERVICES COMMITTEE.

No. 51-1.

Simla, the 22nd April 1919.

FROM

THE PRESIDENT,
MEDICAL SERVICES COMMITTEE

TO

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
ARMY DEPARTMENT.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Medical Services Committee.

2. The orders of the Government of India appointing the Committee, as well as the terms of reference, are contained in your letter No. 16239-1 (A. D.), dated the 15th January, 1919, to the address of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, the first four paragraphs of which run as follows:—

"I am directed to say that the Government of India have decided to appoint a committee, composed as under, to examine and report on the question of the re-organization of the medical services in India, both civil and military:—

PRESIDENT.

The Hon'ble Sir Verney Lovett, K.C.S.I., I.C.S.

MEMBERS.

Major-General G. Cree, C.B., C.M.G., A.M.S.
Major-General P. Hehir, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., M.B., I.M.S.
Major-General H. Hendley, M.D., K.H.S., I.M.S.
The Hon'ble Major-General G. G. Giffard, C.S.I., I.M.S.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Shairp, C.M.G.
Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. A. Rind.
An officer of the Home Department to be nominated later.

SECRETARY.

Major A. A. McNeight, M.B., I.M.S.

"2. The committee, which will meet in Delhi in January, 1919, should examine the question from the standpoint that it is desirable that there should be a unified medical service for India. The committee is not a travelling committee, but if they or any of their sub-committees consider it desirable to visit other places in the course of their enquiries, they are authorised to do so.

"3. The committee is empowered to summon to Delhi officers whose oral evidence is considered necessary or to consult by means of correspondence any officer whose views might be valuable.

"4. The Government of India desire that the committee, in carrying out their duty, should first formulate a general scheme for the future organization of the medical services in India. This portion of the work is urgent and the views of the committee should be submitted to this Department as early as possible, in order that the opinions of Local Governments and Administrations may be obtained. As soon as this report has been submitted, the committee should proceed with the examination of the position of military and civil assistant and sub-assistant surgeons and provincial subordinate medical services under the scheme, and also the future organization of the Medical Store Department. In dealing with these points sub-committees may be formed, co-opting, if necessary, other officers to serve thereon. In this connection it is desirable that the views of Indian medical men should be obtained and for this purpose, therefore, one Indian officer of the Indian Medical Service and one Indian private practitioner will be co-opted. I am to ask that the names of suitable Indians may be intimated to this Department as soon as possible."

3. The officer nominated by the Home Department to serve as a member of the committee was Mr. S. R. Hignell, C.I.E., I.C.S.

Owing to my duties in connection with the Imperial Legislative Council, I was unfortunately prevented from presiding over all the meetings of the Committee and was compelled to return to Delhi from Calcutta when the remainder of the Committee proceeded to Madras. I rejoined my colleagues at Bombay. During my absence Mr. Hignell officiated as President.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rind was unable, owing to his duties at Army Headquarters, to accompany us on tour, or to serve with the committee after our return to Simla. Major M. T. Cramer-Roberts, D.S.O., of the Adjutant-General's Branch at Army Headquarters, took his place on the Committee.

Three Indian gentlemen, instead of two, were co-opted as members of the Committee. These were the Hon'ble Colonel H. E. Banatvala, C.S.I., I.M.S., Inspector-General of Civil Hospitals, Assam, Lieutenant-Colonel Bhola Nath, C.I.E., I.M.S., and Sir Temulji B. Nariman, Kt., of Bombay. Lieutenant-Colonel Bhola Nath and Sir Temulji Nariman served with the committee during our sittings at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. Colonel Banatvala was not relieved of his civil duties in time to join us before we reached Bombay. He sat with us there, and continued to serve on the Committee after our arrival at Simla. He has taken part in all our consultations here and authorises us to say that he concurs in all our recommendations.

The only other officer whom we co-opted was Lieutenant-Colonel H. Ross, O.B.E., I.M.S., Assistant Director-General, Indian Medical Service (Stores). He assisted our colleague, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Shairp, C.M.G., in examining the question of the future organization of the Medical Store Department.

4 The Committee assembled at Delhi on the 22nd January, and examined the first witness there on the 11th February. The time allowed for our enquiries was, as we speedily discovered, very short, as they obviously must embrace a variety of thorny and delicate questions. We considered that we would be most likely to elicit full facts and real opinions if we sat *in camera.* We, therefore, held our sittings in private throughout—they numbered 46 in all.

On the 23rd February we proceeded on tour, visiting successively Lucknow, Patna, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and examining witnesses at each of these places. On the conclusion of our inquiries at Bombay we proceeded to Simla to prepare our report. While at Delhi, and on tour, we examined in all 102 witnesses, consisting of 43 officers of the Indian Medical Service (including 3 Indians) 4 officers of the Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps, 7 members of the Indian Medical Department, 21 independent private practitioners (of whom 6 were Europeans and 15 Indians), 9 civil assistant surgeons, 5 civil sub-assistant surgeons, 2 medical missionaries, 6 non-official Indian gentlemen not connected with the medical profession, and 5 other witnesses including the Adjutant-General in India and a representative of the Government of Bombay. Among the 43 Indian Medical Service officers were 2 Surgeons-General with Local Governments, 5 Inspectors-

General of Civil Hospitals and 3 Medical Storekeepers to Government. The views of 5 Local Governments were presented to us by officers of the Indian Medical Service, who appeared as witnesses. The Government of Burma sent us a written statement of their views. We received other written statements from public bodies and individuals. At the end of our examinations of witnesses our co-opted colleagues favoured us with their views which are submitted with the records of these examinations.

5. The sub-committee formed to consider the future organization of the Medical Store Department visited the Government Medical Store Depôts at Lahore, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The main committee visited the depôts at the three last-named places, and examined the Medical Storekeepers on the spot.

6. We have carefully considered the views of the non-official Indian members of the Imperial Legislative Council, as expressed in the debate of the 8th March, 1918. We invited the mover of the resolution on that occasion to favour us with any further expression of his views. He informs us that they remain unchanged.

7. Whenever asked if statements or evidence were to be treated as confidential, we have always replied that the decision of that question rested with the Government of India, but that, so far as we were concerned, the report and its appendices would be confidential.

8. We submit separate volumes containing the evidence recorded and the more important papers which have been placed before us.

9. We have to express our great obligation to all who have assisted us, to the witnesses, to the Governments of the various provinces, and to the Heads of Departments at Delhi.

10. We have framed a scheme for a unified medical service; but, as we have stated in the report, we fully realise that this scheme cannot be carried out unless it commends itself to the War Office. We trust that it will be acceptable, as it is, in our opinion, the only scheme of a unified service which is practicable; and if a unified service be not introduced, many present difficulties will continue. We should state that it was impossible to separate our work into two parts, and to submit two reports as was contemplated by the orders of the Government of India. The formulation of our scheme demanded as careful an examination of details as we could accomplish within the time, and has occupied us continuously up to the very day of submitting this report.

11. We endeavoured to estimate the financial effects of our proposals, but found time and data alike insufficient for the purpose. Moreover, we understand from paragraph 3 (iv) of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 11th October, 1918, to the Government of India, that what is required of us is to produce a scheme the details of which can be worked out in England.

12. In conclusion we wish to bring to your favourable notice the valuable and untiring labours of our Secretary, Major A. A. McNeight, I.M.S., to whom we are greatly indebted.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. V. LOVETT,

President, Medical Services Committee.

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REPORT.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Purpose of appointment of this Committee.

1. We have been directed to examine and report on the question of the re-organization of the medical services in India, both civil and military. We are to do this from the standpoint that it is desirable that there should be, if possible, a unified medical service for India. We are first to formulate a general scheme for the future re-organization of the medical services. We are then to examine the position, under our scheme, of military and civil assistant and sub-assistant surgeons, and of provincial subordinate medical services, as well as the future organization of the medical stores department. In dealing with these points we were invited to form sub-committees, co-opting, if necessary, other officers to serve thereon, and further co-opting one Indian officer of the Indian Medical Service and one Indian private practitioner.

Medical services in India—the Royal Army Medical Corps.

2. The medical services in India are, first, the Royal Army Medical Corps, which is headed and directed by majors-general and colonels of the Army Medical Service, and, secondly, the Indian Medical Service. The Royal Army Medical Corps is exclusively military and solely concerned with the care of British troops. It forms part of a powerful and highly efficient corps which is entrusted with the medical and sanitary care of the British Army in all parts of the world. Its strength in India is determined by the War Office, which nominates the officers detailed for duty in this country. The normal tour of service in India for a Royal Army Medical Corps officer is five years; but this period may be extended to seven years. The sanctioned establishment of Royal Army Medical Corps officers in India is 320. Of these, 15 hold staff appointments and the rest perform executive duties. The arrangement provides 4 Royal Army Medical Corps officers per mille of a pre-war garrison of 75,000 British troops. This strength includes a leave reserve and allows for casualties, but it does not provide any war reserve whatever in this country. A short history of the Royal Army Medical Corps is given in our annexure I.

The Indian Medical Service.

3. The Indian Medical Service is primarily military,* but its considerable war reserve has hitherto been employed on civil duties. Four hundred and twenty-two civil medical appointments may be held by Indian Medical Service officers, but of these 133 are not absorbed by the ordinary war reserve, and some may be held by medical men who do not belong to the Indian Medical Service.

The civil duties performed by Indian Medical service officers have been described in paragraph 3 of annexure XII of the report of the Public Services Commission (page 246) in the following terms:—

"(*i*) attendance on the police and on all Government servants entitled to free medical attendance;

"(*ii*) the administration and inspection of all Government hospitals and dispensaries;

"(*iii*) the charge of the headquarters hospital of each district and the performance there of the more important surgical operations;

"(*iv*) the medico-legal work connected with the administration of justice;

"(*v*) the examination of recruits for the army, police and State employment generally; and

"(*vi*) the issue of health certificates to all Government servants."

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* "The question whether the Medical Service is primarily military or civil is one which has repeatedly been brought forward during the century and a half of its existence. On two occasions in the eighteenth century, in 1766 and again in 1796, it was divided into two separate services, military and civil. On both occasions separation was found impracticable and the two services were speedily again united. With these two exceptions, the question has always been decided in one way, and has been finally so settled. This decision is, that officers of the Indian Medical Service are all primarily military officers, that those in civil employ are only temporarily lent for civil duty, in which they form a reserve for the army, and that they are all liable to recall to military duty at any time." Crawford, *History of the Indian Medical Service*, vol. I, page 249.

The Commission go on to state that there are also other duties of a quasi-medical character, particularly in connection with jails and the public health, which, as a matter of economy and convenience, are entrusted to medical officers in addition to their public duties. To perform all these duties a regular service of officers is maintained in each province. At the head of these organizations is the surgeon-general in Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, and the inspector-general of civil hospitals in other provinces. Below them, at the headquarters of each civil district, is a medical officer, known in Madras as the District Medical and Sanitary Officer, and in other provinces as the Civil Surgeon. The civil surgeon has under his orders a provincially recruited staff of assistant and sub-assistant surgeons.

The Commissioners say, and say truly, that, "in the present conditions of India, if there were no State service there would be large tracts of country which would be left without any regular provision of medical relief. We are also convinced that State control is necessary in order to secure the continued and extended diffusion in India of western medical knowledge." These remarks this Committee entirely endorses for reasons which we shall state further on. The Indian Medical Service has not only performed its military functions, administered jails, asylums, and dispensaries, and initiated measures relating to sanitation and public health—it has conducted the medical education of the country. That education is, as we shall show later, in a decidedly incomplete state.

All officers of the Indian Medical Service at first serve with troops. After two years' service they may apply for civil employment in particular provinces, but of late transfers have not generally taken place until after the completion of 6 or 8 years' service. Before the war about 62 per cent. of Indian Medical Service officers were ordinarily in civil employment, and each of these could be reverted to military duty at his own request. The total strength of the service at the same period averaged from 750 to 775, including leave reserves. In March, 1914, the number of officers on military duty was 265, of whom 19 were employed in staff and administrative appointments. The remaining 246 were employed on executive duties in connection with Indian troops and followers, giving a ratio of 1·28 per mille. The total strength of Indian Medical Service officers in civil employment at the beginning of August, 1914, was approximately 470. Of these 331, distributed among 7 calls, were looked upon as available for military duty in the event of general mobilization. In fact, about 350 officers were reverted from civil to military duty before the end of the war. Even these, however, did not suffice for military needs, and it was found necessary to utilize the services of private practitioners and civil assistant surgeons. At present the Indian Medical Service includes about 800 Indian temporary officers.

Military subordination of both services to the Director, Medical Services in India.

4. Both the Royal Army Medical Corps in India and the Indian Medical Service are, so far as military work is concerned, under the Director, Medical Services in India. He is a staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief and is charged with the distribution of the entire medical forces at the disposal of His Excellency. He is not, however, responsible for the recruitment, promotion or retirement of officers of either service, except, to the extent stated below, for the promotion of Indian Medical Service officers. These responsibilities pertain, in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps, to the Director-General, Army Medical Service, at the War Office, and in the case of officers of the Indian Medical Service to the Director-General of that service, who is ordinarily a member of the Imperial Legislative Council, and works with the Government of India in regard to civil matters through the Home Department. In promoting his officers he has to obtain the concurrence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, whose adviser in such matters is the Director, Medical Services. The latter has hitherto been an officer of the Army Medical Service and, although the appointment may be held by an Indian Medical Service officer, it has in fact never been so held, except for short periods in an officiating vacancy.

The fact that the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, cannot promote even officers in civil employment without obtaining the concurrence of the highest military authorities is explained by the circumstances that at any time such officers may be needed for active service with troops, and that, even in peace time, some are reverted to military duty after years of civil employment and given military administrative appointments after short periods of preliminary training.

Comparative advantages of the two services.

5. It follows then that, although an officer of the Indian Medical Service has often been for years together in civil employment, he has in fact always been largely subordinate to a military chief and has been liable to recall to military duty. An officer of the Royal Army Medical Corps, on the other hand, has served always in India as a military officer pure and simple. In peace time the Indian Medical Service officer has had more varied chances and more opportunity of adding to his income by private practice. But in time of war, and especially during the past four and a half years, Indian Medical Service officers who have served for years in civil employ have been at some disadvantage in comparison with officers of a purely military medical service. It is not unnatural that a measure of friction has resulted. This friction existed before the war; but in endeavouring to frame some plan for removing it, we have found ourselves confronted by larger issues; and, in order that these may be thoroughly grasped and that the ground may be cleared for the consideration of constructive proposals, we will endeavour to trace briefly the history of our subject for the past thirty years.

History of the Royal Army Medical Corps in India and of the Indian Medical Service from the year 1879. The proposals of that year.

6. After receipt of the report of the Indian Army Commission of 1879 the Surgeon-General, Her Majesty's Forces in India, and the Surgeon-General with the Government of India (who then corresponded to the present Director, Medical Services in India, and Director-General, Indian Medical, Service) were directed to draw up a scheme for the unification of the Army Medical Department and the Indian Medical Service into a single service under the Government of India. They fulfilled their mission and submitted proposals, which were not, however, approved by the War Office. That authority propounded an alternative scheme recommending that the whole charge of the army in India, British and Indian, should be handed over to the Army Medical Department, and that in future the Indian Medical Service should confine its energies to civil work. This scheme was promptly rejected by the Government of India, and nothing was done.

The proposals of 1897-1902.

7. In the year 1897, the Army Medical Department, which had become the Army Medical Staff, was unpopular and unable to attract sufficient recruits. The Indian Medical Service however was, and had been for years, in a highly flourishing condition. The Secretary of State for War (Lord Lansdowne) addressed the Secretary of State for India to the following effect:

"The time has come to consider whether this difficulty cannot be successfully overcome by the severance of that portion of the Army Medical Staff which is necessarily and permanently required for Indian Service, from that which is sufficient for the Imperial Service at home and in the Colonies, and by a corresponding increase of the Indian Medical Service."

Discussion took place, and eventually, in 1901 the Secretary of State for India addressed the Government of India proposing:—

(a) that the establishment of officers of the Army Medical Staff, which had become the Royal Army Medical Corps, serving in India should be increased by 40; and,

(b) that the rates of pay of officers below the rank of major while serving in India should be increased so as to bear to the proposed British rates the same ratio that then existed between the British and Indian scales.

To this the Government of India replied on the 13th of February, 1902.

They pointed out that the existing strength of Royal Army Medical Corps officers in India (322) was sufficient for peace requirements. The proposed addition must therefore be regarded as an addition to the war reserve. It was unnecessary for India to maintain a larger reserve of Royal Army Medical Corps officers for war; whatever additional number of officers might be necessary for war should belong to the Indian Medical Service, which could employ its officers usefully in either war or peace service in this country. An available surplus in the Royal Army Medical Corps could not be utilised on peace service, and could not be employed to relieve a strain on the Indian Medical Service.

The Government considered that the existing system of maintaining the two services side by side promoted friction. They considered the arrangement an anachronism, only justifiable in the days when the army of the East India Company was entirely separate from that of the Crown. The real desideratum was a single medical service for the whole army in India—British and Indian. To obtain this, either the military side of the Indian Medical Service must be divorced from the civil side and united to the Royal Army Medical Corps, which would then supply medical officers for the whole army in India; or charge of British troops in India must be taken away from the Royal Army Medical Corps, and all the medical work, whether military or civil, must be undertaken by the Indian Medical Service.

The first alternative Lord Curzon's Government rejected on the following grounds:—

(a) separation of the military from the civil side of the Indian Medical Service would result in the deterioration of both;

(b) the war reserve, then economically provided by the liability of recall to military service of medical officers in civil employ, would disappear;

(c) it was impossible for the Royal Army Medical Corps to take over charge of the Indian Army, as that service was unpopular and could hardly be kept at its then existing strength.

The second alternative Lord Curzon's Government advocated. They put forward the following arguments:—

(a) it would not, in their opinion, be injurious to the officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps to close to them the field of Indian service;

(b) the exclusion of the Royal Army Medical Corps from India would not tend to any narrowing of the professional attainments of officers of the Indian Medical Service. (No difficulty was then found in maintaining the high standard of qualifications possessed by officers entering that service);

(c) they thought that a reduction in the proportion of civil appointments to the total strength of the Indian Medical Service would not seriously impair the attractions of that service;

(d) only nine Indians had received commissions in the Indian Medical Service during the preceding two years, and it was therefore obvious that it would be easy to arrange that this small proportion should always be employed with Indian troops, or in the civil department, so as to keep a legitimate career open to the best Indian talent;

(e) efficiency would be promoted; friction would disappear; power would be economized; the machine would work more smoothly; the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, would administer the whole service.

It was proposed to call for volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps for permanent service, and (among senior officers) for temporary service, in India.

The Government of India submitted a detailed scheme in accordance with their proposals, but the Commander-in-Chief, while signing the despatch, added a note which entirely dissented from its main proposition. He was strongly against the abolition of the Royal Army Medical Corps, so far as India was concerned. He also considered that "it would be most unwise to divorce the civil from the military side of the Indian Medical Service." He gave clear and substantial reasons for his views.

The proposals of the Government of India for a unified medical service were not accepted by the Secretary of State.

Lord Morley's proposals and discussion thereon.

8. The years 1903-8 were marked by a very rapid development of educated Indian ambitions, and the then Secretary of State, Lord Morley, consulted the Government of India on the possibility of fostering the growth of an inde-

pendent medical profession in India by transferring to independent practitioners some of the posts then held by officers of the Indian Medical Service. The Government of India replied that, as about one-third of the Indian Medical Service officers in civil employ did not form part of the real war reserve, there would be no military objection to the transfer to independent practitioners of the civil appointments held by them. They stated, however, that any transfer of this kind should be gradual, tentative, and mainly from the bottom; that it should be made only as really qualified candidates became available; that nothing should be done to lower the efficiency of the medical schools and their hospitals; that a sufficient number of civil appointments should be reserved in order to provide for the economical employment of the war reserve of the Indian Medical Service, and that, in determining what these appointments should be, the necessity of maintaining the attractiveness of the Indian Medical Service should be borne in mind. Lord Morley agreed and asked to be informed of the measures which the Government of India would suggest in order to carry out their proposals. At the same time he ruled that no further increase of the Indian Medical Service could be allowed, and that efforts must be made to reduce its strength by gradually and increasingly recruiting in India independent medical practitioners. The Government of India then consulted local Governments, and replied to the Secretary of State that, in their original despatch, they had "gravely underestimated objections," on other than military grounds, to the contemplated transfer of appointments. They were now of opinion that the mere transfer of a certain number of Government appointments from the Indian Medical Service to private practitioners would not materially encourage the growth of an independent medical profession; that most of the civil appointments then held by the Indian Medical Service could not suitably be given to men not in regular Government service, with whom private practice would naturally be the first consideration; that the retention of a considerable number of superior civil medical appointments for the Indian Medical Service was essential, not only in the interests of administrative efficiency, but also for the purpose of making the service itself attractive to able medical men. It was important to do nothing which would lower the attractiveness of the Indian Medical Service; and, even though there might be no objection, from the military point of view, to the transfer to independent practitioners of the civil appointments held by one-third of the Indian Medical Service officers in civil employ, it was obvious that the subtraction of these appointments would greatly impair the advantages of the service.

The Secretary of State (Lord Crewe) accepted these views. He, also, was of opinion that the question of the steps to be taken to promote the growth of the unofficial medical profession in India must be treated as distinct from that of limiting or reducing the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service. He considered that the criterion to be adopted was that the Indian Medical Service should be restricted to the military needs of the country, both from the point of view of economy and from that of the desirability of increasing as far as possible the number of important posts held by Indians. He subsequently asked for some form of statement showing approximately the manner in which military requirements were estimated from time to time, in order to facilitate a closer scrutiny of any proposed additions to the civil cadre of the Indian Medical Service. In reply, the Government of India wrote on the 5th March, 1914: "The civil side of the Indian Medical Service is the medical war reserve of the army in India, and in the event of the mobilization of the field army on a large scale our deficiency in medical officers (Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service) would be in round numbers 360, of which the shortage in the Indian Medical Service would be about 150, while in addition there would be a deficiency in military assistant surgeons of 246. We feel no doubt that Your Lordship will be convinced by the figures referred to that the civil side of the Indian Medical Service can be largely increased without exceeding potential military requirements." This correspondence was edited and published in 1914.

9. In 1911, the question was further considered in the Army Department of the Government of India. The number of Indians entering the Indian Discussion of 1911.

Sir Pardey Lukis's note.

Medical Service was materially increasing. Again it was proposed to make the Indian Medical Service a purely civil service and to organize the Royal Army Medical Corps in such a manner as to enable it to fulfil all military requirements. Indians would enter the former but not the latter. A full and interesting note was recorded by Sir Pardey Lukis, then Director-General, Indian Medical Service. He objected that the scheme would abolish the Indian Medical Service war reserve. There was already a complete mobilization scheme, and the civil authorities were bound to supply 326 officers, distributed over six calls. In fact, complete mobilization of the Indian Army would require a total number of 652 executive Indian Medical Service officers.' Sir Pardey Lukis supported this statement by figures. He pointed out that 234 Indian Medical Service officers were in military employ. This figure included officers on furlough; the number who would be medically unfit might be computed at 5 per cent, or 12 in all; 326 officers might be surrendered from civil employ, making a total of 548 officers available for 652 appointments. In no way could this reserve be replaced either from England or from the independent medical profession in India. The introduction of the 5 years' curriculum had materially decreased the number of medical students in England, and the employment of civilian practitioners in war had been by no means an unqualified success. The independent medical profession in India was chiefly represented by 201 European and Eurasian,' as well as 49 Indian practitioners with British qualifications. The majority of these were under contract with private firms and companies. The best men among ordinary Indian practitioners were enjoying lucrative practices among their fellow-countrymen. The army could not afford to lose the services of "well-trained and highly qualified civil surgeons, all of whom possess four to seven years' previous military experience; who have an intimate knowledge of the country, and who have had unrivalled opportunities of acquiring skill as operating surgeons, and as administrators of large hospitals."

Sir Pardey Lukis went on to show the large percentage of higher qualifications among Indian Medical Service officers, especially in the matter of surgery. He proved that the standard was still being maintained, and that the death rate among Indian troops had within the past 30 years fallen from 39·22 to 5·62, while that among British troops had only fallen from 24·85 to 6·25. He emphasized the valuable services rendered by Indian Medical Service officers in civil employ in connection with the training of the assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons who constitute an important part of the personnel of British and Indian military hospitals and, when drafted to civil employ, go to swell the numbers of the war reserve. He referred to the work done by Indian Medical Service officers in imparting post-graduate instruction to officers of both services. He asserted that if, as a military medical machine, the Indian Medical Service fell short of the standard attained by the Royal Army Medical Corps, this deficiency was due to the maintenance in the Indian army of the obsolete regimental as opposed to the station hospital system.* The latter should be introduced and specialists should be grouped at brigade and divisional head-quarters, as was done in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

Sir Pardey pointed out, however, that the medical schools in England were beginning not to send their best men into the Indian Medical Service as the future of that service was considered uncertain: Indian candidates were thus entering in greater number; but, if the Government of India would definitely proclaim that they contemplated no further radical change in the constitution of the Indian Medical Service, equilibrium would be re-established.

He considered that the grievances of Indian Medical Service officers in military employ were remediable and that to convert the Indian Medical Service into a civil service would mean worse men and higher salaries. "With all the glamour of military rank and titles taken away, is it conceivable that good men will come to India to struggle for a pittance with the ever increasing tide of Indians, except on the condition that they receive far higher pay than they do at present?"

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*See "Note on the Introduction of the Station Hospital System/for Indian Troops" (Annexure II).

Sir Pardey Lukis's note resulted in the dropping of the question. It was intended that a station hospital system for Indian troops should be inaugurated, but this intention was not carried out till quite recently. It was believed in some influential quarters that the maintenance of the regimental doctor was better adapted to the needs and administration of the Indian Army.

Declining popularity of the Indian Medical Service.

10. With effect, however, from the time when Lord Morley's proposals and views regarding the future of the Indian Medical Service became known, uncertainty as to its prospects began to affect competition for entrance in England. Indian candidates too increased, and Indian private practitioners, who had been for some years growing in numbers and improving in quality, greatly extended their practice among their fellow-countrymen. Private fees and practice had already been by regulations restricted for Indian Medical Service officers, and dwindled rapidly before this extra competition and rising Indian nationalism. Salaries, however, remained absolutely stationary. The service speedily declined in popularity, and in September, 1913, the Secretary of State for India invited the assistance of the British Medical Association in order to ascertain the causes of discontent. After careful inquiry, the Association drew up a memorandum which was placed by the Secretary of State before the Indian Public Services Commission which sat in London in July, 1914. The chief points dealt with in the memorandum were: (1) the inadequate scale of remuneration; (2) the difficulties in obtaining ordinary and study leave; (3) the constant irritating and damaging interference with private practice; and (4) the unsatisfactory position of the director-general and surgeons-general in relation to the Government of India and local Governments. Evidence on these matters was given by Colonel Elliott, on behalf of the Association, before the Public Services Commission. The Commission supplemented this evidence by the testimony of a number of witnesses examined in India.

The recommendations of the Public Services Commission.

11. Their report was completed on the 14th of August, 1915, but was, on account of the war, not published until January, 1917. Their field of inquiry was limited to civil services, imperial and provincial. It related to "the method of recruitment and the systems of training and probation; the conditions of service, salary, leave and pensions"; and last but not least "such limitations as still exist in the employment of non-Europeans and the working of the existing system of the division of services into imperial and provincial." In dealing with medical services they included in their inquiry all those appointments which, though not necessarily medical in character, were then filled by officers possessing medical qualifications, *e.g.*, the professorships, chemical examinerships and their connected posts, and the posts in the alienist, bacteriological, sanitary, and jail departments. The more important of these were then filled by officers forming the war reserves either of the Indian Medical Service or of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department. The Commission dealt with pre-war conditions. They found that there were 772 Indian Medical Service officers in all, of whom 475, or 62 per cent., were engaged on civil duties. In the assistant surgeon branch of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department there were 713 officers, of whom 41 per cent. were in civil employment. Only a few of them held superior appointments. Altogether, out of a total of 566 officers in superior civil medical employment within the sphere of the Commission's investigations, 493, or 87 per cent., were military and 73, or 13 per cent., were civil officers.

The Commission observed that the dependence of the civil medical administration on the military was a subject of complaint on the part of most non-official witnesses. It was, however, obvious that under the existing arrangements the civil medical work of the country had hitherto been performed satisfactorily and economically, and that no case had been made out, either on the ground of expense or of efficiency, for ceasing to employ the medical war reserve of the army in India on civil duty. As regards the needs of the civil population, Government must obtain such additional assistance as might be necessary by some form of civil recruitment. The machinery of the present system had stood the test of previous wars, but must be re-examined in the light of experience gained in the present great war.

The Commission laid stress on *the necessity for calculating separately on their merits the needs of the army and of the civil administration, and for abandoning the idea that the civil medical administration should be dependent on the requirements of a military reserve.* "At the conclusion of the war," they wrote, "it should be possible to estimate more closely than has hitherto been the case what are the military requirements, and to what extent these can be met by private practitioners in England or in India. Calculations should also be made, and reviewed from time to time, of the civil needs of the country, and a purely civil machinery should be created to meet all civil requirements. The officers forming the medical reserve of the army should be admitted to the civil cadres so formed. But if, after an estimate has been made of the military requirements in time of war, it is found that the number of Indian Medical Service officers available for civil employment, as determined solely by military requirements, is insufficient for the needs of the civil administration, then every civil medical post for which no war reserve officer is available should be filled by civil recruitment, the method of which we shall proceed to indicate."

They recommended imperial and provincial civil medical services. The provincial medical services would, in each province, carry out duties of minor importance, and would be called after the name of their province, Madras (Bombay, or Punjab) Civil Medical Service. The Commission wrote as follows: "Officers of the Indian Medical Service, who have been admitted permanently to the Indian Civil Medical Service, should be at the disposal of the military authorities only if they are not of administrative rank, and only in the event of war. The present practice by which senior officers on the civil side are promoted to hold medical commands on the military side towards the end of their careers produces an unnecessary disturbance, and should be discontinued in the case of all future entrants. Officers already in the service should maintain their existing privileges."

They further recommended that, if the military reserve were increased so largely as to endanger seriously the maintenance of a civil element in the civil medical administration, it should be considered whether a minimum number of civil officers in the civil medical service should not be fixed. They thought it important that the military officers admitted to civil cadres should take their place with civilian officers in the manner in which officers of the army hold Indian Civil Service posts in the regulation provinces, or are employed in the Public Works and Railway Departments. Steps should also be taken to secure that, even under the gravest war conditions, the civil cadres should not be unduly depleted, and in particular that no dislocation of the educational and scientific work of the country should take place. They would entrust the imperial Indian civil medical service mainly with the work of supervision. It would include all the civil surgeoncies and posts of similar or superior position; and all the officers holding them should be on one list with seniority as amongst themselves, counting from the day of their entry on the list. All would be equally eligible for appointments of a purely civil character.

As regards appointments in the civil medical service not reserved for the war reserve of the Indian Medical Service or for officers of that service, they would fill these by the promotion of assistant surgeons and otherwise by direct civil recruitment, regard being had to the special needs of European officers entitled to free medical attendance and of their families.

The Commission recommended increases of salaries for higher administrative officers, and a temporary increase of 12½ per cent. in the salaries of all other officers of the Indian Medical Service.

Circumstances in which the Commission reported.

12. These were the main proposals of the Public Services Commission. Two Indian members, Sir Mahadeo Chaubal and Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim, submitted separate notes. The former recommended that only a fixed

proportion of the war reserve should be employed in the civil medical administration. Mr. Rahim recommended that military officers should be admitted only to a limited proportion, about one-third, of the superior appointments in the civil medical service. The proposals of both these gentlemen were dictated by the desire that civil should not be subordinated to military requirements. This, in a minor degree, was the view of the Commission.

At the time of the Commission's inquiries, out of 772 officers in the Indian Medical Service, 54, or 7 per cent. were Indians; but the number of Indians competing in the entrance examinations in London had risen from 5 in 1910 and 3 in 1911, to 8 in 1913 and 14 in 1914.

It must be noted that the Commission considered one side only of the problem before us, and also that they wrote before the scheme of provincial decentralization proposed by the Montagu-Chelmsford report had come into outline, and before the present great shrinkage of medical students and medical men in England had occurred. It does not appear that anything of this kind entered into their calculations. Thus they did not take into account various factors which have perplexed us.

As we have already shown, their report was pigeon-holed from August, 1915, to January, 1917. Nothing whatever was done to alleviate the discontent of the Indian Medical Service, and in the meantime events moved fast. The great war had begun before the report of the Public Services Commission was completed and, as it proceeded, gradually searched out weak spots and defects in military preparations and organization.

The medical services and the War.

13. Twelve officers (5 lieutenant-colonels, 5 majors and 2 captains) on the Indian strength of the Royal Army Medical Corps were on leave or sick leave in England on the 4th August, 1914. These were all transferred to the home establishment. Between the beginning of the war and the 31st December, 1915, 38 more officers of the Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps (12 colonels, 11 lieutenant-colonels, 9 majors and 6 captains) were transferred from India to England. Other regular officers of the British medical services left India for service with the Indian Expeditionary Forces in addition to those who had actually accompanied them on mobilization. In place of these officers whom she gave up, India received 82 Royal Army Medical Corps officers (1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 majors, 30 captains and 48 lieutenants). Only 3 of these were regular officers; the remainder belonged to the Territorial Force, or Special Reserve, or held temporary commissions. It is therefore, obvious that the War Office used the Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps contingent in India as a valuable trained reserve, for spheres of war outside India.

The civil side of the Indian Medical Service was considerably depleted by the war. On the 8th of April, 1915, the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, prepared a memorandum showing that, whereas under existing arrangements the civil administrations were bound to surrender 337 officers on mobilization, they had in fact already surrendered 286 officers, and had warned 15 more to be in readiness to proceed on active service without delay, should their services be required.

The following officers had been surrendered: 188 civil surgeons, 15 officers on plague duty, 17 superintendents of central jails, 8 professors, and 13 officers employed on bacteriological work. Minor details are needless.

The vacancies so caused had been filled by various expedients, principally by recalling all officers from leave and by promoting civil assistant surgeons of the provincial services. Only 15 had been filled by the employment of private medical practitioners, or uncovenanted medical officers; 31 had been filled by appointing civil surgeons to be in visiting charge of neighbouring districts; while 11 had been filled by placing civil surgeoncies in collateral charge of officers in military employ. The administrative charge of central jails had been made over either to members of the Indian Civil Service or to police officers, or to retired military assistant surgeons and uncovenanted officers who, whilst on the active list, had been in charge of district jails. Whenever a non-medical officer was placed in administrative charge of a central jail, the civil surgeon took over the medical duties connected with the jail, as a collateral charge. Great care had been taken to prevent any interference with teaching in the various medical colleges. Only 8 officers holding professorial appointments had been surrendered. One hundred and thirteen military assistant surgeons had been reverted to military duty.*"

The total number of Indian Medical Service officers in civil employment who were surrendered for military duty between the 4th August, 1914, and the 31st December, 1918, was 393. During the same period 71 officers were returned to civil employment. The 393 officers surrendered included 197 civil surgeons, 15 officers on plague duty, 36 superintendents of central jails, 6 superintendents of lunatic asylums, 24 professors, 24 officers of the bacteriological department, and 28 of the sanitary department.

The Indian Medical Service and the War.

14. The war thus meant dislocation in the domestic and financial arrangements of many Indian Medical Service officers. Some, too, on returning to military duty of a peculiarly exacting kind, after years of civil employment, found themselves at a disadvantage when serving alongside officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps who had devoted the whole of their active careers to the army. It is clear, moreover, from the reports of the Mesopotamia and Vincent-Bingley Commissions, that many Indian Medical Service officers must, for the first two years or so, have suffered severely in the field for the manner in which military medical expenditure in India had been starved in the past, for the long continued omission to introduce the station hospital system, and for the lack of sufficient medical personnel and equipment. The deficiency in assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons was severely felt in Mesopotamia, and other medical establishments were quite inadequate. The supply of stores also was unsatisfactory. The reports referred to above, while strongly emphasizing the evils of parsimony in medical administration, suggest the conclusion that, as the medical organization of an army is an integral part of its military organization, its administration will be best conducted by officers whose training has been almost exclusively military. The reports advised the immediate institution of the station hospital system in the Indian Army and their advice has since been followed. Their publication exercised a further depressing influence on a service already depressed.

It is clear from various evidence that cases of friction between officers of the two medical services occurred during the war. It is probable that these largely resulted from their some times widely different antecedents, and from the fact that, while the one service had been exclusively military, the other had not. It is certain that many officers of the Indian Medical Service expressed their grievances to the British Medical Association in strong terms. "We have received," said Colonel Elliot to the Secretary of State last June, "a large number of letters containing cold details of the financial position of the writers, shewing that they have been living on their savings or on their other sources of private income for the past three-and-a half years, and are now heavily in debt. They complain that their services have not been used to the best advantage, and that they have been constantly superseded by officers junior to them in other branches of the medical organization, and that they are not being paid a living wage."

The Government of India and the Secretary of State addressed themselves to remedy some of these grievances. They improved the rates of staff pay in the field; they developed a system of accelerated and acting promotion to prevent supersession of Indian Medical Service officers by officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, and they took other steps. But in the meantime the report of the Public Services Commission had been published; political ambitions were speaking loudly in India, and the interests of the Indian Medical Service were assailed from a political quarter.

Indian political views regarding the future of the medical services in India.

15. On the 8th of March, 1918, the Hon'ble Mr. Sastri, a prominent politician, moved a resolution in the Imperial Legislative Council recommending the constitution of a civil medical service which should be wholly independent of the medical organization of the Indian Army; that the higher

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*See page 20 of the Report of the Public Services Commission.

medical posts, at present filled by officers of the Indian Medical Service, should be transferred to the civil medical service; and that the civil medical service should be recruited from the civil medical officers and the independent medical profession.

He also proposed that the salaries of Indian Medical Service officers employed on civil duty should not be enhanced as recommended by the Public Services Commission; and that military assistant surgeons should not be given preference over civil assistant surgeons, and should not receive more than one-sixth of the higher posts reserved for subordinate medical officers.

Mr. Sastri's first argument was that the civil medical service of the country should not be kept in subordination to the military, so that, when trouble came, there were "absolute dislocation and paralysis of civil work throughout the country. The interests of the civil medical service are paramount in themselves." He next argued that the "coming in of the Indian Medical Service into civil employ shuts out Indian talent, hinders the progress of the independent medical profession, and makes the civil population, for their ordinary medical needs, depend upon a service, which is called upon to serve in the military both at the beginning and at the end of their careers, and in war-time would not be available at all." "When therefore," he said, "we are asking that a complete separation should be made, it is impossible for us to countenance the suggestion that, in order to render civil employment attractive to officers, their salaries should be raised and a further drain imposed on the resources of the country." He urged that professorial chairs, upon the successful occupation of which depends the welfare of millions, should not be treated as the private property of any service constituted primarily for war needs. He finished with the following words: "I do not deny that the Indian Medical Service has done wonders for India in the past. It has produced many eminent doctors. It has contributed much to the sum of medical knowledge. But when all this is said—and I say it with all my heart without meaning to take away anything from the credit due to the Indian Medical Service—let me say that it must not be allowed any more to dominate the whole of the civil medical profession, to keep the children of the soil out of what is their rightful place, and generally to check the growth of the independent medical profession and treat all the professorial chairs and the research chairs as their private appanage, thus producing, as I said before, some harm to the progress of the science itself, and at the same time, in many cases, doing no good to the positions themselves."

In reply to Mr. Sastri, the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, Surgeon-General Edwards, pointed out that 34 members of the Indian Medical Service had gained the blue ribbon of the scientific world, the Fellowship of the Royal Society. He laid stress on the research achievements of the service, on the excellence of the medical colleges, and on the small incomes from private practice as compared with medical incomes in England. Indians were being admitted to the service in steadily increasing numbers. He was not in favour of forming a separate Indian civil medical service. Provincial services could do all that could be done by such a service. The war reserve of the Indian Medical Service would be a nucleus for these. The existence of this war reserve was vital. It was the existence of this reserve that enabled the Indian divisions, when they proceeded overseas, to go fully mobilized, at the most critical period of the Empire's history.

"It is obvious," he said, "that in peace time, if military medical officers are to be kept fully employed, less than half their numbers are amply sufficient to carry on routine duties, and the remainder should be employed on civil work. The Hon'ble Member may say, 'If this is so, why is this not done in the Royal Army Medical Corps?' My reply is, that it would undoubtedly be done, were the British army in peace time stationed in England, and were there a civil medical service into which its surplus medical officers could be drafted."

The Resolution was also opposed by Sir William Vincent, Home Member, on the ground that civil efficiency must be combined with and subserve to military preparedness, and that the imposition of obligations for war service on purely civil medical officers had, so far as experience went (*e.g.*, in the case of civil sub-assistant surgeons), proved a bruised reed. " We have had," he said, " a number of men who have resigned their appointments, or have been dismissed, rather than accept the alternative of going on service. Further, however efficient civil medical officers may be in civil employment, they must be totally inexperienced in military duties and would have to adjust themselves rapidly in war time to an organization with which they would be entirely unfamiliar, their usefulness being proportionately impaired. Finally, I may say that the removal of purely civil officers in war-time from their ordinary employment would cause no greater and no less dislocation than is at present caused by the removal of Indian Medical Service officers." The Home Member also opposed the resolution on the ground that it was premature, as the present was no time for revolutionizing the medical administration. The Government of India had come to no conclusion on the recommendation of the Public Services Commission that the pay of the Indian Medical Service should be raised. He argued that, if the prospect of civil employment were denied to candidates for a military medical service, that service would expect to be paid at a far higher rate than at present.

The resolution was put to the vote and lost. It was supported by all the non-official Indian members of the Council.*

Sir G. Makins's views.

16. In February, 1918, Sir G. Makins, K.C.M.G., C.B., President of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, after examining much of the work of the Indian Medical Service in peace and in war, recorded an interesting memorandum which appears as annexure III of this report.

The Secretary of State's anxiety for the future of the Indian Medical Service.

17. About the same time the position and prospects of the service were occupying the attention of the Right Hon'ble the Secretary of State, and on returning from India he received an important deputation from the British Medical Association. This deputation expressed extreme disappointment with the recommendations of the Public Services Commission, and emphasized the depressed condition of the Indian Medical Service. In reply, Mr. Montagu stated that the present situation was one which must give rise to the greatest apprehension among those who were responsible for the future of the service, and must reflect a very unsatisfactory state of affairs in the service itself. The question was one of ensuring a supply of good doctors for India. " Just as India," he said, "cannot to-day, or, so far as anybody can see—I was going to say, for ever—do without the services of those who help to govern her, so India cannot command the services of those who help to govern her, unless the Europeans who carry the burden of the Empire in India can be supplied with the best expert medical aid. And therefore, as you, Sir, rightly said, the Indian Medical Service can be regarded as the pivot upon which all other imperial services in India depend. But, over and above that, the Indian Medical Service is a service on which India is mainly dependent for the satisfaction of all its manifold medical and sanitary requirements, and also—and not least—for the education of future generations of medical men in India. I therefore think it is an essential part of our duty to see that the Indian Medical Service should not be allowed to deteriorate, and I can assure you that I am determined to do everything that I can to provide for India a medical service of the highest quality obtainable."

Mr. Montagu mentioned steps which had been taken to alleviate the grievances of Indian Medical Service officers reverted from civil to military duty. He indicated the limitation of professional opportunities which must arise from divorcing the civil from the military side of the service. He stated that he had no objection to according freedom to Indian Medical Service officers to practise privately within " well recognized and quite wide limits." There was no reason why the indigenous medical profession should not grow up in an atmosphere of free competition with highly trained European doctors. He considered that the remuneration offered to the service must be adequate, that the cadre of the service must provide a sufficient leave reserve, and that the service must afford in its organization increased and increasing opportunities for Indians to enter it. Aided schools and colleges in India must be developed. Moreover, the conditions of the service must be as free as possible from irritation, friction or annoyance. Therefore the Indian Medical Service and the Royal Army Medical Corps must be considered together, with a view to promoting harmony and, as far as possible, achieving unification. There must also be a drastic re-organization of the relations of the Indian Medical Service with the Government. Mr. Montagu concluded by dealing with recommendations which the deputation had made regarding education and recruitment.

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*The report of the debate is reproduced in volume III of this Report.

The despatch of the 11th October, 1918.

18. On the 11th of October last the Secretary of State addressed the Government of India, forwarding copies of the above proceedings, and pointing out the principles which he considered essential for observance, if the Indian Medical Service was to be rescued from ruin. He asked that "the whole mechanism by which the medical needs of India (and especially medical education) are to be satisfied in future" should be examined. He pointed out that, if it were decided to amalgamate the Indian Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps, the war reserve would be so large as practically to monopolise the civil appointments, and the civil departments would thus become more than ever adjuncts of the military service, a condition of affairs which the Public Services Commission recommended should be abandoned. What was necessary, *at a time when the demand for medical men elsewhere would far exceed the supply*, was to put before the medical profession in England a scheme that would attract to India candidates of the requisite qualifications and in sufficient numbers. Half-measures and provisional schemes were no longer practicable. The details of any scheme proposed by the Government of India must be worked out in England in consultation with the War Office and the medical authorities in England. The views of the Government of India were invited on all these points and on any other measures which seemed likely to improve the position and prospects of the Indian Medical Service.

The pay of the Indian Medical Service raised materially.

19. From the papers which have been shown to us it appears that, after consulting local Governments regarding the proposals of the Public Services Commission to raise the pay of the Indian Medical Service, the Government of India made certain proposals to the Secretary of State in this connection. On the 10th of December last the Secretary of State cabled that an increase of pay of Indian Medical Service officers in military employment equivalent to 33⅓ per cent. of military grade pay, as it stood before the introduction of the station hospital system for Indian troops, was necessary. Civil pay was also to be increased by 33⅓ per cent. of the grade pay which the officers would have drawn if in military employment under the regimental system. The increase would be announced before details had been worked out. The revised scale of pay intended to attract European candidates with the highest professional qualifications.

Appointment of this Committee.

20. The Government of India in the Army Department appointed this Committee. At our first meeting it was explained to us that, although paragraph 2 of our letter of appointment directed us to discuss the question of the re-organization of the medical services in India from the standpoint that it was desirable that there should be a unified medical service, the Government of India did not intend this to prevent us from submitting different proposals, should we consider that a unified medical service would not provide the best solution of the problem.

A brief survey of present circumstances.

21. It is plain from this chapter that, although the problem before us is not a new one, its conditions have altered remarkably since the discussions of twenty years ago. The searching experiences of a prolonged and world-wide war against enemies armed with all the resources of modern science have induced a strong military preference for medical services trained mainly or exclusively with troops in peace-time. The Royal Army Medical Corps is now a flourishing service, while the Indian Medical Service has become depressed and has ceased to attract the British competition which it once commanded so easily. Medical students and medical men in the United Kingdom have been greatly reduced in numbers. We do not know how soon this shortage will be remedied. Medical education in England has become more

expensive, and medical aspirants and their fathers have become poorer. The Government of India will have to face keen competition at a time when in India the political balance has considerably shifted and may shift further. An Indian career occupies a position in popular estimation in England decidedly inferior to the position which it occupied in 1902. But while British competition has so much declined, Indian candidature for all Government services has greatly increased and will go on increasing.

This increase does not mean that the practice of western medicine has made great headway against the indigenous medical systems of India. These systems, the Ayurvedic and Unani, Hindu and Arabic, still appeal to the masses and, in a less degree, to the educated classes. The records of recent debates in the various Legislative Councils on the subject of registration of medical practitioners show this clearly; and it is probable that, when provincial Governments become in some degree dependent on popular votes, they will be frequently urged to spend public money on Ayurvedic and Unani schools and dispensaries. On the other hand, all available funds are badly needed for extending medical relief and sanitary prevention on western lines. This is manifest from the recent speech of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, in the Imperial Legislative Council, which appears as annexure IV of our report. Major-General Edwards explained in some detail how great is the field for "medical research, preventive medicine, and the education of the people of India in public health measures." We are convinced that, unless vigorously supported and pioneered by thoroughly efficient and energetic Government services, western medicine and methods of sanitation will rather lose than gain ground in this country. However much medical graduates may multiply, they will not spontaneously incline to practice in the villages and smaller towns where no dispensaries have been established by Government or local bodies. Even in the Madras presidency, where English education is comparatively widespread, a recent inquiry showed that in only one of all the towns of 8,000 inhabitants or less was a single registered private practitioner of western medicine to be found working alone in the absence of a dispensary maintained by public funds. We cannot suppose that similar inquiries in other provinces would show any better conditions. An increasing output of medical graduates will multiply aspirants for Government service, and will increase the numbers of independent practitioners in cities and the larger towns, but will not by itself advance western medicine or sanitation in the country at large. It will, however, tend to hasten an already remarkable decline in private practice for officers of the superior Government medical service, and we must take this circumstance into account in considering the prospects of the future.

All these various factors have engaged our attention, but before preceeding to offer constructive proposals, we must give some account of the minor and provincial medical services of the country.

CHAPTER II.

PROVINCIAL AND MINOR MEDICAL SERVICES.

A.—Military.

The Indian Medical Department.

22. THE Indian Medical Department, until last year known as the Indian Subordinate Medical Department, consists of two branches:—

(*a*) the Military Assistant Surgeon Branch, and
(*b*) the Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon Branch.

Military assistant surgeons.

23. Military assistant surgeons are recruited by competition from among Europeans and Anglo-Indians, between the ages of 16 and 20 years. The examination, which is much the same as that of standard VII, takes place early in February at a large number of centres. It is conducted under the orders of the Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, and the vacancies are filled by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, from among candi-

dates who have obtained over 40 per cent. The paucity of candidates in recent years has necessitated the lowering of this standard to 30 per cent.

Selected candidates are sent as military pupils to the medical colleges at Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, to undergo a four years' course of professional training at the expense of Government. In the two former places they are accommodated in the hostels provided by Government, in the last-named they make their own arrangements. In each college they are under a superintendent, who is a senior officer of the Indian Medical Department, and are trained in drill, physical exercises, etc., by a British sergeant instructor. On completion of the course, the principals of the colleges report as to the fitness of the students for admission into the Indian Medical Department. Those declared fit are examined by written papers issued by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, and the total marks obtained determine their position in the general list which is maintained. They are then gazetted as warrant officers, and enter the service as fourth class assistant surgeons.

The shortage of well-educated lads of a suitable class necessitated improvements in pay and prospects. These were introduced in November, 1914. At this time it was determined to change the system of recruitment by competitive examination to one of nomination of selected candidates who had passed a general educational test recognized by the General Medical Council of Great Britain and Ireland entitling them to be registered as medical students. A five years' course was likewise determined on. This would permit of all students obtaining a medical qualification registrable in the United Kingdom. It was intended to enter the students for the membership of the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Bombay, the State Medical Faculty, Bengal, and the corresponding examination in Madras. At the time it was expected that these qualifications would be accepted by the General Medical Council as entitling the holders to registration in the United Kingdom. This anticipation, however, has so far not been fulfilled, and the system of nomination and the extension of the course to five years have been held in abeyance on account of the war.

Owing to the introduction of the Medical Degrees of 1916, it is now necessary that all military assistant surgeons should obtain qualifications registrable in India, and to comply with this act students are now entered for the licentiate examinations of the State Medical Faculty, Bengal, the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Bombay, and the Board of Examiners, Madras. These examinations may be passed after a four years' course. This is a temporary arrangement only, and it is hoped that by the beginning of 1920 it will be possible to introduce admission by nomination with a five years' professional course.

Military assistant surgeons are recruited for service with British troops in India, and are attached for duty to British station hospitals; they do not normally serve with Indian troops or under Indian Medical Service officers. The authorized cadre is 739, of whom 303 are ordinarily in civil employment, forming the war reserve for the army.

24. The duties of military assistant surgeons are varied, but in British station hospitals they include those of a clerk, compounder, ward master, steward, and store-keeper. The assistant surgeons maintain discipline in the hospital and see that the orders in connection with the treatment of patients given by the Royal Army Medical Corps officers under whom they are serving are duly carried out. They have to be on duty at hospital at all times, and to this extent discharge the functions of a resident medical officer. They are frequently employed to proceed in medical charge of patients or British troops moving by rail or road from one station to another, and in such cases take the place of a medical officer. On the whole they have little scope for essentially professional work while on military duty. Duties.

25. Military assistant surgeons selected for civil employment, which is greatly prized, remain on probation for the first 5 years, during which time the local Government may move the Government of India to return them to Civil employment.

military duty if they are found unsuitable. If given an independent civil charge, an officer of their class may, during the first 3 years of holding such a charge, be returned to military duty, if for any reason he is found unfit for the post.

Military sub-assistant surgeons.

26. Military sub-assistant surgeons are recruited for service with Indian troops. They are attached to Indian station hospitals and serve under Indian Medical Service officers. When the regimental system was abrogated on the 1st December, 1918, they ceased to be attached to Indian units.

The total sanctioned strength is 894. Of this number 154, who form the war reserve, may be employed in civil appointments, including miscellaneous military charges and other semi-military posts. These appointments are, as a rule, greatly prized.

Recruitment and training.

27. Recruitment is made by selection from among Indian candidates of all classes, between the ages of 16 and 20 years, who offer themselves at the beginning of each session to the principals of the medical schools at Agra, Lahore, Bombay, and Madras.

All candidates for employment as sub-assistant surgeons, both civil and military, are required to pass the university matriculation examination or equivalent test before admission to the medical schools.

Formerly, the pupils were neither enrolled nor subject to military law; but since 1917 they have been enrolled and placed under military law and the principal of the medical school exercises over them the powers of a commanding officer.

Military students are educated at Government expense, are provided with free quarters, and receive a monthly allowance of Rs. 12. They undergo a four years' course of professional training, and are now obliged, with the civil students of their class, to enter for the licentiate examination of the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Bombay, the Board of Examiners, Madras, and the L.M.P., and M.P.L. diplomas of the United Provinces and the Punjab, respectively.

On admission to the Indian Medical Department they are gazetted into the service as third class sub-assistant surgeons and hold the rank of warrant officers, being the only branch of the Indian Army who hold such rank. Those trained at Lahore and Agra are borne on the Bengal list, those at Poona and Ahmedabad on the Bombay list, and those at Madras on the Madras list. On joining the service they sign a declaration that they will serve in the Indian Medical Department for a period of 7 years.

Duties.

28. The duties of a sub-assistant surgeon serving in an Indian station hospital correspond with those of a military assistant surgeon in a British station hospital, and consist mainly in those of a clerk, compounder, and ward-master; he maintains discipline in the hospital and, in the matter of the treatment of patients, carries out the orders of the Indian Medical Service officer under whom he is serving. He likewise attends to the medical wants of the families of the Indian units to which he may be attached, and, under a medical officer, discharges certain sanitary duties in Indian troops' lines. He is frequently sent in medical charge of detachments of Indian troops moving by rail or road, or going into camp for musketry practice, etc.

B.—Civil.

Establishment.

29. The medical service of each province and local administration is under the control of an administrative medical officer, and consists, besides himself, of (*a*) Commissioned officers of the Indian Medical Service, (*b*) military and civil assistant surgeons, some of whom are employed as civil surgeons in medical charge of districts, and (*c*) military and civil sub-assistant surgeons.

Position and duties of the head of the department.

30. The surgeon-general or inspector-general, as the head of the civil medical department of the province, is responsible for the superintendence of all hospitals, dispensaries, lunatic asylums and other similar institutions, as also for the supervision of medical colleges and schools. He has the control of the medical staff and arranges for the recruitment, transfer and promotion

of the purely provincial medical personnel. He is the adviser of his Government upon all matters connected with the medical administration of the province.

Indian Medical Service officers.

31. Each province has on its permanent staff a number of Indian Medical Service officers varying from 11 in Assam to 51 in Bombay and Madras. The creation of each additional appointment in a province involves an increase in the Indian Medical Service cadre, and requires the sanction of the Secretary of State; but once an officer is allotted, unless he belongs to an imperial department or to an appointment requiring the concurrence of the Government of India, such as a professorial appointment, he can be moved within the province at the will of the local Government. The bulk of these officers are employed as civil surgeons in charge of districts.

Civil assistant surgeons. Recruitment and training.

32. The grade of civil assistant surgeon was established in 1847 when Government authorised the formation of a superior grade of Indian practitioners. It is now open to Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indians. The number employed in the various provinces varies from 49 in Assam to 232 in Madras.

The present day civil assistant surgeon is a passed student of a medical college, and he is either a graduate (M. B.) or a diplomate (L. M. S.) of a university.

Candidates for appointment to the provincial services are selected either according to their position at their final professional examination, or by a separate competitive examination, or by nomination to fill vacancies or fresh appointments on the temporary establishment.

On being appointed permanently to Government service they are required to execute a bond to serve the civil Government for five years, or in default to pay a fine of Rs. 500. There is no liability for military service expressed in the bond.

Duties.

33. There are a certain number of civil surgeoncies reserved for this class. Members of the service are employed as lecturers in the medical schools, demonstrators and assistant professors in the colleges, as house surgeons and house physicians in the large hospitals, in charge of hospitals at headquarters and the larger rural dispensaries, as assistants to the chemical examiner, in various railway appointments, and as medical inspectors of schools.

Civil sub-assistant surgeons. Recruitment and training.

34. So far as we have been able to ascertain the total number of civil sub-assistant surgeons in India is no less than 3,442. In addition, we understand, that a considerable number in excess are entertained in each province on a temporary list. The civil sub-assistant surgeon was formerly known as the civil hospital assistant, and has been for years the backbone of the provincial medical services. He is educated at a provincial medical school, usually distinct from the medical college. A considerable number of the students receives scholarships from the State, or local fund sources, but a proportion pay their own way. Government is not bound to take its own scholars into its service, but naturally prefers to take the best men of their year. As in the case of the assistant surgeons, the sub-assistant surgeons are recruited to fill vacancies or fresh appointments on the temporary establishment.

Local Governments have been empowered to promote sub-assistant surgeons to the rank of civil assistant surgeon, with the pay and privileges of that class, on the condition that the concession is jealously guarded and strictly confined to a few men with not less than 20 years' service, who in the exercise of their profession have shown themselves to be possessed of very exceptional attainments.

On promotion to the permanent list the sub-assistant surgeon signs a bond which binds him to serve the civil Government for five years, but in addition he agrees, in case of necessity, to serve on military duty in India. The penalty is fixed at Rs. 400 in case he commits any breach of duty which has the result of terminating his service, or Rs. 200 for every act of disobedience of the rules and regulations prescribed for his conduct while on military duty.

The question of altering the provisions of the bond so as to include liability for military duty in peace and war, in or out of India, was discussed by the Government of India and referred to local Governments in 1915, owing to the difficulty experienced in obtaining the services of medical practitioners of this class to serve in the field. It was decided that no alteration in the terms of service should be made while the war lasted, but that the whole question of the period of civil and military services to be rendered by sub-assistant surgeons, together with the remuneration and tours of military service to be granted to and imposed on them, should be considered after the war.

Duties.

35. The duties which sub-assistant surgeons may be called upon to perform are varied. They are placed in sub-charge of police, jails, lunatic asylums, and State railway hospitals; they hold independent charge of local fund, canal and itinerating dispensaries; they are employed as travelling medical subordinates on State railways and with survey and forest parties, and have to deal with outbreaks of epidemic disease occurring in the vicinity of their charges. They are employed on all kinds of duties connected with epidemics generally, and more especially in the measures taken to cope with outbreaks at fairs and other large gatherings. They are entrusted with medico-legal work as far as their own immediate charges are concerned, but they are not permitted to undertake post-mortem examinations or to deal with such cases as the police consider should be referred to the civil surgeon.

Compounders.

36. No account of the organization of the provincial medical services would be complete without a reference to the compounders. This class is recruited locally. They must have sufficient education to read and write in the vernacular, and are encouraged to obtain a working knowledge of English. Their duties are to compound medicines prescribed by the medical officer in charge, to do such dressings as are delegated to them, and to assist generally in the care and treatment of both in and out patients.

CHAPTER III.

THE MAIN PROBLEM.

Lessons of the War.

37. THE War has impressed upon the military authorities that the medical requirements of armies are best met by a medical service which is progressively and pre-eminently military. It has impressed upon provincial Governments that no province can well afford long to be denuded of the bulk of its best medical officers; and that care must be taken not to restrict a much needed supply of doctors qualified in western methods by depriving colleges of professors or taking specialists from their particular tasks. As regards, however, this aspect of the past four years, we are not surprised that the greatest of all wars demanded unprecedented sacrifices from the medical as well as from other departments of the civil administration. There can be no doubt that this department suffered considerably, that sanitary efficiency and good surgery declined, and medico-legal work deteriorated, as did also jail discipline and management. All this was to be expected. But, on the whole, we see no reason for dissenting from the considered opinion of one of our most valuable witnesses, Colonel Mactaggart, Inspector-General of Civil Hospitals in the United Provinces, that one lesson of the war is that " it is possible for local Governments to surrender a large proportion of their medical officers on a military emergency and still manage to maintain for a considerable time fairly efficient medical, sanitary and jail administration, provided that the administrative officers and a proportion of the senior commissioned medical officers are left in civil employ." We would add to this provision another, which is that this residue of officers should belong to a service of substantial merit and high standards of duty. For as their service is, so will they be.

The lessons which this war has taught as to the medical training best adaptable to service in the field have been explained to us by highly competent experts and may be gathered from the pages of official reports. They

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cannot be ignored. But in applying them we must consider reasonable possibilities, as well as the claims of medical administration in various provinces which differ considerably from each other in educational development.

Exceptional circumstances of the present.

38. Before we offer constructive proposals we must state that everywhere we have found the officers of the Indian Medical Service in a state of acute discontent, partly by reason of various grievances mentioned in our first chapter, especially lack of leave and straitened means, and partly because they share in the unusual anxiety with which the future is now regarded by British officers in all the civil services. It may be that this anxiety will lessen later, and will be counter-balanced by a recognition that, if things are difficult in India, they are also difficult and uncertain elsewhere. We cannot foretell the future; we merely indicate the ways of thinking which now prevail in the Indian Medical Service.

At present, too, the composition of all the medical services, imperial and provincial, is abnormal. In both the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Indian Medical Service there are many officers to whom leave has long been overdue. Both are employing large numbers of temporary officers. In the Indian Medical Service there are 354 Indian temporary captains and lieutenants serving overseas, as well as 331 in this country. Return to pre-war conditions has, up to the present, been extremely slow.

So far we have written of India. But in England, too, circumstances are exceptional. There the supply of medical students and medical men is, and will for some time be, limited. The needs of India will have to compete against the needs of the United Kingdom, and possibly those of Egypt, Mesopotamia, East Africa and Palestine. Altogether we are hardly in a position to estimate the exact degree of inducement which medical service in this country should offer, and our calculations are further disturbed by generally abnormal conditions and ignorance of the precise extent of shrinkage in the supply of medical students available in Great Britain. We conjecture, however, that some number will still be attracted by an Indian career, provided that the political prospect clears, that the pecuniary and leave conditions are attractive, and that candidates are not asked to pledge themselves irrevocably for thirty years to a service the conditions of which, they are likely to be told, are obscure.

One Indian medical service must serve military and civil needs.

39. We must add another condition which, we are convinced by the evidence before us, is essential, if a good class of British competitors is to be attracted to medical service in this country. The condition is, that such service shall partake of the nature of a mixed career, military, civil, professorial, sanitary, and research, and that it shall offer the varied opportunities which appeal to men of action as well as to men skilled in the different branches of the medical profession. For this reason we are opposed to any attempt to start in London separate competitions for two Indian medical services, a military and a civil; because the former, competing on the one side with the Royal Army Medical Corps and on the other side with an Indian civil medical service, would certainly, for years to come, fail to attract sufficient of worthy British candidates. Unless we decide to ignore abundant evidence of unquestionable authority, we must hold that a military career in India, without any of the opportunities which civil employment affords, will appeal to few well educated European medical men, although, on account of the good pay from the point of view of an Indian student, it would attract candidates from this country.

We must mention an alternative solution which we have carefully considered. It was suggested that we might make over the care of the entire army in India to the Royal Army Medical Corps, aided by a supplementary Indian branch, and convert the Indian Medical Service into a purely civil service, the members of which would be liable to periods of military training. We did not accept this suggestion for various reasons, of which the more prominent were: first, that the Royal Army Medical Corps is, by charter, exclusively European, and to relegate Indians to a supplementary, and what would, we think, be considered an inferior branch of this corps would, according to much of the evidence before us and to our own anticipations, be resented as treatment unworthy of the part which India has played and plays in the defence of the Empire; and, secondly, that we find that the present Indian Medical Service would be generally opposed to such an arrangement. We do not think that an Indian Medical Service which was civil from start to finish, would in any way recover the ground which has been lost. It would produce a type of officer inferior to the type of the past. It is true that such a service was, in a qualified degree, contemplated by the Public Services Commission; but, as has already been pointed out in paragraph 12, we write under largely different conditions.

Thus the only solution of our difficult problem is the creation of one Indian Medical Service which will compete in London for candidates who desire a career of mixed opportunities, military and civil. Such a service will, we believe, give better all-round results than any other.

The service should be a corps.

40. It is clear that the military authorities strongly desire a military medical service organized much on the lines on which the Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps are organized in England, and emphatically a 'corps.' They would be willing to spare officers of this corps to serve for periods of five years or less in civil employment, but they would not assent to a continuance of the hitherto existing arrangements whereby officers of the Indian Medical Service remain in civil employment for long periods and are recalled to military duty at the close of such periods. They consider that arrangements of this kind produce a medical officer unsuited to army requirements in peace and war.

The Governments of the various provinces, on the other hand, would never assent to an arrangement whereby the officers who form the main strength of provincial medical services were merely lent for short periods. They would, however, we anticipate, be willing to utilize officers so lent, on occasions of epidemics and in a certain fixed number or proportion of appointments. We think they could reasonably be required to do this in the interest of the efficiency of the medical administration of the army which defends the Empire, of which they form part, and that in so doing they would benefit their own medical and sanitary administration. We would give the Indian army a corps with its own leave and study reserves, as well as its ordinary war reserve of officers lent to civil administrations or for service under the Foreign or other Departments of the Government of India for periods not exceeding five years. We would also, as we shall show later, in our paragraphs 47 and 48, give that corps a distinctly civil side.

Is absorption in this corps of all Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps officers serving in India practicable? Advantages of such a unification.

41. This leads us to consideration of the larger question, whether it will be possible to commit to that corps, which we would call the Indian Medical Corps, the care of all British and Indian troops, and to absorb into it all Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps officers serving in India. It must be remembered that these officers do not come to this country with their corps, but only as officers of their corps. When they arrive they work in British station hospitals, without the non-commissioned officers and men of their corps, but with inefficient indigenous substitutes. It is therefore *primâ facie* desirable to include them in the new Indian Medical Corps, and to provide the combined corps with a unified service of well trained subordinates. If this can be done, all officers of the new corps will have the same training and tradition; all will have their own Director. The amalgamation of British and Indian station hospitals will be facilitated and the friction engendered by the existence of two cadres of medical officers with different rates of pay, rules of leave and pensions, will disappear. There will be many other advantages. Although at the present day it is impossible in peace time to mix up, at once and entirely, British and Indian doctors and to use them indiscriminately for the treatment of British and Indian troops, we believe that if there were a unified service it would be possible to extend gradually the medical treatment of British troops by Indian officers. The British officer and soldier seem to object to treatment by Indian doctors, not because they are Indians, but largely because they believe that Indian doctors have not as yet generally attained to so high a standard of medical and surgical knowledge as have British doctors. It is also as difficult for an Indian

medical officer to understand the habits, diet and methods of thought of the British soldier as it is for a British medical officer to enter into the predilections, customs and manners of Indian troops of various races. But, were the medical officers of British and Indian army hospitals to belong to one corps, much that separates them would, we believe, gradually disappear.

It would lead to more co-ordination between military and civil hospital administration.

42. Indeed we may go further and say that, if our Indian Medical Corps served both British and Indian troops, and on its civil side, which we will subsequently discuss, supplied the mainsprings of provincial medical administration, it would be possible to get rid of much unnecessary duplication of personnel and hospital equipment and buildings. One of our members notes: " I have lately been in a military station in India where the British station hospital was staffed with 15 medical officers with only 80 patients to treat; the Indian station hospital had 4 officers with 200 patients, and the civil hospital had one medical officer and 180 patients." This was, of course, in war time, when some officers were waiting at particular hospitals to be sent elsewhere; but experiences of such a kind are not unique, and we think that, with closer co-ordination between British and Indian station hospitals, both staffed by officers of one corps, and between military and civil hospitals, also staffed by the same corps, they should be impossible. With an Indian Medical Corps serving military needs on one side and civil needs on the other, far closer co-ordination than is otherwise practicable could be arranged.

We have indicated an ideal to which we would like to see effort directed. There should be more co-operation than there is between the military administration and civil Governments in the matter of hospital management and hospital buildings. With a little mutual arrangement savings would be effected; convenience and a high standard of treatment would be more easily attainable, notably in regard to the wives and families of European civil and military officers. Moreover, on mobilization of the field army, were groups of civil and military hospitals working more or less together, field medical units could be despatched with greater facility than at present, and with less dislocation of hospital arrangements in India. We believe that co-operation of this kind was recently practised in Canada with great success. We do not see why it should not be eventually practicable, at least to some extent, in this country.

Scheme of unification and formation of one corps.

43. A substantial obstacle to the immediate absorption into the new Indian Medical Corps of all Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps officers who wish to serve in India is, that the rapid promotion which so many of these officers have received during the war would be liable to result in the immediate domination of the new Indian Medical Corps by officers transferred from the British service. It is, however, so important, in our opinion, that unification of the medical services in India should take place that we consider that no such obstacle should be permitted to stand in the way. Proposals for the equalization of the seniority of such officers as will be affected when the Indian Medical Corps is formed will be found in annexure V. It is proposed that the new Indian Medical Corps shall be composed of the officers of the existing Indian Medical Service, together with officers who agree to voluntarily transfer, during the next three or four years, from the Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps, as well as a large number of officers nominated for commissions by the Secretary of State from among past and present temporary members of the Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service. We feel strongly that, if ever a serious attempt is to be made to terminate the inconveniences and friction which result from the existence side by side of two military medical services in India, that attempt should be made now. We anticipate that within three or four years the new Indian Medical Corps will have become sufficiently organised to take over the whole of the military medical work in India, and will from its civil side be able to assist the provincial medical services with a cadre of medical officers less liable to depletion than the present supply from the Indian Medical Service. Further on we will give reasons for the latter expectation.

If our views are adopted, the Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps officers who have not volunteered to join the Indian Medical Corps will gradually revert to the home establishment during the transition period of three or four years. Thus the Indian Medical Corps will be formed by the gradual filling up of its cadre by voluntary transfers and by new officers, either nominated by the Secretary of State or admitted by examination in London. We recommend that the Secretary of State should lose no time in forming the new corps, as it is important to obtain the services of volunteers from the temporary cadre both of the Royal Army Medical Corps and of the Indian Medical Service before demobilization has been largely effected. There is at the present day not only a certain degree of friction between the two existing services but a considerable amount of overlapping and reduplication of effort. When one Indian Medical Corps has been formed co-operation and the interchange of duties will be easy. As the Indian Medical Corps will be organized on the same lines as the Royal Army Medical Corps, and as in peace time it will work on the station hospital system, the officers and men of these two corps will find it possible and indeed easy to work together when they meet outside the boundaries of India on field service. It is our aim that the two services be so alike and be so organized on the same lines, that, if in the future an Imperial Medical Service for the whole of the British Empire be established, the Indian Medical Corps should fit into it with the least possible disturbance or modification in its constitution.

Composition of the military side of the Indian Medical Corps.

44. The new corps would include commissioned officers, military assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons, the Army Hospital Corps, the Army Bearer Corps and other hospital establishments. A skeleton outline of the proposed organization is given in annexure VIII.

We are not certain whether it will be necessary, should this corps be formed, to remove from it all colonels and general officers, as is done in the case of the Royal Army Medical Corps. If this removal be carried out, the title, Indian Medical Service, should be retained in order to denote officers of these two ranks.

The military side of the new corps should have its own leave and casualty reserve of 25 per cent. and study reserve of 4 per cent., besides a war reserve calculated on the numbers that are necessary to meet the medical requirements of the field army of India on mobilization.

We recommend that the military cadre of officers for the corps should be calculated at the ratio of 3 per mille of the total strength of British and Indian troops and followers in the army in India. The present authorized cadres of the Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service in military employ allow for a ratio of 4 and 1·28 per mille respectively, as shown in our paragraphs 1 and 2. In view of the higher standard of medical treatment and sanitation required in connection with Indian troops, the necessity for which has already been admitted in the despatches leading up to the introduction of the station hospital system, we consider that it will be necessary to recommend that in future the general ratio be fixed at 3 per mille.

We have already stated, in paragraph 42, that the formation of one Indian Medical Corps to take over the care of both British and Indian troops will lead to economy in personnel and hospital buildings. But we do not consider that this economy in personnel will allow of the employment of a smaller proportion of medical officers than 3 per mille, until combined hospitals for British and Indian troops are introduced—and this will probably take considerable time.

In Chapter V, we recommend that the medical education of military assistant surgeons should be improved to such an extent as to provide them with qualifications registrable in the United Kingdom, or, at any rate, in India, and that, in future, they should be employed on purely professional duties of the same nature as those of commissioned officers. If effect is given to these proposals, and to others which we make later on regarding the performance of duties now allotted to assistant surgeons, it will be possible to reduce the cadre of commissioned officers, calculated on the ratio recommended above, in proportion to the extent to which such officers are replaced by assistant surgeons, or, as they may well be called in the future, assistant medical officers.

Whether such replacement takes place or not, it is obvious that the cadre of the Indian Medical Corps must be very much larger than that of the military side of the present Indian Medical Service. It is of the greatest importance that this increase should not be confined to the junior ranks but should include a considerable proportion of senior officers of experience. It is, therefore, most desirable that, if possible, a large number of officers of the Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps should transfer to the new corps. Such officers would become eligible for the rates of pay of the Indian Medical Corps, and we recommend that they should be permitted to count all previous service in India, or overseas with Indian formations, towards earning a proportionate Indian pension.

We do not contemplate that it will be necessary to maintain a larger ordinary war reserve for the unified corps than would be required for the Indian Medical Service if the existing system were continued. In the past it was never, so far as we can ascertain, found necessary to bring additional Royal Army Medical Corps officers out to this country in connection with military operations on the frontiers.

A central depôt and school of instruction for the Indian Medical Corps.

45. We consider it essential that the new Indian Medical Corps should have a central depôt and school of instruction to be its educative and social home. In the uncertainty which prevails as to the future organization and geographical distribution of the army in India we are unable to suggest any specific location for this depôt, but we consider that the following are essential conditions for its success:—

(*a*) a good climate in which training can be conducted throughout the year;

(*b*) the presence of a large number of troops, both British and Indian; and,

(*c*) large permanent hospitals, both British and Indian.

A central position in India is also desirable. We realise that it may be found necessary to have subsidiary depôts located in the areas of recruitment, for the initial training of the rank and file. It is obvious also that the distribution of the rank and file after training in the central depôt should so far as practicable be territorial. The training should be conducted on the lines followed in the Royal Army Medical Corps Depôt and company headquarters in England. Our suggestions for the organization of the corps depôt, as well as a skeleton syllabus of the course of instruction to be given at the school, are contained in annexure VI. We suggest that, in the event of the adoption of mechanical transport for ambulance purposes in India, the drivers and other personnel of such transport should, after training at a central mechanical transport school, be incorporated in the Indian Medical Corps.

Training of officers in tropical medicine.

46. As will be seen from annexure VI, we propose that all junior officers of the Indian Medical Corps when they first arrive in India, as well as all assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons and other ranks of the corps when they first join it, should undergo courses of instruction at this depôt.

We are in agreement with the views of Sir G. Makins,[*] although the introduction of the station hospital system for Indian troops has altered conditions since he wrote, that junior officers should, before they are posted to military hospitals in India for duty, spend some time in the practical study of tropical diseases at either a large civil hospital or a school of tropical medicine in India. Satisfactory training in this subject cannot be obtained in England or in the military hospitals in India, whereas the institutions which we have mentioned above offer unrivalled opportunities for it. We recommend, therefore, that officers should, either before joining the depot or immediately on leaving it, be attached for a period of 3 to 6 months to one of these institutions. We understand that sanction has already been accorded to a proposal that newly appointed officers of the Indian Medical Service should, on first arrival in India, be attached to presidency hospitals for 2 months for clinical instruction in tropical diseases. We do not, however, consider two months a sufficient period.

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[*] See Annexure III.

The Special Reserve.

47. Behind the leave, casualty, study and war reserves of the Indian Medical Corps should be a further reserve, which we will call the Special Reserve, to be drawn on for professional and not administrative work, only on occasions of national emergency, and then subject to certain restrictions. We would recruit this special reserve partly from civil assistant surgeons and independent medical practitioners voluntarily enrolled and periodically trained. We would suggest that provincial Governments should give the former special privileges when enrolled, and that the latter should be granted retaining fees, and further that temporary rank should be given to both whilst under training, as well as honorary rank thereafter. But we would recruit the main strength of this special reserve from the civil side of our new Indian Medical Corps, which we suggest should be composed of officers who have begun their Indian career by three or four years of military service.

It has been represented to us that there is now no need to maintain a war reserve of officers of the Indian Medical Service, as such a reserve can safely be composed entirely of civil assistant surgeons and independent medical practitioners, all of whom, it is said, have given signal proof of their patriotism during the war. In view of this claim we have been at some pains to ascertain the true facts regarding the recruitment of Indian private practitioners during the recent war. Facts and figures supplied to us by the office of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, leave no doubt that there was a general disinclination on the part of Indian private practitioners to proceed overseas, although they were offered for such service the same rates of pay as temporary Royal Army Medical Corps officers engaged in England. In this connection we were told that, during the first flush of patriotic excitement and pressure at the beginning of the war, the private medical practitioners of one of the provinces assembled together and telegraphed to His Excellency the Viceroy that over 50 of their number had resolved to offer their services to Government for use in any manner considered desirable. Later on, however, so many impossible conditions were attached to the offer that, of the original number of volunteers, there remained only six who were willing to serve out of India. Of all the private medical practitioners in India only 373 volunteered for military service, and 125 of these were not prepared to proceed overseas. It must, however, be noted that, until July 1917, only those who held qualifications registrable in the United Kingdom were accepted for temporary commissions. Of the 248 who volunteered for general service 104 were young doctors under 28 years of age, and 144 were over that age. Further, we are informed that, so far from the supply of temporary Indian Medical Service officers having been sufficient to meet all demands in connection with the war, the Commander-in-Chief in India was compelled to inform the War Office in 1917 that he was unable to supply medical officers as reinforcements for Mesopotamia, Egypt and East Africa. The War Office then undertook to provide such reinforcements for Indian as well as British units in those theatres of war, from among practitioners recruited from other parts of the Empire.

We have also made careful enquiries as to the quality of these recruits, and are satisfied that, as would naturally be the case, they were as a general rule decidedly inferior to Indian regular officers of the Indian Medical Service who had finished their medical education in England and had at some time or other been accustomed to serve with troops. As the result of these enquiries we are convinced that it would be unsafe for Government, in present circumstances, to rely largely for its war reserve on the non-official classes. We therefore propose that the special reserve shall draw its main strength from the Indian Medical Corps.

The civil side of the Indian Medical Corps.

48. Whatever may be the results of the present conferences at Paris, India will remain a continent rich in potentialities, which from time immemorial, in the words of an Indian speaker in the Imperial Legislative Council, "has attracted the cupidity of powerful rulers and states."

Moreover, the responsibilities of the British Empire, as one of the great powers of the world and a mandatory of the League of Nations, are about to widen and not to narrow. We must therefore reckon on the clear possibility that one day the army in India may require help from the imperial and provincial civil medical services. For this reason, and because the civil medical service or services of this country must for some time at any rate, in their own interest, draw their chief strength from British recruitment, for which we can devise no better door than the new Indian Medical Corps, we recommend that this corps should include a distinctively civil side. Transference to this civil side should be on the basis of figures to be furnished now to the Imperial Government by the provincial Governments, who would state the number of posts which they wish to fill as permanent civil appointments from the Indian Medical Corps. The Imperial Government would have its own list of appointments under the Foreign and other Departments. The holders of these posts would be liable to be called on for military service on occasions of serious national emergency and then only. Even on such occasions, if holding certain residuary, teaching, or research appointments for which no fit incumbents could be found, they should not be called out. When once permanently employed in civil, officers would not revert to military duty by choice. They would continue to receive military promotion in accordance with a time scale until they reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel, after which they would receive no further advance in army rank. Officers holding civil administrative appointments should, however, be granted special precedence in accordance with those appointments.

We propose, in fact, that the Indian Medical Corps shall recruit alike for the military and for the higher civil medical service, that all newly joined officers shall for their first three or four years serve with troops, and shall then elect for the civil or the military side. As opportunity occurs, and as far as possible in accordance with their choice, they would be assigned to temporary civil employment for periods of 5 years, and would then be eligible for permanent civil employ if they chose, and if they were approved by the provincial Government, or the department of the Government of India, concerned. When once permanently civil medical officers, they would be liable to recall to military duty only on occasions of grave national emergency.

Provincial medical services.

49. We do not propose that the civil side and the war reserve of the military side of the Indian Medical Corps should furnish the whole of the superior civil medical service of the country. We have already stated that it will be for each provincial administration to estimate and report to the Government of India the number of posts which it would reserve, as permanent appointments, for officers of the civil side. Similarly, the military authorities would supply the figures of the numbers needed as an ordinary war reserve. We consider that provincial administrations are bound to employ this reserve in the interests of the defence of the Empire, without diminishing their cadre of Indian Medical Corps officers in permanent civil employment. By doing so, they will only partly provide for provincial needs. We invite attention to the evidence of Major Norman White, C.I.E., Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India, which our own experience entirely endorses. The existing civil organization is, he says, "hopelessly inadequate" to meet the medical needs of the country. Major-General Robinson, C.B., Surgeon-General with the Government of Bengal, told us: "The Indian Medical Service hitherto has been starved in every way, under-staffed, under-paid. It has consistently been starved for money both in civil and military. * * * The epidemic diseases of India particularly require study and investigation, and there are dozens of diseases to be prevented, and that could be prevented were means taken to do so. It is a question of money to a very large extent." We are, of course, well aware that the great obstacle to medical and sanitary improvement is the conserva-

tive and apathetic character of the mass of the people who intensely prefer to walk in the ways of their fathers. We are sure that it is beyond the wit and power of any Government, however wealthy and generous it may be, to produce substantial improvement, unless it be aided by strong, persistent, and widespread popular effort. We welcome the first sign that such an effort may one day come, in the co-operative movement in Bengal for medical relief and anti-malarial measures, described to us by the Hon'ble Mr. P. C. Mitter of Calcutta. We invite careful attention to this movement which deserves generous support from all who would see India become a strong, prosperous, self-governing unit of the British Empire. But all movements of this kind need encouragement and help from parallel Government action. The Government organization and staff of medical officers must not be "hopelessly inadequate." We have examined the figures of medical expenditure, both imperial and provincial, for the past six years and compared them with the figures of educational expenditure for the same period. The medical figures are considerably less than half the education figures. To those who know the conditions of India the former are decidedly unsatisfactory.

There is ample need for better and wider medical organization in all provinces. Civil surgeons are over-worked; colleges and schools are understaffed; far more deputy sanitary commissioners are required; research institutes need money and workers; travelling dispensaries could with great advantage be indefinitely multiplied. All the provincial medical and sanitary administrations are, even in ordinary times, undermanned. The present is emphatically the time for a new start. Should the proposals of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme be accepted by Parliament, substantial steps will immediately be taken toward the goal of responsible provincial government, and provincial administration will at once become far more decentralized than at present. It is, we believe, contemplated that possibly provincial medical and sanitary administration may pass to the control of Indian ministers. In all provinces, as is stated in the Montagu-Chelmsford report, and as has been emphasised by our co-opted colleague, Sir Temulji Nariman, a considerable British element is necessary in the medical as in other branches of the civil administration. The provinces differ greatly in educational progress, but all should draw their main strength for medical and sanitary progress from adequate staffs of high class officers. These they will draw from the new corps; but they will supplement these staffs by local officers whom they will themselves appoint. They will thus develop their medical and sanitary administrations for themselves on secure foundations. They will not give up their permanent civil officers of the Indian Medical Corps for any ordinary expedition or minor war, but only in case of a grave national emergency. Should such an emergency arise, they will do what all Governments do on these occasions and make the best arrangements that they can for filling vacancies caused by the withdrawal of any portion of the special reserve. They would have to do this whether or not their most important medical officers had begun their careers in military service.

Thus the provincial medical services will include officers belonging to the following categories:—(*a*) Indian Medical Corps officers holding residuary appointments, who can never be recalled to military duty; (*b*) Indian Medical Corps in temporary civil employment. Provincial Governments will be recalled to military duty, as professional men and not as administrators, in case of grave national emergency; and (*c*) military officers of the Indian Medical Corps in temporary civil employment. Provincial Governments will be able to select officers, who are or have been in temporary civil employment, for permanent employment, as occasion offers. Such officers will pass into categories (*a*) or (*b*). Provincial Governments will also employ (*d*) purely civil officers whom they will appoint themselves.

European medical attendance on Europeans in outlying districts.

50. In considering the needs of the civil populations we should mention that both the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and the European Association consider that our scheme of re-organization should recognize as a basic principle that, at every military station and at every civil district headquarters, there should be available a European medical officer. We see no

reason to suppose that under our scheme there will not be a European medical officer at every large military station; but we cannot propose that there shall be one at every civil district headquarters. This has not been the case in the past; and in future there will be many district headquarters at which there will be no European officials or non-officials. At central or important places, such as divisional headquarters, there should always be European medical officers. It is at such places that non-official Europeans mainly reside. Officials, however, go where they are sent; and, although there will in ensuing years be a diminishing number of European officials in outlying stations, we feel strongly that Government should certainly arrange that European medical attendance is secured for these officials, their wives and families. European women in India, as a rule, strongly prefer doctors of their own race for themselves and their children. It is only natural that this should be so; and special arrangements must be made in acknowledgment of the fact. European civil surgeons should be in charge of the hill stations during the hot weather; suitable hospital and other accommodation for the sick should be maintained at the headquarters of civil divisions and in the larger plains stations; and European officers of the Indian Medical Corps should be held ready to go to outlying stations where their services are required either for European officials or their wives and families. The services of such medical officers should also be available for European planting, railway, and other non-official communities.

A system of optional retirement on gratuity desirable, to attract candidates to the new corps.

51. We do not think that it will be possible to secure a sufficient supply of European candidates for the new Indian Medical Corps unless retirements with gratuities be permitted after fixed periods, before pension is earned. It must be some time before the medical profession in Britain recovers its equilibrium. A system of retirement with gratuity exists in the Royal Army Medical Corps and in the Medical Department of the Royal Navy. It should certainly be introduced into the Indian Medical Corps in order to guarantee British candidates against a possible prospect of being tied for life to India much against their will. It must also apply to Indian candidates, as we cannot differentiate between races in this matter. We believe that every effort will be made to assure the position of the services by parliamentary legislation. But we should not be doing our duty if we did not clearly voice certain apprehensions which are current, and we cannot do so better than by quoting from the evidence of a distinguished officer of the Indian Medical Service. Recommending a system of possiblle retirement with gratuity, and speaking " entirely from the point of view of recruitment " and with every wish for the success of the coming reforms, he said :

> The proposal of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme to place the civil medical department under an Indian minister, and the further proposal to recast the constitution every ten years or so, introduces an element of uncertainty into the careers of men entering a service with the prospect of spending their lives in it, as they can form no idea of what their position will be as regards the more attractive civil work at least in the future except that it is almost certain to be altered for the worse.
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> This uncertainty will militate more against recruitment than any other factor, when it is realized in Great Britain. It will therefore be necessary to allow all officers, including these already in the service, to retire at stated periods of their early service, before they become pensionable, on liberal gratuities, which would enable them to buy a practice or partnership at home, as is already in force in the Royal Army Medical Corps and in the Medical Service of the Royal Navy. They should have this option every four or five years of their service.
>
> The frequency with which officers availed themselves of this right would be a very valuable guide to the Government regarding the popularity or otherwise of the service, which should allow them to gauge any discontent in time to enable wise statesmen to take the necessary steps to remove the causes of such discontent before the Indian Medical Service is again brought to the present position of being unable to recruit the class of men whom it used, not long ago, to command, and which only very liberal and expensive remedies will now relieve.

We would suggest a system of optional retirement with the following gratuities: £500 after 4 years' service; £1,000 after 7 years' service, with a first class passage to England in each case for European officers.

Conditions of admission to the corps.

52. We have shown the reasons which impel us to recommend the constitution of a new Indian Medical Corps which shall absorb the present Indian Medical Service and will become the Indian imperial medical service of the future for both civil and military duties. We have stated conditions which, we trust, will make this corps a success. Before going further, we will briefly propose conditions for admission to it.

We consider it essential that there should be only one examination for the Indian Medical Corps, and that this should take place twice a year in London. In annexure VII, we suggest a syllabus of subjects. It will be noticed that, in accordance with the recommendation of the Public Services Commission, in paragraph 9 of annexure XII of their report (page 249), we aim at making the examination more practical than it is now. As we wish the Indian Medical Corps to be a *corps d'élite*, we consider that the men who enter it should have received a high class training in all branches of practical medicine. Such a training is unobtainable in India at the present day. It is impossible to obtain in Indian medical colleges complete instruction in gynæcology, obstetrics, and diseases of children; and in these colleges generally, education in ear, nose and throat surgery, advanced X-ray therapeutics and electro-therapeutics is either defective or unobtainable. All candidates should go through courses of instruction in these subjects in Great Britain.

To give Indians a fair chance of completing all the subjects of their medical education and of competing on an equality with doctors educated in the United Kingdom, we suggest that Government should offer for competition in India, after nomination, a limited number of scholarships, tenable for 18 months or two years in the United Kingdom, to medical students who have completed their third year, or to medical graduates of the five universities at Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore and Allahabad. The scholarships, would, as far as possible, be shared equally by the five universities, and their number would bear some relation to the number of impending vacancies in the Indian Medical Corps. Even if scholars did not succeed in finally obtaining admission to the corps, they would return to India much the better for the training which they had undergone, and would easily find places in the provincial services, or be able to set up in private practice with good prospects of success. We do not mean to exclude from the examination Indians who wish to compete but are not scholarship-holders.

The Public Services Commission, in the paragraph quoted above, pointed out that medical education for, at any rate, a civil practitioner could not in some respects be satisfactorily completed "in many parts of India," owing to the customs of the country. They added: "if it be found necessary to give Indians this training" (in midwifery and the diseases of women and children) "in the United Kingdom, sufficient facilities should be provided there for them." Our suggestions are in accordance with these views.

We consider that, in the present emergency, and before examination again becomes the only portal of entry, temporary officers of the Indian Medical Service should not be excluded from nomination to permanent commissions in the Indian Medical Corps, even though their medical education has been entirely received in India. Facilities for the completion of this education should be accorded to such nominated officers.

We have carefully considered the view expressed in paragraph 317 of the Montagu-Chelmsford report, that there should be, in all services now recruited from England, a fixed and annually rising percentage of recruitment in India. We are, however, unanimously of opinion that it is not advisable to attempt to fix a percentage of Indians to be admitted to the Indian Medical Corps. It is our desire as stated above, to form the Indian Medical Corps into a *corps d'élite*, and, whilst we consider that the State may legitimately help Indians to appear at the London examination, we consider it of paramount importance that the best possible doctors should be attracted to the corps. We believe that, if adequate professional opportunities, salaries and leave conditions are offered, the corps will in time obtain the popularity in Britain which the Indian Medical Service formerly enjoyed.

Miscellaneous departments and residuary posts.

53. The recruitment and prospects of the new corps will be considerably affected by the opportunities to be offered to its members, both British and Indian, in the fields of research, bacteriology and sanitation. The Secretary of State recognized this fact when he recently said to a deputation from the British Medical Association: "You and I are in complete agreement in thinking that opportunities for research and reward for research form an important part in the considerations which are necessary to ensure a good medical service for India."

Unless our scheme reserves to officers on both sides of the corps full opportunities for a career in scientific medicine, it will fail to attract highly trained men. We would therefore admit officers of the Indian Medical Corps to a first call on important research and bacteriological appointments. These appointments are few in number. It seems probable that they will shortly be in the gift of an Imperial Health or Advisory Board, research and bacteriology remaining imperial departments. We are in favour of such arrangements. In the absence of a suitable candidate from the Indian Medical Corps for one of the principal research or bacteriological appointments, the vacancy should be filled from outside. Officers of the corps who are admitted to these departments should in no case afterwards be liable to recall as ordinary military officers, but only as specialists. We would invite independent medical practitioners who wish to take part in research to work in the Government research institutes, giving them a salary if necessary.

Each province should develop its own sanitary department with the help of a sanitary commissioner who should be a member of the Indian Medical Corps. As many as possible of the deputy sanitary commissioners of each province should belong to the same corps. Sanitation is a subject which is of vital importance to the army and which is exceedingly well taught in army medical schools. It is also a subject in which the provincial Governments require additional expert aid.

The Jail Department is about to be examined by a committee of experts. We would provide that the inspectors-general of prisons and the superintendents of central jails should belong to the civil side of the Indian Medical Corps. No superintendent of a central jail who belongs to the corps should be considered available for military duty in any circumstances. These appointments should be placed in the residuary category, but officers in charge of smaller jails should be available for the ordinary war reserve. We consider that higher jail allowances should be given to civil surgeons in executive charge of jails. Such charges add greatly to their work and responsibilities.

The Public Services Commission recommended that "the teaching staff of each Government college should be treated as a separate unit." We think on the contrary, that professors in Government medical colleges should be selected, by an Advisory Board, from a special all-India list. No local Government can satisfactorily staff its medical colleges on all occasions from its own small cadre. We would reserve all clinical professorships for officers of the Indian Medical Corps. We would throw scientific professorships open, allowing a prior claim to officers of the corps, provided that candidates are thoroughly competent to fill the particular chairs concerned. There can be no doubt that such opportunities are necessary to attract to the corps men of scientific merit and attainments. We refer only to chairs in Government medical colleges. Chairs in aided colleges should be entirely open to the medical profession in India and the United Kingdom.

We would reserve superior posts in the chemical and alienist departments for officers of the corps, should suitable candidates be forthcoming.

We would debar medical officers holding scientific posts from private practice, giving them instead monthly allowances. Officers holding clinical posts should be allowed consulting and operating practice in their own subjects. So should chemical examiners and alienists.

No officer of the corps holding any superior chair on a professorial staff, or a chemical examinership, or an alienist post, should be liable to recall to military duty in any circumstances.

A junior Indian Medical Corps officer in temporary civil employment should be lost to the ordinary army reserve whilst holding a scientific professorial appointment, but he would again join the reserve [category (c)] if and when he gave up such an appointment.

The only alternative to our proposals.

54. Such are our main proposals. We have observed the chief principle emphasised by the Public Services Commission: the necessity for calculating separately on their merits the needs of the army and of the civil administration; but we are clearly of opinion that the wants of each will be best served by a system which entrusts the higher direction of military and civil medical affairs to distinct branches of one select and well-trained corps of officers who begin their careers with military service.

The only alternative to the scheme which we suggest is to abandon all attempts at unification, and to confine our recommendations simply to the formation of a medical corps for the Indian army, and substantial improvements in the salaries and leave rules of the Indian Medical Service. It would be necessary to equalize the attractions of this service and those of the Royal Army Medical Corps by fixing the salaries of officers of the former at considerably higher rates than those which suffice for officers of the latter.

The Indian Medical Corps would, in this case, be formed by the amalgamation into one corps of the officers of the military side of the Indian Medical Service, the sub-assistant surgeons of the Indian Medical Department, and the rank and file of the Army Hospital Corps and Army Bearer Corps, with the necessary establishments for Indian station hospitals. In order to carry out the required expansion in the cadre of officers to 3 per mille, it would be necessary to call for some volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps. But the Army Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps would remain distinct in India. Should this alternative be adopted, the friction and many of the inconveniences which have led to the appointment of our Committee will be perpetuated. The staff of British station hospitals would then consist of:—

(1) officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps;

(2) military assistant surgeons of the Indian Medical Department (to be used, according to our proposals in chapter V, solely as professional men);

(3) some of the rank and file of the Royal Army Medical Corps; and,

(4) some of the rank and file of the Indian Medical Corps.

Under this arrangement the staff of these hospitals would consist of members of three different services, the members of two of which (the Indian Medical Department and the Indian Medical Corps) would be serving under officers of a corps to which they do not in any sense belong.

Thus, although the alternative scheme would consolidate the staff of Indian station hospitals, it would perpetuate present disadvantages and reduplications. We wish, therefore, to press Government to accept unification, which seems to us to be the only satisfactory scheme in the circumstances. Now that from a military point of view a medical corps is imperative for the Indian Army, and that the old regimental system is gone for ever, the medical corps of the Indian Army must, in the interest of economical and smooth military administration, be amalgamated with the medical corps of the British Army in India.

Consent of the War Office necessary for the adoption of our scheme.

55. We fully realize that the consent of the War Office is necessary for the adoption of our scheme. That consent would also be necessary if the alternative scheme were adopted as it would be impossible at present to form a medical corps for the Indian Army alone without including therein transfers from the permanent or temporary personnel of the Royal Army Medical Corps. We trust that the War Office will accept the larger measure which we have proposed in the interest of the whole army in India.

We realize that the exclusion of officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps from India would deprive that corps of a valuable field of experience in tropical medicine. Its officers have, however, in other parts of the Empire, excellent opportunities in this direction. To obviate any disability arising from the closure to them of the field of research in India, we recommend that arrangements should be made whereby as many officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps as is considered desirable can be attached to any of the medical institutions in India.

Our proposals considered in the light of some other proposals detailed in our introductory chapter.

56. We are under great obligations to the excellent report of the Public Services Commission, and have only differed from them when we felt impelled to do so by altered circumstances, and a wider survey of the medical services than they were required to make, and by consideration of the lessons taught to India by the great war. In conformity with the general proposals of the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme we contemplate provincial civil medical services which will draw their main strength from our new corps. We have carefully considered the best means of meeting the wishes of educated Indians which are apparent from the debate in the Imperial Legislative Council referred to in paragraph 15 of our chapter I. We have already given reasons for our inability to recommend the formation of a civil medical service which would be wholly independent of the medical organization of the army in India. We have done our best to devise a system which will differentiate the military and civil medical services more effectively in time of war, whilst we point the way to greater mutual assistance and complementary effort during peace.

We do not find that, even during the great war, there was anything approaching "absolute dislocation and paralysis of civil work throughout the country"; nor do we think that officers of the civil medical service should ever consider themselves divorced from all obligation to take part, if so required, in the defence of India. We by no means intend that Indian talent shall be excluded from either the civil or the military side of our new medical corps. On the contrary, we have proposed increased facilities for qualified Indian candidates. We find that, so far from the drafting of Indian Medical Service officers into civil employ being a hindrance to the progress and expansion of the independent medical profession, the latter owes its existence and growth to this very circumstance. We are sure that it will continue to grow, and will grow all the faster by contact with a strong and efficient superior civil medical service, and the influence which such a service must exercise on the spread of western medicine and sanitation among the people. We agree with the Public Services Commission that, "if there were no State service in the country, there would be large tracts which would be left without any provision for western medical relief." With them we "are convinced that State control is necessary in order to secure the continued and extended diffusion in India of western medical knowledge." We are also sure that this State control should be exercised by means of a thoroughly efficient service consisting of British and Indians. The British element will, as the Secretary of State has already realized, not be obtainable without the offer of adequate salaries and wide professional opportunities. And, as a considerable British element is essential, both in the interest of the progress of western medicine in the country, and because, in the words of the Secretary of State, the medical service is "the pivot upon which all other imperial services in India depend," we recommend that measures be taken which will effectually secure it. At the same time we have no desire either that this British element shall monopolise the new corps, or that the latter shall absorb the civil medical services of the country. We hope that this corps will contain a strong and high class Indian element, and that the Governments of the various provinces will, with the help of officers from that corps, develop their own medical administrations, appointing their own officers as occasion arises. We further desire that western medicine be advanced in every way possible both by Government and by non-official efforts, and we have emphasized the need which exists for far wider and more general endeavours in this direction. We have done our best to meet Indian political opinion in so far as we could do so with the knowledge which we have acquired of the many-sided conditions of the problem before us.

CHAPTER IV.

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OFFICER GRADE.

General causes of discontent.

57. THE causes of discontent in the Indian Medical Service are apparent from our paragraphs 9, 10, 14 and 38. We may add to those already stated the present high cost of living in India, which, in the absence of an increase of salaries, has for years pressed heavily on all officers of the Indian services who have wives and families and do not occupy high positions. Recruiting for the Indian Medical Service was, up to the year 1900, maintained largely by the traditions of the service founded on conditions which had even in those days passed away. It was still a common belief in England that India was a cheap country to live in. India is no longer a cheap country to live in. The average officer with a family pays more rent for his bungalow in India than he does for a house in England suitable for a man of his position to live in. He also often pays more in servants' wages than an officer of his position does in England. Furthermore, he has the burden of keeping up two establishments in the hot season, and of the heavy travelling expenses connected with the annual move of his family to the hills, and the journey for himself and his family to the United Kingdom when he can obtain leave. In addition, all imported articles, such as wearing apparel and provisions, are much more expensive in India than in England. In fact the only necessaries of life that are cheaper in India than in England are the common articles of food produced in the country, such as meat, vegetables, bread, etc., the cost of which forms only a small proportion of his obligatory expenditure. The purchasing power of officers' pay has fallen so much that in many instances they are unable to save enough to meet the expenses connected with furlough to England, including the cost of passage both ways. Unless an officer has saved substantially he cannot take furlough, as his income is then considerably reduced.

In 1913, Mr. Datta's Committee, which toured India for two years, reported that the rise of prices in the previous few years had been 22½ per cent. The increase is now computed to be far in excess of this figure.

The special causes which have worked for discontent in the Indian Medical Service are as follows:—

(a) The salary of an Indian Medical Service officer was fixed many years ago on the understanding that, private prcatice being permitted, a large number of officers would be able greatly to increase their income from this source. There can be no doubt that, except in the case of comparatively few officers, private practice has diminished very considerably and has in many instances completely disappeared. We are, of course, aware that steps have already been taken to remedy the inadequacy of salaries.

(b) Although the leave rules contemplate that an officer will ordinarily spend 6 years on furlough out of 30 years' service in India, the experience of the senior officers of the service proves that leave has been difficult and in many instances impossible to obtain. Leave was totally closed to the Indian Medical Service during the Burma war, the Tirah campaign, the China war, the South African war and this war. It has also been closed, if not to the whole service, at any rate to the civil side in some provinces, at different times owing to plague and famine. One senior officer who gave evidence before us stated that the average period of furlough enjoyed by Indian Medical Service officers in civil employment during 30 years' service was probably less than 3 years. In fact the leave cadre of the service has never been sufficient to allow of the grant to officers of the total amount of leave admissible under regulations. Other services in India maintain higher leave reserves, although they come under similar furlough rules. The Indian Medical Service leave reserve was, till recently, 20 per cent., the Indian Civil Service 25·89 per cent., the Supply and Transport Corps, Military Works Service, and Military Accounts Department, 25 per cent. The majority of the officers of the service had, on the civil side at any rate, large accumulations of leave due to them before the war. When the benefit of study leave was granted no extra provision was made to enlarge the leave reserve and consequently, in the past, when study leave was taken it was at the expense of ordinary furlough. It is true that sanction was accorded, in 1916, to an increase of the leave and study reserves of the Indian Medical Service to a total of 23½ per cent., but, owing to the cessation of recruiting, this increase has not yet had time to have any effect. But if leave has been scanty work has been abundant.

(*c*) Every Indian Medical Service officer of above 15 years' service has told us that work has enormously increased in amount and that a higher standard is generally required. In the meantime medical education has become more expensive, more difficult, and more prolonged. As work has increased and leave has become more difficult to obtain, the 30 years of Indian service have become more onerous, but the savings of officers have at the same time diminished. This has led to delayed retirement, with the result that officers have reached administrative rank too late in life.

(*d*) A considerable amount of discontent has existed in the Indian Medical Service on account of the fact that its military side has always been administered by an officer of the Army Medical Service (see our paragraph 4). We have already referred, in paragraph 14, to the consequences of the war to officers of the Indian Medical Service.

(*e*) There is a feeling that substantive promotions to administrative grades have been inadequate in number in view of the increase that has occurred in the Indian Army.

(*f*) The station hospital system has only just superseded the regimental system in the Indian army. Station hospital buildings are so far unsatisfactory. Indeed, they are generally incomplete, obsolete, and likely to depress, from the point of view of their profession, high-class medical officers who may be deputed to work in them. In the interests of the patients and of such officers, an improved class of building should be introduced as rapidly as is financially possible.

58. The remedies for all these disabilities and grievances fall naturally into five groups:— **Remedies.**

(*a*) *Increased salaries.*—This is now under consideration.

(*b*) *More liberal leave.*—Leave, next to pay, is to the officers of the Indian Medical Service the most important consideration just now. We strongly recommend that efforts should be made by Government, both on the military and on the civil side, to give, at as early a date as possible, such leave to regular officers of the Indian Medical Service as is long overdue. We recommend also that study leave be converted into study duty, and that officers be granted passages to the United Kingdom and back when absent from India on study duty. The leave, casualty and study reserves should be brought up to sufficient strength to enable officers to obtain furlough in accordance with regulations.

(*c*) *Earlier full pension.*—We have received evidence from Indian Medical Service officers to the effect that the conditions of service have so changed that it has become necessary to shorten the period of service for full pension from 30 to 28 years. The reasons given for this are, that work in India has enormously increased, that greater responsibility is thrown on individual officers, and that the ordinary civil surgeon is so occupied with his work that he has no time for private practice. In addition to this the average age at which officers enter the service has considerably increased in recent years.

(*d*) *Improved position of civil administrative officers.*—Complaint has been made that the position of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, and surgeons-general and inspectors-general under the Government of India and provincial Governments is unsatisfactory. This question was discussed by the Public Services Commission. They did not recommend that civil administrative medical officers should be appointed secretaries to Government. The director-general and all the administrative officers have stated that they desire to have the right of direct access to the Viceroy and heads of provinces, respectively. We have found that in most of the provinces custom and good feeling between the Government and the administrative officers have already led to this access being given, but we think that it would be better to constitute it a right.

(*e*) *Improvement of Indian station hospital buildings.*—We recommend that these buildings be brought up to date as early as possible.

CHAPTER V.

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MINOR AND PROVINCIAL SERVICES.

A.—Military Assistant Surgeons.

Their future place in the medical organization.

59. IN no branch of the medical services have we found so much discontent as in that of the military assistant surgeons, and we have no doubt that their status and prospects should be improved materially. It has been suggested to us by a number of witnesses that recruitment of this class should be discontinued, but we are convinced that this is not feasible, in view of the fact that they fill, in the medical organization of the country, a place which cannot be filled otherwise, except by the employment, at prohibitive cost, of additional commissioned medical officers. The duties on the military side to which we refer are those of assistant medical officers, or house surgeons, in station hospitals, and those of medical officers in charge of small parties of troops or camps. On the civil side they can be employed with advantage on railways, in stations on the Persian Gulf, in out of the way stations on the frontier, in small hill stations and in other appointments of a similar character.

Future standard of education.

60. In future, in accordance with orders issued by the Government of India, in 1914, candidates for admission to medical colleges as military medical pupils must possess a preliminary education of the standard required by the General Medical Council of the United Kingdom, and their course of training in the colleges will last for five years instead of four. In these circumstances military medical pupils will be able to sit for examinations which will, if they pass, give them a qualification registrable in the United Kingdom. We recommend that only those pupils be entertained whose academic qualifications are such as to enable them to sit in the university classes in the medical colleges and to proceed to a medical degree. We are of opinion that those pupils who fail to obtain such a qualification should only be admitted to the Indian Medical Corps if they pass the membership examination of the College of Surgeons and Physicians, Bombay, or of one of the provincial State Medical Faculties. We attach the greatest importance to this proposal because, as already explained in paragraph 44, we contemplate in our scheme of re-organization that the military assistant surgeon should be employed in

the Indian Medical Corps on purely professional duties of the same nature as those of a commissioned medical officer.

Obligations and conditions of service.

61. They should all be required to serve Government for a period of ten years in return for the free medical education which they have received.

We would make a distinction between those military assistant surgeons who obtain a degree and those who only secure a diploma. We suggest that the former at the end of three years' service be permitted, after selection, to proceed, at Government expense where necessary, to the United Kingdom and compete for the Indian Medical Corps commissioned ranks. The remainder should serve Government for seven years as warrant officers, for seven years as lieutenants, for six years as captains and for the rest of their service as majors, beyond which rank they should not rise.

We recognize that, with the superior qualifications to be required of the military assistant surgeon, it will be necessary to give him substantial increases of pay and pension, though we are not in a position to recommend what these should be.

B.—Military Sub-Assistant Surgeons.

Their importance to the army.

62. The military sub-assistant surgeon is an integral part of our Indian Army organization, and a valuable assistant to the medical services in peace and war. The importance of his work in the army is shown by the vast expansion of this branch that has taken place during the war. The number of military sub-assistant surgeons in peace time is 894, of whom 154 (the war reserve) are in civil employment. On the 30th November, 1918, there were in military employment in India 1,256, and overseas 721, a total of 1,977, or more than twice the peace strength. This was not sufficient to meet demands from overseas forces connected with India, and 1,323 dressers had to be entertained as substitutes.

Abolition suggested by some witnesses.

63. Some witnesses whom we examined were in favour of the abolition of the military sub-assistant surgeon, on the ground that the duties he now performs as resident medical officer should be carried out by officers of commissioned rank. We are unable to agree to this, if only on account of the large increase in expenditure that would be involved by acceptance of the proposal.

Summary of grievances of sub-assistant surgeons.

64. The Committee received a number of representations from sub-assistant surgeons and their associations. These largely dealt with questions of preliminary education for entry into the medical schools; eligibility for assistant surgeons' appointments; the duration of the professional curriculum and the standard of their medical education; provision of hostels for Indian military medical pupils; amount of the stipend granted to such pupils; change of designation; improvement of quarters; study periods; grant of Indian commissions on leaving their medical schools; increase of pay, allowances, pensions and rates of travelling allowances.

We know of no branch of Government service to which such a large number of concessions have been made during the last 20 years than to the one under reference. For example, in the matter of pay we find that, up to 1910, third class hospital assistants were in receipt of Rs. 20 per mensem, with Rs. 5 extra if they were qualified in English; to-day they receive Rs. 60 per mensem. The various sub-charge allowances, although fewer, have been increased in amount; the sub-assistant surgeon now receives free rations, and free quarters; and the course of his professional education has been extended from 3 to 4 years at Government expense.

Preliminary education.

65. There is considerable disparity in the preliminary education required of this class for admission to the various medical schools. In none is it up to the standard required of university medical students in India, or that of the General Medical Council of Great Britain and Ireland, yet sub-assistant surgeons wish to be allowed to compete for university qualifications and to obtain diplomas registrable in the United Kingdom. We are of opinion that they should all be educated up to the standard of the Indian university matriculation examination, but we do not consider that sufficient grounds

exist for us to recommend that Government should undertake the additional expenditure involved in extending their free education to the extent which they desire, particularly as the qualifications to which they aspire are not necessary for the duties required or likely to be required of them.

Difference in training of assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons.

66. Military assistant surgeons obtain their professional training at the three presidency medical colleges and attend the same classes and do the same work in the colleges and hospitals as pupils of the civil assistant surgeon class. Military sub-assistant surgeons, on the other hand, receive their professional training at medical schools, in which the technical teaching is not up to the standard of the medical colleges. For various reasons it has been found necessary to train the assistant surgeon and sub-assistant surgeon pupils in different institutions, even when they are in the same city or town.

It is doubtless desirable that lads of exceptional talent should be given opportunities for further study and advance in a medical career, and we suggest that any military sub-assistant surgeon who has obtained a membership diploma of the Bombay College of Surgeons and Physicians, or of a State Medical Faculty, shall be eligible for transfer to the military assistant surgeon branch.

Hostels.

67. Hostels are provided in certain of the medical schools. We are of opinion that they should be provided in all.

Change of designation.

68. Many witnesses have asked for a change in designation. Most of them wish to be called Assistant Surgeons. There are several reasons against this. They began with the name of Dresser; then they became Hospital Assistants; in 1910 they were called Sub-Assistant Surgeons, a title which, until 1874, had denoted the civil assistant surgeons of the present day. If Government do not see their way to granting Indian commissioned rank, as suggested below, we find it difficult to suggest a better designation than the present.

Indian commissioned rank to all sub-assistant surgeons.

69. The military sub-assistant surgeon asks to be given a commission as soon as he qualifies, and he is supported in this request by some of the senior Indian Medical Service officers who have given evidence before us.

At present about 10 per cent. of sub-assistant surgeons hold Indian commissions as jemadars and subadars, but such rank is not generally attained until after 20 years' service. We understand that the Government of India have under consideration a proposal to grant Indian commissions to this class at an earlier date. We do not think that, under existing conditions, a sub-assistant surgeon is fit to assume the military responsibilities associated with the rank of jemadar until he has had at least 5 years' service. We would recommend, however, that all sub-assistant surgeons should go through a full course of military training, when they first enter the service, at the proposed Indian Medical Corps Depôt and School of Instruction. If this is done, we think that every sub-assistant surgeon might be given commissioned rank, as jemadar, on completing the course and passing an examination in the subjects in which he has been trained.

Physical training at medical schools.

70. It has been represented to us that military sub-assistant surgeons break down under the strain of field service more rapidly than any other branch of the Indian Army. This is ascribed largely to defects in physique. We therefore recommend that they be selected with greater regard to physical fitness, and that they be put through a regular system of physical training during their medical school career.

Study periods.

71. Military sub-assistant surgeons should be required to undergo study duty periods at regular intervals in post-graduate courses, and at the proposed depot and school.

Pay.

72. We consider that the military sub-assistant surgeon is now in receipt of a liberal wage when the facts that he has received a free medical education, and is in receipt of free rations, quarters, and clothing allowance, are taken into account.

Sub-charge allowance.

73. A frequent complaint is that many sub-assistant surgeons, by the change from the regimental to the station hospital system, have been deprived

of sub-charge allowances. When regimental hospitals existed there were usually two sub-assistant surgeons attached to each, the senior of whom drew sub-charge allowance. Under the new system, in Indian station hospitals, some of which have as many as 16 or more sub-assistant surgeons, only one of them gets this allowance.

The allowance for sub-medical charge of a regiment under the old system was Rs. 10 per mensem, and was, under normal conditions, rarely drawn by a sub-assistant surgeon with less than 15 years' service. To compensate for the loss of this allowance, the pay of all sub-assistant surgeons with more than 15 years' service has been raised by Rs. 15 per mensem. In addition, liberal allowances for the sub-charge of Indian station hospitals have been sanctioned. The lowest of these allowances is Rs. 15 per mensem and the highest Rs. 40, as compared with Rs. 5 and Rs. 20 for the sub-charge of the central stores and office of the Senior Medical Officer, Indian Medical Service, under the old system. In these circumstances we do not consider that any case exists for an increase of allowances.

Expenses connected with transfers from one station to another.

74. We have received many complaints that officers of this class have been exposed to frequent—sometimes technically "temporary"—transfers involving them in either separation from their families or excessive expense in taking their families with them. We should like to bring this to the notice of Government as being a serious and, we are disposed to think, often justified cause of discontent.

Allowances while travelling on duty.

75. The allowances, admissible under Army Regulations, India, volume I, paragraph 907 (foot-note), to sub-assistant surgeons while travelling on duty are, in our opinion, inadequate. Sub-assistant surgeons are required to travel on duty, *e.g.*, in medical charge of troops and invalids, much more frequently than Indian officers and men of combatant units. We understand that many sub-assistant surgeons have been put to very considerable financial loss through the performance of frequent journeys with inadequate allowances. We recommend that the allowances be so increased as to prevent such loss.

Pensions.

76. We understand that the question of the revision of the rates of pension and family pension admissible to military sub-assistant surgeons was deferred for consideration after the war. We recommend that these matters be taken up as early as possible. We should like to see some form of provident fund introduced. Many of the witnesses examined expressed their willingness to contribute to such a fund if constituted.

C.—Civil Assistant Surgeons.

Claims to superior appointments.

77. The evidence we have recorded brings out the fact that the civil assistant surgeon lays claim not only to the superior civil appointments now open to the military assistant surgeon, but to a larger proportion of those held in each province by members of the Indian Medical Service. He asserts that his class is, as shown in the recent war, perfectly able to take the place of the Indian Medical Service officer and of the military assistant surgeon as a war reserve. It is unnecessary for us to give in detail the reasons why we are unable to accept this contention.

Previously to the war assistant surgeons held only a small number, calculated on a percentage prescribed by the Government of India, of the superior district appointments. It is doubtful if any administration would endorse a suggestion made to us to throw open the superior appointments now held by civil assistant surgeons to competitive examination; but we think that selection for superior appointments should take place earlier in their service, perhaps at the fourteenth year, subject to a period of probation for those who have not been tried already in officiating appointments. At present few obtain such promotion before twenty years' service, and the average is considerably above this period.

Alleged disabilities.

78. We will now refer to the more important of the disabilities under which civil assistant surgeons allege that they labour. Most of these are

common to all the provinces. They complain that facilities for independent work are wanting; that civil surgeons are inclined to monopolise the more important surgical operations; that they obtain no study leave or post-graduate courses. They contend that the latter should be substituted for the septennial examinations. Exception was taken in Bombay to the reservation of the resident medical officer appointments for military assistant surgeons. Other demands are in connection with the conditions of service; for pensions to be given at 25 years' service, or 20 years on medical certificate; abolition of the designation of assistant surgeon, as suggested by the Public Services Commission; eligibility for professorial appointments in Government colleges; greater recognition on ceremonial occasions; and lastly and most important, an increase of pay.

Remedies proposed.

79. We proceed to suggest remedies where these seem essential.

We understand that in some provinces civil assistant surgeons are being substituted for sub-assistant surgeons in charge of dispensaries in growing towns, and it would seem advantageous for provincial governments to assist district boards and municipalities to do this more extensively. A considerable number of independent charges are held by graduates who have therein an opportunity for advancing their reputation. We consider that self-reliance and a sense of responsibility might be still further developed in this class, by using them more than at present to supervise the work carried on in rural dispensaries by sub-assistant surgeons, and by giving them a definite place in the sanitary work of the sub-district or tahsil in which their charge lies.

We consider that they should be required to undergo study periods at regular intervals during their service, and that an examination should be held after each course to test the extent to which they have profited by it.

Unless Government makes a radical change in the nomenclature of the minor medical services, we would make no change in the designation of this class.

As regards the claim to professorial appointments in Government colleges, we understand that some such appointments have already been thrown open alike to the assistant surgeon class and to the independent medical profession. In paragraph 53 of our report we have suggested the policy which should be adopted in making these appointments.

There can be no doubt that the pay of the civil assistant surgeon is inadequate and that an increase for all grades is overdue. We would indeed go further than the recommendation made by the Public Services Commission to the effect that the future pay of the service should be for all provinces, except Burma, Rs. 150 rising by triennial increments to Rs. 400, and propose that the minimum pay of this class should be Rs. 200 per mensem. This rate we consider would not be in any way excessive when the qualifications which should be required of the civil assistant surgeon are taken into consideration. We have been informed that in some provinces, owing to the present low rates of pay, Government is now not obtaining, as it should, the best men of this class.

There is a very laudable desire expressed for some kind of military training, which however most of the witnesses considered should be restricted to the earlier years of service. It would be impossible to give all civil assistant surgeons a prolonged training such as has been suggested by some witnesses, but we consider that, from both a military and a civil point of view, it would be of great advantage if a limited number were given periods of training at the proposed Indian Medical Corps Depot and School of Instruction.

D.—Civil Sub-Assistant Surgeons.

tatus and ualifications.

80. Civil sub-assistant surgeons, on account of their numbers and the nature of their duties, form an important part of the medical organization of the country, and many of them have represented to us that their status should be improved so as to approximate to that of the civil assistant surgeon. But this request seems to us unreasonable. The qualifications required of the two classes are widely different, and the cost of raising the status of the sub-

assistant surgeon to the extent proposed would be prohibitive. We may look forward to a time when the Government will only employ on medical duties those who have obtained a complete medical education, but for some years to come the sub-assistant surgeon class, as at present constituted, will pay an indispensable part in the medical organization of India.

Pay.

81. The pay of the civil sub-assistant surgeon varies in the different provinces and is now much lower than that of the military sub-assistant surgeon. The Bombay Government has adopted the time scale already in force in Madras, and we are of opinion that, considering (*a*) the enhanced cost of living throughout India, (*b*) the nature and responsibilities of the duties that devolve upon them, and (*c*) the temptations in connection with medico-legal work, especially to junior men, the example set by these two governments should be generally followed.

Designation.

82. We have considered the wish expressed generally by civil sub-assistant surgeons for the abolition of their present designation. We do not consider that their claim to be called Assistant Surgeons is justified, and we would not advise that the existing designation, denoting rank, as it does, should be abolished, unless this is also done in the case of the civil assistant surgeon.

Standard of education.

83. We are of opinion that the sub-assistant surgeon should have a more complete medical education, and a sufficiently good general education to enable him to obtain the fullest benefit from the instruction given to him. The matriculation examination standard is now very generally demanded from civil students entering a medical school, and we consider that this practice should become universal, and also that a minimum and uniform standard of medical education for this class should be adopted in all provinces.

The war reserve of sub-assistant surgeons in civil employment.

84. Although it has been suggested to us that all civil sub-assistant surgeons should be required to undergo military training before admission to the provincial services, it is doubtful whether such a radical change could be made applicable to the whole of India, or indeed whether it is really necessary. We have, however, to ensure that a sufficient number of sub-assistant surgeons can be made available as a war reserve for service, not only in India but also overseas. In the United Provinces it was considered that it would only be necessary to extend the period of liability to remain in Government service to 10 years, and to increase the penalty in case of default to Rs. 1,000. We cannot think of a better solution of this difficult problem. We have received a suggestion that every civil sub-assistant surgeon should be required to sign an agreement binding him to serve wherever he may be required, on either civil or military duty, as a condition of service under the civil government. We strongly recommend that, if possible, effect may be given to this suggestion; for it is obvious from the experience of the recent war, during which the most liberal inducements completely failed to provide an adequate number of volunteers, that it will be necessary to take steps to ensure for the army a sufficient reserve of sub-assistant surgeons when they are required in the future. We recommend, also, that those civil sub-assistant surgeons who are called up for military service should be given three months training in the proposed Indian Medical Corps Depot and School, at the end of which they should be given the temporary rank of jemadar and supplied with uniform.

Post-graduate courses for sub-assistant surgeons.

85. It is, if anything, more necessary for the sub-assistant surgeon than for the assistant surgeon to have compulsory courses of post-graduate instruction, and these should be arranged for him at regular intervals.

We are also of opinion that arrangements should be made to bring into district headquarters, as frequently as possible, for periods of training there, all sub-assistant surgeons in charge of rural dispensaries.

CHAPTER VI.

MEDICAL STORE DEPARTMENT.

The question of re-organiza-

86. In view of the many complex and intricate problems involved in considering any re-organization of the Medical Store Department, and also in

tion referred to a sub-committee.

view of the short time at our disposal, we considered it desirable to refer the whole question to a sub-committee, consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel Shairp and Lieutenant-Colonel H. Ross, Assistant Director-General, Indian Medical Service (Stores), who was co-opted for this purpose.

The sub-committee went most carefully into all the questions affecting the Medical Store Department and, although they are unable, for want of time, to visit the Medical Store Depot at Rangoon, they inspected all the depots in India.

Report of the sub-committee.

87. We attach, as annexure IX the full and valuable report which they have submitted, and with which those of us who belong to the medical services are in general agreement. The President, Mr. Hignell and Major Cramer-Roberts feel that they have been unable, from lack of time and technical knowledge, to give this subject as much attention as would entitle them to express an opinion. We desire to invite particular attention to the following points.

The necessity for improved accommodation.

88. Having seen for ourselves the depots at Madras and Bombay, we are convinced of the necessity for the early provision of improved accommodation at both places, and in view of the description of the Lahore depot, which the committee as a whole were unable to visit, we consider that a scheme for re-building it, and for providing improved accommodation there also, should be taken in hand as early as practicable. More particularly is this extension and improvement of accommodation necessary in the case of the laboratories at the Madras and Bombay depots, if the development of manufacture and the pioneering of industries in connection with preparations from indigenous products is to be extended.

Closing of the laboratory at Lahore.

89. We concur in the recommendations as to the closing of the laboratory at Lahore and the transfer of such machinery as can be more usefully employed at one of the larger depots. We also agree that the services of the chemist now at Lahore should be utilised elsewhere.

Status and emoluments of medical storekeepers.

90. We are convinced that a considerable improvement in the terms of employment of medical storekeepers, and the establishments in medical store depots is urgently required. The work is arduous and by no means congenial to the professional man, and we consider it most necessary that there should be adequate provision for purposes of leave and for the due performance of the administrative and supervisory duties. We, therefore, strongly support the recommendations of the sub-committee for an increase of cadre and for the retention of the posts of deputy medical storekeeper which were instituted as a war measure. We are not, however, in agreement with the sub-committee in regard to the scales of pay and allowances which they recommend for the medical storekeepers. We consider that, instead of the intricate system of various allowances which they propose, it would be preferable to institute, if possible, a scale of consolidated pay based upon the importance of the work carried out at each of the depots. We therefore recommend that the medical storekeepers at Madras and Bombay should be graded for purposes of pay as Assistant Directors of Medical Services holding administrative appointments, and draw the consolidated rate of pay which, it is understood, has been recommended for this administrative grade. At Calcutta and Lahore, where the work is of a less arduous nature, we consider that it would be sufficient if the Medical Storekeepers were graded, for purposes of pay, as Assistant Directors of Medical Services at Army Headquarters. We realise that, at the present time, in view of the junior rank of the officers who must shortly succeed to these appointments, the rates of pay may appear unduly high, but we would not let this stand in the way of our recommendations.

Designation of medical Storekeeper.

91. We support the recommendation that the designation of Medical Storekeeper should be changed to that of Officer-in-charge, Medical Store Depot.

Establishments.

92. At all the depots which we visited the deficiency in trained and adequate establishment was brought forcibly to our notice. We, therefore, strongly support the recommendation that this question should now be fully examined, and that the scale of establishment should be raised, and a better

class of men entertained. In no class is the deficiency of adequate establishment more marked than in that of compounders, and we would strongly recommend that these men to whom is entrusted the issue of many poisonous drugs, should be required to undergo a specific examination. We consider that this examination should be in the nature of a standard prescribed by Government and should not be left to the discretion of the medical storekeeper concerned. Compounders should be recruited from among men who have passed this test, or, should there be an exceptionally intelligent employee in a depot, he might be allowed to undergo training and pass the examination at the proposed Indian Medical Corps Depot and School. We have been informed that a serious accident occurred recently at one of the depots owing to the deficient education of a so-called compounder, and it is most desirable that the possibility of such occurrences should be removed.

Emergent indents.

93. We consider that the number of emergent indents appears to be far in excess of what is necessary, and we concur in the opinion of the sub-committee that administrative medical officers should exercise greater control over such indents and their submission.

Institutions to be supplied by the depots.

94. We support the policy recommended by the sub-committee for the supply of drugs, etc., to medical institutions in this country.

Measures to prevent the adulteration of drugs.

95. We are convinced of the desirability of some form of protection as regards the quality of drugs offered for sale in the open market. We recommend that the consideration of the feasibility of such a measure should be taken up as soon as possible, though we recognise the difficulties inherent in the introduction of legislation of this nature.

Employment of military assistant surgeons in medical store depots.

96. We are of opinion that, if our proposals, given elsewhere in this report, with regard to the improvement of the position of military assistant surgeons are accepted, the number of officers of this class employed in medical store depots could be considerably reduced. It will be a waste of technical education and the high qualifications with which we now propose that the assistant surgeon should be invested to employ him in a subordinate position where these qualifications are of comparatively little value. We suggest, therefore, that the appointments now held by military assistant surgeons should be filled from the more intelligent men of the depot establishment, and that a suitable grading and scale of pay should be devised for them and submitted to Government by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service. We recognise, however, that it may be necessary in an exceptional case, such as that of the Rangoon depot, which is a collateral charge, to retain the services of a military assistant surgeon for the purpose of supervision.

Employment of research and pharmaceutical chemists.

97. We consider it very necessary that research and pharmaceutical chemists should be employed in certain of the depots. Much valuable work of the nature which these chemists would do has, in the past, been performed by some of the military assistant surgeons now employed. The reduction, as suggested in the previous paragraph, the number of assistant surgeons employed in these depots would increase the necessity for employing chemists, although we consider that this necessity would not be obviated by their retention.

Equipment list and forms in use in depots.

98. We strongly support the recommendation for the standardization of the forms in use in medical store depots and for the revision of the equipment list. It is most desirable that the latter should always be kept up to date.

Increase in the staff of the office of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service.

99. The sub-committee has recommended that certain work, such as the pricing of the home indents, should be thrown upon the office of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service. If these proposals are accepted, the staff in the office of the Director-General should be increased. We are of opinion that the senior officer dealing with questions regarding medical stores, in this office, should be graded as a Deputy Director-General, Indian Medical Service, and that he should be assisted by an officer graded as Assistant Director-General, together with a suitable staff of clerks. These appointments should be open to the cadre of the Medical Store Department, which should be increased permanently, or temporarily, to the extent necessary.

Verification of stocks.

100. We regret that we are unable to support in their entirety the views of the sub-committee with regard to the verification of stocks. We consider that a reduction in this verification to the extent apparently contemplated by the sub-committee might possibly prove disastrous. We, therefore, recommend that the complete verification of all stocks held in medical store depots should be undertaken at least once in every three years.

System of accounting.

101. We are convinced of the necessity for a change in the system of accounting at present in force in medical store depots, and we consider that that recommended by the sub-committee should be adopted, at any rate as an experimental measure.

The future control of the department.

102. We have not as yet touched upon the question of the future control of the Medical Store Department in the event of our proposals for an Indian Medical Corps being accepted. The large civil obligations of the department seem to make it impossible to place it under the Commander-in-Chief. On the whole, we are inclined to rcommend that the Medical Store Department should be placed under that Department of the Government of India which will in future control the civil medical service.

CHAPTER VII.

MISCELLANEOUS.

A.—Sanitary and Bacteriological Departments.

Co-operation between research and clinical medicine.

103. We have had a considerable amount of information connected with the administration and working of the Sanitary and Bacteriological Departments placed at our disposal, but we are chiefly indebted to the report of the conference of sanitary and bacteriological experts held at Delhi, in December last.

We are unanimously of opinion that to obtain the best results there must be closer co-operation between medical research and applied preventive and curative medicine.

Health boards.

104. We would recommend the formation of one Imperial Health Board, with the head of the Indian civil medical service as its president, and provincial health boards with the administrative heads of the provincial medical services occupying a similar position.

If, as we consider most necessary, a directorship of medical research is created, then this director and the Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India would be the more important members of the central board, with the Deputy Director-General, Indian Medical Service, as secretary. In the provinces the members would advantageously and conveniently be the Sanitary Commissioner, the Inspector-General of Prisons, a representative of the Medical Council of Registration, either a representative of medical research or one of the professors of the local medical college, and the provincial Sanitary Engineer. Each board would have the power to co-opt members for long or short periods as required.

Expansion of the departments.

105. The Secretary of State has emphasized the necessity for a more liberal provision of public health institutes and research laboratories. We would endorse all that has been said in this connection, and add that our inquiries have shown us how great the future expansion of the bacteriological and sanitary services generally must be, if there is to be an adequate expansion of sanitary work in India.

Officers for sanitary work.

106. There is great need for more officers of the type of the Indian Medical Service officer, who must, we consider, be highly trained in public health and tropical medicine, and must also be men accustomed to control others. We would not, however; confine these appointments to the Indian Medical Service, but offer inducements to attract the best men trained in the United Kingdom or in India, whether European or Indian. At present good men are often deterred from preparing themselves for a career in public health owing to the poor prospects which such a career now offers. It is not

only in the matter of pay but also in the conditions of service that there is discontent amongst men serving in provincial sanitary appointments; they find service under municipal bodies unsatisfactory, and clamour for the establishment of a properly graded service, which would give them a better official status and would also offer within it prospects of promotion and a certain pension, as well as providing them with a professional head to whom they could look to safeguard their interests.

Co-operation in the provinces.

107. We desire to emphasize the necessity for closer co-operation between the administrative heads of the medical services of provinces and sanitary commissioners. There is, we consider, a tendency for these officers to work independently.

We consider that the two services should be controlled by the same department of government.

B.—Alienist Department.

History.

108. As far as the history of the administration and management of lunatic asylums in India goes we may confine ourselves to the consideration of three important decisions of the Secretary of State and the Government of India. These decisions were: (*a*) to maintain one central asylum in each of the five large provinces, (*b*) to substitute whole-time for part-time superintendents in these central asylums, and (*c*) to keep alienist appointments open to, but not to reserve them for, Indian Medical Service officers.

Central and district asylums.

109. There are now 6 central asylums managed by whole-time officers of the Indian Medical Service, and 14 smaller asylums, the charge of which is held by civil surgeons in addition to their other duties. These asylums are controlled by local governments and inspected by the administrative medical heads of the provinces.

Considering the great strides made in the treatment and care of persons suffering from mental diseases, we are of opinion that Government's decision in favour of central asylums in substitution of district asylums should be acted upon to a further degree, so as to permit of the majority of cases coming under the care of trained experts or specialists at as early a period in the course of the malady as possible.

The recruitment of alienists.

110. We would adhere to the decision to keep asylum appointments open to others than Indian Medical Corps officers, but we would insist upon all who are selected having a practical training in the treatment and management of mental cases.

Formation of a department.

111. We are of opinion that no great advance is likely to be made in the administrative control of asylums until there is established a definite and properly organized department, with its own leave and study reserves.

Medical officers and assistants.

112. We are satisfied that more medical officers are required if the treatment of insanes is to be efficiently carried out; there should in our opinion be not less than two qualified alienists in each of the large asylums, besides assistants, and each provincial asylum should be in charge of a trained alienist. We would continue the employment of military assistant surgeons as assistants to the superintendents, but we suggest that an attempt should be made, by offering a more suitable salary, to induce the best men of this class and also Indian graduates to take up mental work.

Superintendents of central asylums as military consultants.

113. We endorse the suggestion made in the course of our inquiries that, when a department is established and properly organized, superintendents of the central asylums would naturally become consultants to military hospitals, but we would add that such an arrangement would necessarily follow on the adoption of our scheme for a unified service.

C.—Women's Medical Service in India.

History.

114. The early history of medical relief for Indian women by women doctors is associated with missionary enterprise, but in about 1873 government medical colleges and schools commenced to open their doors to women, who were taught in the same classes as male students. These Indian medical

women when qualified received a certificate or license similar to that given to sub-assistant surgeons. They were left to find employment for themselves, and most of them entered the service of local bodies for work in the women's departments of general hospitals or dispensaries. They did not belong to any organized service.

The Dufferin Fund.

115. At the instance of the Countess of Dufferin a fund was established in 1885, mainly with the object of bringing out medical women from England for employment in local fund hospitals. The pay of these posts was, however, small and owing to this, and to the absence of pension and official status, the appointments offered failed to attract women of ability in the numbers required.

In 1909 an appeal for assistance was made to the Government of India, and eventually, in 1913, an annual grant-in-aid was given to the National Association for Supplying Female Aid to the Women of India, to enable it to constitute a women's medical service to be under its sole administration and control.

We are of opinion that, as the new service was only constituted in 1914, it is too early to venture upon an opinion as to whether it is likely to develop along lines which will enable it to allow fully for the necessary future expansion of a superior women's service.

We understand, however, that the funds at the disposal of the association are insufficient to allow of a much needed increase in the cadre or to raise the pay of the different grades of the service, steps which alone will now induce suitable women to come out to India. We are therefore of opinion that, in the absence of a state service, this association should be placed in a position to meet these demands, and we strongly recommend its needs to the early consideration of Government.

Demand for more medical women of a lower grade.

116. The demand for qualified women of the sub-assistant surgeon class is rapidly growing, and we consider that the time has come for them to be more largely taught by persons of their own sex in their own medical schools and hospitals. These need not be State institutions but we recommend that they should receive financial assistance from Government and be regularly inspected.

Women serving under local bodies.

117. It has long been realised that the position of women doctors of the assistant-surgeon and sub-assistant grades is not satisfactory and we understand that the Dufferin Committee has under its consideration the creation of a service, affiliated to its superior service, which will include the former, whilst certain of the local governments are engaged on schemes for services for the latter.

Post-graduate courses of instruction.

118. The necessity for post-graduate training is, in our opinion, even greater for women doctors of these grades than for the ordinary assistant and sub-assistant surgeon, and we consider that efforts should be made to introduce classes for such training.

Women doctors as a reserve.

119. During the war the Women's Medical Service has undertaken the whole of the executive professional work in one of the special war hospitals at Bombay, while members of it have worked singly in other military hospitals; there would thus seem to be no reason why they should not be reckoned upon as a reserve to take the place of medical officers in the treatment of women in family hospitals, and in times of emergency, that of men in military hospitals in the general wards and casualty departments. Doubtless too, as they increase in number in rural districts, their services would be available for the care of women and children in the absence of European medical officers.

D.—Nursing Services of the Army in India.

Unsatisfactory state of nursing in military hospitals in India.

120. There is a considerable amount of evidence before the Committee showing that nursing in the army in India is far from satisfactory; that in British station hospitals it does not approximate in quality to the standard considered essential in the United Kingdom, whilst in Indian station hospitals scientific nursing is non-existent. The present day standards of nursing

and of efficiency and discipline demanded of nurses of all classes are on a much higher level than they were a generation ago.

The present organization. 121. Nursing duties in the military hospitals in India are performed by the following classes of personnel:—

(a) In British station hospitals, by
  (1) the Queen Alexandra's Military Nursing Service for India (a short history of this service and its organization are given in annexure X);
  (2) nursing orderlies drawn from the various British combatant units in the stations concerned, and trained to a certain extent by the nursing sisters and the medical officers in the hospitals; and
  (3) Indian ward servants of the Army Hospital Corps.

(b) In station family hospitals, by a matron, trained and holding a certificate in midwifery, assisted by a menial staff, under the supervision of a medical officer and military assistant surgeon.

(c) In Indian station hospitals, by Indian ward orderlies, drawn from combatant units, and trained to a very limited extent by the medical officers and sub-assistant surgeons in the hospitals.

Defects in British station hospitals. 122. In the British station hospitals there are several factors which impede the progress of nursing; these are:—

(i) the conditions of service of the Queen Alexandra's Military Nursing Service for India,

(ii) the employment of partially trained combatant soldiers, as nursing orderlies, and

(iii) the employment of low caste Indians as ward attendants.

Queen Alexandra's Military Nursing Service for India. 123. Since all the ladies of the Queen Alexandra's Military Nursing Service for India retain the same rank and standing as they had when they first joined, to probably their third term of service, there is not that chain of responsibility which is essential for good administration. Even the lady superintendent of a circle may hold at the same time the position of matron in a first class station hospital, and be occupied also in executive nursing duties. Consequently she has neither the time nor the position to exercise administrative and disciplinary functions over the remaining members of the service who are junior to herself. The chief disadvantages of continuous service in India have been the effects of the climate and life in this country upon the average nursing sister, and professional deterioration due to want of facilities for keeping in touch with modern knowledge and methods.

British nursing orderlies. 124. British soldiers are selected by their commanding officers from amongst the rank and file, for employment as nursing orderlies, and are sent to the various hospitals to be trained. This training must of necessity, from the short time available for the purpose and the frequent changes of personnel, be of a sketchy and perfunctory character. Furthermore, the nursing orderly is changed every 6 months, as a longer period of duty in a hospital is considered detrimental to his efficiency as a fighting soldier. They are taken away on mobilization, and for regimental training, at the will of their commanding officers.

Ward servants. 125. The employment of Indian ward servants on any form of nursing duty has always been a mistake. The men are of very low caste, and most venal and dirty in their habits. They are untrustworthy, and perform even the most menial of nursing duties in a very indifferent way.

Station family hospitals. 126. In station family hospitals the whole of the nursing, as well as the conduct of uncomplicated cases of labour, is carried out by a matron, assisted by some menial female servants. The matron has, as a rule, no training in general nursing, and, though she may be an efficient midwife, she cannot have that knowledge of ordinary sick nursing which is essential for the proper attendance on the various classes of cases that find admission to the hospitals.

Indian station hospitals.

127. In Indian station hospitals the present arrangement is that a certain number of sepoys (8 per 100 beds) are attached to these hospitals as ward orderlies. The men chosen are as a rule those who have failed in some way as soldiers. This is radically wrong. It is hoped that the Indian Medical Corps of the future will contain a nursing section, the members of which will be properly trained. But to ensure this, nursing sisters are required in Indian station hospitals.

In annexure XI will be found specific and detailed recommendations made by the expert members of the Committee in connection with the whole question of nursing in military hospitals in India.

CHAPTER VIII.

Summary of Recommendations.

128. The changes which we have recommended are as follows:—

General recommendations.

(1) The formation of an Indian Medical Corps which shall take the place of the Indian Medical Service and, in addition, do the work now done by the Royal Army Medical Corps in India. It should also recruit for, and include the higher civil medical service of the country (paragraphs 37—48).

(2) It should have an ordinary war reserve of officers lent to civil administrations for five years or less (paragraph 40), and a special reserve of officers belonging to its civil branch who should only be recalled to military duty on occasions of grave national emergency, and not even then if holding certain residuary appointments (paragraphs 47—48).

(3) It should include transfers from the Army Medical Service and the Royal Army Medical Corps (paragraph 44).

(4) The military side of the corps should have its own depôt and school of instruction (paragraph 45).

(5) Junior officers should, shortly after their first arrival in India, be attached to a large civil hospital or school of tropical medicine for practical instruction in tropical diseases (paragraph 46).

(6) The special reserve should be partly recruited from civil assistant surgeons and independent medical practitioners (paragraph 47).

(7) The governments of the various provinces should supplement their contingents of officers from the Indian Medical Corps with exclusively civil medical officers whom they will themselves appoint (paragraph 49).

(8) Special arrangements should be made by Government to secure European medical attendance for European officers and non-officials, when required (paragraph 50).

(9) A system of optional retirement on gratuity should be adopted in order to secure a sufficiency of candidates for the new corps (paragraph 51).

(10) Admission to the corps should be through the portal of a single examination held in England twice a year. Selected Indian students from the five Indian universities should be assisted by scholarships to compete in this examination (paragraph 52).

(11) Immediate admission, however, must be by transfer and nomination (paragraphs 43, 44 and 52).

(12) Special opportunities should be provided for work in research and scientific medicine. Certain posts in the sanitary and other departments should be reserved to officers of the new corps (paragraph 53).

(13) There is only one possible alternative scheme, which we indicate but regard as decidedly inferior to the scheme which we recommend (paragraph 54).

Improvements in the officer grade.

(14) Salaries should be increased. More liberal provision should be made for leave. Full pension should be admissible at an earlier date. The

position of civil administrative medical officers should be improved. Better buildings should be provided for Indian station hospitals (paragraph 58).

(15) The number of officers of the corps required for duty in peace time should be calculated at 3 per mille of the total strength of the army in India. A leave and casualty reserve of 25 per cent and a study reserve of 4 per cent of the officers required for duty should be provided (annexure VIII, paragraph 2).

(16) Promotion should be on the same system as promotion in the Royal Army Medical Corps, including selection for promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel to fill a fixed establishment. Every officer should, between his seventh and tenth years of service, undergo a post-graduate course at the Royal Army Medical College. All officers should on attaining the rank of lieutenant-colonel make their choice between the careers of (*a*) military administration, (*b*) professional employment as consultants, and (*c*) permanent civil employment. No officer should be eligible for transfer from civil to military, or military to civil employment after promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel (annexure VIII, paragraph 9).

(17) The head of the military side of the new corps should be an officer of the corps. A board should be established for the selection of officers for promotion (annexure VIII, paragraph 15).

Improvements in the minor and provincial services.

A. Military Assistant Surgeons.

(18) The standard of education should be raised so as to admit of their obtaining a registrable qualification. They should be employed only on professional duties (paragraph 60).

(19) Those who obtain a qualification registrable in the United Kingdom should be allowed to proceed to England and compete for admission to the commissioned ranks of the Indian Medical Corps. Their pay and pension should be raised in consequence of the previous recommendations (paragraph 61).

B. Military Sub-Assistant Surgeons.

(20) Their standard of general education should be raised (paragraph 65).

(21) Sub-assistant surgeons who obtain certain diplomas should be eligible for transfer to the military assistant surgeon branch (paragraph 66).

(22) Hostels should be provided in all medical schools (paragraph 67).

(23) Sub-assistant surgeons should, on first joining the corps, undergo a full course of training at the Indian Medical Corps Depôt and School (paragraph 69).

(24) They should be put through systematic physical training at the medical schools (paragraph 70).

(25) Post-graduate instruction should be provided (paragraph 71).

(26) Allowances while travelling on duty should be increased (paragraph 75).

(27) The question of increasing their pensions and family pensions should be considered, and a provident fund introduced (paragraph 76).

C. Civil Assistant Surgeons.

(28) Selection for superior appointments should take place earlier than at present (paragraph 77).

(29) They should undergo regular study periods. Their pay should be raised. A limited number should be trained for the special reserve, at the Indian Medical Corps Depôt and School of Instruction (paragraph 79).

D. Civil Sub-Assistant Surgeons.

(30) The time scale of pay should be adopted generally (paragraph 81).

(31) The standard of preliminary education should be raised, and a minimum and uniform standard of medical education for this class should be adopted in all provinces (paragraph 83).

(32) They should all be required to sign an agreement to serve wherever they may be required, on civil or military duty. When called up for military service they should be given 3 months training at the Indian Medical Corps Depôt and School (paragraph 84).

(33) They should undergo courses of post-graduate training (paragraph 85).

Medical Store Department.

(34) Improved accommodation should be provided for the depôts at Madras, Bombay and Lahore (paragraph 88).

(35) The laboratory at the Lahore Depôt should be closed (paragraph 89).

(36) The cadre of medical storekeepers should be increased, and the pay of these appointments raised (paragraph 90).

(37) Medical storekeepers should in future be known as Officers-in-charge, Medical Store Depôts (paragraph 91).

(38) The scales of subordinate establishment should be raised and a better class of men entertained (paragraph 92).

(39) Compounders should be required to undergo a prescribed examination (paragraph 92).

(40) Greater control should be exercised by administrative medical officers over the submission of emergent indents (paragraph 93).

(41) The question of the introduction of measures to prevent the adulteration of drugs should be considered at an early date (paragraph 95).

(42) The number of military assistant surgeons employed in the depôts should be reduced (paragraph 96).

(43) Research and pharmaceutical chemists should be employed in certain depôts (paragraph 97).

(44) The forms in use in depôts should be standardized, and the equipment list revise and kept up to date (paragraph 98).

(45) The staff of the office of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, should, under certain conditions, be increased. There should be a Deputy Director-General, Indian Medical Service, and an Assistant Director-General, Indian Medical Service, to deal with questions regarding medical stores. These appointments should be open to the cadre of the Medical Store Department (paragraph 99).

(46) Stocks should be verified at least once in every three years (paragraph 100).

(47) The system of accounting should be changed (paragraph 101).

Sanitary and Bacteriological Departments.

(48) Imperial and provincial health boards should be formed (paragraph 104).

(49) Both the departments should be expanded (paragraph 105).

(50) The staff of officers in the Sanitary Department should be increased and inducements should be offered which would be likely to attract the best men (paragraph 106).

(51) Greater co-operation is required between the administrative heads of provincial medical services and sanitary commissioners (paragraph 107).

Alienist Department.

(52) Central asylums should be still further substituted for smaller asylums (paragraph 109).

(53) The department should be properly organized with its own leave and study reserves (paragraph 111).

(54) The cadre should be increased. Greater inducements should be offered to military assistant surgeons and Indian graduates to take up mental work (paragraph 112).

(55) Superintendents of central asylums should become consultants to military hospitals (paragraph 113).

Women's Medical Service in India.

(56) The National Association for Supplying Female Aid to the Women of India should be placed in a position to enable it to augment its cadre and increase the pay of the medical women employed by it (paragraph 115).

(57) Women students of the sub-assistant surgeon class should be taught by women doctors in female medical schools and hospitals. These institutions should be assisted financially by Government, and regularly inspected (paragraph 116).

(58) Women doctors of the assistant and sub-assistant surgeon class should receive post-graduate instruction (paragraph 118).

Indian Medical Corps and Nursing Services of the Army in India.

(59) Proposals for the organization of the Indian Medical Corps, and the future organization of the nursing services for the army in India are contained in annexures VIII and XI, respectively.

(Signed) H. V. LOVETT,
President.

G. CREE, *Major-General.*
P. HEHIR, *Major-General.*
H. HENDLEY, *Major-General.*
GERALD G. GIFFARD, *Maj.-Genl.*
S. R. HIGNELL.
A. SHAIRP, *Lieut.-Colonel.*
M. T. CRAMER-ROBERTS, *Major.*

A. A. McNEIGHT, *Major,*
Secretary.

DATED, SIMLA, THE 22ND APRIL, 1919.

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ANNEXURE I.

SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS.

BEFORE the year 1872, the medical services of the British Army were entirely constituted on a regimental basis, that is, every regiment had its quota of medical officers, generally three per battalion, its own hospital, and nursing orderlies drawn from the regiment itself. The senior of the medical officers in a battalion did not command the regimental hospital, nor were the medical officers responsible for the equipment or dieting, the command being vested in the officer commanding the battalion and the supplies in the quartermaster. There were also no female nurses beyond a few soldiers' wives who were occasionally employed.

After the failure of the medical services in the Crimea the matter was taken up in Parliament, and a Commission of inquiry was appointed in 1859, under the Presidency of Lord Herbert of Lea. This Commission recommended many changes, including the abolition of the regimental system, the institution of station hospitals, the formation of a hospital corps, and the introduction of nursing sisters in military hospitals. Nothing very much was done till the year 1872, owing to the opposition of the combatant officers and a disinclination on the part of many regimental medical officers to cut themselves adrift from their regiments.

In 1872, a unified medical service was introduced and called the Army Medical Department, and all medical officers in the army, with the exception of those in the Guards, both foot and horse, were placed on one list for promotion, appointment, etc. Station hospitals were introduced, and a corps to undertake the nursing, clerical and other subordinate work was instituted and called the Army Hospital Corps. This corps was officered and commanded, not by medical officers, but by special officers called Lieutenants, Captains and Majors of Orderlies, who were also responsible for the supplies of its hospitals as well as the discipline of the other ranks of the Army Hospital Corps.

From this date the unpopularity of the Army Medical Department commenced to make itself apparent. The loss of social status resultant on being taken away from regiments, and the fact that medical officers were no longer any body's children, the lack of substantive rank, the indifferent pay and prospects, the want of proper recognition by the combatant officers, and the divided administration of the hospitals, all had their effect, with the consequence that in a few years it was found most difficult to obtain candidates for commissions. The medical schools, especially those of London, all set their faces against the Army Medical Service, and the War Office were obliged to "scrape the pot" to get any candidates at all. This culminated, in 1887 to 1889, in the service being entirely closed, no candidates at all being obtainable. The British Medical Association had interested itself in the question for some time and were able now to insist on some amelioration of the conditions in the Army Medical Department. These resulted in the granting of compound titles to the officers: Surgeon-Captain, Surgeon-Major, etc., the change of the designation of the service to Medical Staff and Medical Staff Corps, with complete command of the latter, and also of the station hospitals, by officers of the Medical Staff. This was followed by a substantial increase of pay and better prospects of promotion and pension. However, the Army Medical Department had been so thoroughly discredited in the medical schools that even with these concessions it was found difficult to obtain candidates of a good stamp for commissions. The Indian Medical Service and Royal Navy invariably had the first choice. The British Medical Association and the medical schools still continued their campaign with the War Office, fighting a difficult battle against much prejudice and vested interest, till the time of the South African war, when one medical corps for the army was formed, giving the officers military titles and complete and absolute command of the other ranks of the corps, and a further increase of pay and a betterment of prospects. The corps was called the Army Medical Corps, and shortly afterwards the title of " Royal " was conferred by the late Queen Victoria.

From now commenced an era of increasing prosperity for the Royal Army Medical Corps, its rehabilitation in the eyes of the medical schools and its gradual appreciation by the rest of the army. Co-incident with these was the institution of a far better system of training for the officers after joining, and of examination before promotion, which ensured at least that each officer had devoted a portion of his time to learning his trade and keeping himself abreast of modern methods. The introduction of specialists in all branches of medical science, after a long post-graduate course and examination, opened an avenue of attraction to men who were desirous of devoting themselves to particular branches of medicine, with the happiest results. All this was made possible by the building of the Royal Army Medical College at Millbank, with its close connection with the great London hospitals and medical schools. The attractions of the Royal Army Medical Corps now became established, and instead of, as formerly, it being difficult to obtain the right sort of candidate, competition became strong, and the pick of the medical schools presented themselves for the entrance examinations. This was influenced to a certain extent by the increasing unpopularity of the Indian Medical Service and also that of the medical service of the Royal Navy, but the fact remained that the Royal Army Medical Corps offered an attractive career to the young man who desired an adventurous life, as well as to those who wished to devote themselves to research but had not sufficient means to support themselves while doing so. The final step in popularising the corps was the grant, in 1918, of the ranks of major-general and lieutenant-general instead of the old title of surgeon-general.

Previous to the institution of the Royal Army Medical College at Millbank, in about 1902, all successful candidates were sent to the Royal Victoria Hospital, Netley, for courses of instruction in military medical affairs. From its isolated position, and disconnection with the centres of medical education, as well as from its lack of clinical material, this institution was considered obsolete, and with the reconstruction of the Royal Army Medical Corps the College at Millbank was built. This college houses all the research departments of the Royal Army Medical Corps, and instruction on these subjects is carried out there, but clinical work is done at the Queen Alexandra Hospital, Millbank, which is the military hospital for the whole London Command, and at the special Military Venereal Hospital, Rochester Row, as well as the great London general hospitals.

The instruction is carried out by a combination of special officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps and professors chosen from the teaching bodies of London. The examinations at the completion of the courses are also conducted by the same combination of examiners.

The social point of view is not lost sight of, as the Royal Army Medical Corps London Mess is situated there, and all bachelor officers going through the classes live in the college.

There are two special points connected with admission to the Royal Army Medical Corps which are worthy of note: (1) that each candidate signs a declaration that he is of unmixed European parentage, and (2) that he has to appear at a personal interview with the Director-General, Army Medical Service, before he is allowed to compete. The competitive examinations for the Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service differ entirely in their character and are not comparable.

After successful competition all young officers proceed to the Royal Army Medical College, Millbank, where they undergo a course of study in special military medical subjects, which lasts for two months. At the completion of this they are examined in those subjects. They are then sent to the depot of the Royal Army Medical Corps, where they undergo a course in military subjects, drill, equitation, field work, etc. This lasts for three months, and on its completion they are again examined in those subjects.

The combined marks obtained at the entrance examination, at Millbank, and at the depot, determine their final position in their batch.

Between the seventh and tenth years of their service all Royal Army Medical Corps officers proceed to Millbank for a post-graduate course. This course lasts altogether for nine months, and is divided into three periods of three months each. At the completion of these periods examinations are held and it is possible for an officer, by the results of these examinations, to accelerate his promotion by from six to eighteen months, as well as to qualify for a specialist appointment. The examinations are conducted by a mixed board of examiners as above. Officers who fail at this examination are re-examined after six months, but do not attend any further course at Millbank. If they fail a second time they are retired with a bonus.

The functions of the Royal Army Medical College, as will be seen, are educational, disciplinary and social, in addition to which it is also the centre for the great work of research that is always in progress there.

ANNEXURE II.

NOTE ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STATION HOSPITAL SYSTEM FOR INDIAN TROOPS.

History.

FROM time to time it had been proposed to introduce into the Indian Army the station hospital system, which had proved so satisfactory in the case of British troops. In 1880, sanction was actually accorded to the establishment in each station of a combined hospital for the treatment of all the sick of the Indian garrison. Effect was, however, never given to this sanction. The question came up again for consideration in 1883, but was negatived on account of the expense that was anticipated. The Secretary of State next suggested, in 1886, the possibility of effecting a reduction in the cadre of the Indian Medical Service if station hospitals were introduced. His query was met by the answer that there was no prospect of the system being adopted owing to its alleged unpopularity with officers and men. It is interesting to record that on the next occasion when the question was mooted, in 1890, its reconsideration was due to a suggestion made to the effect that the adoption of the station hospital system would allow of an interchange of Indian Medical Service and Royal Army Medical Corps officers, and so permit of the freeing of Indian Medical Service officers for civil employ. The system was tried at Calcutta and Rawalpindi in 1891, and, although it failed to produce evidence on the point that gave rise to the experiment, it brought to light the very indifferent menial, nursing and clothing arrangements under the regimental system, and it conclusively showed that no reduction in officers or establishments would be possible. The introduction of the system was not favoured by Lord Roberts, who held the opinion that it was not suited to the Native Army.

Although, in 1900, a proposal to try the station hospital system in the late Hyderabad Contingent was submitted and accepted, and Lord Curzon's Government expressed the opinion to the Secretary of State " that the advantages that might be anticipated from the proposed system outweighed the arguments against its adoption," it was not until 1906 that any real progress was made. In that year, combined regimental hospitals for Indian troops were introduced. Under this system, which was a compromise designed to make good, as far as possible, the defects of the former system, but at the same time maintaining its essential features, the sick of all regiments in a station were treated in a central hospital, retaining their regimental customs and arrangements. Administration was placed under the senior of the regimental medical officers, but the disciplinary control over medical officers and subordinates remained, as before, in the hands of officers commanding regiments. This system resulted in anomalies, in that at times it was impossible to avoid all the medical officers doing duty at a station being very junior in rank while at other times all might be men of standing and experience. It afforded no opportunity of ensuring that the most capable officers were selected for the higher and more responsible positions. It did not allow efficient co-ordination between the regimental hospitals constituting each combined hospital, nor was it economical in personnel and equipment, as each regimental hospital was still separately maintained.

The Lukis Committee.

In 1910, a committee, with the late Surgeon-General Sir C. P. Lukis as president, was appointed to examine the question anew. This committee presented a report which recommended the abolition of the system of regimental hospitals, the raising of an Indian Army Hospital Corps and of a Corps of Ward Orderlies to take the place of regimentally enlisted men, and the retention of the existing establishment of Indian Medical Service officers. After a careful examination of the proposals the Government of India decided that it was unable to accept them, for financial reasons.

The question of giving effect to the recommendation of the Lukis Committee was again raised in 1912, but no decision had been reached when war broke out in 1914, and the further consideration of the case was deferred.

Introduction of the station hospital system.

As a result of the report of the Mesopotamia Commission, and at the instance of the Secretary of State, the question was once more considered. The Government of India proposed to introduce the station hospital system as recommended by the Lukis Committee, and, further, to carry out other suggestions made by it, for the dieting of the sick, the provision of clothing and bedding, and the equipment of the hospitals with such furniture, medical and surgical equipment, staff and buildings as modern requirements demanded. The Secretary of State approved of the proposals and the Government of India issued orders for the introduction of the new system with effect from the 1st December, 1918.

Changes made by the introduction.

The changes effected by the introduction of the station hospital system may be briefly stated as follows:—

(*i*) the abolition of regimental and followers' hospitals, and the substitution for them, in each station, of a single hospital, or sections of a single hospital, in which all the Indian sick of a garrison, both troops and followers, are treated;

(*ii*) the hospitals are commanded and administered by Indian Medical Service officers;

(*iii*) all junior officers, medical subordinates, and menials engaged in the care of the sick, instead of being under the control of regimental commanders, are under the orders of the officer commanding the hospital;

(*iv*) the hospital establishment is recruited directly for the purpose, instead of being passed through regimental channels;

(*v*) the sick in hospital are dieted by the State, in addition to the extras that were formerly provided, and they are given appropriate clothing and bedding;

(*vi*) the effect on the Indian Medical Service officer is that, instead of his being one of the officers of a regiment, he is now an officer in what is becoming a "corps;"

(*vii*) the general effect will be the more efficient treatment of the sick in a single hospital, better staffed and equipped, and with an organization assimilated to conditions which prevail in war.

ANNEXURE III.

MEMORANDUM, DATED FEBRUARY, 1918, BY SIR G. H. MAKINS, K.C.M.G., C.B., PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS IN ENGLAND.

IN India the close relation existing between the civil and military elements of the medical profession should form the ideal. If this relation be disturbed, the military element would suffer in medical experience, since either British or Indian soldiers—a body of carefully sifted, sound, healthy young men—offer comparatively small opportunities for practice, except in so far as such endemic diseases as malaria, the minor ailments common to soldiers in camp, and a small number of emergency cases due to acute disease or occasional accidental injuries are concerned. The civil element, on the other hand, practising amongst the mass of the population, beyond such cases as those enumerated above, is called upon to deal with every form of disease, and has abundant opportunity of acquiring practical experience. A close and intimate relation is therefore to be desired between the two branches of the service in order that the ideal should be fully realised.

Certain reasons appear to have interfered with this desirable result, some of which may be indicated:—

(1) a want of sufficient interchange between the civil and military elements;

(2) the maintenance of a purely military element;

(3) the indiscriminate employment, in time of war, of officers who have been engaged in special forms of work, and during many years have gained experience of the greatest value, in purely administrative military posts. These officers are suddenly switched off to perform duties to which they are unaccustomed, with the result that, while valuable experience is sacrificed, yet an inferior administration only may be obtained.

The question of interchange is not one of any great apparent difficulty if the service be treated as a homogeneous whole. The custom prevailing of attaching officers on their arrival in India to a regiment, and continuing them as regimental officers for a period of five years or more, seems to be the first step in the wrong direction. As already mentioned, military service offers few opportunities for acquiring practical experience in medicine and surgery, yet these young officers, but recently qualified, are at the outset of their careers placed in this unsatisfactory position, which is moreover exaggerated by the fact that some of the diseases they are called upon to treat are of an unfamiliar nature to them. The whole position would be reversed were the newly-joined officer sent directly to a civil hospital and kept there doing duty for at least one year, as a junior resident medical officer. During this period he would acquire invaluable experience of the forms of disease met with in India, and when sent to a military hospital later he would not only be more capable, but he would also have already acquired interest in his work and be far more likely to utilise such material as would come under his charge.

The proposition that has been made that officers during their period of military duties should attend "post-graduate courses dealing with X-ray work, bacteriology, malaria technique, serology, and tropical medicine," and further should have *systematic access* to neighbouring station and civil hospitals, *in their leisure* hours, is unpractical. Such courses could only be arranged for successfully by the institution of an Indian Medical Staff College, *a practical necessity* not yet provided, while casual attendance on hospital practice, unaccompanied by the assumption of any practical work and individual responsibility, is of very slight educational value. A preliminary two years' civil work followed by three years' military duty would be a far better method of procuring a highly-trained medical officer at the termination of his first five years of service.

The question of post-graduate instruction can only be successfully solved by the establishment of an Indian Medical Staff College. It may be pointed out that such a college not only provides for scientific study, but also allows the heads of the service to take stock from time to time of the officers at their disposal, to become acquainted with the capabilities and individual character of every officer, and thus become enabled to make a better distribution of the officers to posts suitable to their individual attainments and personal disposition. When necessity arises to transfer specially capable men in any branch of medicine from civil to military duty, it should be possible for a highly trained physician or surgeon to be utilised as such and yet attain the same rank and receive the same pay and allowances as a purely administrative medical officer.

The scope of the work performed by the Indian Medical Service is perhaps hardly realised in India itself, and certainly not without its borders. To the service is confided:—

(*a*) the medical charge of the European members of the Government and of the Indian Civil Service, also a leading part in the medical treatment of the whole Indian community;
(*b*) the inception and regulation of measures relating to the public health and sanitation of the whole country;
(*c*) the management of jails and asylums;
(*d*) the medico-legal work of the whole community;
(*e*) regimental duties and the care of the hospitals of Indian troops;
(*f*) the exertion of a certain political influence directly dependent on the close relation which medical duties establish between the officers of the service and individuals of the Indian population;
(*g*) the medical education of the country.

It may be well, in view of the present unpopularity of a service entrusted with such important duties, to first ask what position the medical service holds with regard to the executive Government of the country. The duties are second to none, so far as the well-being of the entire Indian community is concerned, yet such a thing as an Indian Medical Department cannot be said to exist. The service as a whole is represented by a Director-General with a ministerial staff, who makes indirect recommendations to a Council on which he has no seat or opportunity of refuting criticism which may be made, while his recommendations often relate to matters which it is difficult for the civilian to grasp or fully understand. Again, even in the internal management of the service something in the way of a dual control exists, as in time of war officers employed in civil work are handed over from the department and pass under the control of military officers not fully cognisant either of their professional capacity or their individual characteristics. To the outside observer, in fact, the Indian Medical Service appears to be a congregation of individuals, held together by the common tie of similar duties, but possessing no proper central administrative department to correlate and combine the various paths of work, or to which the members of the service can look to for advice, direction or support.

In England the multifarious duties fulfilled by the Indian Medical Service are controlled and directed by no less than three important bodies, the Privy Council, the Local Government Board, and the General Medical Council, a tripartite arrangement which it would be easy for the Government of India to improve upon. In India it is not easy to appreciate what obstacle can exist to the formation of a single Board to undertake the duties, and to, on the one hand, facilitate the work of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, and on the other, control effectively the whole medical organisation of the country, including sanitation, medical research, and medical education. Such a Board should consist of both medical and civil representatives and be itself represented on the Executive Council of the country by medical and civil members.

ANNEXURE IV.

SPEECH BY THE HON'BLE MAJOR-GENERAL W. R. EDWARDS, C.B., C.M.G., DIRECTOR-GENERAL, INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE, IN THE IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ON THE 10TH MARCH 1919.

"SIR, my illustrious predecessor, the late Sir Pardey Lukis, when he addressed this Council two years ago, pointed out that scientific investigation and preventive medicine could never again be relegated to the background. Medical research is now admitted on all sides to be a vital part of government activities. The appalling pandemic of influenza which swept over and ravaged the whole of India has drawn attention in an acute form to the urgent necessity, not only of developing all our existing arrangements for research, but also of applying the knowledge, so acquired, by means of efficiently organized public health services. I wish to say something further on these points, but before doing so, I will give a brief review of our activities during the last two years.

" The exigencies of the war demanded the reversion of the majority of the officers of the Bacteriological Department to military duty, where they formed the major part of the staffs of the central laboratories in Mesopotamia. Those remaining in India were engaged almost entirely on war work, that is in the preparation of vaccines, intended to protect the troops, in India and overseas, from typhoid and para-typhoid fever and cholera. I am proud to be able to say that, in spite of the enormous demands for vaccines, we have been able to meet such demands without indenting on the Home authorities, and we supplied His Majesty's forces in Mesopotamia, East Africa, Egypt and Palestine, as well as in India. The Central Research Institute at Kasauli developed its vaccine production to an almost incredible extent. The yearly average before the war was eighteen and a half thousand cubic centimeters. During the war it rose to over 2½ million cubic centimeters, and included anti-typhoid, cholera, pneumonia and influenza vaccine. From a monetary point of view alone the value of this Kasauli vaccine, for the period of the war, was about half a million sterling. In addition to turning out these vaccines, Kasauli also equipped three laboratories, two of which were sent overseas. I am sure the Council will agree with me that the greatest credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey, Director of the Institute, and his staff, for their excellent and most successful work.

" The Bombay Bacteriological Laboratory at Parel has also enormously developed its production of vaccines, other than plague, which latter is their speciality and the manufacture of which continued. The total vaccines issued from this laboratory to the troops in India and abroad was over 1¼ million doses and, in addition to this, the Director, Lieutenant-Colonel Glen Liston, from June, 1916, undertook the supervision of the bacteriological work in the base hospitals of Bombay.

" The Pasteur Institute at Kasauli also assisted in the war. For it treated no less than 2,177 soldiers sent from the war areas overseas.

" To all medical officers connected with the medical laboratories of India, and who, in consequence, were denied the privilege of proceeding on active service, I now take this opportunity of offering my thanks, for their unselfish devotion to duty and for their loyal co-operation.

" In spite of the war and the absence of so many of our officers, we have nevertheless succeeded in carrying out a considerable amount of research.

" An inquiry into diabetes was continued by Major McCay and his co-workers in Calcutta; and a series of papers which are of great scientific value are being published in the Indian Journal of Medical Research. A report has just been submitted by the same officer on the treatment of diabetes, which is also, in my opinion, of very great importance, and I propose to approach the Governing Body of the Indian Research Fund Association for funds with which to continue these investigations.

" The Research Fund has continued to finance the inquiry at Poona on the subject of plague prevention, and Dr. Chitre, under the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson and Major Kunhardt, has made numerous experiments concerning the best methods of rat destruction. This inquiry has yielded good results which will shortly take practical shape.

" At Karachi, Lieutenant-Colonel Greig, working under the Indian Research Fund Association, continued his valuable work on cholera carriers, and he also investigated the anti-beriberi value of certain foodstuffs. His expert advice has been of constant value both to me and to the military authorities. Recently he has submitted a most value paper on influenza written in collaboration with Captain Maitra. From his laboratory at Karachi we have also had valuable studies on the curative values of certain drugs, such as chenopodium oil, and thymol, used in the treatment of ankylostomiasis. These were contributed by Captain Wrench, R.A.M.C. Lieutenant-Colonel Greig has just been deputed by the Government of India to proceed with Major Norman White to the Inter-Allied Conference at Paris in connection with influenza.

"Lieutenant-Colonel McCarrison is on special duty in charge of an inquiry into beriberi, and is investigating other so called 'deficiency diseases.' A very important paper on his initial results appeared in the January number of the Indian Journal of Medical Research. Three further papers from his pen are in the press and will be published in April.

"The study of 'hookworm disease' has been pursued by Lieutenant-Colonel Clayton Lane in Bengal and by Dr. Mhaskar in Madras. The results show that the incidence of hookworm infection is in many places nearly one hundred per cent. They have further shown that this disease can, not only be cured, but even eradicated, if only the people could be sufficiently educated in sanitary matters.

"Captain Knowles, who is Director of the Pasteur Institute at Shillong, is now engaged in an investigation as to the mode of infection of kala-azar; he also is being assisted by the Indian Research Fund Association.

"Mr. Awati has continued his investigation into the bionomics of house flies and has contributed papers regarding the specific differences of the genus musca. This work is of much importance, as we know that the house fly is a terrible carrier of disease.

"Another insect engaging our attention is the sand-fly, and an effort is being made to discover and destroy these pests in their larval state. This investigation is being conducted by Mr. Mitter at Lahore, who has done good work in this direction.

"Sir Leonard Rogers, among other activities, continues to conduct the general direction of an inquiry into the chemistry of chaulmoogra oil and other oils found useful in the treatment of leprosy. Meanwhile, the Mission to Lepers has instituted a trial, by qualified medical men and women, into the comparative effects of drugs thus prepared. These trials are under the general advice of Sir Leonard Rogers, and the Mission is being helped financially for this purpose by the Government of India.

"There are several other lines of research in progress in India; some of them are of a highly technical nature. For example, a study is being made regarding the best constitution of media, with reference to vaccine production on a large scale. This is engaging the attention of the staff at Kasauli, who are being assisted by Dr. Norris.

"Dr. Annandale has undertaken surveys in Madras, Persia, Baluchistan and North India in connection with molluscs, with reference to the possibility of the spread of bilharzia. In the Bombay Bacteriological Laboratory valuable work has been done on molluscs by Dr. Soparkar. The staff of the Bombay laboratory has also been engaged in perfecting methods for detecting typhoid carriers. Captain Malone, who has come out with an excellent reputaton for research, has recently been sent to investigate influenza.

"From what I have just said I am sure that all will agree that medical research work is of the utmost importance and further that it is most necessary that we should give the inhabitants of India every chance of getting a first-class training in medical research, in India. Thanks to the energy of Sir Leonard Rogers, a school of tropical medicine, with a special hospital of its own attached to it, will shortly be opened in Calcutta, and now I have the greatest pleasure in stating that there is every prospect of another school of tropical medicine and medical research being shortly opened in Bombay. This school will be based on the splendid Parel Laboratory, which Colonel Glen Liston has by his indefatigable labours brought to such perfection. It will also have a special hospital of its own attached to it. That well-known philanthropist, Sir Dorab Tata, has by a munificent gift of a lakh a year enabled the Bombay Government to proceed with their school, which will not only be well staffed, but also have a number of valuable scholarships, including travelling ones, attached to it. We shall thus shortly have means of giving the best possible training in medical research to Indians. This will enable them to aspire, not only to professorships, but also to the winning of world-wide reputations.

"In addition to these schools it is very necessary that we should have at least two institutes of medical research. I want to see an imperial institute comprising an imperial library and bureau of medical research opened in Delhi, and another institute opened in Southern India. For the first we must depend on the Government of India, and for the second I have reason to believe that we can rely on the munificence of the Tata family, and other wealthy philanthropists of that great presidency of Bombay. I have just been asked by Sir Dorab Tata if a first-class expert could be found to visit India, at Sir Dorab's expense, to advise on this matter.

"So much for research, but it must be remembered that without a Ministry of Public Health, such as is now being instituted in Great Britain, and well organised provincial health services, the knowledge that we thus acquire cannot be efficiently applied. This at least is my private opinion. In such public health services all the officers must be responsible, not merely to the members of a municipality or district board, but through their superior officers to Government itself. It is only by means of well-paid and pensioned services that officers of public health can act efficiently, without fear or favour.

"A third factor is, however, absolutely essential to the preservation of public health, and that is the education of the masses. Without this the best organized preventive medical service in the world must work in vain. An ignorant populace not understanding the meaning of advice, or the value of orders, will not follow the former, and will actively or passively resist the latter. District visitors and magic lantern lectures cannot do more than touch the fringe of the dense ignorance of the masses. There is only one way to remove this ignorance. The knowledge of public health, like all other knowledge, must be imparted through the schools and colleges of India; this is essential. I know the difficulty; it is first necessary to educate the teachers. Unfortunately, too, in practically every country in the world, the rulers themselves have never received any education in public health. They therefore find it difficult to believe, even now, in the absolute necessity of giving this instruction in every school throughout the land. I would indeed go further than simply teach. I would, in order to impress the vital necessity of this knowledge on the educated classes, make public health, if not a compulsory subject, at least a highly marked optional subject, in the matriculation examination of every university in India.

" To bring the immense importance of this subject home, I can say without fear of contradiction that such teaching would, alone, without a single additional doctor, or a single drug, save India hundreds of thousands of lives and millions of money every year. To substantiate this last remark of mine I would like, as time permits, to mention a few diseases concerning which every inhabitant of India should have some knowledge.

"Take first hookworm, or ankylostomiasis. This parasite affects to a greater or less extent the rural population of the whole of India, in many parts infecting as many as 90 per cent. It causes anæmia and debility, it renders the sufferers unfit for hard work and an easy pray to other diseases. The means of infection is briefly as follows. Microscopic larvæ hatch out of eggs deposited with human excrement. These larvæ, attaching themselves to the feet or legs of the next comer, penetrate the skin painlessly, get into the blood current, and so go to the lungs; from the lungs they find their way through the air passages and working up to the throat are then swallowed and thus infect the intestinal canal. This debilitating disease, so universal in India, could be eradicated by the use of properly attended latrines. It is also not a difficult disease to cure. Another disease is Guinea-worm, which in parts of India is a veritable scourge. It is propagated by minute insects (the cyclops) which act as the intermediary hosts and are swallowed with drinking water. This disease may be entirely avoided by straining all drinking water through a cloth as the Jains have been taught to do. Of course boiling the water would also make it safe to drink. Then again take malaria itself. How many villagers know that this disease cannot be contracted except through the bite of an infected mosquito, and that the systematic use of mosquito nets and surface drainage would make an enormous difference in its incidence.

"Cholera, dysentery and typhoid are diseases due to germs derived solely from human excrement. These diseases can only be contracted by drinking water which has been fouled by such excrement or by taking contaminated food or milk. Flies which have been feeding on human excrement are the usual source of food contamination. These germs are killed by a temperature of 140°, and therefore by eating only freshly cooked food with clean hands and drinking only hot fluids you can live without danger in the midst of an epidemic of cholera. Typhus again, which has recently ravaged the United Provinces, is spread by lice and can be avoided by cleanliness.

"That terrible scourge bubonic plague is contracted from the bite of an infected rat flea. Obviously the way to eradicate it is to keep rats out of houses and grain stores, and to destroy them as far as possible. During an epidemic keeping the skin oiled will probably prevent a flea biting. Lastly, take tuberculosis. The knowledge we have of this worldwide disease, if acted on, would make an enormous difference in its incidence and so save untold misery and innumerable lives.

"I think I have said enough to show that, if the knowledge of even these few diseases alone was systematically imparted in every school throughout the land, the effect would be of enormous benefit to the entire population of India. With regard to influenza we have, I regret to say, much to learn. The latest researches go to prove that we have not yet even discovered the germ, which is undoubtedly ultra-microscopic and filter passing. This and many other diseases call for and are receiving close investigation.

"I trust that I have not wearied the Council and that I have said enough to convince everyone of the immense importance of medical research, preventive medicine and the education of the whole people of India in public health measures."

ANNEXURE V.

PROPOSALS FOR EQUALIZING THE SENIORITY OF OFFICERS OF THE INDIAN MEDICAL CORPS.

IN transferring officers from the Royal Army Medical Corps to the Indian Medical Corps, it is essential to maintain equality between officers of the two services. We suggest that any officer of the Royal Army Medical Corps who transfers to the Indian Medical Corps should be placed in the list of the latter corps exactly as if he had joined the Indian Medical Service originally, dating his seniority in that list according to the length of his service. In those cases in which two corresponding batches of Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical Service officers have different dates of first commission, we propose that, for purposes of seniority, it be assumed that each officer has the Indan Medical Service dates of first commission as lieutenant. promotion to captain, and promotion to major.

As regards the position of each officer in his respective batch, some difficulty is experienced, and there are two possible solutions of the problem: (1) to place each Royal Army Medical Corps officer at the top of the batch, because he originally belonged to the senior service; and (2) to place him at the bottom of the batch, as he is transferring from one service to another at his own option.

No difficulty need be experienced over the question of six months accelerated promotion given for study leave, as all officers transferred would come under the same rules, and if they had not already had any opportunity of taking study leave they would in course of time qualify exactly as Indian Medical Service officers do at present.

The real difficulty lies in arranging equitably the transfer of the Royal Army Medical Corps officers who have been granted the rank of lieutenant-colonel when they had not completed 20 years total service. It is obvious that if these officers are permitted to transfer to the unified service, they will supersede, by virtue of their rank, Indian Medical Service officers who do not receive promotion to lieutenant-colonel until they have completed 20 years service. The difficulty is a serious one and can only be overcome by the arbitrary expedient of placing the Royal Army Medical Corps officers in the unified list assuming them to be majors. Although we think that this should be their position as regards seniority in the Indian Medical Corps list, yet we cannot ask officers who have been granted the rank of lieutenant-colonel to revert to that of major. We therefore propose that they should retain this rank, but be regarded for all purposes of pay, position and seniority in the unified list according to their length of total service, that is to say, although they are lieutenant-colonels they would be paid according to the time scale of pay laid down for the Indian Medical Service. This procedure partakes of the same nature (but reversed) as the late practice in the Royal Army Medical Corps by which an officer who had completed 20 years service, but for whom there was no vacancy in the establishment of lieutenant-colonels, was paid as a lieutenant-colonel although he still was a major. Lieutenant-colonels who voluntarily transfer to the Indian Medical Corps will obtain the benefits of an Indian pension. This may be considered as a set off to the loss of pay entailed by their being treated as majors until they have completed 20 years service. Such difficulties that arise through the difference in army rank will have to be surmounted by careful postings of officers. The difficulty will not last for more than 3 or 4 years at the longest, as officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps who would transfer have over 16 or 17 years service.

Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps who have been superseded or passed over for promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel should certainly not be allowed to transfer.

The problem is however, so difficult that it seems probable that, if equal treatment is to be secured, each individual case will have to be considered on its merits.

ANNEXURE VI.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN MEDICAL CORPS DEPOT, TRAINING SCHOOL AND RECORD OFFICE, AND SKELETON SYLLABUS OF INSTRUCTION.

I.—ORGANIZATION.

A.—*Commandant and Staff*:—

Commandant—Colonel—graded as an Assistant Director, Medical Services.

Second-in-Command (who will also be Chief Instructor).

British.	Indian.
utant.	Jemadar Adjutant.
rtermaster.	Jemadar Quartermaster.
imental sergeant-major.	Regimental habildar-major.
rtermaster sergeant.	Quartermaster havildar.
Orderly room clerks.	

B.—*Depot Staff*:—

Officers Commanding Companies and Platoons (who will also act as Officer Instructors).

British.	Indian.
Company sergeant-majors.	Company havildar-majors.
Sergeants.	Havildars.
Corporals.	Naiks.
Lance-corporals.	Lance-naiks.
Buglers.	Buglers.

C.—*Instructional Staff*:—

Officer Instructors (company and platoon commanders—see under B above).

Assistant Instructors (assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons)

Non-commissioned officers (British and Indian).

Instructor in equitation (not necessarily a whole-time appointment).

D.—*Record Office*:—

Officer-in-charge of records.

Assistant to the officer-in-charge.

Staff of clerks.

II.—SKELETON SYLLABUS OF INSTRUCTION.

A.—*Officers*:—

1. Indian army organization.
2. Elementary principles of Indian military law.
3. Discipline.
4. Caste and racial differences of Indians.
5. Military hygiene and sanitation as applicable to India, in both peace and war.

B.—*Assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons*:—

As above*, with the addition of the following:—

1. Drill and physical training.
2. First aid.
3. Equitation and stable management.
4. Field service training.
5. Care and custody of medical mobilization stores and equipment.
6. Duties in military hospitals.
7. Principles of sick nursing.

C.—*Other ranks*:—

On first entering the depot every recruit should receive primary instruction in his vernacular and in English to the extent considered necessary in each individual case. (If subsidiary depots are established this instruction would be given there.) Concurrently with the above there should be instruction in drill and physical training. During this period of preliminary training each man's individual capacity should be watched, so that on its completion he may be drafted to specialized training in accordance with his aptitude. The specialized training should be under four heads :—

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*NOTE.—It is realized that the instruction in caste and racial differences of Indians need not be complete for these classes as for officers.

I.—*Nursing*—including—

1. First aid.
2. Duties in wards, as laid down in appendix 2, Standing Orders for the Royal Army Medical Corps, modified to suit the intelligence of the men.
3. Massage.
4. Duties of attendants in skiagraphy and electro-therapeutical departments.
5. Duties of operating room attendants.

II.—*Clerical.*—General duties in connection with accounts, correspondence, completion of forms, etc.

III.—*Store Keeping.*—

1. Care and custody of stores.
2. Quality of supplies.
3. Preparation of store returns and connected forms, etc.

IV.—*Ambulance.*—

1. First aid.
2. Stretcher drill including ambulance transport, and improvisation, etc.

ANNEXURE VII.

EXAMINATION PROPOSED FOR CANDIDATES FOR THE INDIAN MEDICAL CORPS.

I. Written papers—	Marks.
1. Surgery—General	100
2. Surgical Anatomy	50
3. Medicine—General (including therapeutics)	100
4. Obstetrics—Midwifery and diseases of children	100
5. Bacteriology and Pathology	100
II. *Viva Voce* and practical—	
1. Clinical Surgery	100
2. Surgical Pathology with specimens	100
3. Operative Surgery and Surgical Anatomy	100
4. Clinical Medicine	100
5. Medical Pathology with specimens	100
6. Gynæcology	100
7. Midwifery and Instruments	100
8. Bacteriology and Pathology	100

ANNEXURE VIII.

ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN MEDICAL CORPS.

The organization of the proposed Indian Medical Corps must provide for all the needs of British and Indian station hospitals as regards personnel. It should, therefore, consist of the following categories :—

1. Officers.
2. Assistant medical officers,

3. Sub-assistant surgeons.
4. Other ranks:—
    - (*a*) Nursing section.
    - (*b*) Clerical section.
    - (*c*) Ambulance section.
    - (*d*) Storekeeping section.
    - (*e*) General section.

The sections must be divided into two classes, British and Indian, as will be explained hereafter, in order to provide for the different needs of British and Indian hospitals.

Officers.

2. The cadre of officers of the corps should be calculated as follows:—

(1) Actual military peace requirements including those on study duty. (2) Leave and casualty reserve.	These officers will be in Military employment.
(3) Ordinary reserve for the army.	
(4) Special reserve, consisting of officers in civil employment who are considered as normally lost to the military side.	These officers will be in civil employment.

The actual strength of the Indian Medical Corps, under (1), should be calculated at 3 per mille for both British and Indian troops and followers, the strength for study duty being taken at 4 per cent of officers in addition. The strength under (2) should be 25 per cent of (1). It is impossible for us to suggest any figures for (3) and (4) as they will depend entirely on the numbers considered necessary, (*a*) to bring the army up to its highest expansion on mobilization for all ordinary wars or expeditions, and (*b*) in the event of a grave national emergency. The numbers under (1) and (2), above, do not include officers of the administrative grades. The number of the latter must obviously be determined by the future organization and geographical distribution of the army in India. The officers under (3) are included in the cadre of the Indian Medical Corps, but those under (4) should be considered as supernumerary to it.

Assistant medical officers.

3. It has been suggested in the main body of the report that the status of the present military assistant surgeons should be considerably improved, and that in future they should be employed solely on professional duties, and not as at present. As this will involve an improvement, not only in their qualifications, but also in their status, we consider that their cadre will bear reduction. It is impossible to say at what figure their future cadre should be fixed, but, assuming that their value will be doubled, we are of opinion that a cadre of some 200, in place of the 400 odd at present in military employ, should prove sufficient. As these men will now be highly trained doctors we consider that they can be employed in lieu of commissioned medical officers, and that the strength calculated for (1), above, can be correspondingly reduced.

Military sub-assistant surgeons.

4. The conditions of service of this class have recently been much improved. In order to increase their military value we would give them a course of training, when they join, at the proposed depot and school.

Other ranks.

5. These five sections of the corps will consist of all ranks up to warrant officer, or, as may be found necessary in the case of Indian ranks, up to Indian officer.

Nursing, clerical and storekeeping sections.

6. These sections should be divided into two classes, British and Indian. The British division should be recruited from the Anglo-Indian community and should be trained in the duties pertaining to the sections, at the proposed corps depot and school. In addition there should be a skeleton cadre of volunteers from the Royal Army Medical Corps, in order to provide, at any rate in the early existence of the corps, an element of trained and disciplined men. There is under the consideration of Government a scheme for the for-

mation of an Indian Hospital Corps. From details of these scheme which we have seen we consider that no difficulty should be experienced in incorporating it into our proposed Indian Medical Corps.

Ambulance section.

7. This section must consist entirely of Indians.

General section.

8. This will also consist entirely of Indians, and will include those of trade designations, such as dhobies, barbers, cooks, water carriers and sweepers.

Should it be desirable to employ members of the Anglo-Indian community as cooks in British station hospitals, a special section will have to be formed for this purpose.

Conditions of service—officers.

9. For the officer personnel of the Indian Medical Corps the conditions of entrance and promotion should be on the same basis as those of the Royal Army Medical Corps, including selection for promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel to fill an establishment. We may here explain that our 4 per cent for study duty has been provided in order that every officer of the Indian Medical Corps may, between the seventh and tenth year of his service, undergo the post-graduate course at the Royal Army Medical College in England.

It is recommended that, as all officers are not desirous of becoming purely administrative officers, each, on attaining the rank of lieutenant-colonel, should decide on one or other of the following careers:—

(*a*) military administration,
(*b*) specialists, namely, consulting surgeons and physicians to the army, or
(*c*) permanent civil employment.

In (*a*) officers will be eligible for promotion to the highest ranks and, after being selected for the rank of lieutenant-colonel, should be required to undergo a special course at a staff college, either Quetta or Camberley.

In (*b*) they will be promoted to fill a cadre of specialists and consultants, the numbers being decided later. They will not be promoted beyond the rank of colonel, but will be eligible for such administrative extra pensions as may be admissible from time to time in that rank.

The cadre for (*c*) has been dealt with in the main body of the report, but we would here emphasise that no officer after promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel should be considered eligible for transfer from military to civil employment, or *vice versa*; in other words, that on promotion to that rank every officer must select definitely for one or other branch of medical employment.

Training of officers.

10. It is proposed that, on first arrival in India, after undergoing the courses at Millbank and the Royal Army Medical Corps Depot, which a young officer of the Indian Medical Service has now to undergo, the young officer of the Indian Medical Corps should proceed to the proposed depot and school, where he would receive further instruction, an outline of which will be found in annexure VI. After this he should undergo a course of training in tropical medicine, as indicated in paragraph 46 of our report.

Assistant medical officers—conditions of service.

11. The future status of the military assistant surgeon, the proposed designation for whom is assistant medical officer, will be so changed that it will be necessary to draw up entirely new conditions of service. We would suggest that this can best be done in consultation with the heads of the medical colleges.

Assistant medical officers—training.

12. On leaving his medical college the assistant medical officer should proceed to the Indian Medical Corps Depot and School for a course of training analogous to that of the commissioned medical officer.

Other ranks—conditions of service.

13. As regards the Indian ranks of the corps, we understand that this question has already been fully examined. The conditions of service of the proposed skeleton cadre of the Royal Army Medical Corps, other ranks, must of necessity be considered in consultation with the War Office. Those of the Anglo-Indian community present many difficulties and we suggest that they be further considered, if and when the general scheme is accepted.

Other ranks—training.

14. We have indicated, in our annexure dealing with the formation of the proposed school and depot, the courses of training which these other ranks should undergo.

Governance.

15. The military side of the Indian Medical Corps, the constitution of which is outlined above, should be administered by the Commander-in-Chief in India, through the Director of Medical Services, who should in future be selected from the corps. In order to provide for the selection of the fittest officers for promotion, and to fill the various military appointments, we would suggest that a selection board be established. The Director of Medical Services, the head of the Civil Medical Service, and the Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India should be *ex-officio* members of this board. With them would be co-opted, as occasion required, the surgeons-general with the major provincial governments and the Deputy Directors of Medical Services.

Dental service.

16. It is also considered desirable to have a cadre of dental surgeons and assistants, attached to the military side of the Indian Medical Corps. They should be recruited in the United Kingdom by the Secretary of State, and should be eligible for promotion up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel on a time scale. The terms of service, pay, etc., can only be decided by the Secretary of State in consultation with the British Dental Association.

ANNEXURE IX.

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT MEDICAL STORE DEPARTMENT.

History of the Department.

In the year 1894 all government medical store depots in India were first brought under the control of the Government of India in the Military Department and directly under the administration of the Surgeon-General with the Government of India (subsequently Director-General, Indian Medical Service), Surgeons-General with the Governments of Bombay and Madras acting under instructions from the Surgeon-General with the Government of India in respect of all matters connected with the management of the medical store depots at Bombay, Madras and Rangoon.

In Military Department letter no. 3991-D., dated the 14th August, 1896, it was decided that the surgeons-general with the governments of Madras and Bombay should cease to have any connection with the management of the medical store depots at Madras, Rangoon and Bombay subject to the conditions that(*a*) the surgeons-general, Madras and Bombay, should retain the right to correspond direct with the medical storekeepers at Madras, Bombay and Rangoon, regarding matters connected with the issue of drugs and stores to civil charges under the control of the surgeons-general, and (*b*) that the present interests and rights enjoyed by the civil department in the supply of stores etc., should be maintained.

So far as is known no modification of these orders has been made and they are still in force.

From 1896 to 1910 the work of the Medical Store Department progressively increased and, in the latter year, the Government of India sanctioned a conference of medical storekeepers with a view to drawing up a scheme embodying various proposals for improvement in the working of the department.

This conference drew up and submitted to Government a report containing various proposals, but certain of these proposals had, for various reasons, not been carried into effect up to August 1914. The strain suddenly thrown on the ill-equipped and understaffed Medical Store Department from the date of the outbreak of war was enormous, and the manner in which demands were met, and the work carried out, without a breakdown, reflects the greatest credit on the departmental staff.

Following the cessation of hostilities the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, considering that it was not in the best interests of Government that this large and important department should continue to work under difficulties due chiefly to inadequate staff and accommodation, proposed to Government that Lieutenant-Colonel Shairp and Ross should visit each depot in turn, ascertaining the views of medical storekeepers on various administrative questions with a view to framing proposals for the reorganization of the department.

The Government of India agreed to this proposal, but considered that the enquiry came within the scope of the Medical Services Committee, and that Lieutenant-Colonels Shairp and Ross should be appointed as a sub-committee with a view to their drawing up a scheme of reorganization for the consideration of the Medical Services Committee.

The sub-committee visited the various depots on the following dates:—

Lahore	6th to 8th February.
Calcutta	3rd to 7th March.
Madras	10th to 14th March.
Bombay	17th to 22nd March.

The Medical Services Committee visited the depôt at Calcutta on 3rd March, Madras on 10th March, Bombay on 19th March.

Time did not permit of a visit to the Rangoon depôt.

Functions of the Medical Store Department.

2. The Director-General, Indian Medical Service is, in conjunction with the Director, Medical Services in India, responsible to the Government of India in the Army Department, for the equipment and supply of all military medical stores, and with the Quartermaster-General in India for military veterinary stores. In addition he is responsible for the supply of medical stores to Government and Government aided institutions (both medical and veterinary) on the civil side. Since the outbreak of war, the supply of artificial limbs to disabled soldiers, dental equipment to army dentists throughout India, and the equipment of orthopaedic institutions has also devolved on the Medical Store Department.

He also, at the request of other Government departments, assists in procuring or manufacturing, a great variety of articles urgently required for war purposes, which cannot, strictly speaking, be adjudged as coming under 'medical supplies.'

The stores required are obtained:—

(1) By importation through the India Office.
(2) From other Government departments, such as the Supply and Transport Corps, Military Works Department, Revenue and Agriculture Department, etc.
(3) By purchase from business firms and contractors in India.
(4) By manufacture at Medical Store Depots.

For storage, manufacture and distribution there are five Government Medical Store Depots, *viz.*, Calcutta, Lahore Cantonment, Madras, Bombay and Rangoon, under the control of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service; of these, the depots at Lahore Cantonment, Madras and Bombay are manufacturing, as well as supply depots, those at Calcutta and Rangoon being mainly supply depôts.

The Medical Store Department also undertakes the repair of surgical instruments, etc., returned by both civil and military institutions.

Prior to the outbreak of war, it was manufacturing pharmaceutical preparations to a considerable extent, and the fact that it was in a position to do so was of material assistance in meeting the greatly increased demands, not only from military hospitals in India, but from overseas forces.

Prior to the arrival of a British base depot of medical stores at Bombay in January, 1917, the Medical Store Department was responsible for the supply of all the medical and surgical stores required by the army in Mesopotamia; it still continues largely to supplement the requirements of this depot, in addition to supplying all articles coming under the heading of

Indian pattern field medical equipment. It has equipped all general hospitals, field ambulances, clearing and stationary hospitals, advanced depots of medical stores, and sanitary sections to meet the demands both for the army in India and for overseas forces, as from time to time required by the military authorities.

Owing to freight difficulties and in order to relieve strain on home resources, every endeavour has been made to develop the manufacture of medical requirements from Indian sources. It was recognised that many articles formerly imported could, and should, be manufactured in India.

Present accommodation provided for medical store depots.

3. *Lahore.*—The depot, situated in the centre of the cantonment, is located in a series of old bungalows enclosed by a wall, which have, from time to time, been supplemented by minor additions. The sub-committee are of opinion that the present buildings are most unsuitable and inadequate. Owing to lack of accommodation the compound of the depot is, of necessity, littered with valuable stock thus causing considerable loss, both from breakage and deterioration, as well as increasing enormously the daily work of the depot and rendering impossible a true, or even approximately true, verification of the stock. Owing to the fact that Lahore Cantonment will, in the future, become a large military supply base and that any frontier expedition will largely depend on it for supplies, the Medical Store Depot at Lahore will increase rather than diminish in importance. The location of two base depots of medical stores containing about 4,000 packages at the Lahore depot has lately been decided upon.

We are of opinion that the erection of a new depot on modern lines on a new site is most necessary as it would undoubtedly result in the work being performed with greater efficiency and expedition, also greatly simplifying verification of stock, reducing losses from deterioration of stores, allowing for future expansion, and minimizing risk from fire.

Calcutta.—The depot is well housed and ample accommodation is available.

Madras.—This depot is accommodated in buildings formerly occupied by the Madras Gun Carriage Factory.

Ample space for expansion is available and with the exception of altering existing buildings to permit of expansion of the laboratory, and the provision of suitable accommodation for the analytical chemist to carry out research work, little in the way of new buildings will be required.

The godowns in which bulk dressings are stored are overcrowded. This can, however, be remedied by closing in the verandahs by 'expanded metal.' The medical storekeeper has been asked to submit his proposals.

Bombay.—It has, for a considerable time, been recognised by Government that complete reconstruction of this depot is necessary, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in January, 1917, issued instructions that the work was to be expedited in every way possible.

Since that date only one double-storeyed building has been erected and, at the time of our visit, work on the other buildings had not even been commenced.

It is most essential that this work should be completed at as early a date as possible, more particularly the construction of the proposed large three-storeyed block.

The present buildings are overcrowded and most unsuitable and it is with the greatest difficulty that the work of the depot is being carried out.

When No. 11 Base Depot Medical Stores is closed, presumably in the near future, it is probable that the Medical Store Depot, Bombay, will supply both the civil and military requirements of Mesopotamia.

Establishment.

4. *General.*—The establishment now employed has been sanctioned from time to time to meet the individual requirements of each depot. There is thus no uniformity, or interchange of staff between the various depots; each has its own promotion list and promotion is usually given by virtue of seniority and not necessarily according to merit.

The system does not commend itself and we suggest that all depot establishments (with the exception of menial establishment) should be borne on an all-India cadre subject to transfer from one depot to any other.

Controlling Establishment.—Each depot is in charge of an Indian Medical Service officer who is known as the Medical Storekeeper to Government. These are whole time appointments at the Medical Store Depots at Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and Lahore, the Rangoon depot being a collateral charge usually held by an Indian Medical Service officer on military duty in Rangoon.

The name Medical Storekeeper appears a misnomer and should, it is thought, be altered to Officer-in-charge, Medical Store Depot.

It is customary for officers once selected as medical storekeepers to remain in the Department throughout the greater part of their service. The cadre at present consists of four permanent appointments, no provision having apparently been considered necessary to provide either for leave, furlough or casualty vacancies. The duties, always extremely arduous, are becoming progressively more so, and these officers have to work continuously in such enervating climates as Madras, Bombay and Calcutta.

During the war 3 out of the 4 permanent medical storekeepers have been obliged to take sick leave for considerable periods, their places being filled by assistant surgeons owing to no trained reserve being available. It is obviously undesirable false economy to continue working with an undermanned cadre and medical storekeepers should be encouraged to take a reasonable amount of furlough.

Deputy medical storekeepers.

5. Owing to the increase during the war in the work of medical storekeepers both in complexity and extent, it was found necessary to create temporary appointments as Deputy Medical Storekeepers at Madras and Bombay. The sub-committee consider that these appointments should be made permanent, as at these depots it is quite impossible for one man, no matter how energetic and hardworking, to carry out efficiently the manifold duties involved.

In addition, a junior Indian Medical Service officer should be permanently appointed as deputy medical storekeeper to the Lahore depot which will shortly include the Quetta division in its circle of supply. His duty would primarily be the charge of the mobilization reserves including the regular turn-over of stocks in the two base depots of medical stores which will be located there; he would in addition assist in the general work of the depot which has become too great to be efficiently carried out by one man.

If it is decided to adopt the name Officer-in charge, Medical Store Depot, in place of that of Medical Storekeeper to Government, Deputy Medical Storekeepers will be known as Assistants to Officers-in-charge, Medical Store Depots.

For the appointment of deputy medical storekeeper young Indian Medical Service officers of from 5 to 8 years service should be selected.

A deputy medical storekeeper must elect to serve in the Department for a minimum period of 3 years at the end of which time he will, if the Director-General considers him suitable, be asked whether he desires to be appointed permanently to the department. Once permanently appointed he will not be permitted to revert to other duty, except at the discretion of the Director General.

The cadre of officers would thus consist of:—

Medical Storekeepers	4
Deputy Medical Storekeepers	3
TOTAL	7
Add for leave and casualty reserve	2
TOTAL	9

Pay of medical storekeepers.

6. The pay drawn by medical storekeepers was fixed in Military Department notification no. 132, dated the 17th February 1905. Three of the four permanent appointments are now held by senior lieutenant-colonels all of whom have served for many years in this department. Candidates are not forthcoming and, at the moment, there is only one suitable officer on the waiting list.

The reasons for the present undoubted unpopularity of service in this department are manifold, a few of the most important being that these officers are underpaid and are required to live in expensive presidency towns, they are deprived of all opportunities of private practice, the work is of an extremely arduous and harassing nature and it is impossible for them to keep up their professional knowledge as medical men. It is extremely unlikely and will probably become more so in the future, that medical storekeepers can ever attain to administrative rank. With the increased attractions for senior officers offered by the station hospital system it will be more difficult than ever to get officers for these posts unless the emoluments are made sufficiently large to attract candidates.

In suggesting revised rates of pay and allowances the best basis to go on will be to take the case of each appointment separately, it being assumed that medical storekeepers will benefit in common with the rest of the service in the increased rate of pay lately sanctioned by the Secretary of State.

Bombay.—This is a large manufacturing depot which, owing to its geographical situation, will continue to be a most responsible and onerous charge.

The cost of living at Bombay has, of late years, increased to such an extent that the present pay is inadequate; house rents have gone up enormously and it is at present impossible to obtain even a small flat at a lower rental than Rs. 250 to 300 per mensem. Owing to the location of the depot at Byculla it is necessary for the medical storekeeper to live either on Malabar Hill, or in the Fort, and he is forced to maintain a motor car for the efficient performance of his duties. To obviate these disadvantages we suggest that the Medical Storekeeper, Bombay, should continue to draw his present staff pay at the rate of Rs. 500 per mensem and that this staff pay should be drawn irrespective of rank as the responsibilities are similar for all holders of the appointment. He should receive an additional Rs. 100 per mensem, manufacturing depot allowance.

The Medical Storekeeper, Bombay, does not come within the Bombay House Allowance Scheme *vide* Appendix XIII Army Regulations, India, volume I, although the appointment is a permanent military one; he should be allotted Government quarters at the usual rates or admitted to the Bombay House Allowance Scheme. To compensate the medical storekeeper for being debarred from private practice a local allowance of Rs. 200 per mensem should be granted.

Madras.—This is the largest manufacturing depot.

The cost of living at Madras is not nearly so high as at Bombay but the duties are equally arduous. It is suggested that the pay of this appointment should be fixed at grade pay *plus* present staff pay of Rs. 500 per mensem *plus* Rs. 100 manufacturing depot allowance *plus* Rs. 200 per mensem local allowance in lieu of private practice.

Calcutta.— } The pay of these appointments should be grade pay *plus*
Lahore.— } present staff pay of Rs. 500 per mensem *plus* Rs. 200 per mensem local allowance in lieu of private practice.

The extra expense of living in Calcutta is to a large extent compensated by the existence of Government quarters for the medical storekeeper.

Pay of deputy medical storekeepers.

7. The pay of deputy medical storekeeper should be the pay of rank for officers in military employ now under consideration *plus* Rs. 200 staff pay rising to Rs. 400 per mensem after five years service in the department. In the case of Bombay, he should either be allotted Government quarters at the usual rates or admitted to the Bombay House Allowance Scheme.

Subordinate establishment.

8. The cadre at present consists of 9 military assistant surgeons—3 each at Madras and Bombay, 1 each at Calcutta, Lahore and Rangoon.

At each depot the senior military assistant surgeon is placed in sub-charge of the depot and at the large manufacturing depots at Madras and Bombay an assistant surgeon acts as superintendent of the laboratory and another as superintendent in charge of the surgical instruments and appliances sections.

The duties carried out by military assistant surgeons attached to medical store depots are of a technical nature and a course of training in these duties is necessary to render them efficient.

At present owing to their being no leave reserve an inexperienced man is brought in to fill leave vacancies. This does not tend to efficiency and we urge the advisability of adding an additional appointment to permit of one assistant surgeon always being on leave. This would bring the strength of the cadre of military assistant surgeons to 10.

Pay of Military assistant surgeons attached to medical store depots.

9. The present rates of allowances as laid down in Army Regulations, India, volume I, paragraph 398, are considered inadequate.

The same arguments as those noted in the case of medical storekeepers apply, to a minor degree, in the case of these men. Their duties are of a responsible nature for which men of integrity are necessary. They are debarred from civil employment thus foregoing all chance of private practice. Furthermore, on retirement, they are no longer competent to add to their pensions by doing professional work.

Recruitment should only be made from the ranks of fourth class assistant surgeons as it is most advisable that men should be trained in their early years of service.

We recommend the abolition of the present allowances laid down in Army Regulations, India, volume I, paragraph 398, and the substitution of the following inclusive allowances irrespective of the duties performed.

	Pay. Rs.	Allowances. Rs.
4th class assistant surgeon	100	*plus* 100 per mensem.
4th class assistant surgeon after 5 years in the Medical Store Department.	100	*plus* 125 per mensem.
3rd class assistant surgeon after 7 years in the department.	150	*plus* 125 per mensem.
3rd class assistant surgeon after 10 years in the department.	150	*plus* 150 per mensem.
2nd class assistant surgeon after 12 years in the department.	200	*plus* 150 per mensem.
2nd class assistant surgeon after 15 years in the department.	200	*plus* 175 per mensem.
1st class assistant surgeon after 19 years in the department.	250	*plus* 175 per mensem.

any of the above when acting as manager *plus* 50.

Permanent manager—pay of rank *plus* 250.

In addition they should be entitled, as at present, to free quarters (or house allowance in lieu).

Assistant surgeons should be on probation for two years after joining the department, at the expiry of which, if considered suitable, they should elect to remain permanently in the Medical Store Department.

Military sub-assistant surgeons.

10. Military sub-assistant surgeons are employed as stock holders at the smaller depots. In view of the fact that they are employed in stations where the cost of living is high and that they are, from the nature of their duties, debarred from any opportunity of private practice, we consider that the present allowance, *viz.*, 25 per cent. of grade pay, should be abolished and in its place substituted an allowance of Rs. 40 per mensem for all ranks.

Superior establishment.

11. This consists of (*a*) clerical (*b*) depot establishment and (*c*) laboratory establishment.

As regards these establishments, no two depots are alike either in rates of pay, personnel or designation. In the case of each depot extra establishment has been entertained as required to meet increasing work and many of the present appointments are temporary, sanctioned only for the duration of the war. There is, in our opinion, no doubt that these establishments are both understaffed and underpaid, and that the administration of the department is considerably handicapped by these conditions. We have already suggested the advisability of having an all-India cadre, and, if this principle is accepted, detailed suggestions regarding the establishments to be entertained, including a reserve for purposes of furlough and leave, with proposed rates of pay, will be submitted for the consideration of Government by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service. This however will involve considerable work, necessitating frequent references to the various medical storekeepers, and cannot, owing to lack of time, be embodied in the present report. We would point out, however, that certain proposals which we are submitting aim at effecting a considerable reduction in labour both in the clerical and depot work, and that the question of the strength of the establishment required will largely depend on whether these proposals are accepted or not. If the principle of having the superior establishment brought on to an all-India cadre is accepted, all such establishment will be placed on equal rates of pay according to grade, and prospects will be improved by the grant of local allowances. As regards the designation of the various employees all depots should be the same. Establishments already engaged will be given the option of accepting service under the all-India cadre scheme.

Menial staff.

12. The adequacy or otherwise of the menial staff need not be brought within the scope of this report. Medical storekeepers will be asked to submit proposals which, when received, will be submitted to Government for sanction.

The menial staff need not be brought under an all-India cadre.

Depot assistants (compounders).

13. We consider it necessary to draw attention to the class of man employed as depot assistants (compounders). The duties consist in the retail issue of drugs, which in many instances are extremely valuable and poisonous. The rates of pay range from Rs. 15 to Rs. 40 per mensem.

The men are recruited from the more intelligent cooly boys, who have acquired a very haphazard smattering of English, in order that they may be able to decipher the printed labels, etc., handed to them. With this very moderate mental equipment these men are expected to be able to issue in retail preparations which are frequently poisonous. It appears quite unnecessary to emphasize the danger of this practice, and we consider that provision should be made for adequately trained men on suitable rates of pay. It is quite possible that the variation from book balances which are discovered at the daily and annual verifications of stock are largely due to the inaccuracy of these untrained men.

In order to ensure efficiency, all compounders employed should have passed the provincial examination for compounders employed under the civil department, and no promotion should be made until candidates have passed the examination prescribed for their contemporaries in ordinary civil employ.

We suggest three grades—

3rd grade compounders on Rs. 30 per mensem.
2nd grade compounders on Rs. 40 per mensem.
1st grade compounders on Rs. 50 per mensem.

In the case of Bombay a local allowance of Rs. 10 per mensem should be sanctioned in each grade.

It will not be necessary to include compounders on an all-India cadre and they should in future be classed as "compounders" and not as "depot assistants."

Scope of work undertaken by medical store depots.

14. (*a*) *Military.*—The Medical Store Department is normally responsible for the supply of all medical stores both to military medical and veterinary institutions of the army in India, as well as for the equipment of all field

medical and veterinary units. Medical stores are also supplied to vessels of the British Navy in Indian waters as well as to the Royal Indian Marine. During the war the work increased enormously owing to the fact that the department had to meet very large unanticipated demands from overseas forces, in addition to undertaking supplies to army dental surgeons throughout India, the manufacture of artificial limbs, orthopædic appliances, etc. Military charges indent annually for their requirements basing their demands on the scales authorised in Army Tables, Medical, for non-expendible stores, expendible stores being demanded on an "as required" scale. We found that much unnecessary work is being thrown on the Medical Store Department owing to the great number of emergent indents submitted by military hospitals.

The fact that many hundreds of emergent indents from military hospitals are submitted annually appears to show, not only that military medical officers do not exercise sufficient care in the preparation of their annual indents, but that Army Tables, Medical, are in urgent need of revision. Certain articles are being continually demanded in excess of authorised scale, and in such cases these scales should be revised so as to obviate the necessity for the submission of so large a number of emergent indents. If the military medical authorities instructed officers commanding military hospitals that this frequent submission of emergent indents means bad hospital administration, much will have been done towards reducing the work now being thrown on the Medical Store Department. M. 1216, Military Annual Indent Form, does not correspond with Army Tables, Medical, and should be made to do so.

Unauthorised articles are frequently demanded in annual indents for military hospitals and almost invariably passed for supply by the administrative medical officers concerned. This necessitates careful check of all military medical indents at medical store depots to ascertain if unauthorised demands are included and whether authorised stores are demanded in the authorised quantities as laid down at the end of paragraph 178, Army Regulations, India, volume II. It is considered that such check should be carried out in the office of the military administrative officer who should alone be held responsible for demands made.

When unauthorized articles are required, their supply should either be authorized by the Director, Medical Services in India, or he should delegate such authority to military administrative officers.

We suggest that the ruling referred to should be made applicable to officers countersigning such indents, thereby greatly decreasing the work now thrown on medical storekeepers.

If these suggestions are accepted the medical storekeeper would simply comply with all demands received without being held responsible for check, thus considerably reducing his work, speeding up compliance with indents, and freeing him from criticism as to delay which is now so often made.

(*b*) *Civil.* (*1*).—Although prior to the war a very large number of Government civil medical institutions indented on the Medical Store Department for articles included in the Depot Equipment List many institutions preferred to indent either on the Director General of Stores, India Office, London, direct, or on private firms in England. In 1917 the Government of India, Indian Munitions Board, drew attention to this fact and asked the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, whether it would not be possible for the Medical Store Department to undertake the supply of such stores as are normally stocked at medical store depots to all Government civil hospitals, medical colleges, Government schools, museums and similar institutions; also whether he would agree to include in the Depot Equipment List articles, not already in the list, for which a continued demand exists.

Following this reference orders were issued by the Government of India, Indian Munitions Board, *vide* their letter no. P.-44, dated the 26th February 1918, (enclosure no. 1) in which all the above classes of institutions were instructed to indent on the Medical Store Department with a view to obviating the waste of money and labour involved in piece-meal purchasing by the India Office. There can be no doubt that the introduction of this very necessary order will effect a considerable saving to Government, as, not only will it permit of wholesale, instead of piece-meal, purchasing by the India Office at correspondingly lower rates, but in many cases civil institutions will, from a monetary point of view, benefit considerably by purchasing drugs which are now being manufactured at medical store depots from indigenous products at prices much lower than those at which firms at home can possibly supply them.

There are grave indications that local governments are not altogether satisfied with their dealings with medical store depots, the chief complaint made by most of the witnesses summoned before the Medical Services Committee, being of undue delay in compliance with demands. A general speeding up of the depot work is undoubtedly desirable, and this is an administrative question which must be carefully examined by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service. In fairness to the department, however, it is pointed out that this delay is largely due to the chronic condition of overwork at all depots, owing chiefly to inadequately paid and undermanned staffs, also to lack of sufficient suitable storage accommodation, and in addition to the fact that indents are frequently submitted which have been carelessly drawn up necessitating careful check at the depots.

The time taken by the India Office in complying with demands submitted in annual indents appears unduly long, supplies, on occasions, not being received in India within a year after date of submission. Such long delays should not occur and the India Office should be asked to endeavour to comply more rapidly with demands.

Civil hospitals are supposed to submit indents on due dates but, in practice, they frequently fail to do so. This naturally results in delay in compliance as the depots are, on occasions, unable to deal with all the indents received as rapidly as is desirable. Every civil hospital is notified as to the date on which its annual indent should be sent in and administrative medical officers should be asked to issue strict injunctions to civil surgeons that failure to despatch their indents on due dates will be considered as reflecting on their administration.

(2) *Municipal and District Board Dispensaries.*—The Government Medical Store Department supplies the great majority of these institutions throughout the Madras and Bombay presidencies. In these presidencies this concession was continued when, in the year 1894, the administrative control of provincial depots was taken over by the military department, and it is considered by the local governments in question as a vested right, any attempt to do away with which would undoubtedly be strongly opposed. No attempt therefore should be made to discontinue the supply of medical stores to municipal and district board dispensaries in the Madras or Bombay presidencies. These institutions throughout India are, in most cases partly financed by means of Government grants-in-aid, and it is beyond question that the present practice of purchase, either through travelling agents, or direct from private firms in India, is an extravagant one and frequently involves the purchase of inferior drugs, a most grave danger and one which cannot be obviated until a Drugs Adulteration Act has been introduced into India.

Owing to war conditions the purchase in India of considerable quantities of medical stores by the Government Medical Store Department proved necessary and it was in many cases found that even firms which were generally considered reputable were not above supplying drugs of inferior quality.

The experience gained in the last few years goes to prove that municipal and district board dispensaries, which purchase in the market in India in preference to availing themselves of the concession of obtaining supplies from the Government Medical Store Department, not only pay very much higher rates for their requirements but, in many cases, obtain drugs of poor quality. As most of these institutions are assisted by Government grants-in-aid it follows that Government money is being wasted by this practice at the expense of the general public.

The Medical Store Department has at present as much work as can be carried out without considerable expansion and, all things considered, we do not think it advisable to press for any extension in the direction of supplying these State-aided institutions.

Apart from the question of overburdening the depots, opposition is to be expected from the trade, and it is desirable that private enterprise should be encouraged and that there should be additional sources of supply available in times of emergency. Until, however, a Drugs Act is brought into force in India the quality of drugs in the bazaar will continue to be below the standard required. We strongly urge therefore that a Drugs Act should be brought into force as soon as possible.

It should continue optional for district board and municipal dispensaries as to whether they obtain their supplies from the Medical Store Department or by purchase in the open market.

(3) *Native States.*—A few Native States are being supplied and many others would undoubtedly welcome the concession of being permitted to obtain supplies from the Government Medical Store Department, but extension in this direction would interfere with the interests of private firms and tend to retard development of the drug industry in India. It is therefore thought that any extension in this direction is inadvisable.

(4) *Mission Hospitals.*—A certain number of these institutions in the Madras and Bombay presidencies are, on the recommendation of the local surgeons-general, supplied by the Government Medical Store Department.

It should not be forgotten that these institutions relieve Government of a large amount of its responsibility for the medical treatment of people often in otherwise inaccessible areas, and it seems reasonable that they be permitted to share the advantage as to economy, etc., which would result from their being permitted to indent regularly upon the Government Medical Store Department.

Owing to the present high cost of drugs, etc., which makes it difficult for missionaries to obtain their requirements in the open market while working within their budget allotments, and the difficulty of obtaining many drugs at the present time, a number of requests have been received asking for permission to obtain their requirements from the Government Medical Store Department.

If the concession of being permitted to deal with Government depots was extended to mission hospitals it would be greatly appreciated.

(5) *Supply to medical institutions independent of Government.*—With a view to lightening the work of the Government Medical Store Department it was decided in Home Department resolution No. $\frac{5\text{-Medical}}{360\text{-}369}$, dated the 11th June, 1888, that medical institutions independent of Government should no longer have the privilege of indenting on the Government Medical Store Department. In Government of India, Home Department (Medical) resolution, No. 380-393, dated 26th March 1898, it was considered advisable, owing to the receipt of numerous applications from non-Government medical institutions asking for exemption from this ruling, to reconsider the above order, and it was decided that, subject to certain conditions, local governments and administrations should be empowered to authorise any medical institutions within their respective jurisdictions to obtain their supplies of medicines, etc., from the Government Medical Store Department.

We are aware that the Government of India (Home Department) in its letter No. 361-369, dated the 4th May 1912, decided on the continuance of the arrangement under which non-Government institutions and private bodies were allowed this privilege, but we consider that the question should be reviewed in the light of the recommendations made in the report of the Indian Industrial Commission, and that in view of the necessity of encouraging private enterprise and manufacture in India, the continuance of this practice is not advisable; we therefore suggest that no medical institution financially independent of Government should be allowed to indent on the Government Medical Store Department for their supplies of drugs, etc.

Manufacture in medical store depots.

15. Although, prior to 1914, the Medical Store Department was manufacturing many pharmaceutical preparations on a considerable scale the strain of war led to a great development in the utilization of Indian resources. It was recognised that many articles formerly imported could, and should, be manufactured in India from indigenous products. Analytical chemists were engaged and are working at the manufacturing depots at Bombay and Madras and many preparations are being manufactured at these depots from indigenous raw materials which were, before the war imported from home.

Every effort has been made to develop the manufacture of surgical dressings at the depots and, at the same time, to encourage reliable private firms to extend their output in this direction.

The Medical Store Department is a very large purchaser of surgical instruments and appliances, of which an important source of supply for many years has been the workshops at the Medical Store Depot, Bombay. Part of these premises has been handed over to a private concern which has established in it a factory that provides a considerable portion of the requirements of the Department. It employs several hundred workmen who have been trained to manufacture and repair instruments and appliances and the articles turned out are of excellent workmanship and finish, comparing favourably with similar articles manufactured by the best known surgical instrument makers at home, both in quality and price. War demands have led to many new developments including the manufacture of shaped artificial limbs and orthopaedic appliances.

The question of ascertaining what raw materials are, or can be, made available in India and the best methods of obtaining supplies, both for immediate requirements and with a view to future developments, has been a subject of close investigation for some time. It is an undoubted fact that up to now the indigenous resources of India have not been utilized to anything like the extent possible. The practice, prior to war, was to purchase in England through the medium of the India Office not only manufactured drugs, but also most of the raw materials required for the manufacture of pharmaceutical products, many of which raw materials had actually been exported to England from India.

The general investigation as to the possibilities of obtaining Indian grown products has for some time been carefully gone into by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, who in December, 1917, drew up and submitted a note to the Revenue and Agriculture Department pointing out the desirability of actively taking up the question of the organized cultivation of medicinal trees and plants. It has been decided that this question will come within the scope of a Drugs Manufacture Committee with the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, as President.

So far, the information available merely, as it were, touches the fringe of possibilities, and, owing to the almost complete lack of data in the form of any up-to-date literature or reliable information on the subject, the problem is an extremely difficult one.

Many of the medicinal plants required grow wild in the Indian forests and owing to the hitherto small demands are classified as minor forest produce, and no special attention appears to have been paid to them nor does there exist, as far as is known, any effective organization for collection. Within the last few years a considerable advance has been made in utilizing resources, and medicinal plants are now being grown in various parts of India for supply to the Medical Store Department. Much remains to be done, as many other valuable medicinal plants are known to grow wild in large quantities in the Indian forests, but until an organized survey is undertaken the problem of collection and utilization of these products cannot be satisfactorily solved. In order to demonstrate the great advance in the manufacture of drugs which has taken place in the laboratories of the Medical Store Department within the last few years we attach a list (enclosure No. 2) shewing the more important drugs, etc., of which the total requirements of Government are now being manufactured.

The necessity of encouraging, in every way possible, the manufacture of drugs in India so as to render the country as self-supporting as possible, has been fully recognised, but a considerable amount of research investigation will be necessary before private enterprise can be expected to capitalize the drug industry on a commercial scale.

The Indian Industrial Commission in their report advocate the establishment by Government of " Pioneer " or " Demonstration " factories with a view to the inception by Government of industries on a small commercial scale in order to ascertain and overcome the initial difficulties, and discover if the industry can be worked at a profit.

In dealing with drugs the question of quality is so important that it is essential that Government should not discontinue any manufacture until reliable commercial firms have proved that they can manufacture drugs of the necessary quality on a sufficiently large scale as to render it absolutely certain that Government will be able to obtain all its requirements without difficulty and at prices comparing favourably with Government cost production. It has unfortunately, up-to-now, frequently been the experience of the Medical Store Department in dealing with firms in India that the difference between samples submitted and actual supplies subsequently delivered is liable to be considerable and much time must elapse before it will be possible to close down, or limit the scope of, our manufacturing laboratories at Madras and Bombay. These laboratories are already established and in full working order with up-to-date machinery. Their output, already large, should be increased by the addition of an extra staff of permanent research chemists.

Extra machinery is required and proposals for this will, it is understood, shortly be submitted to Government by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service.

They can be utilized as "Demonstration Factories" for educational purposes serving as schools for training Indian chemists. Commercial firms desirous of taking up drug manufacture would be advised to send men possessing a knowledge of chemistry for training under expert guidance in the processes of manufacture.

At the present time drugs and pharmaceutical preparations are being manufactured at three medical store depots, *viz.*, Madras, Bombay and Lahore, the laboratories at the two former places are very large that at Lahore being a small one poorly equipped with machinery. We are of opinion that the maintenance of this small laboratory at Lahore is both a waste of time and money. One power-driven tablet making machine, which we saw is obviously far beyond the necessities of Lahore and would be far more usefully employed in increasing the output of a large depot where it would be regularly, instead of spasmodically, used. The services of the pharmaceutical chemist now employed at Lahore, would be utilized to greater advantage if working with others similarly employed than in carrying out routine details.

We therefore recommend the closing down of the laboratory at Lahore, the establishment and equipment being transferred to Bombay with the exception of the pharmaceutical chemist who would be transferred to Madras.

Research chemists.

16. In order to carry out the research work required to develop drug manufacture with a view to making India self-supporting, the services of highly qualified research chemists are necessary. In Europe the value of scientists in industrial work is being increasingly recognised with the inevitable result of raising their remuneration. India cannot afford to have second-rate men in her technical services, and in order to obtain the best she must be prepared to offer adequate inducements.

At the present time Captain MacCulloch, late Royal Field Artillery, who was temporarily attached as analytical chemist to the Madras depot, on 27th

April, 1917, as a war measure, is the only chemist employed possessing the necessary higher qualifications. This officer before the war was employed at Edinburgh as a research chemist under the Medical Research Committee to investigate the chemical side of bacteriological problems under Professor Ritchie of Edinburgh University. On the outbreak of war his services were utilized for research work on the high explosive, tri-nitro-toluene. He is a M. A., B. Sc. (honours) of Edinburgh University and an associate of the Institute of Chemistry. The investigations into the possibilities of drug manufacture from indigenous products carried out by this officer during the past two years have led to the manufacture of many drugs and chemicals not previously manufactured in India.

We are strongly convinced of the advisability of the services of such analytical chemists being obtained permanently for research work under the Medical Store Department and suggest the following terms as regards the future recruitment and service of research chemists employed under the Government Medical Store Department:—

Pay on joining the department at the rate of Rs. 600 per mensem rising to Rs. 1,400 by annual increments of Rs. 50, pensionable on the completion of 20 years service. Leave and furlough to be based on the rules laid down in Civil Service Regulations for gazetted officers.

In view of the great importance of the research work to be udertaken, we would press strongly on Government the advisability of sanctioning the permanent employment, in addition to Captain MacCulloch (assuming that he will be retained in the department) of a well qualified research chemist for the Bombay depot. These officers to come under any house allowance schemes ruling at Madras and Bombay.

The advisability of these research chemists being eventually absorbed into the Indian Chemical Service suggested by the Indian Industrial Commission, remaining seconded for employment in the Medical Store Department and being eligible for higher appointments in that service can be considered at a later date when the Indian Chemical Service has come into being.

We have reason to believe that an enquiry into the financial working of the Government medical store depot laboratories would now show a profit to Government of several lakhs of rupees annually after payment of all charges.

Pharmaceutical chemist.

17. In addition to the above superior appointments we suggest that Private J. E. Bowen, now temporarily employed as pharmaceutical chemist in the laboratory at the Bombay medical store depot, be permanently engaged as pharmaceutical chemist at Bombay. Private Bowen, a member of the Pharmaceutical Society, came out to India in the Royal Army Medical Corps, and has been employed at the Medical Store Depot, Bombay, since May, 1917. The work which he has carried out while so employed has been most valuable and the retention of his services is desirable.

He has practical experience of the work required, having, before the war, been employed under a well known firm of manufacturing chemists in England. We suggest the following terms as regards his engagement:—

(*a*) Pay Rs. 450—20—850 per mensem.

(*b*) That for purposes of leave, furlough, and pension he should be under the Civil Service Regulations.

(*c*) That during the period of his service he be granted two passages to England and back and a free passage on the termination of his contract.

(*d*) That contribution by him towards a general provident fund be obligatory.

(*e*) Engagement in England.—(1) That upon his discharge from military service he be engaged by the Secretary of State, if found to be physically fit, at as early a date as possible and sent out to India on a free passage.

(2) That his Indian service and Indian rates of pay count from the date of his embarkation for India.

(*f*) Termination of service.—(1) That his first appointment be probationary for one year.

(2) After being confirmed, his services should be liable to termination on six clear calendar months' notice on either side.

Assistant chemists.

18. In addition to the above we consider the employment of assistant chemists desirable. These would be recruited as required from Indians, who have had a scientific training in India.

We suggest two grades:—

2nd grade on pay Rs. 75—5—150 per mensem.

1st grade on pay Rs. 150—10—300 per mensem.

Organisation of depots.

19. During our visit to the various medical store depots we were impressed with the fact that much of the work being carried out could either be simplified or done away with as not necessary, and with this in view we make the following suggestions.

Preparation of home indents.

20. At the present time the annual home indent is priced by the medical storekeeper who prepares it, the prices being obtained from the home invoices. The latter are sent out by the India Office to the Senior Controller of Military Supply Accounts who, after noting the prices, proceeds to circulate them to the various depots. As each depot in turn has to copy out each invoice, the process of complete circulation may frequently take as long as two years. As there is a constant succession of home invoices with varying prices it follows that, at the time of the submission of the home indent, each depot has different rates available, with the resultant anomaly of an instrument for the Bombay depot being priced at possibly double the cost of an exactly similar instrument required for the Madras depot. This absurdity has, of course, been emphasized by war conditions, but inquiry would doubtless prove that similar instances could be found to have occurred before the war.

We strongly urge, therefore, that the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, who consolidates the home indent, should in future alone be responsible for its pricing, and that duplicate copies of the home invoices when despatched to the Senior Controller should be sent direct by the India Office, to his office. The centralization of this laborious work would relieve medical storekeepers of a large amount of work which, as now carried out, is entirely valueless owing to its inaccuracy.

The prices entered in the printed copies of the consolidated home indent, circulated to medical storekeepers from the Director-General's office, should form a sufficient guide to them when making local emergent purchases or for any estimate purposes.

The adoption of this suggestion has been approved of both by all medical storekeepers and the Senior Controller of Military Supply Accounts.

Home estimates.

21. If the suggestion that the pricing of home indents will in future be carried out in the office of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, is adopted, it naturally follows that the home estimates will be drawn up entirely by that office.

It would also considerably reduce the work at medical store depots if in future, the office of the Director-General carried out the compilation of statements concerning all depots, as well as furnishing information asked for regarding the pricing of field equipment and furnishing estimates as to the cost of equipment required for both military and civil hospitals, and the preparation of estimates for new schemes.

Stocks of Europe stores to be held at medical store depots.

22. As regards stocks to be held at medical store depots, in view of the extension indicated in Government of India, Indian Munitions Board, letter No. P.-44, dated the 26th February, 1918 (enclosure No. 1), we consider that no reduction should be made in the present practice of basing demands for non-perishable articles on a three years established proportion. We consider that any reduction would be unsafe, as in actual practice, there is rarely, if ever, more than a two years stock actually in the depots, and this three

years stock of non-perishable articles is thought to be the irreducible minimum required as the margin of safety in the event of war.

As regards perishable articles, demands should be based on an 18 months established proportion, but in the case of articles subject to rapid deterioration in India, such as bleaching powder, rubber gloves, rubber tubing, etc., arrangements should be made with the India Office to send out in monthly or quarterly consignments as demanded in the home indent.

In calculating the established proportion, abnormal expenditure of any articles in any one year should be carefully considered by the medical storekeepers in working out the required quantity, and it should also be taken into account whether such abnormal expenditure represents actual issues to charges or includes transfer to other depots. Such should not be taken into account if unlikely to recur.

Inter-depot indents.

23. When a medical storekeeper indents on another depot to replenish stock the present procedure is to submit monthly a consolidated indent to the office of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, for countersignature.

This does not appear to serve any useful purpose, and it is thought that the signature of medical storekeepers is sufficient, a copy of such indents being however submitted quarterly by both indenting and supplying officers to the office of the Director-General for scrutiny.

The submission of vouchers for the Director-General's countersignature in the case of transfer of articles from quick to dead stock is also considered unnecessary and should be abolished.

Registers and forms.

24. There seem to be a large number of local forms in use which have been adopted to suit the convenience of each separate depot. This system is undesirable and standard forms should be drawn up by the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, in consultation with medical storekeepers for use in all depots.

Disposal of obsolete stores.

25. A list showing stocks of obsolete articles should be submitted annually, on June 1st, by medical storekeepers to the office of the Director-General who will issue instructions as to their disposal.

Disposal of surplus Europe stores.

26. On the receipt of the home indent from medical store depots, the office of the Director-General, will arrange for the transference of stocks shown to be surplus to other depots, a corresponding reduction being made in the home indents of the depots in question. This procedure will lead to a reduction in the work at medical store depots and prevent accumulation of stocks. Any stores remaining surplus after the transfers proposed, should be intimated annually to other medical store depots by medical storekeepers in order that they may be brought into consumption as soon as possible.

Revision of the equipment list for medical store depots.

27. The last revision of this list was carried out in 1915 and it is in urgent need of a further complete revision throughout. The absence of an up-to-date list must increase the work and correspondence of medical storekeepers very considerably. The present list should be scrutinized as regards sections 1 to 8 by acknowledged authorities in medicine, surgery, veterinary science, bacteriology, etc., with the object of obtaining suggestions for the exclusion of articles considered out of date or unnecessary and the inclusion of new articles likely to be useful.

It will be necessary for the actual work of compilation to be carried out in the office of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service. It will greatly assist in carrying out future revisions if military and civil administrative officers were instructed to submit annually a statement of such additions or deletions as they think desirable.

Proposed alteration in the present system of placing contracts for local supplies.

28. The present system is not satisfactory. Too great an interval elapses between calling for tenders and the actual allotment of contracts. Owing to the limited financial powers which medical storekeepers possess for the purchase of articles of local produce it has been necessary to include in the schedules a large number of items required in trivial quantities.

Much of the labour associated with the placing of contracts would disappear if medical storekeepers were granted moderate powers of purchasing Indian products.

The following illustrates the unnecessary elaboration of the present system.

The current year's requirement of cassia pulp for the Lahore depot was 10 lbs. at a total cost of Re. 1 annas 9.

To comply with the regulations in force the medical storekeeper had to include this item in his annual contract schedule; otherwise he would have had to obtain the sanction of the Director-General to the purchase.

A large number of similar trivial orders are invariably included in the contract schedule which is submitted to the office of the Director-General for scrutiny and sanction. From a scrutiny of this year's contract schedule of the Lahore depot we found that 142 out of 192 items might be said to be of a trivial nature.

With a view to the elimination of what appears to be unnecessary work, we suggest the grant to medical storekeepers of contractual powers to purchase any article of local supply required (*a*) for depot use, (*b*) for laboratory use, or (*c*) for stock, up to a limit of Rs. 1,000 per annum in the case of any one article, and that the financial power of the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, be increased from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 5,000 as in the case of divisional commanders, thus obviating unnecessary references to Government.

Again, the present system of calling for tenders in the month of October for contracts to supply in the ensuing financial year beginning from the 1st April means that tenderers have to forecast market prices a very long period ahead, with the result that, if the market price rises to any appreciable extent, contractors are unable to supply at tendered rates except at a loss and applications are received for enhancement of rates.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs will be largely remedied if our suggestion above is accepted, as the period elapsing between calling for tenders and their acceptance must be greatly reduced, owing to the fact that they have not to be referred to the office of the Director-General. An exception should be made in the case of articles, the rates of supply of which are dependent largely on seasonal crops; tenders for the supply of such should be called for at the most suitable time.

Abolition of the Rangoon medical store depot.

29. The abolition of this depot was recommended in the report of the conference of medical storekeepers held in October 1910; medical stores to be supplied to charges direct from the Madras depot.

We agree that Madras should supply the Rangoon depot but consider that the proposal to abolish the latter is not a well-advised one.

During the war, sea communication between Madras and Burma was at one time non-existent for months at a time, and, during the whole period of the war, ships sailed only at very irregular intervals.

Again Burma is a rapidly developing province and the number of medical institutions is increasing.

It is thought that considerable practical difficulties and delays would arise in supplying medical charges direct from Madras, which would only be partly obviated even if stores were sent through the medium of a local agent for Government consignments at Rangoon.

Leave rules for medical storekeepers.

30. We would draw attention to the anomaly of the rules laid down in paragraph 122, volume I, Army Regulations, India, with regard to the leave rules for medical storekeepers. We consider that, as the Medical Store Department is a military department, medical storekeepers should be subject to military leave rules regardless of the rules, military or civil, under which they were serving at the time of their transfer to the Medical Store Department.

Repair of surgical instruments.

31. With reference to appendix II, volume III, Army Regulations, India, we do not understand why no charge is made against the civil department for the repair of surgical instruments. We are of opinion that a charge should be made for such repairs, the percentage of cost being calculated in the same way as for the issue of drugs, etc.

32. At the present time there are two systems of stock-taking in force in medical store depots, namely, annual and daily. The annual stock-taking requires that the medical store depot shall be closed for all, except emergent, work for one month, namely, March, during the year. We have been told by all medical storekeepers that this closure involves no increase of work, but we are entirely at a loss to understand how such an opinion can be expressed when it obviously means that the work of twelve months has to be compressed into eleven. While we admit that this annual stock-taking may be of value as regards costly or poisonous drugs, we fail to see that the advantage gained by this dislocation of work in a store depot in ascertaining the actual balances of such items as feeding cups, urinals, etc., is commensurate.

Verification of stocks.

The daily verification is carried out by means of a clerk whose sole duty it is to ascertain balances, or reputed balances, of articles in the store. He works straight through a list and it is thus perfectly easy for any stock-holder by means of simple calculation to arrange that the balances of items which he knows will be shortly checked are correct. Were the system carried out by means of a surprise verification we could understand its value, but under the present arrangement it seems entirely unnecessary and a waste of establishment.

When in Calcutta we discussed this question of stock-taking and verification at some length with the Senior Controller of Military Supply Accounts. The Controller is in favour of discontinuance of the daily verification of non-expendible articles, the stock-holder being held responsible for deficiencies. He considers that a daily verification of expendible articles, *i.e.*, drugs, etc., should be carried out as a surprise verification by an officer, namely, the medical storekeeper or his deputy, this verification being so arranged that each item is checked once in three years. The Controller further considers that the annual stock-taking may be abolished, subject to the condition that any balance may be examined and verified at the time of the inspection of the depot by the local auditor. In addition to the above there is a verification which is carried out annually during two days by a senior Indian Medical Service officer, who is deputed specially for this duty. We fail to see the value of this further verification and recommend its immediate abolition.

We must admit that the medical store-keepers are, in the main, opposed to any variation of the present system, but it seems to us that the system of accounts at present in force in medical store depots is very largely the cause of the view that the present system must be continued.

33. The present system of ledger posting in the depots seems to lead to a great waste of time in the preparation of the ledgers for the quarter during which they are to be used. These ledgers are written in duplicate by means of carbon paper, one of which is sent to the Controller for audit the other being retained in the depot for record purposes. As the circulation of the vouchers for stores being issued takes some time it is frequently a week or more before an issue is recorded in the ledger; even then it is recorded without showing the day on which the stores were actually issued. It is obvious, therefore, that this system of ledger-posting renders it practically impossible for a correct balance of any item in the depot to be struck at any given moment. We therefore fail to see how the system of verification and stock-taking to which we have referred above can be of any value when it is impossible to ascertain actual balances.

Ledger system.

By the courtesy of the Director, Royal Indian Marine, we were permitted to examine the system of storekeeping and ledger posting in force in the Marine Store Dockyard, Bombay. We append a note by Captain Constable, the marine storekeeper, as to the system there employed (enclosure No. 3), and are of opinion that this should be adapted to the Medical Store Department, retaining its essential features. We understand that this system has now been in force in the marine dockyard for the past year or more, and is about to be introduced into the dockyard at Kidderpore, Calcutta. We think that this would be an opportunity for an experimental trial of the system at the Medical Store Depot in Calcutta, where the storage accommodation available is such as to make it most readily applicable. We admit that the marine system requires special arrangements as regards storage, but with the alterations in the accommodation now in progress at the medical store depots we cannot see that this difficulty is insuperable. We may add that this method of storekeeping and ledger posting was discussed with the Senior Controller of Military Supply Accounts, who expressed himself as being entirely in favour of it.

Cost accounts.

34. The system of cost accounting at present in force in medical store depots appears to be unnecessarily elaborate. This has already been recognised by the Senior Controller of Military Supply Accounts, and he has put forward certain proposals for their simplification. We append a copy of Colonel Hudson's note on this subject (Enclosure No. 4), and are entirely in accord with him, as also we understand the medical storekeepers to be, and recommend that the system advocated therein should be adopted as soon as practicable.

We may add that the medical storekeeper, Madras, has suggested that the only system which would remove the present difficulties in matters of accounts which are experienced by medical storekeepers would be by the introduction of an accounting section detailed by the Senior Controller of Military Supply Accounts, to be attached to manufacturing depots. The inherent difficulties and possibilities of collusion, were such a system to be adopted, are to us so obvious as to make the suggestion not worthy of further consideration.

Percentages added to cost prices in the case of issues to the civil department.

35. In our examination of past budget figures relating to medical store depots we have found that in some years the cost of administration has been reduced or entirely wiped out, and possibly even a surplus realised, owing apparently to large receipts as profit from issues made to civil institutions. This is apparently the result of the present system of adding percentages on an arbitrary basis to the original cost of the articles. While admitting that this arbitrary percentage is necessary for the simplification of accounts, we consider that in practice they would appear to have been fixed at too high a level. We therefore recommend that the whole system of percentages for freight, packing, handling, etc., should be reviewed by the Senior Controller of Military Supply Accounts.

Standing Orders for Medical Store Depots.

36. The manual, Standing Orders for Medical Store Depots in India, has not been revised since 1911. An entire re-compilation is necessary and will best be carried out when decisions have been arrived at regarding the various proposals formulated in this scheme.

Enclosure No. 1.

LETTER NO. P.-44, DATED THE 26TH FEBRUARY, 1918, FROM THE SECRETARY, INDIAN MUNITIONS BOARD, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, TO ALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIONS.

It has been brought to the notice of the Government of India that a large number of indents necessitating many small purchases are sent to the Director-General of Stores, India Office, London, every year from civil hospitals, medical colleges, Government schools and museums, and similar institutions. Although the demands from these departments are small in total value, they usually consist of many items which, under the present system, have to be purchased piecemeal. Practically all of the indents ask for small quantities of various descriptions of medicines, chemicals, surgical and scientific instruments and apparatus and accessories such as operation gloves, bottles, and specimen jars.

2. With the object of obviating the waste in money and labour involved in such repeated purchases, the Government of India have decided, with the approval of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, that such medical stores and scientific apparatus as are on the Equipment List required by the institutions in question should, in future, be obtained from the Medical Store Depots at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Lahore and Rangoon, at each of which

large stocks are maintained which are replenished from the bulk supplies demanded in the consolidated indents of the Medical Department.

3. There is no objection to indents being sent, as before, on the Director-General of Stores in respect of articles of a character not ordinarily stocked in the Medical Depots, but the Government of India will be glad to consider the question of the inclusion in the Equipment List of articles not already in the List for which a continued demand exists.

4. With regard to chemicals and scientific instruments which are of minor importance, or of stereotyped pattern, and which it is not considered desirable to include in the list, I am to invite attention to the resolution of the Government of India in the Indian Munitions Board, No. P.-44, dated the 26th February 1918, which authorises the direct purchase of such articles.

5. I am to request that, with the permission of His Excellency the Governor in Council / His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor (in Council), necessary instructions on the subject may be issued to the authorities concerned.

Copy forwarded to the Home Department, with the request that the Director-General, Indian Medical Service, may be instructed to issue the necessary instructions on the subject to the Medical Storekeepers.

Enclosure No. 2.

LIST OF ARTICLES, WHICH WERE PREVIOUS TO THE WAR IMPORTED, NOW BEING MANUFACTURED IN THE GOVERNMENT MEDICAL STORE DEPOTS.

1. Absolute alcohol, from rectified spirit.
2. Aloes preparations, from Indian grown aloes.
3. Amylum B. P. (starch), from rice.
4. Anti-fly spray.
5. Argenti nitras induratus—made from argenti nitras crystals obtained from the Gujrat chemical works.
6. Bamber oil—an insecticide oil.
7. Belladonna preparations, from Indian grown belladonna.
8. Borated talc powder.
9. Calcium carbonate precipitated, B. P., from calcium chloride and sodium carbonate.
10. Calcium sulphide solution.
11. Citric acid and citrates, from Indian limes.
12. Collodium flexile—made from cotton, nitric acid, sulphuric acid, Canada balsam and oleum ricini, all of which are made in India.
13. Creta preparata, B. P., from a very pure limestone obtained in the Madras presindency.
14. Digitalis preparations, formerly manufactured from imported leaves, now manufactured from Indian leaves.
15. Electuary, cough (veterinary).
16. Extractum cascaræ sagradæ liquidum, made from pulvis cascaræ sagradæ and alcohol 90 per cent.
17. Extractum glycyrrhizæ liquidum, made from glycyrrhiza radix, Indian grown, and alcohol 90 per cent.
18. Extractum hyoscyami from hyoscyamus leaves obtained from the Government botanical gardens, Saharanpur, and from alcohol, 90 per cent, obtained from the Ahmedabad distillery.
19. Ferrous sulphate, from iron filings (foundry waste) and sulphuric acid.

20. Fly oil (veterinary).

21. Keating's powder, an insecticide substitute for.

22. Liquor bismuthi et ammonii citratis—made from bismuth subnitrate, potassium citrate, potassium carbonate, nitric acid, and liquor ammoniæ.

23. Lysol, from cresol.

24. Magnesii carbonas levis, B. P., from magnesii sulphas made in India from crude magnesite and sulphuric acid.

25. Mannite, from manna grown in India.

26. N. C. I. powder (made from naphthaline, creosote, and iodoform).

27. Nux vomica preparations, from the Indian seeds.

28. Oleum anethi, from dill seeds.

29. Oleum crotonis, from croton seeds.

30. Oleum santali, from sandal wood.

31. Oleum anisi, from aniseed.

32. Oleum myristicæ, from nutmegs.

33. Oleum cedri, from shavings from the Madras Pencil Factory.

34. Oleum caryophylli, from cloves.

35. Oleum theobromatis, from cocoa beans.

36. Oxymel scillæ from acetum scillæ and honey, both obtained locally in India.

37. Paper, litmus, prepared from litmus, alcohol 90 per cent, hydrochloric acid and filtering paper; all except litmus are obtained locally.

38. Potassium carbonate, B. P., from nitre obtained as a soil efflorescence in India.

39. Sinclair's glue—a substitute for adhesive plaster.

40. Sapo mollis, B. P., from ground nut oil and caustic potash.

41. Sodium carbonate, B. P., made from soda ash, and used in the preparation of Benedict's solution which now replaces Fehling's solution.

42. Sodium chloride, chemically pure—the magnesium sulphate present is precipitated by barium chloride made from barytes obtained in abundance and in excellent quality in the Madras presidency.

43. Sodium nitrate.

44. Sodium phosphate, calcium phosphate and phosphoric acid, from char dust.

45. Sodii sulphas exsiccatus made from crude sodium sulphate—a bye-product from soda water factories.

46. Syrupus ferri phosphatis co—made from iron wire, concentrated phosphoric acid precipitated calcium carbonate, potassium bicarbonate, sodium phosphate, coccus, sugar and glucose. The iron wire, calcium carbonate and sugar are obtained locally.

47. Talc, prepared from a suitable steatite obtained in abundance in the Madras presidency.

48. Talcum purificatum—a purified form of French chalk.

49. Tannic acid from divi divi and myrabolams—both Indian grown.

50. Thymol, B. P., from Indian ajwan seeds.

Enclosure No. 3.

NOTE ON METHOD OF STOREKEEPING FOLLOWED IN THE STORE DEPARTMENT, ROYAL INDIAN MARINE DOCKYARD, BOMBAY.

General.

The store is divided into sub-heads, *i.e.* "A" comprises timber, "B" ironmongery, "C" coal, etc. Each sub-head is in charge of a conductor assisted by a sub-conductor, storehousemen, and store lascars.

Bin ledgers. 2. For every article in the Store there is a bin ledger for recording receipts, issues and the balance. Every article has a pattern number allotted to it, and when referring to an article it is usual to quote the pattern number with the full description of the article. The bin ledgers also show the ledger folio number of the main ledger (see remarks against main ledger).

Main ledgers. 3. These are maintained in the Marine Store Office according to sub-heads by a separate staff named the Ledger Section. To each sheet of the ledger is allotted a folio number.

Indents and demand notes. 4. Stores required by ships and outside Government departments are demanded from the Store Department on indent form in triplicate. Stores required by the manufacturing departments of the dockyard are demanded on demand note form. On receipt indents and demand notes are registered in the Marine Store Office and sent to the conductor concerned for compliance. Simultaneously with the issue of stores the relative indents and demand notes are completed by the conductor with details showing actual quantities issued and the ledger folio number is inserted.

The vouchers are then stamped "Issued" and date of issue shown with conductor's signature. When stores are drawn at Bombay, receipt for them is passed on the indent or demand note by the officer drawing the stores.

The vouchers are then disposed of as follows:—

(a) For stores issued at Bombay.

INDENTS—

Original	To be sent to office	Disposal by conductor.
Duplicate		
Triplicate	To be made over to party drawing stores.	

(1) Original to be sent to the Chief Accountant for rating and transmission to the Controller of Marine Accounts.	Disposal by office.
(2) Duplicate to be sent to ledger section at once	

(b) For stores despatched to outstations.

Original	To be sent to office	Disposal by conductor.
Duplicate	Original to be enfaced "Shipping."	
Triplicate	To accompany relative package list and sent to shipping section for disposal.	

(1) Original to be sent to shipping section for entering shipping details. On completion to be sent to Chief Accountant.	Disposal by office.
(2) Duplicate to be sent to ledger section at once	

DEMAND NOTES—

Original	To be sent to office	Disposal by conductor.
Duplicate		
Triplicate	To be made over to party drawing stores.	

(1) Original to be sent to ledger section at once	Disposal by office.
(2) Duplicate to be sent to Chief Accountant	

The copy for the ledger section is on receipt in that section given a serial number. The register of the ledger section also shows for easy reference the number and date allotted to the vouchers when first received in the Marine Store Office. The copy is then passed by the register clerk to the posting clerk. He passes it on to the next man and it travels thus through the section till it comes to the man who has charge of the ledger to which it appertains. It is then posted by him and passed on till it has reached the last posting clerk, each posting clerk initialling the voucher whether it concerns him or not. The voucher is then made over again to the register clerk who files it.

(c) *For stores received from England or out stations, made in the Yard for stock, surplus stores returned by manufacturing department or stores returned to store on survey report.* A supply note in triplicate is prepared and disposed of as follows:—

Original	To be sent by receiving conductor to issuing conductor, who will receipt and immediately return the duplicate and triplicate to the receiving conductor who will send up to office the duplicate copy and retain the triplicate. The original to be posted by the issuing conductor and sent to office when completed.	Disposal by conductor.
Duplicate		
Triplicate		

(1) Original to be sent at once to ledger section.	Disposal by office.
(2) Duplicate to be filed.	

(d) *Local orders for stores.* These are made out in quintuplicate and disposed of as follows:—

Original	To be sent to receiving conductor.	Disposal by office.
Duplicate		
Quintuplicate		
Triplicate	To be sent to vendor.	
Quadruplicate	Retained in office.	
Original	To be completed by receiving conductor and sent with stores to issuing conductor for receipting and posting. Original and duplicate to be sent to office. Quintuplicate returned to receiving conductor.	Disposal by conductor.
Duplicate		
Quintuplicate		
Original	To be attached to vendor's bill.	Disposal by office.
Duplicate	Sent to ledger section at once.	

NOTE.—In all cases of supply note and local orders for the ledger section, the same procedure as regards registering them and posting them as in the case of indents and demand notes is followed.

Enclosure No. 4.

SIMPLIFICATION OF COST ACCOUNTS OF MEDICAL STORE DEPOTS.

The following proposals are offered after an examination of the accounts kept at the depots at Madras and Bombay.

Cutlers' accounts.—There are no cutlers' accounts at Bombay, the repairs being done there by Mr. Eyres. The remarks on the Madras accounts will doubtless apply to Lahore depot also.

2. The cutlers' accounts are hardly worth the trouble bestowed on them. At Madras a permanent clerk is employed all his time in the laboratory and on cutlers' accounts, the latter taking him about a week to complete each month. He maintains separately for the cutlers' accounts:—

(1) abstract of material,
(2) non-production account,
(3) final abstract of material and percentage charges,
(4) total output statement,
(5) cost ledger, and
(6) work order book.

He works out the non-production account to show non-production charges correct to annas and pies; yet the allocation to this account of some charges can only be a rule-of-thumb allocation, *e.g.*, one-sixtieth of the medical store-keeper's pay each month is allocated, while amounts are added for superannuation and leave allowances. The other charges, which are worked out more exactly are: (1) pay of head cutler, (2) extra establishment not charged direct, (3) value of stores drawn for shop use—not spare parts of instruments, and (4) depreciation on the value of buildings. These give the non-production charges. The power charges are taken at one-twentieth of the total power charges of the factory.

3. The charges for direct labour are the basis of the cutlers' accounts. An all-round rate for the pay of the cutlers is struck. It has long been 2 annas per hour in Madras. The number of hours spent on each job is recorded, and the direct charges are obtained by multiplying the all-round rate by the number of hours the cutlers spent on all jobs. Monthly totals are thus available for (*a*) direct charges, (*b*) non-production charges, and (*c*) power charges.

The clerk then works out figures for his final abstract each month under the following heads for each job separately:—

(*a*) direct charges,
(*b*) non-production charges,
(*c*) power charges, and
(*d*) value of materials issued from stock, *i.e.*, spare parts of instruments. Here (*a*)—2 annas multiplied by the number of hours spent by cutlers on the job and (*b*) and (*c*) are obtained from the equations $\frac{b}{a} = \frac{B}{A}$ and $\frac{c}{a} = \frac{C}{A}$.

4. The clerk works out (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) even for military items. This is done that he may be able to check the totals of his final abstract, but in many cases for no other purpose; no recoveries being made for the numerous military items except when the repairs are done on payment, which items are few. This refinement of accounting is hardly necessary as the total charges for Madras, including those for which no recoveries are effected are only Rs. 200 or 300 a month.

5. The following percentages were added to direct charges for the first six months of 1917-18, after which period the cutlers' shop closed down owing to the move of the depot.

1917.	Percentages added to direct charges.	
	For non-production charges.	For power charges.
April	69	20
May	72	24
June	71	24
July	65	19
August	104	20
September	96	10
Average	80	20

If therefore the clerk had added on account of non-production and power charges, 100 per cent to his direct charges for each job, he would have arrived at the same grand total for the six months and his results would have been more consistent; for under the present system he added 84 per cent for a job completed in July, but if the same job had been completed in August he would have added 124 per cent., which is not consistent.

6. Instead therefore of keeping up the present elaborate accounts it would be sufficient to record merely the number of hours spent by each cutler on each job and in the case of Madras to charge 2 annas for each hour so spent. This would give the direct charges; while to charge 4 annas for each hour would cover direct and non-production and power charges. This is probably what a commercial firm would do, except that it would charge at least 8 annas in order to make a profit. The cost of materials should be added when materials are used. No cost should be worked out for military items unless recovery has to be effected.

7. This proposal might be adopted for this year. At the close of 1918-19, and of each future year, the non-production and power charges might be worked out for the year and the ratio which they bear to direct charges examined. If there should be much variation from the results shown in paragraph 5, the controller would determine the percentage to be added to direct charges. The percentage would thus be based on the actual of the previous year. Similarly percentages for 1917-18 and for future years might be worked out for Lahore.

8. If this proposal is adopted all the accounts now maintained may be dispensed with except the non-production account—to include power charges and total output account. The work cards at present maintained for each man should be kept up; they will give the figures required for the "total output."

9. *Laboratory Accounts.*—These occupy one clerk all his time in Bombay and in Madras one clerk for three weeks each month. The depots maintained the following accounts:—

(1) abstract of material,
(2) non-production account,
(3) power cost for month,
(4) power account,
(5) machinery account,
(6) final abstract of labour and material,
(7) total output,
(8) cost ledger, and
(9) work order book.

No. (1) may be dispensed with. It merely shows the total value of materials for each work order, these figures are available in the cost ledger.

10. The non-production account and power account are prepared with the same attention to minutiæ as in the case of cutlers' accounts. The former includes: (1) one-third of the pay of the medical storekeeper each month, (2) pay of the superintendent and compounders, (3) value of stores for shop use, *e.g.*, cloth, paper, and not drugs, (4) depreciation on buildings, (5) establishment, and (6) superannuation and leave allowances. The total (A) of the non-production charges for a year is calculated. The total output in pounds (B) for the year is also worked out on the system authorised in 1911-1912. The figure $\frac{A}{B}$ to the nearest pie gives the amount to be added on account of non-production charges to the value of one pound of outturn of each medicine, tablet, etc., made up. The total (C) of the power account for the year is also calculated and the figure $\frac{C}{B}$ gives the amount to be added on account of power charges to the value of one pound of outturn of each medicine for which power is used.

11. The prices of medicines made up are entered in the final abstract and other accounts correct to the last pie. The final abstract with typical entries is as follows:—

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Serial number of work orders.	Work orders.	Amount of outturn.	Value of material.	Non-production charges at Rs. per lb.	Power charges at Rs. per lb.	Total of columns 4, 5 and 6.
		lbs. oz.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
13. Liniment belladonna	...	500	2,544 12 8	23 7 0	...	2,568 3 8
16. Tinct. scillae	...	324	32 8 0	15 3 0	...	47 11 0
23. Unguent hydrarg	...	72	47 3 6	3 6 0	1 2 0	51 11 6

These 3 items are taken from the accounts of the Bombay depot for 1916-17, in which year the rates in columns 5 and 6 were Re. 0-0-9 and Re. 0-0-3 per lb., respectively. The office of the Supply Controller worked out rates of laboratory medicines for its triennial price list of 1917 for Bombay depot from these accounts and the accounts of the two previous years. But that office had to ignore the refinement of these accounts. Thus the stock book rate of belladonna liniment if worked out from item 13 only would have been Rs. 5 per lb. for military and Rs. 5-8-0 for civil institutions, the rules for simplification of stock book rates being adhered to. Hence this refinement in the cost accounts is wasted.

12. Major Marr suggests that power charges should be allocated not only to the work order for which power is used, but over all work orders. He points out that even for work orders for which power is used the present rule acts unfairly; in some jobs very little power is used; for other jobs, the engine may be employed for some days; yet in the accounts these two jobs are treated as if the same amount of power had been used for each. As the total non-production charges for 1916-17 were Rs. 20,327-2-0 and the power charges were only Rs. 3,386-5-1 this proposal will cause only a slight variation of rates, while greatly reducing clerical labour. It would mean for Bombay for that year an all round addition of 0-0-10 per lb. instead of Re. 0-0-9 for those items where power charges are not now borne and instead of Re. 0-1-0 for those items where power charges are now borne (paragraph 11 above).

13. Thus if Major Marr's proposal were in force the values in column 7 for the 3 typical items given in paragraph 11 would be—

	Rs. A. P.		Rs. A. P.
Liniment belladonna	2,570 13 4	and not	2,568 3 8
Tinct. scillae	49 6 0	„	47 11 0
Unguent hydrarg.	50 15 6	„	51 11 6

The materials for the first item are much more expensive than those for the second. This and the "poundage system" explain the greater comparative difference in the values of the second item.

14. If the proposal to charge power against all laboratory preparations is adopted the credit entry in the power account "Amount charged direct, etc., etc.," should be altered to "Amount charged against non-production in the non-production account."

The final abstract should be prepared at all depots as it is now prepared at Lahore, *viz.*, columns 5, 6 and 7 should not be filled in monthly; at the end of the year a summary in the final abstract should be made of the cost of each separate preparation for the year, columns 5, 6 and 7 being filled in for the summary. As this procedure has been accepted by the medical storekeeper at Lahore, the Controller, Military Supply Accounts, might request the other two depots to follow it. The remaining accounts given in paragraph 9 should be maintained as at present, No. (1) being abolished, see last clause of paragraph 9.

15. Major Marr has made the further suggestion that the military accounts department should revise every year or even half year not only for laboratory supplies but for all medicines supplied by the depot, the "Medicines" section of the price list, which price list is now revised throughout triennially. There should be no difficulty in doing this with the present establishment of the military Accounts Department. But as the production account is only completed yearly for reasons advocated by Mr. Rawcliffe in 1911, the revision of the "Medicines" Section could not well be done oftener than once a year.

16. These proposals (paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 12, 14 and 15) do not affect the main principle, of cost accounts but only the manner in which these principles have been applied. They will need the sanction of Government.

17. An alternative proposal of Major Marr's is that all supplies to civil institutions, whether made up in the laboratories, or issued as purchased by depots, should be priced at 10 per cent below current local rates. This would admit of a very large profit being made on medicines so large that it would not be necessary to levy departmental charges against civil institutions, which charges often act very unfairly. And it would allow of instruments being sold cheaper by depots than by local dealers, whereas at present instruments are often to be obtained cheaper from the latter. But this proposal is not likely to meet with favour of Government, as it would overthrow the cost accounts system.

ANNEXURE X.

SHORT HISTORY OF THE QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S MILITARY NURSING SERVICE FOR INDIA.

The Queen Alexandra's Military Nursing Service for India was inaugurated in 1888, as the Indian Nursing Service. Prior to this date trained female nurses were not employed in military hospitals in India.

The first batch of English trained nurses, ten in number, arrived in India on the 21st March 1888. Of these, six were located at Rawalpindi and four at Bangalore. During 1890-1 the total number of nurses was increased to 28. The employment of these nurses in India was regarded more or less as an experiment for the first few years. In 1892-3 the scheme was considered sufficiently successful to have justified its trial and continuance. From 1893 the nursing service was recognized as an integral part of the military medical service. From 1896 it was known as the Indian Army Nursing Service, and the establishment was increased to 52.

The nurses were distributed to the principal station hospitals. Four circles were formed, each containing three or four stations where nurses were employed. Four lady superintendents were appointed in independent charge of these circles, with their headquarters at Rawalpindi, Meerut, Bangalore and Poona. Deputy lady superintendents were appointed in charge at stations where lady superintendents were not located. The staff of nursing sisters allotted to a station varied from two to four. Sisters were not in charge of their own wards. Each took her turn on duty to supervise the general nursing in the one or two special wards where the nursing sisters were employed, so that in each station the sisters had to subordinate their work to one another, and this proved difficult and often unsatisfactory. Such a system required mutual tact and good feeling to carry it through successfully, and this was not always possible. It was a trial to many who had held responsible and independent posts in England.

It was originally intended that the lady nurses should merely superintend the nursing of serious cases concentrated in the special wards. British nursing orderlies, drawn from the local combatant units, were allotted to do the actual nursing with the assistance of Indian ward servants. These orderlies were totally ignorant of the most rudimentary principles of nursing, and the sisters had to work with them in order to instruct them in practical detail and by force of example get them to take an interest in their duties.

About 1902, a committee was appointed to consider the re-organization of the British nursing service. The War Office suggested amalgamation of the British and Indian services, but this proposal was rejected by the Indian authorities.

About a year later the Indian service became the Queen Alexandra's Military Nursing Service for India, and its strength was increased to 91.

There are now in this service 4 lady superintendents and 16 senior nursing sisters, the remaining 71 being known as nursing sisters. One of the lady superintendents is styled Chief Lady Superintendent, and is the recognised advisor of the Director, Medical Services in India, in matters affecting the interior economy and welfare of the nursing service.

Lady nurses are engaged for a term of 5 years. With the permission of the Government of India, and if pronounced by a medical board to be physically fit for further service in India, they may re-engage for a second and third term, and further, if in all respects efficient, and if specially recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, for a fourth term.

ANNEXURE XI.

PROPOSED FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE NURSING SERVICES OF THE ARMY IN INDIA.

The Committee propose that the following changes should be made in the present organization of the nursing services of the army in India :—

(1) That the present Queen Alexandra's Military Nursing Service for India be abolished and its place taken by the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service as described below. Members of this service should come to India for tours of duty, as they do in various other parts of the Empire.

(2) The introduction of Royal Army Medical Corps, other ranks, and eventually the nursing section of the Indian Medical Corps, composed of a skeleton cadre of Royal Army Medical Corps men with members of the domiciled community, as contemplated in our scheme, in British station hospitals.

(3) The introduction of the nursing section of the Indian Medical Corps into Indian station hospitals.

(4) The matrons of station family hospitals should possess a certificate in general nursing, in addition to that in midwifery, and should have a competent staff of female nurses under them.

(5) The whole of these nursing services should be under the supervision of the senior ladies of the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Nursing Service as contemplated below.

The requirements in personnel of the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service and the functions they should perform, should be as follows :—

at Army Headquarters—Matron-in-Chief with an appropriate staff.
at Command Headquarters—A Principal Matron and staff.
at Divisional Headquarters—A Senior Matron and staff.

These will form the administrative ranks of the service and should not be engaged in executive nursing duties. They would be responsible for the distribution of the nurses, and the proper control and supervision of the nursing in all the station hospitals, both British and Indian, and station family hospitals in their area of administration.

Each hospital should have its proper proportion of nurses in their various grades, and the matron, or charge sister, as the case may be, should be considered to be the senior nursing official of the station in question. She should maintain the same supervision over all the nursing duties in that particular station as laid down for the ladies of the higher ranks.

The ladies of the nursing service in administrative appointments should be considered to be staff officers of the Director, Deputy Director, or Assistant Director, Medical Services, as the case may be.

It is realised that the abolition of the present Queen Alexandra's Military Nursing Service for India would necessitate some scheme for their disposal, and the following is proposed. Those who are in their second or later tour of service should be permitted to complete the necessary service for pension under their original terms of employment. They would continue to serve in such a grade in the Imperial service as their standing in the Indian service may warrant. In their first tour of service these ladies should, with their consent, be transferred to the Imperial Nursing Service, otherwise their employment should be terminated. Pensions, if admissible, could be arranged for all these latter, proportionately to their length of service in India.

It is considered that members of the Imperial Nursing Service should not be allowed to serve for longer tours than five years in this country, and should not be permitted to return for another tour until after three years' intervening service in the United Kingdom.

Ladies who are appointed to the position of Matron-in-Chief or Principal Matron should have completed one tour in India before such appointment.

The Matron-in-Chief should be selected by the Secretary of State on the recommendation of the Director-General, Army Medical Service, and the lower grades should be deputed to this country by the War Office as demanded by the Secretary of State.

Ladies who have been trained in the general and presidency hospitals in India should be eligible for admission to the Imperial Nursing Service provided that they fulfil the requirements of that service. If admitted they should join in the United Kingdom for duty.

It has been contemplated to place in each first class Indian station hospital a certain number of nurses for the supervision of nursing and training of ward orderlies. It is considered that these ladies should be a branch of the Imperial Nursing Service, and should be entertained for periods of five years under contract. The matron or charge sister of such a hospital should belong to the Imperial Nursing Service, and come under the jurisdiction of the local administrative nursing authority.

SGPI L—55 AD—1-6-20—1,500

EAST INDIA (MEDICAL SERVICES COMMITTEE)

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF THE RE-ORGANIZATION

OF THE

MEDICAL SERVICES IN INDIA

(President: Sir Verney Lovett, K.C.S.I., I.C.S.)

April 1919

Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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[Cmd. 946.]

[H.L.]

A

BILL

INTITULED

An Act to enable Persons during the continuance of the War, and for a period of two years thereafter, to be appointed or admitted to the Indian Civil Service without examination.

A.D. 1915.

BE it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

Power to appoint to Indian Civil Service without examination.

1.—(1) The Secretary of State in Council may with the advice and assistance of the Civil Service Commissioners make rules providing for the admission and appointment to the Indian Civil Service by the Secretary of State in Council, during the continuance of the present war, and for a period not exceeding two years thereafter, of British subjects possessing such qualifications with respect to age and otherwise as may be prescribed by the rules, notwithstanding that they have not been certified as being entitled for appointment as the result of examination in accordance with the regulations and rules made under section thirty-two of the Government of India Act, 1858, and section ninety-seven of the Government of India Act, 1915:

Provided that—

(*a*) not less than one-fourth of the persons admitted to the Indian Civil Service during such period as aforesaid shall be persons who have been so certified as aforesaid; and

(*b*) a person shall not be appointed to the Indian Civil Service under the rules made under this section unless the Secretary of State in Council has, with

A.D. 1915.

the advice and assistance of the Civil Service Commissioners, satisfied himself, in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules, that such person possesses the necessary educational qualifications.

(2) The provisions as to the laying before Parliament of regulations and rules made under the said sections thirty-two and ninety-seven shall apply to the rules made under this section.

Short title.

2. This Act may be cited as the Indian Civil Service (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1915.

Indian Civil Service (Temporary Provisions). [H.L.]

A

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An Act to enable Persons during the continuance of the War, and for a period of two years thereafter, to be appointed or admitted to the Indian Civil Service without examination.

Brought from the Lords 28 *October* 1915.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
2 *November* 1915.

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[Bill 152]

20 [illegible]

EAST INDIA (INDIA OFFICE. RETIREMENT AT 65).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons,
dated 4 February 1915;—*for*,

"RETURN of copy of MINUTE by the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, stating the circumstances under which a Member of his permanent establishment has been retained in the service after he has attained the age of 65."

India Office,
8 February 1915.

T. W. HOLDERNESS,
Under Secretary of State for India.

(Mr. Charles Roberts.)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
8 *February* 1915.

Cx. m. 35

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EAST INDIA (INDIA OFFICE. RETIREMENT AT 65).

The following has been prepared as a Minute by the Secretary of State for India in Council setting forth the reasons for the prolongation of the service of Mr. H. J. W. Fry, C.I.E., Director General of Stores, beyond the age of 65.

MINUTE.

The Secretary of State for India in Council, acting in the spirit of Clauses 1 and 10 of the Order in Council of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria, of the 15th August 1890 (reproduced in Section 15 of the Order in Council of the 10th January 1910), and of the Treasury Minute of the 12th December 1890, decided by Minute of the 17th August 1892, which was ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on the 18th of that month, to apply the above mentioned Clauses and Treasury Minute to the Permanent Establishment of his Office.

Since the 8th June 1914, prolongation of service beyond the age of 65 has been sanctioned in the case of the following officer, as his retirement at the present time would, in view of his experience and special qualifications, be detrimental to the interests of the public service :—

Name.	Office.	Age.	Period of Retention.
Fry, Henry James Wakely, C.I.E.	Director General of Stores	65 on 13 Nov. 1914.	Further, till 2 July 1915.

INDIA OFFICE,
31st October 1914.

x (1)113 750 2/15

[H.L.]

A

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A.D. 1915.

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1.—(1) The Secretary of State in Council may with the advice and assistance of the Civil Service Commissioners make rules providing for the admission and appointment to the Indian Civil Service by the Secretary of State in Council, during the continuance of the present war, and for a period not exceeding two years thereafter, of British subjects possessing such qualifications with respect to age and otherwise as may be prescribed by the rules, notwithstanding that they have not been certified as being entitled for appointment as the result of examination in accordance with the regulations and rules made under section thirty-two of the Government of India Act, 1858, and section ninety-seven of the Government of India Act, 1915:

Provided that—

(*a*) not less than one-fourth of the persons admitted to the Indian Civil Service during such period as aforesaid shall be persons who have been so certified as aforesaid; and

(*b*) a person shall not be appointed to the Indian Civil Service under the rules made under this section unless the Secretary of State in Council has, with

A.D. 1915.

the advice and assistance of the Civil Service Commissioners, satisfied himself, in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules, that such person possesses the necessary educational qualifications."

(2) The provisions as to the laying before Parliament of regulations and rules made under the said sections thirty-two and ninety-seven shall apply to the rules made under this section.

Short title.

2. This Act may be cited as the Indian Civil Service (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1915.

Indian Civil Service (Temporary Provisions). [H.L.]

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[Bill 152]

14

CIVIL SERVICE.—CLASS I. EXAMINATION.

Copy of Report dated 20th June, 1917, of the Committee appointed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to consider and report upon the scheme of examination for Class I. of the Civil Service.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

CX m 35

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CLASS I. EXAMINATION.

Report of the Committee appointed by the Lords Commissioners of H.M. Treasury to consider and report upon the scheme of examination for Class I of the Civil Service.

TREASURY MINUTE, Dated the 16th November, 1916.

My Lords are pleased to appoint a Committee consisting of :—

Mr. STANLEY LEATHES, C.B., First Civil Service Commissioner (*Chairman*);
Sir ALFRED EWING, K.C.B., F.R.S., Vice-Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh;
Sir HENRY ALEXANDER MIERS, D.Sc., F.R.S., Vice-Chancellor of the University of Manchester;
Mr. H. A. L. FISHER, M.A., F.B.A., Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sheffield;
Professor W. G. S. ADAMS, M.A., Gladstone Professor of Political Theory and Institutions in the University of Oxford;

to consider and report upon the existing scheme of examination for Class I. of the Home Civil Service:

To submit for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury a revised scheme such as they may judge to be best adapted for the selection of the type of officer required for that class of the Civil Service, and at the same time most advantageous to the higher education of this country:

And in framing such a scheme, to take into account, so far as possible, the various other purposes which the scheme in question has hitherto served, and to consult the India Office, the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office as to their requirements, in so far as they differ from those of the Home Civil Service.

My Lords are further pleased to appoint Mr. D. B. Mair, M.A., Director of Examinations to the Civil Service Commissioners, to be Secretary to the Committee.

TREASURY MINUTE, Dated the 4th January, 1917.

My Lords read again Their Minute of the 16th November, 1916, appointing a Committee to consider and report upon the existing scheme of examination for Class I. of the Home Civil Service.

They are informed that Mr. H. A. L. Fisher has found it necessary to resign membership of the Committee on his appointment as President of the Board of Education, and they are pleased to appoint in his stead Dr. W. H. Hadow, Principal of Armstrong College, Newcastle, and Vice-Chancellor of Durham University.

REPORT.

To the LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF HIS MAJESTY'S TREASURY.

May it please Your Lordships,

Your Committee, having carefully considered the existing scheme of examination for posts in Class I. of the Home Civil Service, beg leave to present for Your consideration their Report.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY.

1. The principle of competition by examination for posts in the Home Civil Service was tentatively adopted by the Order in Council of 21st May, 1855, by which the Civil Service Commission was constituted; and from that time forward appointments were made by limited competition to posts in certain of the public offices, candidates being nominated to compete by the heads of the several Departments.

The schemes of examination then applied were various; the following scheme was at a very early date adopted by the Colonial Office for their established posts at home and their writerships in Ceylon, and may be regarded as the ancestor of all schemes for Class I. of the Home Civil Service.

I. *Preliminary Examination.*

1. Exercises designed to test handwriting and orthography.
2. Arithmetic, including vulgar and decimal fractions.
3. Geography.
4. Translation from one of the following languages: Greek, Latin, French, German, Spanish, and Italian, the selection being left to the candidate.
5. The preparation of a precis or abstract of official papers.

Candidates failing to satisfy the Civil Service Commissioners upon each of these subjects will not be permitted to proceed further with their examinations, and will not be entitled to certificates of qualification.

II. *Final Examination.*

1. Languages and literature of Greece and Rome.
2. Languages and literature of France, Germany, and Italy.
3. Modern history, including that of the British Colonies, with exercises designed to test purity and elegance of style.
4. Elements of constitutional and international law, with elements of political economy.
5. Pure and mixed mathematics, not including the highest branches, with accounts and bookkeeping.

Of the five classes of subjects thus defined, candidates are at liberty to select any number not exceeding three, in which they desire to be examined.

2. But the earliest application of the principle of open competition to appointments in the service of the Crown was in 1858, when an open competition was held by the Civil Service Commissioners for posts in the Civil Service of India under the new Act for the Better Government of India. Competitions had previously been held for posts under the India Board.

(11121—40.) Wt. 2583—2. 2500. 8/17. D & S. G 35,

The scheme was as follows:—

English Language and Literature:—		
Composition	500	
English Literature and History, including that of the Laws and Constitution	1,000	
		1,500
Language, Literature, and History of Greece		750
„ „ „ Rome		750
„ „ „ France		375
„ „ „ Germany		375
„ „ „ Italy		375
Mathematics, pure and mixed		1,000
Natural Science—that is, Chemistry, Electricity and Magnetism, Natural History, Geology, and Mineralogy		500
Moral Sciences—that is, Logic, and Mental, Moral, and Political Philosophy		500
Sanskrit Language and Literature		375
Arabic Language and Literature		375
		6,875

Candidates were allowed to take any or all of these subjects.

3. By the Order in Council of June 4th, 1870, the principle of open competition was adopted for posts in the Home Civil Service, and was gradually accepted in all the chief Departments, both for higher and lower appointments, with the exception of clerkships in the Foreign Office, which is not generally reckoned as part of the ordinary Civil Service, and in the Board of Education, where up to the beginning of the war "Examiners" were appointed by the nomination of the head of the Department to perform duties similar to those of Class I. clerks in other Departments. Certain classes in various Departments have also been excepted, where professional or technical qualifications were necessary, such appointments being made either by direct nomination or by limited competition among nominated candidates.

4. The earliest scheme of competition for the highest grade in the Home Civil Service (now generally known as Class I.) was as follows:—

It was called Scheme I. The age limits were from 18 to 24; but the examination was, in fact, chiefly intended for candidates who had completed or were completing their university education. There was a preliminary examination (to qualify for admission to the subsequent competition) in Handwriting, Orthography, Arithmetic, and English Composition. The competitive examination was in the following subjects:—

	Marks.
English Composition (including Precis-writing)	500
History of England, including that of the Laws and Constitution	500
English Language and Literature	500
Language, Literature, and History of Greece	750
„ „ „ Rome	750
„ „ „ France	375
„ „ „ Germany	375
„ „ „ Italy	375
Mathematics (pure and mixed)	1,250
Natural Science—that is (1) Chemistry, including heat; (2) Electricity and Magnetism; (3) Geology and Mineralogy; (4) Zoology; (5) Botany	1,000
⁂ The total (1,000) marks may be obtained by adequate proficiency in any two or more of the five branches of science included under this head.	
Moral Sciences—that is Logic, Mental and Moral Philosophy	500
Jurisprudence	375
Political Economy	375

Candidates are at liberty to name [before a fixed date] any or all of these branches of knowledge. No subjects are obligatory.

5. Schemes for the years 1895 and 1906 showing progressive modification were as follows. The limits of age under both schemes were 22-24:—

1895.

English Composition	500
Sanskrit Language and Literature	500
Arabic Language and Literature	500
[The last two subjects were included in view of the amalgamation of this scheme with that for the Civil Service of India.]	
Greek Language and Literature	750
Latin Language and Literature	750
English Language and Literature (including a special period named by the Commissioners)	500
French Language and Literature	500
German Language and Literature	500
Mathematics (pure and applied)	900
Advanced Mathematical subjects (pure and applied)	900

Natural Science—*i.e.*, any number not exceeding *three* of the following subjects:—

Elementary Chemistry and Elementary Physics [N.B.—This subject may not be taken up by those who offer either Higher Chemistry or Higher Physics.]	600	1,800
Higher Chemistry	600	
Higher Physics	600	
Geology	600	
Botany	600	
Zoology	600	
Animal Physiology	600	

Greek History (Ancient, including Constitution)	400
Roman History (Ancient, including Constitution)	400
English History	500
General Modern History (period to be selected by Candidates from a list in the syllabus issued by the Commissioners, one period at least to include Indian History)	500
Logic and Mental Philosophy (Ancient and Modern)	400
Moral Philosophy (Ancient and Modern)	400
Political Economy and Economic History	500
Political Science (including Analytical Jurisprudence, the Early History of Institutions, and Theory of Legislation)	500
Roman Law	500
English Law.—Under the head of "English Law" shall be included the following subjects: (1) Law of Contract; (2) Law of Evidence; (3) Law of Constitution; (4) Criminal Law; (5) Law of Real Property; and of these five subjects candidates shall be at liberty to offer any four, but not more than four	500

Candidates will be at liberty to offer themselves for examination in any or all of these subjects. No subjects are obligatory.

No candidate will be allowed any marks in respect of any subject of examination unless he shall be considered to possess a *competent knowledge* of that subject.

1906.	Maximum Marks.
English Composition	500
Sanskrit Language and Literature	600
Arabic	600
Greek, not less than two sub-divisions, of which one must be Translation:—	
Translation	300
Composition	300
Literature, &c.	300

	Maximum Marks.
Latin, not less than two sub-divisions, of which one must be Translation :—	
Translation	300
Composition	300
Literature, &c.	300
English	600
Italian	600
French	600
German	600
Mathematics	1,200
Advanced Mathematics	1,200
Natural Science—*i.e.*, any number not exceeding four of the following :—	
Chemistry	600
Physics	600
Geology	600
Botany	600
Zoology	600
Animal Physiology	600
Greek History (Ancient, including Constitution)	500
Roman History (Ancient, including Constitution)	500
English History, either or both sections may be taken :—	
I. to A.D. 1485	400
II. A.D. 1485 to 1848	400
General Modern History	500
[NOTE.—Under this scheme Modern History (including Medieval) was divided into five periods (later six). Candidates took one only at their choice.]	
Logic and Psychology	600
Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy	600
Political Economy and Economic History	600
Political Science	500
Roman Law	500
English Law	500

The marks assigned to candidates in each branch (except in Mathematics and English Composition) will be subject to such deduction as the Civil Service Commissioners may deem necessary in order to secure that a candidate be allowed no credit at all for taking up a subject in which he is a mere smatterer.

[The phrase "mere smatterer" is a conscious reference to Macaulay's Report, mentioned in section 10 below.]

Candidates are at liberty to name any of these branches of knowledge, with the proviso that the maximum number of marks that can be obtained from the subjects chosen is limited to 6,000. *If this maximum is exceeded by a candidate's selection he will be required to indicate one of his subjects, the marks for which should, in his case, be reduced so as to bring his maximum marks within the prescribed limit. The marks so reduced will be subject to a correspondingly reduced deduction.*

[This last paragraph indicates a material alteration in policy, intended to encourage candidates to follow a regular and systematic course of university study, rather than to devote themselves to preparation for the examination by cramming.]

The latest scheme runs thus:—

Limits of age, 22-24.

		Marks.
1.	English Composition	500
2.	Sanskrit Language and Literature	800
3.	Arabic Language and Literature	800
	Greek, not less than two sub-divisions, of which one must be Translation:—	
4.	Translation	400
5.	Prose Composition	200
6.	Verse Composition	200

		Marks.
7.	Literature, &c.	300
	Latin, not less than two sub-divisions, of which one must be Translation:—	
8.	Translation	400
9.	Prose Composition	200
10.	Verse Composition	200
11.	Literature, &c.	300
12.	English Language and Literature	600
13.	Italian: Translation, Composition, and Conversation	400
14.	Italian: History of the Language and Literature	200
15.	French: Translation, Composition, and Conversation	400
16.	French: History of the Language and Literature	200
17.	German: Translation, Composition, and Conversation	400
18.	German: History of the Language and Literature	200
	The History of these Languages and their Literatures can only be taken by candidates who also offer themselves for the rest of the examination in those Languages.	
19.	Lower Mathematics	1,200
20.	Higher Mathematics	1,200
	Natural Science, *i.e.*, any number not exceeding *four* of the following or *three* if both Lower and Higher Mathematics be also taken:—	
21.	Chemistry	600
22.	Physics	600
23.	Geology	600
24.	Botany	600
25.	Zoology	600
26.	Animal Physiology	600
27.	Geography	600
28.	Greek History (Ancient, including Constitution)	500
29.	Roman History (Ancient, including Constitution)	500
	English History, either or both sections may be taken:—	
30.	I. to A.D. 1485	400
31.	II. A.D. 1485 to 1848	400
32.	General Modern History (See note on scheme of 1906.)	500
33.	Logic and Psychology	600
34.	Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy	600
35.	Political Economy and Economic History	600
36.	Political Science	500
37.	Roman Law	500
38.	English Law	500

From the marks assigned to candidates in each subject such deduction will be made as the Civil Service Commissioners may deem necessary in order to secure that no credit be allowed for merely superficial knowledge.

Consistently with the limitations specified above, candidates are at liberty to name any of the foregoing subjects, provided that the maximum number of marks that can be obtained from the subjects chosen is limited to 6,000. If this maximum is exceeded by a candidate's selection he will be required to indicate one of his subjects, the marks for which should, in his case, be reduced so as to bring his maximum marks within the prescribed limit. The marks so reduced will be subject to a correspondingly reduced deduction.

Moreover, if a candidate's handwriting is not easily legible a further deduction will, on that account, be made from the total marks otherwise accruing to him.

A footnote runs:—

> It is notified for general information that the number of marks deducted for bad handwriting may be considerable.

6. In 1895 the scheme of competition for Class I. and the Indian Civil Service became identical, and candidates competed for either or both at their desire, though for some time the limits of age were slightly different.

In 1898 the same competition was adopted for Eastern Cadetships under the Colonial Office; at present such appointments exist in Ceylon, Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, and the Federated Malay States.

In 1908 the scheme was adopted with considerable modifications for Clerkships in the Foreign Office and posts of Attaché in the Diplomatic Service, and in 1911 with other modifications for appointments to Consular posts in the Far East. Under these schemes Foreign Office and Diplomatic Candidates must reach a high qualifying standard in French and German, and the total of the subjects offered by them must not exceed (in effect) two-thirds in mark value of those offered by candidates for Class I. Candidates for the Consular Service in the Far East have to qualify in French, and are under a similar limitation as to the number of subjects to be taken.

7. The Royal Commission appointed in 1912 to inquire into the method of making appointments in the Civil Service, in their fourth Report, dated April 2nd, 1914, made the following recommendation (22) relative to the scheme of competitive examination for Class I. of the Home Civil Service :—

> " A Committee composed of specially qualified persons should be invited to examine the suitability and methods of the Class I. examination."

That Report was under the consideration of Your Lordships when war broke out on August 4th, 1914, and propositions for giving effect to this and other recommendations of the Royal Commission were suspended. But as time went on and the termination of the war was indefinitely postponed, it was felt that the revision of the chief Civil Service examination was a measure of reconstruction that should if possible be completed before the peace.

8. Accordingly, on 25th July, 1916, the Civil Service Commissioners caused a letter to be addressed to Your Lordships, the relevant portions of which follow here :—

> " The outbreak of war made it impossible to give immediate consideration to the Report of the Royal Commission as a whole. But the long duration of the war, the great interruption of University studies, the new start which must be made after the war, render it highly desirable in the opinion of the Commissioners that a new scheme should be prepared before peace is restored in order that the studies of intending candidates may be from the first guided in the directions which are judged most advantageous to education in general, and to the selection of suitable entrants for the Civil Service.
>
> " The present scheme has grown up by the addition of subject after subject until 38 subjects are on the list. This miscellany may permit a well-co-ordinated system of study; it certainly does not suggest or demand anything of the kind. The difficulties of equating with each other Classical studies, Modern Literary studies, Mathematical studies, Scientific studies, with such adjuncts as may be appropriately added to each, are beyond question very great. But it is not in the opinion of the Commissioners impossible to construct a scheme which will be more fair to the various classes of students, more encouraging to the co-ordination of study, and therefore better adapted for the selection of those young men who during the course of a complete and coherent education have made the best use of the best talents.
>
> " The eminent men, who have combined to bring to the notice of the Government and the country the 'Neglect of Science,' have laid great emphasis on this highest Civil Service Examination. They are of opinion that the revision of the scheme should be considered forthwith, and have urged their views on the Commissioners by two informal deputations. The Commissioners themselves are of opinion that such subjects as language, literature, and history, are, on the whole and for the most part of young men, the best preparation for the Higher Civil Service. But, without committing themselves to any specific line of reform, they consider that the representations of this Committee require attention, and they concur in the view that reform should be considered at once in order that the young men who go up or return to the Universities after the war and desire to work for the Home Civil Service should start at once with a knowledge of the new conditions. Some interim and temporary measures will be needed during the two years or so after the war. When this transition period is over the new scheme should come into force at once. . . ."

The Commissioners therefore proposed that a small Committee should be nominated to consider the Class I examination and recommend a new scheme. In the composition of the Committee they submitted that the various interests and studies should be adequately represented by the selection of members to speak for the newer as well as for the older Universities, for scientific studies as well as for literary, and for modern studies as well as for those based on the learning of Greece and Rome.

9. By Treasury letter of 23rd August, 1916, Your Lordships concurred, and this Committee was constituted in due course with reference and composition as above.

ORIGINAL CONCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLASS I. SCHEME.

10. The theory underlying the proposition of selection by open competitive examination among candidates for posts in the public service of the Crown was formulated by Lord Macaulay in a Report of a Committee on the Indian Civil Service dated November, 1854.

The following dicta still deserve to be borne in mind :—

> "Our opinion is that the examination ought to be confined to those branches of knowledge to which it is desirable that English gentlemen who mean to remain at home should pay some attention. . . ."
>
> i.e., *to subjects of liberal education rather than to those which might be held specifically more useful to Indian Civil Servants.*
>
> "Nothing can be further from our wish than to hold out premiums for knowledge of wide surface and of small depth. We are of opinion that a candidate ought to be allowed no credit at all for taking up a subject in which he is a mere smatterer. . . ."
>
> "The marks ought, we conceive, to be distributed among the subjects of examination in such a manner that no part of the kingdom and no class of schools shall exclusively furnish servants to the East India Company. . . ."
>
> "The youth who does best what all the ablest and most ambitious youths about him are trying to do well will generally prove a superior man. . . ."

11. The theory stated by Lord Macaulay was constructed on the basis of facts which no longer exist, or have been greatly modified in the process of time.

The Consultative Committee of the Board of Education in their Interim Report on Scholarships dated 19th May, 1916, speak as follows :—

> ". . . . The joint examination for the Home Civil Service and the Indian Civil Service, which is also used for the Eastern Cadetships of the Colonial Office and, with modifications, for the Foreign Office, is an examination designed to suit men who have completed or are completing a full University course. When these examinations were instituted there was practically for all Englishmen only one course of Higher Education, a course of Classics and Mathematics. It was easy therefore to construct a competitive examination which would be equal for all trained competitors, and would select the best men, so far as examination can distinguish the best.
>
> "Since that time subject after subject has been added to the list of University courses. In 1855, when the Civil Service Commission was established, there were only three teaching Universities in England; there are now ten, besides University Colleges. The history of Cambridge since that time is typical of the general movement. At Cambridge there were then two Triposes, the Mathematical and the Classical. It was necessary to obtain honours in the Mathematical Tripos as a condition of admission to the Classical Tripos. Now there are at Cambridge eleven separate Triposes, in each of which severally an Honours Degree can be obtained. So far has specialisation been carried in Higher Education.
>
> "The Civil Service Commissioners have endeavoured to adapt their examination to these changes by adding subject after subject to their list, until their schedule contains 38 different subjects. Though Mathematics and Science together have great weight in the competition, neither Mathematics alone nor Science alone can command success. Taken together, the two require to be supplemented by Law, or History, or some literary or philosophic subjects. The examination is, in fact, devised as a test of general education rather than of specialised ability; but it has become more and more difficult to adapt the test to the conditions of modern Higher Education. . . .

> "The Civil Service examination should be framed with conjoint reference to the needs of the Services and to the selection under the existing scheme of National Education of the candidates who have turned the best talents to the best advantage under that scheme. It should not be deflected in order to further the aims either of educational reformers or educational conservators. It is possible that the needs of India may be to some extent different from those of the Home Civil Service. But for both services the examination should continue to be a test of general rather than highly-specialised ability and education, so far as that is compatible with our system of National Education. It should be a test of training as well as a test of knowledge. It should include a *viva voce* examination. Finally, most germane to our present purposes, we suggest that, while a scientific and mathematical training is good for Civil Servants just as languages, History, Economics, and Law indubitably are, scientific and mathematical training are not enough by themselves for Civil Servants, but require to be supplemented by training in the use of words, and by knowledge of the institutions, the thoughts and the life of men. . . ."

12. It may be added that the main subjects of education in Macaulay's time are among those which lend themselves most readily to processes of written examination and admit of tests leading to a relatively just distribution of numerical marks. Apart from the great multiplication of subjects of self-contained university study indicated in the last section, and apart from the great difficulty of valuing performance in disparate subjects to a just standard by numerical marks (for instance, in French as against Philosophy), many modern subjects of university study do not admit so exact a valuation of results as Greek translation and composition or certain branches of Mathematics. In History, for instance, one examiner may look for a mass of accurate and specific knowledge, another may lay more stress on intelligent analysis and synthesis, originality, order, and lucidity of expression. The syllabus of each subject has to be generalised to suit the methods of a great number of universities and a still greater number of teachers and students all working in freedom and independence. It is inevitable that the syllabus should be better suited to some institutions and to certain groups of candidates than to others. Just treatment of all candidates is more difficult than in the early days of the Civil Service Commission. Much greater elaboration of the scheme is required; and the task now imposed upon us who are called upon to advise, and on the Civil Service Commissioners who will have to administer, is far more complex than any that was contemplated by Macaulay. The scheme which we shall propose below will be found even more complicated than the existing scheme of the Civil Service Commissioners, but it is not more complicated than the circumstances with which it is intended to correspond.

THE EXISTING SCHEME.

13. In reporting on the existing scheme we are not invited to discuss the system of selection for the public service by open competitive examination. If we were so invited, we might be constrained to declare that the question was not open to free discussion on its abstract merits. Public opinion demands that such coveted appointments as those of Class I. should be made impartially without regard to class or connexions or any kind of influence. It would prefer that they should be made by merit, but it would hardly be satisfied unless merit for such purposes were determined objectively; and the results of public examination are held to possess such objectivity. Though it cannot be claimed for examination that it uniformly selects the best from among the candidates who present themselves, it may be admitted on the other hand that we do not need every year for the public administration the twenty or thirty most able and industrious and energetic and well-trained men that the nation can produce. To take all the best would be an injustice to all the other forms of national activity, which reckoned all together are many times more important than departmental administration. It would be an injustice to the men, the most part of whom could never hope to reach any position worthy of their talents, and a waste of invaluable material. We want as entrants to the Higher Civil Service vigorous, sound, well-educated men of good intelligence. If among those selected by open competition there are not always to be found a sufficient number who, after many years of

service, are, by virtue of their initiative, force of character, freshness of mind, and constructive ability, fit for the highest posts, the fault may lie in the system of training after entry, and in the conditions of subordinate service; it need not be with the competitive system. (See Sir George Murray's evidence, Appendix to the First Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service (C.D. 6210), questions 1955, 1958-1960.)*

14. On the other hand the faith in competitive examination is not what it was twenty years ago. Cambridge, the original home of "order of merit," has abandoned strict order of merit in most of its public examinations. The Senior Wrangler and the other Wranglers are merged in certain first classes or divisions of classes. There has been no Senior Classic for thirty-five years. Examiners, whose attention has thus been directed to classification rather than to arrangement in order of merit, have come to see that mere addition of numerical marks produces results not even in accordance with such justice as an examination is capable of dispensing. When numerical marks are applied not to one common schedule of subjects, but to the immense number of combinations that are permissible under the existing scheme, the degree of approximation to accuracy must be still less. When subjects such as History, Mathematics, and Natural Science, have to be brought to a common standard, that standard cannot be accepted as fully reliable. It will not be possible for us to recommend a simpler system without departing entirely from the conceptions on which this scheme is based. We might recommend that all candidates who had obtained first-class Honours in an approved course at any University should compete in some further examination designed to test the common results of an entire education, rather than the several results of many specialised forms of education. The germ of such an examination may be seen in our proposed Section A. below (Paragraph 36, p. 19). But we do not consider that the time has come for so complete a revolution.

15. Accepting the principle of open competitive examination, we regard the existing scheme as designed to test the results of University education in general, and not the results of a special education preparatory to public service. It would no doubt be possible to construct a scheme of examination comprising only subjects directly useful in the Home Civil Service, another such for the Indian Civil Service, another for the Foreign Office, and so forth. But we agreed with the Consultative Committee (Paragraph 11 above) that the examination should continue to be a test of general rather than specialised ability and education, and that it should be a means of selecting under the existing scheme of National Education those candidates who have used the best talents to the best advantage under that scheme. We consider that the best qualification for a Civil Servant is good natural capacity trained by a rational and consistent education from childhood to maturity. We consider that the first requisite for a successful competition is a good field of candidates, and that such a field can best be obtained by adapting our scheme to the chief varieties of University education; so that candidates while working for University honours will be at the same time preparing themselves to join in the competition if when the time comes they are attracted by it. We do not wish candidates to adapt their

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* 1955. (*Mr. Boutwood.*) At the commencement of your evidence you said something—I forget the exact words—but it amounted to this: That you had some temptation to feeling disappointed with the men in Class I. What led you to that; what was the nature of the temptation; what did you find in them that made you inclined to feel disappointed?—(*Sir George Murray.*) What I was thinking of was this: That while the men who are drawn from the Class I. examination are, I think, very good for the purposes for which they are required for the first ten, or twelve, or fifteen years of their official life, I have at times been rather disappointed at finding how few of them emerge satisfactorily from the ruck and come out as really capable heads of departments.

1958. (*Chairman.*) Will you just explain a little further. Is there, do you think, anything defective in the original way of selecting the first division men, which explains the fact you mentioned of their turning out badly when they get to fifteen or twenty years' service?—(*Sir George Murray.*) I did not wish to say that I thought they turned out badly as a body, but merely that I should have expected that more of them would have been better qualified for the best places that were open to them. But I do not think that anything that you could do in prescribing the subjects for examination, or in making any change in the method of appointment, could possibly affect that.

1959. Might it be quite accidental that in a particular year, or two or three years, you might get a rather inferior lot of men by the examination. That has happened in the Indian Service to my own knowledge?—They do vary a good deal. As you know, the examination is the same for both the Home and the Indian Civil Service, and no doubt the same results take place.

1960. Has there been any change in the age of recruitment for your service which might probably furnish a clue?—I do not think there has been any material change.

education to the examination; on the contrary, the examination should be adapted to the chief forms of general education. We consider it highly important that candidates who sit for this competition and are unsuccessful should be as well qualified, at least, for other non-technical professions as if they had never thought of it. For all these reasons we hold that any scheme that we propose should be accommodated to University education as it at present exists rather than to some scheme of instruction specially devised for the public service. But we think it necessary to give in our scheme duly proportionate weight to the various sides of University education; and in particular:—to give due value to the results that should be expected from a good general education; to attach higher value than at present to certain University subjects that seem to provide suitable knowledge and training, such as history, economics, law, and politics; and throughout to ensure that sufficient attention should be paid to modern conditions.

16. The existing scheme has been condemned on the ground that it gives an excessive advantage to candidates chiefly trained in the learning of ancient Greece and Rome. Some no doubt would wish us to put the Classics at a disadvantage, or to exclude them altogether from the examination. We are not inclined, nor do we think it to be our duty, to put any handicap on the widest, the most systematic, and the most consistent humanistic education that at present exists in this country. We shall make the attempt to put similar and equivalent learning related to modern peoples on an equal footing with Classical learning. But we cannot thereby alter existing conditions, though we may assist by our action the improvement and development of a consistent and continuous education in the language, literature, and history, of the most important European nations. We cannot expect forthwith to find many candidates thoroughly trained in the language, the scholarship, the thought, the social and economic history even of France, as men are now trained in the like learning that appertains to Greece. There will not soon be candidates whose knowledge of France has been built up systematically through twelve or fourteen years; the standard and tradition of scholarship in such studies will not be quickly built up to the Classical level. To teach the Classical learning and develop Classical scholarship there was at work in 1914 a great band of scholars equipped by the tradition, the organised learning, and the experience, of four hundred years. We cannot create for the Modern Languages an equivalent staff of teachers by altering an examination. A large proportion of the most able students have gone in the past to Classics, and we cannot alter the national habits, the prepossessions, and the system, that have caused the most gifted among literary students to follow the ancient studies. But we can give an equal opportunity to modern studies; the schools and Universities must do the rest; if the nation desires enlightenment and sound training to proceed from modern studies it will no doubt in course of time obtain what it desires provided it is prepared to use the requisite means. We do not reckon the influence of this competition to be so great as it is sometimes said to be; but so far as its influence extends we think it should be used to encourage modern studies, though not by accepting an inferior equipment in modern languages, literature, and history, as the equivalent of a much higher equipment in similar Greek and Latin learning and scholarship. Our scheme should be based as Macaulay suggested on the existing scheme of national education; but at the present conjuncture, and with the present needs, we think it may be usefully employed to strengthen elements that still are weak; and by setting up a high standard that may for a time be seldom attained, we conceive that we shall be aiding rather than impeding the healthy development of modern studies; and in the words of our reference adopting means "most advantageous to the higher education of this country."

17. The existing scheme has also been condemned on the ground that it does not give equivalent weight to Natural Science. That contention is either true or not true according as Mathematics and Natural Science are reckoned separately or together. Taken together, in the scheme of 1906 Mathematics and Natural Science had great weight, receiving altogether 4,800 out of 6,000 possible maximum. The Civil Service Commissioners feared indeed that among the candidates obtaining the highest places too many would be found who showed little proof "of training in the use of words and knowledge of the institutions, the thoughts, and the life of men" (Consultative Committee, *loc. cit.* section 11 above). They accordingly used the only device that their scheme permitted to secure greater width of outlook, and

reduced the proportion of marks obtainable by the combination of Mathematics and Natural Science from 4,800 to 4,200. Even under these conditions a fair number of candidates whose chief strength lay in Mathematics or Science or both obtained very high places; but we recognise that it is no longer permissible to assume that Mathematics and Natural Science form one single University whole. We consider that both Mathematics and Natural Science should be put on an equal level for the purposes of this examination with all other first-rate non-technical University studies, and we propose to obtain evidence of general education suitable to Civil Servants by a separate section of the examination common to all candidates alike. We do not wish to divert from research and industry Mathematicians and men of Science who may be needed more elsewhere than in the general administrative work of the Civil Service; but we think that the encouragement of scientific study at the University resulting from equal treatment may be at least equivalent to any diversion of talent from more suitable occupations that may result; a sense of injustice will be removed, and thus we trust harmony among men of learning may be promoted to the benefit of all forms of learning alike.

18. It has also been represented that the existing scheme gives an undue advantage to Oxford and Cambridge over the other Universities of the United Kingdom. The system of scholarships at Oxford and Cambridge attracts to those places of learning a great proportion of the ablest and best trained students. If the results of the competition did not correspond to this fact, something would be wrong with the competition. Moreover, the conception of the existing scheme requires a wide range of instruction, and the Classical course of Oxford, and to a less degree, that of Cambridge, are the widest of University Courses. Both these Classical courses require a high standard of attainment in two languages, and a wide knowledge of two literatures; the Oxford course also requires a thorough training in the eventful history of two races; and, in order to obtain full benefit from the conditions of the competition, Classical candidates must also show good proficiency in Philosophy. No other University course offers a like diversity of coherent training. But all Universities have admitted a high degree of specialisation in studies other than the Classical group, and we are of opinion that these should be treated on equal terms in the Civil Service examination. We propose an expedient which will, we hope, be a corrective at once to the narrowness of interests and knowledge and the lack of useful accomplishments which may be the defects of the specialist, and to the ignorance of modern conditions which may be the defect of students too exclusively devoted to ancient learning. If our tests, designed for all candidates, work as we intend them to work, the candidate who is best educated and who has best educated himself, whatever may have been the bent of his principal studies, will obtain an advantage in Section A, and the mere specialist, whether in Classics or in any other subject, will find himself left behind by those who have kept their minds open to the acquirement of necessary knowledge and accomplishments. By this proposal we conceive that we have done justice to all Universities and provided machinery which should select for the Civil Service the class of men who are needed for the work of the Departments.

19. The Civil Service Commissioners, by their letter of 25th July, 1916 (Section 8, above) show that they themselves are not satisfied with the existing scheme. The last revision was brought into force in 1906, and was a step in the right direction, though it probably was impossible at that time to establish equality of studies and more systematic co-ordination. That revision having been carried through, further changes were undesirable until some time had elapsed; frequent alterations in a scheme affecting many institutions and some hundreds of intending candidates have a disturbing effect; but when the Royal Commission was appointed in 1912 time was ripe for a more complete reconstruction, and but for the war some such Committee as this would very likely have been set up in 1914, and would have completed its work two years ago. But it will probably be admitted that the effects of the war in suspending University studies, breaking up traditions, and shaking preconceived ideas, render possible changes more fundamental than any Committee would have proposed in ordinary times and than the various vested interests would have tolerated before the war. The Civil Service Commissioners inform us that they are prepared to welcome a reform more drastic than they could have accomplished by their own initiative.

THE SCHEME PROPOSED BY THIS COMMITTEE.

Section B. (Paragraph 36, p. 19, below.)

20. We have already indicated that we consider that this scheme should be established on a basis of equality of studies; that is, of the chief studies which are pursued by students at the University up to the conclusion of an Honours course. We propose to place on an equal footing the main schools of: Classical languages, history, and literature; Modern languages, with history and literature; History; Mathematics; and the Natural Sciences. The Classical subjects will be valued at 800 marks; History and Mathematics at the same; candidates in Natural Science taking one main subject up to the higher level and two subsidiary subjects on the lower level can obtain the same totals; while two Modern languages studied as comprehensively as the Classics will be worth the same. It is possible, however, that for some time candidates able to take full advantage of this last opportunity may be few. We propose that the candidate coming from any one of these Schools shall be encouraged—it might almost be said constrained by the force of competition—to offer one or two other additional subjects estimated by us as the equivalent of one fourth part of his whole main subject. This addition, valued at 200 marks, may be made up in many ways, and we do not propose to limit in any way the free choice of candidates. There is also a great range of University studies—political, legal, economic, and philosophical—which have not been as yet, so far as we know, consolidated into one Honours School, though the courses offered by the London School of Economics may cover the most part of them. We have greatly increased the individual and collective weight of these studies, but we do not consider it desirable that candidates for the Civil Service should study exclusively either politics, law, economics, or philosophy; however, for students whose chief interest lies in two or more of these subjects we offer a varied field of selection which is fully equivalent to that appertaining to any of the Schools mentioned above.

21. While grouping subjects as above, and expecting that on the whole the main choice of candidates will be in one or other of the groups, we retain for subjects of University study the old freedom of selection. Whatever limits we imposed upon the choice of candidates, we should still be confronted by the difficulty of equating disparate subjects; *e.g.*, Language including literature and history, Mathematics, History, Natural Sciences. That difficulty has to be solved as best it may by the Civil Service Commissioners and their permanent and occasional staff. It will be no greater under our proposed scheme than it is under the existing scheme. Moreover, we think it would be difficult to make up a list of subjects under our proposed scheme which would not secure a useful University education, either narrower or wider.

Section A. (Paragraph 36, p. 19, below.)

22. But we do not consider it necessary to confine our tests to the results of University study alone. The young men who will be examined by the Civil Service Commissioners will have spent not only three or four years at the University, but ten or more years at school; and the best of them will have had abundant leisure in which to educate themselves and pick up knowledge and accomplishments useful to them in the work of life. Much that they have learnt at school they will quite rightly have forgotten, but that knowledge should have served its purpose; and we do not propose to examine our candidates in school subjects. But we consider that a sound and systematic education should show certain results at University-leaving age; and that candidates who, while devoting themselves to their individual studies, have nevertheless retained an alert and acquisitive mind and have kept their eyes open to the most important facts in the world around them, should have seized and retained a certain amount of knowledge—scientific, economic, and political. We consider it also highly desirable that all Civil Servants should have a good working knowledge—that is, a reading and translating knowledge—of at least one modern foreign language, preferably two.

23. On this basis we have constructed a separate section that all candidates must take. We consider that all well-educated young men should be able to use the English language skilfully and accurately and to grasp its meaning readily and correctly. This accomplishment is specially valuable for Civil Servants, but any form of education that has not developed it has failed in a principal part of its purpose. We therefore propose in the first place that all candidates should

write an essay. This test in the existing scheme was optional, though nearly all candidates took it, perhaps because they thought it required no special study. To construct an essay and work out therein a line of thought with suitable words, logical order, and just proportions is a severe criterion of ability. But it is found by experience that an excellent candidate may on any one occasion fail to do justice to his powers. We therefore propose that candidates should have in other papers opportunities of manifesting like powers of arrangement and effective expression. One of these papers should be a test in English (Section A, subject 2), the nature of which may best be understood by reference to the specimen paper, Appendix A, below. That specimen is somewhat longer than we should think it necessary to set as a rule; it was devised to give some idea of the variety of questions that may be constructed, which is in fact much greater than could be shown even in four or five such papers. But the paper should not be too short. It is desirable that these young men should be able at a glance to seize the nature of a printed passage, to judge what is required of them in connexion with it, and whether it is suited to their tastes. Those who have to spend much time in reading even such a paper as we submit cannot be expert readers of English. Severe economy of words with consecutive and coherent exposition will be required in the exercises. Candidates who have a taste for verse will have a chance to show their skill. If Latin verses have been held by many generations of Englishmen to be an exercise conducive to the mastery of the Latin language, English verses may have a like value as practice in restrained and balanced composition.

24. Further, we propose a paper (3) in modern subjects, social, political, and economic. A specimen paper is printed below (Appendix B). It may be found that many—perhaps most—young men of our country are unduly ignorant of such matters. But the existence of this test should encourage many to turn their attention to these subjects and accumulate in their leisure much useful information. Effective and skilful exposition will be expected, and the young man who has hastily acquired a few facts will not shine beside him who has an easy command of principles and well-digested knowledge. It should be noted throughout this Section A that no candidate will be disqualified for failure in any part, or in the whole of the Section: though, since we allow 500 marks for the written part of the Section, there is much advantage to be gained or lost thereby in the whole competition.

25. We have received from the Government Committee on Science in the Educational System of Great Britain the following resolution:—

> The Committee have had under their consideration certain proposals for remodelling the Competitive Examination for admission to Class I. of the Civil Service at home and in India or in the Colonies. They are unanimous in thinking that it is indispensable that a course in Science extending over several years shall have formed a serious part of every candidate's previous education. They are, however, not prepared to trespass on the province of the Committee which is dealing in detail with this Examination. They feel strongly that if the men with high scientific qualifications who will undoubtedly be needed in the Service to a greater or less extent are to be secured at a comparatively early age by this Examination, then candidates offering Science only (without Mathematics) should in future be placed on complete equality with other candidates, and that this is not the case at present. But they recognise that there may be advantages in obtaining also by other methods scientific advisers for the Service at a greater age and with practical professional education.

With the trend of this resolution we find ourselves in general agreement; and we desire to make it clear that by placing Science, as we have endeavoured to do, on a complete equality with other subjects of a University course, we do not expect to make it possible for certain Departments to dispense with scientific advisers selected in maturer age and possessed of practical experience and of knowledge of a kind that may have to be obtained elsewhere than at a University. And in some Departments specialists in one or another branch of Science will doubtless be selected by tests of a less general kind than that with which we are concerned. The young men selected under our scheme partly for their knowledge of Natural Science, unless they happen to be employed in a scientific branch of the Department in which they are working, may have no opportunity of exercising their scientific acquirements and their knowledge may pass out of date. They should, however, not lose a just estimate of scientific knowledge, and they should know when and where it may with advantage be sought.

We must, however, make one reservation to the terms of this resolution. The "indispensable" requirement of a School course in Science must apply rather to the future than to the present. We cannot now correct the defective education of the past or rule out from our competition for some years to come all those useful candidates who may not satisfy this demand of the Science Committee. Perhaps later it may be possible to require of all candidates some form of School Certificate which may be evidence of suitable training in this and some other subjects not tested by the Examination.

26. However, we think we may even now go so far as this. We can give a substantial advantage in the competition to those candidates who by whatever means have obtained and retained a sound knowledge of some of the principles, methods, and applications of Science, and are able to give a lucid and intelligent account of their knowledge. Our specimen questions for Subject 4 will be found in Appendix C below. It is hoped that the inclusion of this Subject in the scheme will encourage all candidates to make themselves acquainted with the general principles of Science. This paper will also be a test of orderly, effective, and exact expression.

27. Finally, we propose to allot 100 marks for a translation paper from some modern foreign language. We intend this paper to be a serious test of capacity to understand and translate accurately passages from the foreign language. We do not propose to limit the scope; verse may be set as well as prose; but nothing that is antiquated should appear; the candidate should be able to master any passage that is likely to occur in books of ordinary difficulty written in the living tongue; passages dealing with history and politics may be set; but not any technical matter. This, like Subjects 3 and 4 in the Section, should be not only a test of specific knowledge, but also a test of capacity to use the English language with skill and accuracy. For this reason we have assigned a somewhat higher maximum to translation in this section than may possibly be accorded to it in the relative subjects of Section B. The languages mentioned in our list (Subject 5, Section A) are those which appeared to us most likely among European languages to afford information useful to students or to Civil Servants, or to both. We include Latin as an option for those candidates who take two modern languages in B because Latin is commonly imposed at school upon those pupils who take Modern Languages, and we do not wish to lay any unnecessary burden on the Modern Language Candidates. In any case, for candidates who have mastered two languages, classical or modern, there should be no hardship and much advantage in acquiring a third.

Extra Numerum Languages (at the end of our scheme, page 21, below.)

28. Since it is of high importance that Civil Servants should have ready use of two modern languages, we include among our recommendations that any candidate who wishes to offer a second Modern Language on the same terms as in Section A should be permitted to do so beyond the limit of the subjects prescribed in Section A and those permitted in Section B. To acquire a modern language for reading and translation purposes should not be a difficult task for any well-educated man; it can be done in leisure time with a little assistance. But some adequate motive is needed to induce the effort; an effort which should be made by students of History, Natural Science, Politics, Economics, and, indeed, of almost all the subjects in our schedule, but in fact is not always made. We trust that in course of time all our candidates will be prepared to offer two modern languages up to a useful standard, but we do not at present propose to make two compulsory. We hold out an advantage to those who offer two, but success will be possible with only one, and in some cases perhaps without any.

THE *VIVA VOCE* EXAMINATION.

29. The Royal Commission expressed a cautious inclination towards a *viva voce* Examination, but made no definite recommendation. The Consultative Committee in their Report (Section 11 above) say that there should be a *viva voce* Examination. On this point, as on almost every point of our Report, we are unanimous. We believe

that qualities may be shown in a *viva voce* examination which cannot be tested by a written examination, and that those qualities should be useful to public servants. It is sometimes urged that a candidate—otherwise well qualified—may be prevented by nervousness from doing himself justice *viva voce*. We are not sure that such lack of nervous control is not in itself a serious defect, nor that the presence of mind and nervous equipoise which enables a candidate to marshal all his resources in such conditions is not a valuable quality. Further, there are undoubtedly some candidates who can never do themselves justice in written examinations, just as there are others who under the excitement of written competition do better than on ordinary occasions. We do not consider that it is desirable to forgo the *viva voce* test for the advantage of a few weak vessels. As we say below (page 19), we consider that the *viva voce* can be made a test of the candidate's alertness, intelligence, and intellectual outlook, and as such is better than any other. The *viva voce* examination has been proved by experience to redress in certain cases the results of written examination. The examination should, of course, be skilfully conducted by carefully selected examiners accustomed to handle young men and to put them at their ease. We consider that the *viva voce* examination should not be in matters of academic study, but in matters of general interest, on which every young man should have something to say. We think that the marks assigned under this heading should be a valuable corrective to the results of the written papers, and should not infrequently help a useful man to success or save the State from a bad bargain.

"SMATTERING DEDUCTION."

30. In our opinion the practice of the Commissioners of deducting a proportion of marks from the gross totals obtained by candidates in the several subjects and readjusting the remnant should be applied to all the subjects in our schedule. The result of this device, besides eliminating the smatterer, is to give a higher premium for excellence in any individual subject and to depress those who reach only a moderate level in all. We see no reason why the practice should not be explained for the information of all concerned. It consists of deducting one-fifth of the maximum from every candidate's marks and adding thereto one-fourth of the remainder. Thus on a maximum of 100 a candidate who obtained 20 or less would be credited with none. A candidate who gained 52 would get 32 + 8 = 40; a candidate who received full marks would be credited with 80 + 20 = 100, and thus suffer *no* deduction at all. In other words, the candidate's deficit from full marks is increased by a quarter.

UNIT OF VALUE AND NUMBER OF PAPERS.

31. The unit of marks throughout our valuation is 100; some subjects and some parts of some subjects are valued at two units; two parts of Mathematics each at four units; and the total maximum that candidates may compete for in Section B (the optional section) is 10 units; that is, 1,000 marks. The inconvenience is thus avoided which arises from the incommensurate units of the existing scheme. That scheme comprises units of 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and multiples of those units, and necessitates the inconvenient and illogical device of reducing the valuation of some particular subject for those candidates whose selection cannot be otherwise made to correspond with the present fixed maximum of 6,000. The marks assigned to each subject indicate the valuation which we place upon it for purposes of this competition. The question of the number of papers by which any individual subject should be examined is a question for the Commissioners and their assistant examiners. One unit of 100 may require two papers; another like unit may be examined satisfactorily in one.

LIMITS OF AGE.

33. We propose no change in the limits of age, which are at present not less than 22 nor more than 24 on the 1st August in the year in which the competition is held. Under existing practice the examination begins on the 1st of August or on the 2nd of August if the first is a Sunday. We consider this time of year convenient for University candidates.

HANDWRITING AND SPELLING.

33. We are informed that some improvement in handwriting has been observed since the deduction for bad handwriting was instituted; though the examination comes too late in the life of the candidates for any conspicuous influence to be perceived. Really bad spelling has been very infrequent in this competition; we admit that some rare individuals of distinguished ability have been unable to spell, but we think such an idiosyncrasy disadvantageous in Civil Servants, and the system of deductions should be continued.

THE FOREIGN OFFICE, THE INDIA OFFICE, AND THE COLONIAL OFFICE.

34. We have consulted these Departments informally, sending copies of our draft Scheme with such explanatory notes as seemed needed: In each case very careful consideration was given to the question whether the Scheme as proposed was suitable or could be adapted for use in their Competitions as heretofore.

The Colonial Office consider that the selection of Eastern Cadets by means of the Class I. Examination has had good results, and they would be very sorry to discontinue that method. They are, therefore, prepared to accept the scheme if it goes through approximately as submitted to them.

For the Foreign Office, whose use of the Class I. Scheme has been in a very much modified form, a rough scheme was drawn up embodying what were believed to be their principal requirements. They consider the proposed Scheme very suitable for Foreign Office clerkships and posts of Attaché in the Diplomatic Service, and are satisfied that it can be adapted to their needs without difficulty. They suggest certain alterations to which our Scheme can be fitted without in any way impairing its character. Such details would be for discussion between the Foreign Office and the Civil Service Commissioners, should our Scheme be adopted for Class I. The Consular Service and the manner of selection thereto is under consideration with a view to revision; no decision can therefore be given as to the scheme of selection for the Consular Service of the far East (*see* Paragraph 6, above).

The India Office have under consideration the Report of the Royal Commission on the Indian Public Services, in consultation with the Indian Government. Should the proposals of that Commission for the Indian Civil Service be adopted the India Office will be no longer able to use the Class I. Scheme, since their candidates would then be selected at school-leaving age, and not at university-leaving age. If simultaneous recruitment for the Home and Indian Civil Service continues, the India Office state that they would no doubt accept what is best for the Home Civil Service for the Indian Civil Service also so far as Europeans are concerned. They point out that the Scheme, as given in paragraph 36, presents several serious disadvantages for Indian candidates, some of which they enumerate. Our Scheme as it stands was not designed to meet the needs of Indian candidates, but we have kept those needs in view, and we see no difficulty in adding for Indian Civil Service candidates such subjects as are mentioned in the India Office letter, or in making such substitutions in other cases as they desire. Other points may require adjustment, but we see no reason to doubt that such adjustment is entirely practicable.

35. We may now lay before Your Lordships the schedule of our scheme as a whole. The practice has been that the scheme when approved by Your Lordships is gazetted, and cannot be changed without your consent. But the explanatory syllabus has always been under the complete control of the Civil Service Commissioners, who can alter the detail of any part of the scheme year by year as experience suggests. We consider that this discretion must continue to remain with the Commissioners, who have always given due notice of any important change; and we therefore postpone our suggestions as to syllabus until the schedule has been set forth in full, when we shall subjoin such notes on the treatment of individual subjects as we propose on our own motion, or on the suggestion of the Sub-Committees which have reported to us.

36. SCHEME OF EXAMINATION PROPOSED BY THE COMMITTEE.

Section A.

To be taken by all Candidates.

	Subjects.	Marks.
1.	Essay	100
2.	English	100
3.	Questions on contemporary subjects, social, economic, and political	100
4.	Questions on general principles, methods, and applications of Science	100
5.	Translation from one of the following languages not taken in Section B., viz., French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Russian; Latin being also an option for those who take two modern languages in B.	100
6.	A *viva voce* Examination	300
	Total for Section A	800

This Section is intended to test the candidates' knowledge of the English language and their capacity for its skilful use, their accurate command of knowledge which they should have acquired in the course of a systematic education and self-education, and should have retained to assist them in their future work, and their equipment in one foreign language at least for working purposes. The languages selected are those most likely to afford information useful to public servants. As circumstances change others should be added at the discretion of the Civil Service Commissioners.

The *viva voce* should be a test, by means of questions and conversation on matters of general interest, of the candidate's alertness, intelligence, and intellectual outlook, his personal qualities of mind and mental equipment.

It is not intended that any candidate should be disqualified for failure in any of the parts of this Section or in the Section as a whole, but that the Section should count substantially in the competition.

Section B.

Optional Subjects.

Candidates to be allowed to take up subjects in this section up to a total of 1,000 marks.

Languages with History and Literature.

	Subjects.	Marks.
7.	Latin, translation, and prose or verse composition	200
8.	Roman history and Latin literature	200
9.	Greek, translation, and prose or verse composition	200
10.	Greek history and literature	200
11.	French, translation, free composition, set composition, and conversation	200
12.	French history and literature	200
13.	German, translation, free composition, set composition, and conversation	200
14.	German history and literature	200
15.	Spanish* or Italian,* translation, free composition, set composition, and conversation	200
16.	Spanish* or Italian* history and literature	200
17.	Russian,* translation, free composition, set composition, and conversation	200
18.	Russian* history and literature	200

The history and literature subject associated with each of these languages (7-18) can only be taken by candidates who also offer themselves for examination in the relevant language in Section B.

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* Papers on these languages should only be prepared on evidence presented one year in advance and satisfactory to the Civil Service Commissioners that at least one candidate will present himself who is likely to be fit for examination on a standard equivalent to those in French and German.

Subjects (continued).

		Marks.
19.	English literature, 1350-1700	200
20.	English literature, 1660-1914	200

History.

21.	English History to 1660, social, economic, political, constitutional	200
22.	British History, 1660-1914, social, economic, political, constitutional	200
23.	European History, 1494-1763	200
24.	European History, 1763-1914	200

Economics, Politics, Law, and Philosophy.

25.	General Economics	200
26.	Economic History	100
27.	Public Economics, including Public Finance	100
28.	Political Theory	100
29.	Political Organisation	100
30.	The Constitutional Law of the United Kingdom and of the British Empire, and the Law of English Local Government	100
31.	English private Law	200
32.	Roman Law	100
33.	Public International Law and International Relations	100
34.	Moral Philosophy	100
35.	Metaphysical Philosophy	100
36.	Logic	100
37.	Psychology	100

Mathematics and Science.

38.	Mathematics, Lower	400
39.	Mathematics, Higher	400
40.	Astronomy	200
41.	Statistics	100
42.	Chemistry, Lower	200
43.	Chemistry, Higher	200
44.	Physics, Lower	200
45.	Physics, Higher	200
46.	Botany, Lower	200
47.	Botany, Higher	200
48.	Geology, Lower	200
49.	Geology, Higher	200
50.	Physiology, Lower	200
51.	Physiology, Higher	200
52.	Zoology, Lower	200
53.	Zoology, Higher	200
54.	Engineering	400
55.	Geography	200
56.	Physical Anthropology, Prehistoric Archæology and Technology	100
57.	Social Anthropology	100
58.	Agriculture	200
59.	Experimental Psychology	100

A candidate desiring to offer any of the subjects 42-54 or 59 must produce evidence satisfactory to the Commissioners of Laboratory training in an institution of University rank. For (40) Astronomy, (41) Statistics, (55) Geography, (56) Physical Anthropology, &c., and (58) Agriculture, other equivalent training will be required. There will be no laboratory test as a part of the examination.

Extra Numerum.

Candidates may take, in addition to the above, one of the translation papers of Section A. in a language not already taken by them in that section, not more than one of the Scandinavian languages, nor more than one of the three, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, being offered by the same candidate; for this 100 marks will be awarded not included in the 800 of Section A. or the 1,000 of Section B.

37. NOTES ON THE SCHEME PROPOSED BY THIS COMMITTEE.

Section A. There is nothing to be added to the remarks in Paragraphs 23-30 above.

Section B. Subjects 7-18. *Languages with History and Literature.* The proper position of Latin and Greek verse in this competition has been for a long time very difficult to decide. So long as candidates had spent so large a part of their time of study in perfecting themselves in these difficult accomplishments, it seemed hard to refuse them any recognition. But for many years an option was allowed. Candidates were permitted to offer in lieu of verse a prose essay in Greek or Latin. This option did not seem to the Commissioners of 1908 a fair equivalent. They were of opinion that verse composition should be either omitted from the competition, or allowed separate credit. In 1909 it was decided to give it separate credit, and in 1911 this change came into effect.

Having regard to the present aims of Classical Education it seemed to us that the fairest course would be to make verse composition an alternative to prose. It may be expected that a large majority of candidates will offer the latter, but there is no need that those who excel in verse should be denied their opportunity.

It seems desirable that in every case history and literature should be brought into close relation; it may be noted that this principle was adopted in the earlier schemes (Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4) but afterwards, as it seems to us, unhappily abandoned. The questions on literature should require first-hand knowledge of the authors; and the authors dealt with should be those which candidates ought to have read. For the modern languages it may be desirable to publish a list of authors with whom candidates should be acquainted. It may be convenient to set passages of literature for comment on matters of social, political, legal, or other historical importance. Questions on grammer should not, in our opinion, be set in this examination. The grammar is part of the scaffolding by which scholarship is built up. The scholarship should be tested, but not the means by which it was acquired. Questions on philology and the older forms of the languages may be set, but should not be compulsory.

Subject 8. *Roman History.*—The outlines of the history and development prior to 133 B.C. should be known; but the main stress should be laid on the period 133 B.C. to 180 A.D.

Subject 10. *Greek History.*—The main stress should be on the period 510 B.C. to 323 B.C.

Subject 12. *French History.*—The outlines of the history and development prior to 1589 should be known; the period 1589-1660 in somewhat more detail; but the main stress should be on the period 1660 to the present day.

Subject 14. *German History.*—Candidates should know in outline the history of the Medieval Empire, of the growth of the German cities, of the Reformation in Germany, and of the Thirty Years War; but the main stress should be on the period from the accession of Frederick the Great to the present day.

Subjects 15, 16. The similarity of the Spanish and Italian languages being great, it is not thought desirable that candidates should offer both in this examination.

Subject 16. *Spanish History.*—The main stress should be laid on the periods from the Union of Castile and Aragon under Ferdinand and Isabella to the liberation of the Netherlands, and again from 1800 to the present day.

Italian History.—The main stress should be on the 15th century and the first half of the 16th century, and again on the period from 1789 to the present day. Sufficient should be known of the earlier period to understand the position of the Pope and the Emperor in Italy, the rise of the towns, and the position of Dante in history.

Subject 18. ***Russian History.***—Something should be known of the history since the accession of Peter the Great, but the main stress should be laid on the period from 1800 to the present day. Only the broadest outlines of the history prior to Peter the Great should be required.

Subjects 19, 20. *English Literature.*—The subject presents great difficulty of examination treatment, but we felt that it deserved an important place both on its intrinsic merits and as the subject of a separate School in several Universities. Aided by the recommendations of a Sub-Committee, we recommend the division of the subject chronologically, with an overlapping period, so that Milton and Bunyan can be taken with the earlier period, Dryden with the later. We do not recommend the inclusion of the history of the language before Chaucer, nor, in general, of its morphological or phonological changes since his time; we do not consider the grammatical and philological study of our language suitable to this competition, though the history of workmanship, style, and prosody, should not be excluded. Candidates should be prepared to show a first-hand knowledge of some of the works of the following authors and of their place in the history of their country :—

1350-1700.

Chaucer.
Malory.
Spenser.
Shakespeare.
Bacon.
Milton.
Bunyan.

1660-1914.

Dryden.
Congreve.
Defoe.
Swift.
Addison.
Pope.
Fielding.
Johnson.
Goldsmith.
Burns.
Scott.
Jane Austen.
Wordsworth.
Coleridge.
Shelley.
Keats.
Dickens.
Carlyle.
Tennyson.
Browning.

Questions on other writers should not be excluded, but, on the whole, the questions should be directed to the best-known authors and their best-known works, and questions on text-book knowledge should be avoided so far as possible. Candidates should know so much of the history as is necessary to understand the literature in its relation to other activities of the nation; and we hope that candidates whose main strength lies in English literature will also fit themselves to take the papers on English History. We consider that both the historical and the literary studies would benefit thereby.

History.

The examinations in History in the various Universities differ so widely that we have had no option but to generalise the subject in four divisions, two of English History, and two of European History. We do not consider that the authorities set since 1906 for the special periods of European History have been a success, and we propose to drop prescribed books. Candidates should know something of the original authorities, of the principles of historical criticism, and of the principles and the facts of geography in relation to the history.

Subjects 21, 22. *English History and British History.*—We have adopted a somewhat different line of division from that hitherto usual, partly because the later period should include the history of the British Empire and will, therefore, be more heavily weighted, partly because throughout we have desired to give more weight where possible to the modern. The period of the first two Stewarts can either be taken as the beginning of the new age or the end of the old. We have preferred to regard it in the latter aspect. We consider that for our purposes, at any rate, English History should be taken as a whole and not separately, as political, constitutional, economic, &c. There is advantage in teaching and studying the history in these various aspects, but when it comes to testing the results, politics, economics, and constitution, must be considered as mutually affecting each other, and all together as the outcome of the common life of the nation. As history should have some position as of right in the English literature subjects, so literature also should not be excluded from the history subjects. Candidates should be expected to know so much of European history as will make the external action of this country fully intelligible and will explain those movements at home which had their beginnings abroad, *e.g.*, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the reactions in this country of the French Revolution.

Subjects 23, 24. *European History.*—With regret we have omitted from our scheme the medieval history of Europe. We consider that we cannot expect our candidates to be masters both of the modern history and of the medieval, and, as some part must be sacrificed, we think it should be the medieval. We do not think that the influence of this examination is likely to be so far-reaching that medieval studies will suffer appreciably if our recommendation is adopted. Candidates who study both English and European History should have a sufficient knowledge of those aspects of medieval history, which are most necessary to an intelligent understanding of more modern times, *e.g.*, the history and position of the Catholic Church in Western Europe. It should be made clear to candidates that, although a fixed date is given for the beginning of a period, they may fairly be expected to know in general outline how the initial position was reached. We have taken the intervention of the French in Italy as a convenient starting point for modern European history, and the end of the Seven Years' War as a convenient beginning for the most modern part, but we do not desire that either period should be treated as quite watertight. The history of the American continent, of India, and of the Far East, should be included in so far as it influences European fortunes in an important degree.

Economics, Politics, Law, and Philosophy.

Subject 25. *General Economics.*—We recommend that General Economics be made a single subject, since it is difficult and undesirable to separate the theory from what is sometimes called descriptive or realistic economics. We desire that candidates should be prepared to illustrate the theory by the facts and to analyse the facts by the help of the theory. No further definition of General Economics seems to be needed beyond that which is implied by the separation of Public Finance and of Statistics. This last subject, so important for Civil Servants, we have separated for thorough treatment, and, acting on the advice of our Economics Sub-Committee, we have included it in the Mathematical and Scientific group, as implying a wider conception of the art and science of Statistics than if we were to treat them merely in their economic bearing. The history of economic thought will receive some attention under the head of General Economics, but it was thought that it need not be specially mentioned in the syllabus.

Subject 26. *Economic History.*—Candidates should be expected to have a general acquaintance with the early economic history of England; but special attention should be paid to the economic development of the British Isles and other portions of the Empire during the last 200 years, and so much knowledge of European and American conditions should be expected as is necessary for the understanding of British economic history.

Subject 27. *Public Economics.*—The questions should deal with the main forms of State action, central and local, in the economic sphere, together with public finance.

Subject 28. *Political Theory.*—Candidates should be expected to show a knowledge of political theory and its history, political theory being understood to mean not only the theory of legislation, but also the general history of the State and its connection with kindred studies such as Ethics, Psychology, Jurisprudence, Public International Law, and Economics; and candidates will be expected to show a knowledge of original authorities.

Subject 29. *Political Organisation.*—This should include Constitutional Forms (Representative Government, Federalism, &c.) and Public Administration, central and local. Although the history of institutions is not included, candidates should be expected to know the earlier stages from which existing institutions have directly developed.

Subject 30. *Constitutional Law, etc.*—The description seems sufficiently precise, but it will be desirable that examiners in 28, 29, 30 should work in close accord in order that the proper limits may be observed and overlapping avoided.

Subject 31. *English Private Law*, i.e., *the Law of Real and Personal Property (including the Law of Succession), Contracts, and Torts.*—It was not thought desirable by the Sub-Committee on Law and Politics to include Criminal Law and the Law of Evidence.

Subject 32. *Roman Law.*—No specific definition seems required. Passages should be set for translation and comment, but credit should not be given merely for capacity to translate the texts.

Subject 33. *Public International Law, etc.*—Candidates should be expected to show a knowledge of the principal treaties which have affected international relations from 1815 inclusive to the present day.

Subjects 34-37. The Sub-Committee recommended the subdivision of Philosophy into four subjects. In this recommendation we concur, since candidates who have another main subject may wish to take one or more of the subdivisions without taking the whole number, and it is desirable that this should be encouraged; and some candidates may wish to take Logic with Metaphysics, rather than Moral Philosophy with Metaphysics, which has been hitherto required. The phrase in the present syllabus—" the history of the subject will be included "—should be applied to each of the four subjects. It should be understood that candidates will have an opportunity of showing their strength either in Ancient Philosophy or in Modern Philosophy. In Logic questions on mathematical logic may be included; *i.e.*, on the Logic of Mathematics, Symbolic Logic, and the Logic of probability. The Sub-Committee raised no objection to the recognition of Experimental Psychology in the examination, but considered that it should have its place with the Scientific Group.

Mathematics and Science.

Subjects 38, 39. *Mathematics.*—Allowing to Mathematics the equivalent of other main subjects, we arrange it in two divisions, higher and lower, either or both of which may be taken. The following description should suffice:—

Higher Mathematics.—Geometry, Elementary Analysis (viz., Algebra, Infinitesimal Calculus, properties of simple functions of a complex variable), solution of Differential Equations, Mechanics, Hydromechanics, Electricity (including Magnetism).

Lower Mathematics.—Geometry, after the methods of Euclid and Descartes, with the elements of the method of Monge (viz., the representation of three-dimensional figures by plan and elevation), Algebra (including Horner's solution of numerical equations), Plane Trigonometry, Infinitesimal Calculus, Mechanics (including liquids and gases). Candidates should understand the meaning of a differential equation.

The use of the slide-rule and of mathematical tables should be allowed.

Subject 40. *Astronomy.*—This subject is now an Honours degree subject in certain Universities. We consider that it should be included; no definition appears necessary.

Subject 41. *Statistics.*—See also notes on Subject 25.

The questions to be set should cover:—

(1) Elementary theory of statistics, not depending mainly on the theory of probability nor requiring a knowledge of the calculus:—frequency distributions, averages, percentiles, and simple methods of measuring dispersion; graphic methods; elementary treatment of qualitative data, *e.g.*, investigation of association by comparison of ratios, consistency of data; the practice of the simplest graphic and algebraic methods of interpolation.

(2) Practical methods used in the analysis and interpretation of statistics of prices, wages and incomes, trade, transport, production and consumption, education, *etc.;* the more elementary methods of dealing with

population and vital statistics; miscellaneous methods used in handling statistics of experiments or observations.

(3) Elements of modern mathematical theory of statistics:—frequency curves and the mathematical representation of groups generally; accuracy of sampling as affecting averages, percentages, the standard deviation; significance of observed differences between averages of groups, *etc.;* the theory of correlation for two variables.

A considerable choice of questions should be given especially as to paragraph (2), and it should be possible for a candidate without advanced mathematical knowledge to obtain full marks by answering questions under paragraphs (1) and (2).

Subjects 42-53. We think it undesirable to issue special or detailed syllabuses in scientific subjects, which, owing to the progress of scientific investigation, are continually growing and changing, and we are anxious not to fetter the Universities by any limitations which would interfere with their freedom of development. The general notion of treatment for these Sciences is that candidates whose main subject is Science should take one subject up to a higher standard (in which case both the higher and the lower division of the subject should be taken) and two as subsidiary, on the lower standard. We believe that this is most nearly conformable to the practice of the different Universities, though there is nothing in our proposals to prevent candidates from taking two on the higher standard, or one on the higher with three subsidiary, or even four or five on the lower standard.

As between higher and lower we cannot define more closely than in the following words:—

> The standard of the higher division of a science should be that which is required in the main subject for an Honours degree at the Universities.
>
> The standard for the lower division of a science should be that required in a subject subsidiary to the main subject whether required at the final degree examination or at a preceding examination.

Botany should include Vegetable Physiology. Geology should include Mineralogy.

Subject 54. *Engineering.*—This subject should, we think, be included, as forming in most Universities a main Honours subject and as affording a sufficiently comprehensive intellectual discipline. Candidates who have spent their University time in studying engineering should, we consider, have the opportunity of competing for Civil Service appointments if they desire to do so. The subjects should be :—Applied Mechanics, Strength of Materials, Heat Engines, Hydraulics, Civil Engineering including Surveying, Applied Electricity; and candidates should take four of these. We do not consider it desirable to divide Engineering into Higher and Lower.

Subject 55. *Geography.*—We feel that Geography is of much importance in the Civil Service and elsewhere, but we do not see our way to include it among the subjects compulsory for all candidates. The amount of knowledge is too great, and the technicalities are too severe. The principles of Geography should have an important place in the History subjects.

The Sciences which we have valued at four units are those which are generally recognised as Honours degree subjects in the Universities. We have been urged to recommend the same treatment for Geography, but, in our opinion, the position of Geography at the Universities does not yet warrant this. Our Sub-Committee were opposed to any definition in the Syllabus except with reference to the conception accepted at the Universities. They were also opposed to any division of the subject into two sections, one chiefly concerned with non-human factors, the other with political, economical, and historical geography.

Subjects 56, 57. *Anthropology.*—This subject should be of great value to Indian Civil Servants (if the India Office continues to use this examination) and to Eastern Cadets.

The divisions we propose divide the subject into sharply marked compartments; the first inviting laboratory and museum work, consisting mainly in the handling and study of specimens and exhibits; the second involving work which is mainly literary. We are informed that many students take the second of our two divisions by itself, though benefit is of course derived from the study of both divisions in their common bearing on problems of racial and cultural distribution. The study has special, but not exclusive, reference to peoples of rude culture, including prehistoric civilisation. With these remarks we can leave the scope of the subjects as divided to be defined by reference to University practice.

Subject 58. *Agriculture.*—This subject now qualifies for a University degree in Honours. It may be of importance for India and the Far East, and it is hoped that the Board of Agriculture may use this competition for the recruitment of some of its superior staff. See paragraph 38 below.

Subject 59. *Experimental Psychology.*—This subject has received some University recognition, and appears to deserve a place on our list. It does not require specific definition.

Note on all the Science Group.

Competitive examinations in practical laboratory work have proved unsatisfactory in experience. It is not always possible to give the same tests to all the candidates, and, if it is possible, only a part of their capacity can be tested under examination conditions. Thus a very great element of luck is introduced. We hope that the conditions proposed by us will serve to secure that all candidates taking Sciences which need experimental training shall have done the necessary laboratory work. The task will be imposed upon the Commissioners of deciding what institutions should be reckoned as of "University rank." We suggest that at least two years' laboratory training should be required of those who desire to take a subject on the Higher Standard, and at least one year for the Lower.

38. We think it worthy of consideration whether an individual Department requiring special qualifications in its entrants should not be permitted to increase the proportion of marks allotted to one or other of the Subjects on our list for the purpose of competition for its own places; *e.g.*, the Colonial Office might desire to double the allowance for Anthropology for its Eastern Cadets, or the Board of Agriculture might desire to double or even treble the allowance for Agriculture when it had a place or places to offer.

39. We wish to express our gratitude to all those who have kindly assisted us on our Sub-Committees and otherwise by advice, and to Professor Graham Wallas and Mr. P. J. Hartog, who have submitted valuable Memoranda. We wish also to record our appreciation of the services of our Secretary, Mr. D. B. Mair, whose high ability in Mathematics was of special value. We recommend to the consideration of Your Lordships the revised scheme for the Class I. examination, set forth in Paragraph 36 of our Report; and should this scheme be adopted by the Civil Service Commissioners and approved by Your Lordships we recommend to the consideration of those Commissioners the observations set forth in Paragraph 37.

STANLEY LEATHES, *Chairman.*

J. A. EWING.

HENRY A. MIERS.

W. H. HADOW.

W. G. S. ADAMS.

D. B. MAIR, *Secretary.*

June 20, 1917.

APPENDIX A.

(SPECIMEN PAPER FOR SUBJECT 2 OF SECTION A.)

ENGLISH PAPER.

Time : 3 hours.

This is intended to be a test of the understanding of English and the workmanlike use of words.

Candidates should do Question 1 and are recommended to do two others. Each candidate's work on the paper will be valued as a whole, but it is inadvisable to present answers to less than two or more than four questions. It is probable that a first-rate paper of answers can be composed in not more than a thousand words. Concision and precision should be studied, with order and due proportion in the construction, and accuracy in the phrasing and wording. The answers and the parts of the answers must be written in consecutive English, and should be carefully directed to the precise points raised by the questions.

Technical terms should be avoided, or if used should be explained. Work that is not intended to stand should be struck out.

Question 1.

Read the following passage carefully. Then summarise in about 200 words, first the main facts as stated, then the reasons given for the mental condition of the Greeks of Constantinople in the Middle Ages.

"In our modern education, the painful though necessary attainment of two languages which are no longer living may consume the time and damp the ardour of the youthful student. The poets and orators were long imprisoned in the barbarous dialects of our Western ancestors, devoid of harmony or grace; and their genius, without precept or example, was abandoned to the rude and native powers of their judgment and fancy. But the Greeks of Constantinople, after purging away the impurities of their vulgar speech, acquired the free use of their ancient language, the most happy composition of human art, and a familiar knowledge of the sublime masters who had pleased or instructed the first of nations. But these advantages only tend to aggravate the reproach and shame of a degenerate people. They held in their lifeless hands the riches of their fathers, without inheriting the spirit which had created and improved that sacred patrimony; they read, they praised, they compiled, but their languid souls seemed alike incapable of thought and action. In the revolution of ten centuries, not a single discovery was made to exalt the dignity or promote the happiness of mankind. Not a single idea has been added to the speculative systems of antiquity, and a succession of patient disciples became in their turn the dogmatic teachers of the next servile generation. Not a single composition of history, philosophy, or literature, has been saved from oblivion by the intrinsic beauties of style or sentiment, of original fancy, or even of successful imitation. In prose, the least offensive of the Byzantine writers are absolved from censure by their naked and unpresuming simplicity; but the orators, most eloquent in their own conceit, are the farthest from the models whom they affect to emulate. In every page our taste and reason are wounded by the choice of gigantic and obsolete words, a stiff and intricate phraseology, the discord of images, the childish play of false or unseasonable ornament, and the painful attempt to elevate themselves, to astonish the reader, and to involve a trivial meaning in the smoke of obscurity and exaggeration. Their prose is soaring to the vicious affectation of poetry; their poetry is sinking below the flatness and insipidity of prose. The tragic, epic, and lyric muses were silent and inglorious; the bards of Constantinople seldom rose above a riddle or epigram, a panegyric or tale; they forgot even the rules of prosody; and with the melody of Homer yet sounding in their ears, they confound all measure of feet and syllables in the impotent strains which have received the name of *political* or city verses. The minds of the Greeks were bound in the fetters of a base and imperious superstition, which extends her dominion round the circle of profane science. Their understandings were bewildered in metaphysical controversy; in the belief of visions and miracles they had lost all principles of moral evidence, and their taste was vitiated by the homilies of the monks, an absurd medley of declamation and Scripture. Even these contemptible studies were no longer dignified by the abuse of superior talents; the leaders of the Greek church were humbly content to admire and copy the oracles of antiquity, nor did the schools or pulpit produce any rivals of the fame of Athanasius and Chrysostom.

'In all the pursuits of active and speculative life, the emulation of states and individuals is the most powerful spring of the efforts and improvements of mankind. The cities of ancient Greece were cast in the happy mixture of union and independence, which is repeated on a larger scale, but in a looser form, by the nations of modern Europe: the union of language, religion, and manners, which renders them the spectators and judges of each other's merit: the independence of government and interest, which asserts their separate freedom, and excites them to strive for pre-eminence in the career of glory. The situation of the Romans was less favourable; yet in the early stages of the republic, which fixed the national character, a similar emulation was kindled among the states of Latium and Italy; and in the arts and sciences they aspire to equal or surpass their Grecian masters. The empire of the Caesars did undoubtedly check the activity and progress of the human mind: its magnitude might indeed allow some scope for domestic competition; but when it was gradually reduced, at first to the East, and at last to Greece and Constantinople, the Byzantine subjects were degraded to an abject and languid temper, the natural effect of their solitary and insulated state. From the North they were oppressed by nameless tribes of barbarians, to whom they scarcely imparted the appellation of men. The language and religion of the more polished Arabs were an insurmountable bar to all social intercourse. The conquerors of Europe were their brethren in the

Christian faith; but the speech of the Franks or Latins was unknown, their manners were rude and they were rarely connected, in peace or war, with the successors of Heraclius. Alone in the universe, the self-satisfied pride of the Greeks was not disturbed by the comparison of foreign merit; and it is no wonder if they fainted in the race, since they had neither competitors to urge their speed, nor judges to crown their victory."

Question 2.

Read carefully the following passage. First give in your own words an explanation, not exceeding the length of the original, of the three passages in italics, numbered (1) (2) (3) in the margin. Then set out very concisely the contribution of each speaker to the debate.

AGAMEMNON Princes,
What grief hath set the jaundice on your cheeks?
The ample proposition that hope makes
In all designs begun on earth below
Fails in the promised largeness: checks and disasters
Grow in the veins of actions highest rear'd,
As knots, by the conflux of meeting sap,
Infect the sound pine and divert his grain
Tortive and errant from his course of growth.
Nor, princes, is it matter new to us
That we come short of our suppose so far
That after seven years' siege yet Troy walls stand;
(1) *Sith every action that hath gone before,*
Whereof we have record, trial did draw
Bias and thwart, not answering the aim,
And that unbodied figure of the thought
That gave't surmised shape. Why then, you princes,
Do you with cheeks abash'd behold our works,
And call them shames? which are indeed nought else
But the protractive trials of great Jove
To find persistive constancy in men:
The fineness of which metal is not found
In fortune's love; for then the bold and coward,
The wise and fool, the artist and unread,
The hard and soft, seem all affined and kin:
But, in the wind and tempest of her frown,
Distinction, with a broad and powerful fan,
Puffing at all, winnows the light away;
And what hath mass or matter, by itself
Lies rich in virtue and unmingled.

NESTOR With due observance of thy godlike seat,
Great Agamemnon, Nestor shall apply
Thy latest words. In the reproof of chance
Lies the true proof of men: the sea being smooth,
How many shallow bauble boats dare sail
Upon her patient breast, making their way
With those of nobler bulk!
But let the ruffian Boreas once enrage
The gentle Thetis, and anon behold
The strong ribb'd bark through liquid mountains cut,
Bounding between the two moist elements,
Like Perseus' horse: where's then the saucy boat
Whose weak untimber'd sides but even now
Co-rivall'd greatness? Either to harbour fled,
Or made a toast for Neptune. Even so
Doth Valour's show and valour's worth divide
In storms of fortune; for in her ray and brightness
The herd hath more annoyance by the breese (*the gad-fly*
Than by the tiger; but where the splitting wind
Makes flexible the knees of knotted oaks,
And flies flee under shade, why, then the thing of courage
As roused with rage with rage doth sympathize,
And with an accent tuned in selfsame key
Retorts to chiding fortune.

ULYSSES Agamemnon,
Thou great commander, nerve and bone of Greece,
Heart of our numbers, soul and only spirit,
In whom the tempers and the minds of all
Should be shut up, hear what Ulysses speaks.

* * *

AGAMEMNON Speak, Prince of Ithaca; and *be't of less expect* (2)
That matter needless, of importless burden,
Divide thy lips, than we are confident,
When rank Thersites opes his mastic jaws,
We shall hear music, wit and oracle.

ULYSSES Troy, yet upon his basis, had been down,
And the great Hector's sword had lack'd a master,
But for these instances.
The speciality of rule hath been neglected :

* * *

(3) *When that the General is not like the hive*
To whom the foragers shall all repair,
What honey is expected? Degree being vizarded,
The unworthiest shows as fairly in the mask.
The heavens themselves, the planets and this centre
Observe degree, priority and place,
Insisture, course, proportion, season, form,
Office and custom, in all line of order ;
And therefore is the glorious planet Sol
In noble eminence enthroned and sphered
Amidst the other ; whose medicinable eye
Corrects the ill aspects of planets evil.
* * * Neglection of degree it is
That by a pace goes backward, with a purpose
It hath to climb. The General's disdain'd
By him one step below, he by the next,
That next by him beneath ; so every step,
Exampled by the first pace that is sick
Of his superior, grows to an envious fever
Of pale and bloodless emulation ;
And 'tis this fever that keeps Troy on foot,
Not her own sinews. To end a tale of length,
Troy in our weakness stands, not in her strength.

* * *

Question 3.

The following lines are taken from Tennyson's *Ulysses*. The poem expresses the restlessness of a world-wanderer living a life of retirement after a career of quest and danger. Ulysses speaks the lines as he is about to leave the island in the company of other veterans of the Great War. The lines, which run continuously in the poem, have been selected to give Ulysses' idea of (*a*) what is his duty in life, (*b*) what is the duty of Telemachus.

(i) Give your conception of the characters of Ulysses and Telemachus deduced from the lines quoted, giving proof in support of your opinion. (ii) State whether Ulysses' view of the duty of Telemachus is consonant—applied to men in general—with his view of his own duty. (iii) Accepting Ulysses' views as valid, and supposing that an Empire contains men of both types, state briefly how best their relative services may be utilised for the advancement of mankind.

How dull it is to pause, to make an end,
To rust unburnished, not to shine in use !
As tho' to breathe were life. Life piled on life
Were all too little, and of one to me
Little remains : but every hour is saved
From that eternal silence, something more,
A bringer of new things ; and vile it were
For some three suns to store and hoard myself,
And this grey spirit yearning in desire
To follow knowledge like a sinking star,
Beyond the utmost bound of human thought.
This is my son, mine own Telemachus,
To whom I leave the sceptre and the isle—
Well-loved of me, discerning to fulfil
This labour, by slow prudence to make mild
A rugged people, and thro' soft degrees
Subdue them to the useful and the good.
Most blameless is he, centred in the sphere
Of common duties, decent not to fail
In offices of tenderness, and pay
Meet adoration to my household gods,
When I am gone. He works his work, I mine.

Question 4.

The following passage is taken from the *Text-book of Psychology* of William James. The writer expresses a theory. You have yourself experienced some of these emotions. Discuss the theory expressed by referring directly to your own experience, showing why you agree or disagree.

" Our natural way of thinking about these emotions (*anger, fear, love, hate, joy, grief, shame, pride*, and their varieties) is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the Emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that *the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* IS *the emotion*. Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep ; we meet a bear, are frightened and run ; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike or tremble because we are sorry, angry or fearful as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually *feel* afraid or angry.

Stated in this crude way, the hypothesis is pretty sure to meet with immediate disbelief. And yet neither many nor far-fetched considerations are required to mitigate its paradoxical character."

Question 5.

The first (*a*) of these passages is from Edmund Burke. The second (*b*) from H. G. Wells. Sum up as a good judge the conflicting views of the two writers, not omitting to direct the jury as to the principles on which their decision should be based.

(*a*) "You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we are generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence. Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, sceptical, puzzled, and unresolved. Prejudice renders a man's virtue his habit; and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just prejudice his duty becomes a part of his nature."

(*b*) "We marshal and order men into classes entirely with regard to the past, we draw shame and honour out of the past; against the rights of property, the vested interests, the agreements and establishments of the past, the future has no rights. Literature is for the most part history, or history at one remove; and what is culture but a mould of interpretation into which new things are thrust, a collection of standards, a sort of bed of King Og, to which all expressions must be lopped or stretched. Our conveniences, like our thoughts, are all retrospective. We travel on roads so narrow that they suffocate our traffic; we live in uncomfortable, inconvenient, life-wasting houses out of a love of familiar shapes and familiar customs and a dread of strangeness; all our public affairs are cramped by local boundaries impossibly restricted and small. Our clothing, our habits of speech, our spelling, our weights and measures, our coinage, our religious and political theories, all witness to the binding power of the past upon our minds."

Question 6.

The following passage leads up to a discussion of the value of history as the basis of the knowledge of man, the knowledge of whom cannot for us be brought within the certainties of science. Follow on from the point reached at the end of the passage and indicate briefly your own view of the respective values of history and science as sources of enlightenment.

"Perhaps, if we were atoms ourselves, we should find that each atom was endowed with a different individuality. Then we should be unable to forecast with certainty the behaviour of other atoms, each by each or in the lump. It may be that the uniformity of nature, the certainty of physical law, are illusions of human minds, effects of distance. Or it may be that the caprice of human nature, the uncertainty of human action, the pleasing hazard of human affairs, disappear not only in the sight of God but in the sight of beings infinitely less remote. As seen by man, however, man is above all things diverse and incalculable; material nature as seen by man appears to obey fixed laws. The caprice of matter, the immutable laws of human conduct, are things which may exist, but have not been by us observed.

"Human nature craves for certainty. Given a judgement, man elevates it into a precedent. Given a hint, he stiffens it to a rule. Given a principle, he kills it and calls its stuffed image a law. Given a wise man's teaching, he establishes a system. Granted a vision of the Eternal, he formulates an Athanasian orthodoxy.

"But in the realm of human affairs not certainty but probability is king. Of two men of business, equal in courage, accuracy, industry, and knowledge, he who guesses best will succeed. The great leader may dazzle with his rhetoric, his logic, his wide information, but he convinces by confidence in his own speculative forecast. Analyse as we may the daring conjectures that have changed the world, after examining the processes of research, logic, and invention by which the trail was found, we still must acknowledge something beyond these, some flash of soul which lays the East at the feet of Alexander, opens a new world to Columbus, or reveals the cosmic laws to Newton. Man has a gift of guessing; the slave of certainty is an unprofitable servant, who lets his talent tarnish in a napkin."

Question 7.

Write in blank verse or in rhymed and metrical verse a poem on the theme of either extract given below :—

(i) The lost leaves measure our years; they are gone as the days are gone, and the bare branches silently speak of a new year, slowly advancing to its buds, its foliage, and fruit. Deciduous trees associate with life as this yew never can. Clothed in its yellowish-green needles, its tarnished green, it knows no hope or sorrow; it is indifferent to winter, and does not look forward to summer. With their annual loss of leaves, and renewal, oak and elm and ash and beech seem to stand by us and to share our thoughts.

RICHARD JEFFERIES.

(ii) The short January evening is of but a few minutes duration ; just now it was only dusky, and already the interior of the wood is impenetrable to the glance. There rises a loud though distant clamour of rooks and daws, who have restlessly moved in their roost-trees. Darkness is almost on them, yet they cannot quite settle. The cawing and dawing rises to a pitch, and then declines ; the wood is silent, and it is suddenly night.

RICHARD JEFFERIES.

Question 8.

Read carefully the appended poem. (i) State what, in your opinion, is the dominant idea of the poem, the idea which was in the poet's mind as he wrote. (ii) Comment briefly on the logical sequence of the stanzas showing why you agree or disagree with the order, and state whether, and why, any stanza might have been omitted without weakening the expression of the dominant idea. (iii) Comment briefly on the interior construction of the stanzas, showing by a few well-chosen examples how the poet helps the expression of his idea by his choice of vocabulary, by his arrangement and by the sound.

COME HOME.

Come home, come home, and where is home for me,
Whose ship is driving o'er the trackless sea ?
To the frail bark here plunging on its way,
To the wild waters, shall I turn and say
To the plunging bark, or to the salt sea foam,
You are my home ?

Fields once I walked in, faces once I knew,
Familiar things so old my heart believed them true
These far, far back, behind me lie, before
The dark clouds mutter, and the deep seas roar,
And speak to them that 'neath and o'er them roam
No words of home.

Beyond the clouds, beyond the waves that roar,
There may indeed, or may not be, a shore,
Where fields as green, and hands and hearts as true,
The old forgotten semblance may renew,
And offer exiles driven far o'er the salt sea foam
Another home.

But toil and pain must wear out many a day,
And days bear weeks, and weeks bear months away,
Ere, if at all, the weary traveller hear,
With accents whispered in his wayworn ear,
A voice he dares to listen to, say, Come
To thy true home.

Come home, come home ! And where a home hath h
Whose ship is driving o'er the driving sea ?
Through clouds that mutter, and o'er waves that roar,
Say, shall we find, or shall we not, a shore
That is, as is not ship or ocean foam,
Indeed our home ?

CLOUGH.

APPENDIX B.

SPECIMEN PAPER FOR SUBJECT 3 OF SECTION A.

SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUBJECTS.

Time : 3 hours.

Accuracy and order in exposition will have weight in valuation. Accuracy in fact will not be less important. Each candidate's answers to the paper will be valued as a whole and candidates who present answers to less than three or more than four questions will be presumed to do so in knowledge of the value of the answers which they are able to give on the questions they choose. The answers should be written in continuous language; punctuation and paragraphing should receive careful attention.

1. Compare the Parliament of this country in respect of constitution and working with that of (*a*) France, or (*b*) Germany, or (*c*) Italy.
2. What are the chief powers and functions of (*a*) County Councils (*b*) Local Education Authorities (*c*) Local Magistracies ?
3. State and discuss the main arguments for and against Free Education.

4. Either (*a*) What are the chief minerals (other than the precious metals) which are imported into England? Whence do they come and for what purposes are they used? Or (*b*) Discuss the effects of foreign competition on British agriculture.
5. Examine the influence of Colonial expansion on European political relations since 1880.
6. "No question of public policy can be purely economic." Discuss.
7. Discuss the "justice" of the present system of taxation in the United Kingdom.
8. Compare the party system in England with that in the United States of America.
9. Estimate the value to Oceanic transport of the Panama Canal.
10. Discuss the principle of Proportional Representation.
11. Describe the stages through which, in the English Parliament, a bill becomes law.
12. What surprises has the present war occasioned in matters of public finance?

APPENDIX C.

SPECIMEN QUESTIONS FOR PAPER NO. 4 IN SECTION A.

GENERAL SCIENCE.

Time: 3 hours.

Accuracy and order in exposition will have weight in the valuation. Accuracy in fact will not be less important. Each candidate's answers to the paper will be valued as a whole, and any candidate who presents answers to less than three or more than four of the questions will be presumed to do so in knowledge of the value of the answers which he is able to give to the questions he chooses. Answers must be written in continuous language; punctuation and paragraphing should receive careful attention.

N.B.—This list is only intended to show the kind of questions that may be set. The actual paper need not consist of more than 12 questions.

(1.) In what sense is there Conservation of Energy? Discuss this by tracing transformations of the energy supplied (in fuel) to an electric power station. Apart from fuel, what other natural sources of energy are available for the use of man?

(2.) *Omne vivum ex vivo.* On what general evidence is this dictum accepted, and what are some of its practical applications?

(3.) What is meant by a scientific hypothesis? Give an example of a working hypothesis which has been generally abandoned, and explain why.

(4.) Give some account of the chief discovery associated with the name of one of the following:—
(a) Darwin, (b) Pasteur, (c) Mme. Curie, (d) Dalton.

(5.) What do you understand by the kinetic theory of gases? Explain by reference to this theory how the pressure of a gas contained in a closed vessel is affected (1) by pumping more gas into the vessel, (2) by raising the temperature.

(6.) What are the general relations between electricity and magnetism?

(7.) What do you understand by the wave theory of light? How do you explain reflection and refraction?

(8.) Discuss fully why an ordinary coal fire is wasteful.

(9.) What is the importance of (*a*) the nitrogen, (*b*) the carbon dioxide, (*c*) the oxygen, in the atmosphere?

(10.) What are the chief circumstances that determine the climate of either (*a*) England or (*b*) India?

(11.) What are cyclones and anticyclones? Illustrate your answer by reference to a map showing distribution of atmospheric pressure, and show how a knowledge of this distribution contributes towards weather forecasting.

(12.) Describe generally the phenomena of the tides, and indicate their chief causes.

(13.) What evidence is there that the distribution of animals or plants upon the earth in past times differed from that which prevails now?

(14.) What do you know of the structure and function of the heart in man?

(15.) What is the importance to plants of the visits of bees and other insects to their flowers?

(16.) How is Time measured, and by reference to what standard?

(17.) How are curves used to exhibit the variation of one quantity with respect to another? Explain by reference to such a curve the meaning of differentiation and integration.

(18.) What principles are involved in the construction and use of any one of the following:—(*a*) The safety lamp, (*b*) the photographic camera, (*c*) the induction coil?

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